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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

A Report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of 
Representatives:

June 2012: 

Geostationary Weather Satellites:

Design Progress Made, but Schedule Uncertainty Needs to be Addressed:

GAO-12-576:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-12-576, a report to the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The GOES-R series is a set of four satellites intended to replace 
existing weather satellites that will likely reach the end of their 
useful lives in about 2015. NOAA estimates the series to cost $10.9 
billion through 2036. Because the transition to the series is critical 
to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data required 
for weather forecasting, GAO reviewed NOAA’s management of the GOES-R 
program. 

Specifically, GAO was asked to (1) assess NOAA’s progress in 
developing the GOES-R satellite program, (2) evaluate whether the 
agency has a reliable schedule for executing the program, and (3) 
determine whether the program is applying best practices in managing 
and mitigating its risks. 

GAO analyzed program management, acquisition, and cost data; evaluated 
contractor and program-wide schedules against best practices; analyzed 
program documentation including risk management plans and procedures; 
and interviewed government and contractor staff regarding program 
progress and challenges. 

What GAO Found:

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-
R) program has made progress by completing its early design milestones 
and is nearing the end of the design phase for its spacecraft, 
instrument, and ground system components. While the program continues 
to make progress, recent technical problems with the instruments and 
spacecraft, as well as a significant modification to the ground project’
s development plan, have delayed the completion of key reviews and led 
to increased complexity for the development of GOES-R. The technical 
and programmatic challenges experienced by the flight and ground 
projects have led to a 19-month delay in completing the program’s 
preliminary design review. Nevertheless, program officials report that 
its planned launch date of October 2015 for the first satellite has 
not changed. While the program reports that approximately $1.2 billion 
is currently in reserve to manage future delays and cost growth, 
significant portions of development remain for major components. As a 
result, the program may not be able to ensure that it has adequate 
resources to cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems 
for the remaining development of all four satellites. 

The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on 
having a reliable schedule that defines, among other things, when work 
activities and milestone events will occur, how long they will take, 
and how they are related to one another. To its credit, the program 
has adopted key scheduling best practices and has recognized certain 
scheduling weaknesses. It has also recently instituted initiatives to 
automate its integrated master schedule, correct integration problems 
among projects, and assess schedule confidence based on risk. However, 
unresolved schedule deficiencies remain in its integrated master 
schedule and the contractor schedules that support it, which have 
contributed to a re-plan of the schedule of the ground system and to 
the potential for delays to satellite launch dates. The program 
recently determined that the likelihood of the first satellite meeting 
its planned October 2015 launch date is 48 percent. Based on this 
planned launch date, the program reports that there is a 37 percent 
chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOES-series 
satellites, which could result in the need for the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to rely on older satellites that 
are not fully functional. Until its scheduling weaknesses are 
addressed, it will be more difficult for the program to know whether 
its planned remaining development is on schedule. 

NOAA has established policies and procedures that conform with 
recognized risk management best practices. For example, the program 
has documented a strategy for managing risks that includes important 
elements, such as relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities and 
the criteria for evaluating, categorizing, and prioritizing risks. 
However, while the program has a well-defined risk management process, 
it has not been fully implemented. For example, the program has not 
provided adequate or timely evaluations for potential risks, did not 
always provide adequate rationale for the decision to close a risk, 
and has at least two critical risks in need of additional attention. 
Until all defined risk management practices are diligently executed 
and critical risks adequately mitigated, the GOES-R program is at risk 
of exceeding cost and schedule targets, and launch dates could slip. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is making recommendations to NOAA to assess and report reserves 
needed over the life of the program, improve the reliability of its 
schedules, and address identified program risks. NOAA concurred or 
partially concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 
 
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-576]. For more 
information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 
pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Background:

Progress Made in Completing Early Design, but Milestones Were 
Completed Late and Development Costs Have Increased:

GOES-R Schedules Are Not Fully Reliable, Contributing to Milestone and 
Potential Launch Date Delays:

Risk Management Approach Is Well Defined but Not Fully Implemented:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006:

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program:

Table 4: Delays in Program Milestones:

Table 5: Flight Project Development Efforts and Challenges through 
February 2012:

Table 6: Ground Project Development Efforts and Challenges through 
February 2012:

Table 7: Growth in Estimated Contract Cost for Major Program Components:

Table 8: Description of Scheduling Best Practices:

Table 9: Practices Utilized in Selected GOES-R Schedules:

Table 10: Description and Examples of Recognized Risk Management Best 
Practices:

Table 11: Comparison of GOES-R Risk Management Policies and Procedures 
to Recognized Practices:

Table 12: GOES-R Implementation of Risk Practices:

Table 13: GOES-R Program Critical Risks, as of February 2012:

Figures:

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Reporting, Structure, and Staffing:

Figure 4: Recent Growth in Estimated Cost for Selected Development 
Components:

Figure 5: Changes in Program Reserves Over Time:

Figure 6: Changes in Planned Completion Dates for Key Milestones of 
the First GOES-R Satellite:

Abbreviations:

CDR: critical design review:

GOES: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite:

GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series:

IMS: integrated master schedule:

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:

PDR: preliminary design review:

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 26, 2012: 

The Honorable Ralph Hall: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical 
role in our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are 
managed by the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—provide critical information on 
atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help 
meteorologists observe and predict global and local weather events. 
They also provide a means of identifying the large-scale evolution of 
severe storms, such as hurricane track and intensity forecasting and 
complementing radar in tornado or heavy precipitation forecasting. 

NOAA, through collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of 
geostationary satellites, called the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series is to 
replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to 
reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2015. This new 
series is expected to mark the first major improvement in GOES 
instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the 
United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
weather forecasting through the year 2036. 

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management 
of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) assess NOAA’
s progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, (2) evaluate 
whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the program, 
and (3) determine whether the program is applying best practices in 
managing and mitigating its risks. 

To assess NOAA’s progress in developing GOES-R, we analyzed program 
documentation, including monthly status reports, acquisition plans, 
and contractor performance reports on development efforts. To evaluate 
whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the program, 
we evaluated four contractor schedules including two instruments—-the 
Advanced Baseline Imager and Geostationary Lightning Mapper—-the 
spacecraft, and the Core Ground System. We also analyzed programwide 
schedule initiatives. We compared contractor schedules and program 
initiatives to GAO-identified best practices in developing and 
maintaining schedules. To determine whether the program is applying 
best practices in managing and mitigating its risks, we analyzed 
program documentation, including the program’s risk management plan 
and outputs from its risk register. We compared program risk 
management policies and procedures to government and industry 
recognized risk management best practices and compared the program’s 
implementation of its risk management policies and procedures. We also 
interviewed government and contractor staff to discuss the program’s 
development progress and recent challenges as well as their scheduling 
and risk management practices. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to June 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Background:

Since the 1960s, geostationary satellites have been used by the United 
States to provide meteorological data for weather observation, 
research, and forecasting. NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, 
Data, and Information Service is responsible for managing the civilian 
operational geostationary satellite system, called GOES. Geostationary 
satellites can maintain a constant view of the earth from a high orbit 
of about 22,300 miles in space.

NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused 
on the United States (see figure 1). These satellites provide timely 
environmental data about the earth's atmosphere, surface, cloud cover, 
and the space environment to meteorologists and their audiences. They 
also observe the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes 
and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to 
reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. The ability of the 
satellites to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of 
atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's 
weather forecasting operations.

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage:

[Refer to PDF for image: world map] 

Map depicts coverage areas of GOES-West and GOES-East, and areas of 
overlap. 

Source: NOAA (data); Mapart (map). 

[End of figure]

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 
every few years (see table 1).[Footnote 1] NOAA's policy is to have 
two operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all 
times.

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES:

Series name: Original GOES[B]; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987; 
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

Series name: GOES I-M; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001; 
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

Series name: GOES N; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2010; 
Satellites: 13, 14, 15, Q[C].

Series name: GOES-R; 
Procurement duration[A]: 2008-2024; 
Satellites: R, S, T, U.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite 
launch.

[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate 
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and 
GOES-7.

[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

[End of table] 

Four GOES satellites-GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15-are 
currently in orbit. Both GOES-13 and GOES-15 are operational 
satellites with GOES-13 covering the eastern United States and GOES-15 
in the western United States (see figure 1). GOES-14 is currently in 
an on-orbit storage mode and available as a backup for the other two 
satellites should they experience any degradation in service. GOES-12 
is at the end of its service life, but it is being used to provide 
limited coverage of South America. The GOES-R series is the next 
generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the first satellite in 
the series is planned for launch beginning in 2015.

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously 
transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are 
processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the 
satellite for broadcast to primary weather services and the global 
research community in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed 
data are also distributed to users via ground stations through other 
communication channels, such as dedicated private communication lines 
and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from 
the geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial 
terminals.

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern:

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES satellite: 
Raw environmental data sent to ground station; 
Processed environmental data sent back to GOES; 
Processed environmental data broadcast to users. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure]

Overview of the GOES-R Program:

NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of 
prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The 
system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user 
requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing 
satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements 
are expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of 
the observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire 
six different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these 
instruments-
-the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental 
Suite--were considered to be the most critical because they would 
provide data for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes the 
originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities.

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006:

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key 
features include: 
* monitoring and tracking severe weather; 
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and; 
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 
simultaneously. 

Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite[A]; 
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface 
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key 
features include: 
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles of the 
rapidly evolving pre-storm convective environment to support forecasts 
and warnings of high-impact weather phenomena; 
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, 
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms; and; 
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor total lightning (in-
cloud and cloud-to-ground) activity over the United States and 
adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete dataset than previously 
possible. Key features include: 
* detecting lightning activity as an indicator of severe storms and 
convective weather hazard impacts to aviation and; 
* providing a new capability to GOES for long-term mapping of total 
lightning that only previously existed on NASA low-earth-orbiting 
research satellites. 

Planned instrument: Magnetometer; 
Description: Expected to provide information on the general level of 
geomagnetic activity, monitor current systems in space, and permit 
detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm commencements, and 
substorms. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid 
in the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance 
and disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key 
features include: 
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles; 
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons 
and protons; and; 
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite[B]; 
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range 
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well 
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features 
include: 
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor 
solar storms and; 
* providing improved imager capability. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

[A] The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled in September 
2006.

[B] The Solar Imaging Suite was divided into two separate 
acquisitions: the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and the Extreme 
Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor. 

[End of table] 

In September 2006, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and technical 
complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that total 
costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach 
$11.4 billion.[Footnote 2] Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum 
number of satellites from four to two, canceled plans for developing 
the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of 
planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar 
Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. In light of the 
cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, NOAA decided to 
use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop certain satellite 
data products that were originally to be produced by this instrument. 
The agency estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion.

Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the 
cost and scope of the GOES-R program.[Footnote 3] In May 2007, NOAA 
had an independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. 
After reconciling the program office's cost estimate of $7 billion 
with the independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency 
established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an 
increase of $670 million from the previous estimate. Further, in 
November 2007, to mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program 
officials decided to remove selected program requirements from the 
baseline program and treat them as contract options that could be 
exercised if funds allowed. These requirements included the number of 
products to be distributed, the time to deliver the remaining products 
(product latency), and how often these products would be updated with 
new satellite data (refresh rate). For example, program officials 
eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 34 of the 68 
envisioned products, including low cloud and fog, sulfur dioxide 
detection, and cloud liquid water. Program officials included the 
restoration of the requirements for the products, latency times, and 
refresh rates as options in the ground system contract that could be 
acquired at a later time. Program officials later reduced the number 
of products that could be restored as a contract option (called option 
2) from 34 to 31 because they determined that two products were no 
longer feasible and two others could be combined into a single product.

Recently, NOAA restored two satellites to the program's baseline, 
making GOES-R a four-satellite program once again. In February 2011, 
as part of its fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA requested funding 
to begin development for two additional satellites in the GOES-R 
series--GOES-T and GOES-U. The program estimates that the development 
for all four satellites in the GOES-R series--GOES-R, GOES-S, GOES-T, 
and GOES-U--is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036, an increase of $3.2 
billion over its prior life cycle cost estimate of $7.67 billion for 
the two-satellite program. See table 3 for an overview of key changes 
to the GOES-R program.

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program:

Number of satellites; 
August 2006 (baseline program): 4; 
September 2006: 2; 
November 2007: 2; 
February 2011: 4.

Instruments or instrument changes; 
August 2006 (baseline program): 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Imaging Suite (which included the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, 
and Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor); 
* Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
September 2006: 
* Canceled Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
* Decoupled Solar Imaging Suite to the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and 
Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
November 2007: No change; 
February 2011: No change.

Number of satellite products; 
August 2006 (baseline program): 81; 
September 2006: 68; 
November 2007: 34 baseline 31 optional; 
February 2011: 34 baseline 31 optional.

Life cycle cost estimate (in then-year dollars); 
August 2006 (baseline program): $6.2 billion--$11.4 billion (through 
2034); 
September 2006: $7 billion (through 2028); 
November 2007: $7.67 billion (through 2028); 
February 2011: $10.9 billion (through 2036)[A].

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

[A] Based on NOAA's fiscal year 2012 budget estimate, $7.64 billion of 
this cost estimate was for the first two satellites in the series, 
GOES-R and GOES-S. The cost for the remaining two satellites--GOES-T 
and GOES-U--was estimated at $3.22 billion. 

[End of table] 

Acquisition Strategy:

NOAA's original acquisition strategy was to award contracts for 
concept development of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would 
subsequently compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for 
overall system development and production. In keeping with this 
strategy, NOAA awarded contracts for concept development of the 
overall GOES-R system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in 
March 2007, NOAA revised its acquisition strategy for the development 
contract. In response to recommendations by independent advisors, the 
agency decided to separate the overall system development and 
production contract into two separate contracts--the flight system and 
ground system contracts. The flight system includes contracts for the 
development of the five key instruments and spacecraft, while the 
ground system includes contracts for the development of key systems 
needed for the on-orbit operation of the satellites, receipt and 
processing of information, and distribution of satellite data products 
to users.

In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing 
technically advanced instruments, the GOES-R program awarded contracts 
for concept development for five of the planned instruments. It 
subsequently awarded separate development contracts for five 
instruments and, upon completion and approval, these instruments will 
be provided to the prime contractor responsible for the spacecraft of 
the GOES-R program. NASA will then work with the spacecraft contractor 
to integrate and test these instruments. The sixth instrument, the 
magnetometer, is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract.

Program Office Structure:

NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission 
success. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by 
NOAA's Deputy Undersecretary, is the oversight body for the GOES-R 
program. However, since it relies on NASA's acquisition experience and 
technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA 
implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for 
the GOES-R program (see figure 3). NOAA also located the program 
office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the program 
office, there are two project offices that manage key components of 
the GOES-R system. NOAA has entered into an agreement with NASA to 
manage the Flight Project Office, including awarding and managing the 
spacecraft contract and delivering flight-ready instruments to the 
spacecraft. The Ground Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the 
Core Ground System contract and satellite data product development and 
distribution.

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Reporting, Structure, and Staffing:

[Refer to PDF for image: organization chart] 

GOES-R Program: 
System Program Director: NOAA; 
Deputy System Program Director: NASA; 
Assistant System Program Director: NOAA. 

Reports to GOES-R Program: 
Program Control: Lead: NOAA; 
Program Systems Engineering: Lead: NASA; 
Program Mission Assurance: Lead: NASA; 
Contracts Lead: NOAA; 
Flight Project: Project Manager: NASA; Deputy: NOAA; 
Ground Project: Project Manager: NOAA; Deputy: NASA; 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service. 

Commerce: 
Reports to NOAA.

NOAA: 
Reports to National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 
Service. 

NOAA Program Management Council: 
Communicates with: 
NOAA; 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service. 

NASA: 
Reports to Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council. 

Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council: 
Communicates with: 
GOES-R Program; 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service. 

Program Scientist: NOAA: 
Reports to National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 
Service; 
Communicates with GOES-R Program. 
               
Source: NOAA. 

[End of figure]

Prior Reports Noted Program Milestone Delays, Inadequate Continuity 
Plans, and Insufficient Communication with GOES Data Users:

We have previously reported on the impact of program milestone delays 
to GOES-R planned launch dates. In April 2009, we reported that the 
program delayed the planned launch of its first satellite from 
December 2014 to April 2015.[Footnote 4] Program officials attributed 
these delays to providing more stringent oversight before releasing 
the request for proposals for the spacecraft and ground system, 
additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals, and funding 
reductions in fiscal year 2008. In September 2010, we reported that 
NOAA later approved a 6-month delay in the planned launch of the first 
satellite, from April 2015 to October 2015, because work did not begin 
on the spacecraft until August 2009 due to a bid protest and NASA's re-
evaluation of proposals in response to the protest.[Footnote 5]

In September 2010, we found that as a result of delays to planned 
launch dates for the first two satellites in the GOES-R series, NOAA 
might not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in 
orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if 
an existing satellite failed prematurely.[Footnote 6] Further, even 
though there could be a gap in backup coverage, NOAA had not 
established adequate continuity plans to deal with potential coverage 
gaps for its geostationary satellites. Specifically, while NOAA had 
established a policy to always have a backup satellite available, it 
did not have plans that included processes, procedures, and resources 
needed to transition to a single or international satellite. We 
recommended that NOAA develop and document plans for the operation of 
geostationary satellites that included the implementation procedures, 
resources, staff roles, and time tables needed to transition to a 
single satellite, an international satellite, or other solution. NOAA 
has since developed a continuity plan that generally includes the key 
elements we recommended. As a result, NOAA has improved its ability to 
fully meet its mission-essential function of providing continuous 
satellite imagery in support of weather forecasting.

In addition, we found that while NOAA had identified GOES data users 
and involved internal users in developing and prioritizing the GOES-R 
requirements, it had not adequately involved other federal users that 
rely on GOES data by documenting their input and communicating major 
changes to the program that have occurred since 2006, such as the 
removal of certain satellite data products. We recommended that NOAA 
establish and implement processes to notify agencies of GOES-R program 
status and changes. NOAA responded that the GOES-R program would 
develop a communications plan for external stakeholders and that the 
GOES-R System Program Director would provide an annual program status 
briefing to the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, 
which would be responsible for its distribution to agencies that would 
be users of GOES-R data and products.

In February 2012, the GOES-R program developed a communications plan 
that described how external stakeholders would be notified of GOES-R 
progress, status changes, and other relevant activities. Also, the 
GOES-R System Program Director provided annual briefings to the Office 
of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology in October 2010 and 
November 2011. These briefings communicated significant program 
changes to federal GOES data users, such as completed and planned 
milestones, the status of development efforts, and the removal of 
additional products and latency improvements from the ground system 
contract. As a result, federal users of GOES data have received more 
information about changes to geostationary satellites that may affect 
their ability to meet mission needs.

Progress Made in Completing Early Design, but Milestones Were 
Completed Late and Development Costs Have Increased:

While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing its early 
design and is nearing the end of the design phase for its flight and 
ground system components, it completed key design milestones later 
than planned. Recent technical problems with the instruments and 
spacecraft, as well as a significant modification to the ground 
project's development plan, have delayed the completion of key reviews 
and led to increased complexity for GOES-R's development. Moreover, 
several instrument, spacecraft, and ground system problems identified 
during design, have not yet been resolved. In addition to the delays, 
the technical and programmatic challenges experienced by GOES-R's 
flight and ground projects have led to increased costs for its 
development contracts. Despite these problems, program officials 
report that planned launch dates and cost estimates for the first two 
satellites have not changed, and that approximately $1.2 billion is 
currently in reserve to manage future delays and cost growth. However, 
the program has used approximately 30 percent of its reserves over the 
last 3 years and significant portions of development remain for major 
components--including the spacecraft and Core Ground System. In 
addition, the program did not change its reserves when it restored two 
satellites adding approximately $3.2 billion to the program's 
baseline. As a result, the program will be challenged in completing 
its remaining development, particularly the final design and testing 
of the spacecraft and ground system, within its cost and schedule 
targets.

GOES-R Has Made Progress on Its Design, but Initial Design Milestones 
Completed Later than Planned:

Two key types of development milestones, which are identified in the 
GOES-R December 2007 management control plan,[Footnote 7] are the 
preliminary design review (PDR) and a more detailed critical design 
review (CDR). The PDR is an initial design milestone that assesses the 
readiness of the program to proceed with detailed design activities 
and the CDR is intended to demonstrate that the design is complete and 
appropriate to support proceeding to full-scale software development, 
as well as fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing. The 
program planned to complete the flight project's PDR in April 2010 and 
CDR in April 2011. It planned to complete the ground project's PDR in 
July 2010 and CDR in July 2011. These project-level reviews are to be 
completed before the program's comprehensive PDR and CDR can be 
completed.

The program has demonstrated progress toward completing its design. 
Specifically, the program and its subsequent projects have 
successfully completed their PDRs, demonstrating that they are ready 
to proceed with detailed design activities. The program and its 
projects are also currently progressing towards the final design for 
the entire GOES-R system, which is expected to be completed at the 
program's CDR planned for August 2012.

However, the program's PDR milestones were completed later than their 
2007 planned dates. Consequently, its CDR milestones were similarly 
delayed. Table 4 highlights delays in key program milestones as of 
April 2012.

Table 4: Delays in Program Milestones:

Program milestone: Flight project PDR; 
Date planned: April 2010; 
Date completed or planned: January 2011; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 9 months.

Program milestone: Ground project PDR; 
Date planned: July 2010; 
Date completed or planned: December 2011; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 17 months.

Program milestone: Program PDR; 
Date planned: July 2010; 
Date completed or planned: February 2012; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 19 months.

Program milestone: Flight project CDR; 
Date planned: April 2011; 
Date completed or planned: April 2012; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 12 months.

Program milestone: Ground project CDR; 
Date planned: July 2011; 
Date completed or planned: July 2012; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 12 months.

Program milestone: Program CDR; 
Date planned: July 2011; 
Date completed or planned: August 2012; 
Delay from December 2007 plan: 13 months.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

Note: Program officials reported that the 2007 review target dates 
were revised in March 2010. Based on its revised 2010 plans, the 
program missed its revised PDR milestone by 8 months and its revised 
CDR milestone is 5 months later than planned. 

[End of table] 

Going forward, assembly and testing of all flight instruments for the 
first satellite in the series is to be completed by August 2013. Both 
the flight and ground projects' development components are expected to 
be complete by September 2015. Despite recent delays in program 
milestones, NOAA still expects to meet an October 2015 launch date for 
the first satellite in the series by utilizing planned schedule 
reserves.

Flight Project--Instrument Designs Are Complete but Technical 
Challenges Remain:

The Flight Project Office has made progress by completing the critical 
design reviews for each of its five main instruments, which is 
significant because the instrument designs will be applied to each 
satellite in the GOES-R series. The Geostationary Lightning Mapper was 
the most recent instrument to complete its critical design review, 
which occurred in August 2011--16 months after its planned completion 
date.[Footnote 8] Instrument fabrication, assembly, and testing 
activities are under way. The final instrument scheduled for 
completion--the Geostationary Lightning Mapper--is expected to be 
delivered for integration with the spacecraft by August 2013.

Although instrument design milestones are complete and assembly and 
testing activities are under way, each of the instruments and the 
spacecraft has recently encountered technical challenges. The Flight 
Project Office has taken steps to resolve several technical problems 
through additional engineering support and redesign efforts. However, 
there are still important technical challenges to be addressed, 
including signal blurring problems for several of the Advanced 
Baseline Imager's infrared channels and Geostationary Lightning Mapper 
emissions that are exceeding specifications. The project office is 
monitoring these problems and has plans in place to address them. The 
current development efforts and recent challenges for components of 
the flight project are described in table 5.

Table 5: Flight Project Development Efforts and Challenges through 
February 2012:

Instruments: 

Key components: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed critical design review; 
* Testing under way; conducted initial bench testing for the first 
flight model; 
* Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review[A] in March 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Replaced printed wiring boards that were incompatible with 
specifications; 
* Working to resolve signal problems in several of the imager's 
infrared channels.

Key components: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed certain hardware, including detectors and select spare 
parts; 
* Developing software algorithms for the first flight model; 
* Performing environmental testing for three out of five sensors on 
the instrument suite; 
* Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review in January 2013; 
Recent challenges: 
* Corrected failures of its data processing unit during testing.

Key components: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed individual instruments, which are being integrated with 
the instrument suite; 
* Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review in June 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Replaced filters that were damaged during vibration testing.

Key components: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed software algorithms for the first flight model; 
* Completed limited thermal vacuum testing on its engineering design 
unit; 
* Completing remaining work on the telescope and sensor electronics 
prior to instrument-level testing; 
* Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review in September 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Investigated cracks in the camera's electronic box power control 
unit; 
* Working to resolve failures in the structural model analysis filter.

Key components: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed integration of its engineering design unit; 
* Completed software algorithms for the first flight model; 
* Conducting electrical system testing; 
* Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review in December 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Rebuilt electronics unit and sensor unit power boards that failed 
during electrical systems testing; 
* Working to resolve an image signal problem; 
* Working to limit emissions that exceed requirements.

Key components: Spacecraft; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed preliminary design review; 
* Received the Spacecraft Command and Telemetry Simulator, which is a 
simulator to generate spacecraft telemetry and receive ground commands 
to be used in interface and development testing; 
* Completing component and subsystem critical design reviews in 
preparation for the system's critical design in April 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Achieved sufficient mass[B] margins; 
* Eliminated gaps in the flow down of mission assurance requirements 
to subcontractors; 
* Working to obtain adequate fault management design specifications 
from the contractor; 
* Working to increase end-of-life power margins.

Sources: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data.

[A] A pre-environmental review ensures that the hardware or software 
to be tested, facility, personnel, and procedures are in place and 
ready for testing.

[B] Mass is a measure of the amount of matter in a physical body that 
does not depend on location or gravitational pull. 

[End of table] 

Ground Project--Incomplete Requirements Definition and Schedule 
Integration Have Led to Revised Development Plan:

The Ground Project Office has made progress in completing the ground 
system's preliminary design. However, in doing so it experienced 
problems in defining ground system software requirements and 
identified problems with its dependencies on flight project schedules. 
Specifically, the project office discovered in early 2011 that 
software design requirements had not progressed enough to conduct the 
ground system's preliminary design review. In addition, the ground 
system's development schedule included software deliveries from flight 
project instruments that were not properly integrated--they had not 
yet been defined or could not be met. To address these problems, the 
Ground Project Office made significant revisions to the Core Ground 
System's baseline development plan and schedule.

In order to avoid potential slippages to GOES-R's launch date, project 
officials decided to switch from plans to deliver software 
capabilities at major software releases to an approach where software 
capabilities could be delivered incrementally (prior to major 
releases) as the project received data inputs from the flight project. 
According to NOAA and program officials, the revised development 
approach is to provide flexibility in the ground system's development 
schedule and reduce risk associated with the original waterfall 
schedule. However, the revised plan is expected to cost $85 million 
more than the original plan through the Core Ground System's 
completion. This cost includes increased contractor and government 
staff, new oversight tools, and more verification and testing 
activities associated with an increased number of software deliveries. 
Program officials acknowledged that the revised plan intends to expend 
additional resources to reduce schedule risk and potential impacts to 
GOES-R's launch date, but that it also introduces new cost and 
schedule risks associated with incremental development, such as more 
software development and verification activities that require 
additional government oversight and continuous monitoring.

In addition, the program has canceled previously exercised options to 
the ground project that were once considered part of its original 
baseline.[Footnote 9] In early 2011, the program determined that it 
could no longer fund Core Ground System contract options--which were 
estimated to cost approximately $50 million. Program officials stated 
that they canceled the contract options due to approaching development 
commitments, including revisions to the ground system's revised plan 
and schedule, and funding reductions from fiscal year 2011. According 
to program officials, the work to be performed under the canceled 
contract options could be addressed by NOAA after GOES-R satellites 
are launched; however, there are currently no plans in place to do so.

Table 6 describes the development efforts and recent challenges for 
ground project components.

Table 6: Ground Project Development Efforts and Challenges through 
February 2012:

Key components: Core Ground System; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed preliminary design review; 
* Executing a revised development plan and schedule in preparation for 
critical design review in April 2012; 
Recent challenges: 
* Working to avoid delays in the availability of a primary operations 
facility required for testing; 
* Working to fully define software requirements, which are largely 
complete and resolve prior problems, and integrate schedules with 
flight project instruments.

Key components: GOES-R Access Subsystem; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed critical design reviews for systems that will enable 
ground system product processing and distribution; 
* Completed trade studies for communication services to be provided to 
local and federal emergency managers; 
Recent challenges: No recent major challenges.

Key components: Antennas; 
Key efforts: 
* Completed critical design review; 
* Conducting site preparation and construction activities for multiple 
antenna sites; 
Recent challenges: No recent major challenges.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

GOES-R Development Costs Are Rising:

The GOES-R program's estimated costs include, among other things, 
actual and estimated contract costs associated with design, 
development, integration, and testing activities for the instruments, 
spacecraft, and ground system as well as procurement of the 
satellites' launch vehicles. The estimated costs also include 
government costs such as NOAA and NASA program management support and 
contingency reserves to be applied towards critical risks and issues 
as they arise. As of January 2010, the program reported estimates of 
$3.3 billion for the flight project (including reserves of $598 
million), $1.7 billion for the ground project (including reserves of 
$431 million), $2.0 billion for other program costs (including 
reserves of $617 million), and $748 million for operations and 
maintenance.

Although NOAA has not changed its program cost estimates for the 
development of GOES-R and GOES-S, contract costs for the instruments, 
spacecraft, and ground system are rising. Specifically, contractor 
estimated costs for flight and ground project components grew by $757 
million, or 32 percent, between January 2010 and January 2012. Table 7 
identifies growth in estimated contract costs for major program 
components.

Table 7: Growth in Estimated Contract Cost for Major Program Components:

Major components: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Original contract award date: Sep 2004; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 83%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: $524M; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: $581M; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: $672M; 
2-year change ($M): +$148M; 
2-year change (%): +28%.

Major components: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Original contract award date: Aug 2006; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 54%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 69; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 81; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 97; 
2-year change ($M): +28; 
2-year change (%): +41%.

Major components: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Original contract award date: Aug 2007; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 58%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 72; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 81; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 81; 
2-year change ($M): +9; 
2-year change (%): +13%.

Major components: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Original contract award date: Sep 2007; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 62%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 139; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 168; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 182; 
2-year change ($M): +43; 
2-year change (%): +31%.

Major components: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Original contract award date: Dec 2007; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 57%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 157; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 209; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 252; 
2-year change ($M): +95; 
2-year change (%): +61%.

Major components: Spacecraft; 
Original contract award date: Dec 2008; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 32%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 711; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 743; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 862; 
2-year change ($M): +151; 
2-year change (%): +21%.

Major components: Core Ground System; 
Original contract award date: May 2009; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 29%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 704; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 792; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 976; 
2-year change ($M): +272; 
2-year change (%): +39%.

Major components: Antennas; 
Original contract award date: July 2010; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): 37%; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: Not applicable[B]; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 119; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 130; 
2-year change ($M): +11[C]; 
2-year change (%): +9%.

Major components: Totals; 
Original contract award date: [Empty]; 
Percent complete (Nov 2011): [Empty]; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2010)[A]: 2,376; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2011)[A]: 2,774; 
Contractor estimate at completion (Jan 2012)[A]: 3,252; 
2-year change ($M): +757[C]; 
2-year change (%): +32%[C].

Sources: GAO analysis of NOAA and contractor-reported data.

[A] Contractor-reported most likely estimate at completion.

[B] The antenna contract was not awarded until July 2010.

[C] Total 2-year change includes the 1-year change in antenna contract 
costs. 

[End of table] 

Not only have development contracts experienced rising costs since 
January 2010, but they have also experienced larger cost increases 
more recently. For example, between January 2011 and January 2012, 
contractors' estimated costs increased by $184 million for the Core 
Ground System, compared with $88 million for the period between 
January 2010 and January 2011. Also, between January 2011 and January 
2012, contractors' estimated costs for the spacecraft and the Advanced 
Baseline Imager increased by $119 million and $91 million compared 
with $32 million and $57 million, respectively, between January 2010 
and January 2011. Figure 4 depicts recent growth in estimated costs 
for these development components.

Figure 4: Recent Growth in Estimated Cost for Selected Development 
Components:

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Cost growth (January 2010-January 2011): 
Core Ground System: $88 million; 
Spacecraft: $32 million; 
Advanced Baseline Imager: $57 million; 
Total: $178 million. 

Cost growth (January 2011-January 2012): 
Core Ground System: $184 million; 
Spacecraft: $119 million; 
Advanced Baseline Imager: $91 million; 
Total: $394 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of contractors' reported cost estimates. 

[End of figure] 

The recent growth in contract costs is due in part to the additional 
labor and engineering support needed to address technical and 
programmatic problems experienced by flight and ground project 
components, including the technical complexity associated with 
development of the Advanced Baseline Imager and the spacecraft, and 
additional costs associated with the Core Ground System's revised 
development plan. NOAA stated that some of the cost growth is 
attributed to scope changes, including instrument options that were 
exercised in 2010 and 2011. Based on our analysis, approximately $60 
million of the $757 million growth in contractors' estimated costs at 
completion from January 2010 through November 2011 was due to scope 
changes associated with new instrument flight model development. Given 
the recent increases in contract costs, the program plans to determine 
how to cover these increased costs by reducing resources applied to 
other areas of program development and support, delaying scheduled 
work, or absorbing additional life cycle costs.

Depleted Reserves Could Impact Remaining Development:

A contingency reserve (also called management reserve) is important 
because it provides program managers ready access to funding in order 
to resolve problems as they occur and may be necessary to cover 
increased costs resulting from unexpected design complexity, 
incomplete requirements, or other uncertainties.[Footnote 10] NOAA 
requires the program office and flight and ground projects to maintain 
a reserve of funds until their development is completed. Specifically, 
the flight project is to maintain 20 percent of planned remaining 
development costs as reserve, the ground project is to maintain 30 
percent of planned remaining development costs as reserve, and the 
program office is to maintain 10 percent of planned remaining 
development costs as reserve.[Footnote 11]

The program has allocated a proportion of its budget as reserves to 
mitigate risks and manage problems as they surface during development. 
As a result of changes in budget reserve allocations and reserve 
commitments,[Footnote 12] the program's reserves have declined in 
recent years. Between January 2009 and January 2012, the program 
reported that its reserves fell from 42 percent of remaining 
development costs to 29 percent. Over the same period, the program 
reports that after accounting for changes in reserve budgets and 
reserve commitments, reserves fell from $1.7 billion to $1.2 billion, 
an approximately 30 percent reduction in its uncommitted reserves. 
This is important to note since about two-thirds of the development 
remains for the program's two most expensive components--the 
spacecraft and the Core Ground System. Recent utilization of the 
program's reserves included addressing unanticipated problems with 
instrument and spacecraft design, using more than expected labor 
required to accomplish program and project-related milestones, and 
acquiring additional resources required to execute the revised 
development plan and schedule for the Core Ground System. In this 
regard, the program's independent review board recently raised 
questions about the sufficiency of the program's near-term remaining 
reserves, and program officials decided to establish contractual 
funding caps for the spacecraft, three instruments--the Advanced 
Baseline Imager, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, and the Geostationary 
Lightning Mapper--and the Core Ground System for fiscal year 2012, 
delaying work into future years. Figure 5 depicts changes in program 
reserves over time.

Figure 5: Changes in Program Reserves Over Time:

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar and line graph] 

Date: January 2009; 
Program budget: $7.672 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.863 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.722 billion. 

Date: July 2009; 
Program budget: $7.672 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.717 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.799 billion. 

Date: January 2010; 
Program budget: $7.672 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.646 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.492 billion. 

Date: July 2010; 
Program budget: $7.672 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.646 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.406 billion. 

Date: January 2011; 
Program budget: $7.672 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.607 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.122 billion. 

Date: July 2011; 
Program budget: $10.860 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.557 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.368 billion. 

Date: January 2012; 
Program budget: $10.860 billion; 
Program reserve budgeted: $1.533 billion; 
Uncommitted program reserve: $1.245 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA-reported reserve data. 

[End of figure]

At completion of the GOES-R program's preliminary design review in 
February 2012, the program reported that it was within its thresholds 
because it had maintained 20 percent of planned remaining development 
costs as reserve for the flight project, 32 percent of planned 
remaining development costs for the ground project, and 10 percent of 
planned remaining development costs for the program office. The 
program will soon enter the integration and test phase, when projects 
typically experience cost and schedule growth and need additional 
funding--as identified in our prior reviews of NASA acquisitions. 
[Footnote 13] The program may need to draw from its available 
remaining reserves to address a number of situations, including:

* unanticipated problems during completion of the critical design 
reviews of the spacecraft and the ground system;

* unanticipated problems during the integration and test of the 
instruments and spacecraft, such as required redesign;

* potential additional labor required for ground system software 
development and testing;

* potential delays in the readiness of NOAA's Satellite Operations 
Facility for ground system testing, resulting in the use of contractor 
facilities; and:

* higher than expected costs for launch vehicles.

While the program reported that reserves were within accepted levels 
as of February 2012, the reserves may not be matched to remaining 
development. Although the program restored two satellites to its 
budget baseline in February 2011, thereby adding approximately $3.2 
billion to its total budget,[Footnote 14] it did not correspondingly 
change its program reserves. The program did not report its rationale 
for maintaining reserves at the two-satellite program or explain how 
these planned reserves were intended to cover risks associated with 
the development of all four satellites. As a result, there is limited 
assurance that the reserves are appropriate for each satellite's 
remaining development.

Whether the program will continue to stay within its budget depends in 
part on whether officials have a full understanding of the reserves 
required for remaining development. Given the program's recent use of 
reserves and the significant portions of development remaining for 
major components, a complete understanding and proper management of 
reserve levels will be critical to successfully completing all program 
components. Unless NOAA assesses the reserve allocations across all of 
the program's development efforts, it may not be able to ensure that 
its reserves will cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected 
problems for the remaining development of all four satellites in the 
series.

GOES-R Schedules Are Not Fully Reliable, Contributing to Milestone and 
Potential Launch Date Delays:

The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on 
having an integrated and reliable schedule that defines, among other 
things, when work activities and milestone events will occur, how long 
they will take, and how they are related to one another. Without such 
a schedule, program milestones may slip. While the GOES-R program has 
adopted certain scheduling best practices at both the programwide and 
contractor levels, unresolved weaknesses also exist, some of which 
have contributed to current program milestone delays and a replanning 
of the Core Ground System's schedule. Without a proper understanding 
of current program status that a reliable schedule provides, managing 
the risks of the GOES-R program becomes more difficult and may result 
in potential delays in GOES-R's launch date.

GOES-R Integrated Master Schedule and Some Subordinate Schedules Are 
Unreliable:

Program schedules not only provide a road map for systematic program 
execution, but also provide the means by which to gauge progress, 
identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. 
Accordingly, a schedule helps ensure that all stakeholders understand 
both the dates for major milestones and the activities that drive the 
schedule. If changes occur within a program, the schedule helps 
decision makers analyze how those changes affect the program. The 
reliability of the schedule will determine the credibility of the 
program's forecasted dates, which are used for decision making. Our 
work has identified nine best practices[Footnote 15] associated with 
developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. These are (1) 
capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3) assigning 
resources to all activities, (4) establishing the duration of all 
activities, (5) integrating schedule activities horizontally and 
vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities, (7) 
identifying reasonable "float" between activities, (8) conducting a 
schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and 
durations. See table 8 for a description of each of these best 
practices.

Table 8: Description of Scheduling Best Practices:

Practice: Capturing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect all activities (steps, 
events, outcomes, etc.) as defined in the program's work breakdown 
structure to include activities to be performed by both the government 
and its contractors. 

Practice: Sequencing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should sequence activities in the order that 
they are to be implemented. In particular, activities that must finish 
prior to the start of other activities (i.e., predecessor activities), 
as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities are 
completed (i.e., successor activities) should be identified. 

Practice: Assigning resources to all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect who will do the work 
activities, whether all required resources will be available when they 
are needed, and whether any funding or time constraints exist. 

Practice: Establishing the duration of all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect the duration of each 
activity. These durations should be as short as possible and have 
specific start and end dates. 

Practice: Integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically; 
Description: The schedule should be horizontally integrated, meaning 
that it should link the products and outcomes associated with 
sequenced activities. The schedule should also be vertically 
integrated, meaning that traceability exists among varying levels of 
activities and supporting tasks and subtasks. 

Practice: Establishing the critical path for all activities; 
Description: The critical path represents the chain of dependent 
activities with the longest total duration in the schedule. 

Practice: Identifying reasonable float between activities; 
Description: The schedule should identify a reasonable amount of 
float--the time that an activity can slip before the delay affects the 
finish milestone--so that schedule flexibility can be determined. As a 
general rule, activities along the critical path typically have the 
least amount of float. 

Practice: Conducting a schedule risk analysis; 
Description: A schedule risk analysis is used to predict the level of 
confidence in the schedule, determine the amount of time contingency 
needed, and identify high-priority schedule risks. 

Practice: Updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine 
the dates; 
Description: The schedule should use logic and durations in order to 
reflect realistic start and completion dates, be continually monitored 
to determine differences between forecasted completion dates and 
planned dates, and avoid logic overrides and artificial constraint 
dates. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The first seven practices are essential elements for creation of an 
integrated schedule. An integrated schedule that contains all the 
detailed tasks necessary to ensure program execution is called an 
integrated master schedule (IMS). The reliability of an integrated 
schedule depends in part on the reliability of its subordinate 
schedules. Automated integration of all activities into a single 
master schedule can prevent inadvertent errors when entering data or 
transferring them from one file to another.

GOES-R has an IMS that is created manually once a month directly from 
at least nine subordinate contractor schedules.[Footnote 16] Due to 
anticipated limitations related to the number of activities that would 
need to be included, program officials stated that they did not intend 
to make the IMS a live, integrated file. We believe that the lack of a 
dynamic IMS is an acceptable schedule limitation for an organization 
of GOES-R's size and complexity. Program officials also stated that 
they are in the process of creating an automated process for updating 
their IMS from contractor-delivered files sometime in 2012, but this 
was not available in time for our analysis.

To assess the reliability of the programwide IMS, we analyzed four 
subordinate contractor schedules from July 2011[Footnote 17] and found 
several best practices that were met in multiple schedules. For 
example, similar to the program-level IMS, three of the contractor 
IMS's include all activities that were supplemented with monthly data 
received directly from the schedules of their subcontractors, and the 
fourth--the Core Ground System schedule--included milestone activities 
for all subcontractors. All four schedules also substantially or fully 
met the best practice for regularly updating the schedule, including 
regular reporting of status and keeping the number of activities 
completed out of sequence to a minimum. Finally, three of the four 
schedules substantially met the best practice for establishing 
accurate activity durations.

However, we also found weaknesses in each of the subordinate schedules 
when compared to the best practices and, when viewed in conjunction 
with manual program-level updates, we concluded that the program-level 
schedule may not be fully reliable. For example, each of the 
contractor schedules was either not resource loaded or had significant 
overloading of resources. In addition, none of the contractors were 
able to provide information on schedule risk analyses conducted with 
risk simulations.

A full set of analysis results is listed in table 9. Selected 
strengths and weaknesses for each of the four schedules follow the 
table.

Table 9: Practices Utilized in Selected GOES-R Schedules:

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 1: Capturing all activities; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [A]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [B]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [B]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [EC].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 2: Sequencing all activities; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [B]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [C]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [C]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [C].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 3: Assigning resources to all 
activities; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [D]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [B]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [D]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [C].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 4: Establishing the duration 
of all activities; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [B]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [C]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [B]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [B].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 5: Integrating schedule 
activities horizontally and vertically; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [C]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [C]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [B]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [C].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 6: Establishing the critical 
path for all activities; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [B]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [C]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [B]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [D].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 7: Identifying float on 
activities and paths; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [B]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [C]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [C]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [D].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 8: Conducting a schedule risk 
analysis; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [D]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [D]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [D]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [D].

Scheduling best practice: Best Practice 9: Updating the schedule using 
logic and durations to determine the dates; 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper schedule: [A]; 
Advanced Baseline Imager schedule: [A]; 
Spacecraft schedule: [A]; 
Core Ground System schedule: [B].

Source: GAO analysis of schedules provided by GOES-R, documents and 
information received from GOES-R officials.

Key:

[A] The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for this best 
practice. 

[B] The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria for this 
best practice. 

[C] The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for this best 
practice. 

[D] The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for this best 
practice. 

[E] The agency/contractor has not met the criteria for this best 
practice. 

[End of table] 

Of the four component schedules, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper 
schedule demonstrated the most comprehensive implementation of best 
practices. For instance, all activities and durations were 
appropriately captured in the schedule; logic links were included for 
over 99 percent of activities; only one small gap was present in the 
critical path from the date of the schedule through the end of the 
project; a high percentage of activities had appropriate logic; and 
the schedule was updated using logic and durations to determine dates. 
However, more than 10 percent of the resources listed in the schedule 
were overloaded, meaning that the schedule required more resources 
than were available. Also, changes in activity durations for one 
flight model did not result in a corresponding change in the shipment 
date of that flight model.

The Advanced Baseline Imager schedule substantially or fully met three 
of the best practices. As mentioned above, the Advanced Baseline 
Imager schedule met the best practices for including all subcontractor 
records as well as regular updating and reporting on the schedule. In 
addition, it provided a substantial amount of information regarding 
the resources in its schedule; the contractor created a series of over 
900 named codes that denote detailed information such as resource 
type, location, and labor rate. However, 18 percent of remaining 
activities had incomplete or missing logic, and 43 percent had soft 
date constraints. If the schedule is missing logic links between 
activities, float[Footnote 18] estimates will not be accurate. 
Incorrect total float values may in turn result in an invalid critical 
path and an inaccurate assessment of project completion dates. In the 
case of the Advanced Baseline Imager, many detailed activities had 
large total float values throughout. Moreover, the Advanced Baseline 
Imager schedule did not have a valid critical path for one of its 
three flight models and did not have a critical path that spans the 
entire program.

The spacecraft schedule substantially met more than half of the best 
practices. It had a valid critical path through the launch dates for 
the first two satellites, included and mapped all activities 
appropriately, included logic links for over 99 percent of its 
activities, and was appropriately updated. However, more than 10 
percent of its activities had constraints, and nearly 10 percent of 
its activities had gaps between consecutive activities, also known as 
lags. Lags should be minimal, and should not be used in place of 
activities, as they cannot be easily monitored, cannot be included in 
a risk assessment, and do not take resources. For this reason, lags 
should be eliminated and replaced with activities so they can be 
tracked. Also, the spacecraft schedule's critical path included a year-
long current activity for which a detailed breakdown was not 
available, even though the activity is in the current detailed 
planning period.

The Core Ground System schedule contained weaknesses across seven of 
the nine best practice areas resulting in a score of partially or 
minimally met. For instance, a valid critical path could not be traced 
between the schedule's latest status date and the launch date for 
either of the first two satellites; 12 percent of remaining activities 
had incomplete or missing logic and 13 percent had soft date 
constraints; and more than 75 percent of activities had more than 100 
days of total float. Also, not all subcontractor detail activities 
were included in the schedule. Without accounting for all necessary 
activities, it is uncertain whether all activities are scheduled in 
the correct order, missing activities would appear on the critical 
path, or a schedule risk analysis accounts for all risk.

Officials for all four contract teams suggested that certain schedule 
weaknesses were unique to the July 2011 schedules they provided and 
that the weaknesses would be remedied in December 2011 schedules. Our 
subsequent analysis did find improvements for each of the four 
contractors. For example, the Advanced Baseline Imager's December 
schedule had approximately 10 percent fewer activities missing 
predecessors and successors than in July. The Core Ground System 
schedule also performed better in three of the nine best practices, 
including the presence of a full set of duration and total float 
information, and better information on handoffs with external parties. 
However, many weaknesses from the July schedules remained in the 
December schedules. For example, officials stated that several 
schedule risk analyses had been conducted for the Core Ground System 
schedule, but also reported that the schedule risk analysis conducted 
by the Core Ground System's subcontractor was not valid and did not 
provide accurate or constructive information.

Of particular importance is the absence of a valid critical path 
throughout all the schedules. Establishing a valid program-level 
critical path depends on the resolution of issues with the respective 
critical paths for the spacecraft and Core Ground System components. 
Contract specifications for all four contractors require that these 
schedules define critical paths for their activities. Without a valid 
critical path, management cannot determine which delayed tasks will 
have detrimental effects on the project finish date. It also cannot 
determine if total float within the schedule can be used to mitigate 
critical tasks by reallocating resources from tasks that can be 
delayed without launch date impact. Unless the weaknesses in these 
subordinate schedules are addressed, including the generation of valid 
critical paths in all schedules, the programwide IMS that is derived 
from them may not be sufficiently reliable.

Schedule Practice Weaknesses Could Lead to Further Schedule Delays:

Weaknesses in implementing scheduling best practices undermine the 
program's ability to produce credible dates for planned milestones and 
events, as illustrated by schedule discrepancies that occurred between 
the ground project and the flight project and the subsequent 
replanning that was required. The program has already demonstrated a 
pattern of milestone delays during its development due in part to the 
scheduling weaknesses we identified. Although the program has 
initiated two key efforts that could address certain schedule 
weaknesses, other weaknesses have not yet been resolved. Until the 
program's scheduling weaknesses are corrected, it may experience 
additional delays to its key milestones.

The program has revised planned milestone and completion dates for 
each of the instruments as well as the spacecraft and ground system 
components by at least 3 months--and up to 2 years--since the program 
originally estimated dates for key milestones in its December 2007 
management control plan. Program officials noted that its December 
2007 dates were notional estimates until integrated baseline reviews 
could be conducted. However, delays occurred both before and after the 
schedules for the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system 
components were formalized. In certain cases, more recent changes were 
due to delays in building and testing satellite components. For 
example, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager experienced delays in 2011 and 
2012 due in part to delays in software development and in procuring 
flight model parts. Also, a failure in testing power supply boards 
caused rework delays in 2011 and 2012 on the Geostationary Lightning 
Mapper instrument. See figure 6 for a summary of changes in planned 
completion dates for components of the flight and ground projects.

Figure 8: Changes in Planned Completion Dates for Key Milestones of 
the First GOES-R Satellite:

[Refer to PDF for image: time line] 

Spacecraft: 
Planned design reviews: 
April, 2011; 
January 2012; 
April, 2012. 

Advanced Baseline Imager: 
Planned completion for the first satellite: 
October 2010; 
July 2012; 
February 2013. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite: 
Planned completion for the first satellite: 
May 2011; 
March 2012; 
April 2013. 

Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor: 
Planned completion for the first satellite: 
May 2012; 
June 2012; 
March 2013. 

Solar Ultraviolet Imager: 
Planned completion for the first satellite: 
June 2012; 
October 2012; 
May 2013; 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper: 
Planned completion for the first satellite: 
June 2012; 
October 2012; 
August 2013. 

Ground project: 
Planned design reviews: 
July 2011; 
February 2012; 
July 2012. 

Antennas1: 
Planned design reviews: 
September 2012; 
December 2012. 

GOES-R Access Subsystem1:
Planned design reviews: 
July 2011; 
February 2012. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

[A] This chart shows estimated timing of GOES-R milestones based on 
NOAA's initial 2007 estimate and monthly program status reports from 
2010 and 2012. Antenna and the GOES-R Access Subsystem dates were not 
listed in the 2007 estimates. 

[End of figure] 

The potential for delays remains as GOES-R's instruments, spacecraft, 
and ground system components complete their design and testing phases. 
According to program officials, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper 
shipment date remains at risk of a potential slip due to redesign 
efforts that have impacted the release of the build of the electronic 
board component of the instrument. The current projected delivery for 
this instrument is August 2013, leaving only 1 month before it is on 
the critical path for GOES-R's launch readiness date. Moreover, 
weaknesses in implementing schedule best practices make meaningful 
measurement and oversight of program status and progress, as well as 
accountability for results, difficult to achieve--which can in turn 
reduce the timeliness and effectiveness of the understanding and 
mitigation of project risks.

The program office has taken specific positive actions that address 
two of the scheduling weaknesses we identified. First, the GOES-R 
program implemented the Giver-Receiver Intersegment Database, a tool 
that tracks deliverables between the flight and ground projects. Giver-
Receiver Intersegment Database items are formally reviewed by various 
working groups weekly and monthly before they are incorporated into 
the GOES-R IMS. This initiative is intended to address a program-
recognized need for better horizontal integration (related to best 
practice 5). Second, the GOES-R program implemented a Joint Cost and 
Schedule Confidence Level, a set of parametric models designed to 
identify the probability that a given program's schedule values will 
be equal to or less than target values on a specific date.[Footnote 
19] In the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, simulations are 
run for the expected duration of activities based on probabilities 
supplied by officials in the project's cost and schedule division. 
This initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need to 
conduct a schedule risk analysis (related to best practice 8).

However, the possibility of future milestone delays remains. Initial 
results from the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level from January 
2012 indicated that there is a 48 percent confidence level that the 
program will meet its current launch readiness date of October 2015. 
Program officials plan to consult with the NOAA Program Management 
Council to determine the advisability of moving the launch readiness 
date to a 70 percent confidence level of February 2016. Given that 
scheduling weaknesses remain unaddressed, even these confidence levels 
may be unreliable. Establishing accurate confidence estimates depends 
on reliable data that result from the implementation of a full set of 
scheduling best practices.

Furthermore, delays in GOES-R's launch date could impact current 
operational GOES continuity and could produce milestone delays for 
subsequent satellites in the series. Program documentation indicates 
that with the current launch readiness date of October 2015, plus an 
on-orbit testing period, there is a 37 percent chance of a gap in the 
availability of two operational GOES-series satellites at any one 
time, assuming a normal lifespan for the satellites currently on-
orbit. Any delays in the launch readiness date for GOES-R, which is 
already at risk due to the increased cost growth and recent heavy use 
of program reserves discussed previously, would further increase the 
probability of a gap in satellite continuity. This could result in the 
need for NOAA to rely on older satellites that are not fully 
functional. In addition, GOES-R's schedule reserve is being counted on 
to complete activities for GOES-S. As a result, delays to certain 
program schedule targets could impact milestone commitments for GOES-S.

Until the program implements a full set of schedule best practices, 
and uses it on succeeding schedule updates throughout the life of the 
program, further delays in the program's launch dates may occur. In 
particular, without ensuring that all contractor and subcontractor 
information is included in the IMS and conducting regular schedule 
risk assessments, program management may not have timely and relevant 
information at its disposal for decision making. Lack of the proper 
understanding of current program status due to schedules that are not 
fully reliable undercuts the ability of the program office to manage a 
high-risk program like GOES-R.

Risk Management Approach Is Well Defined but Not Fully Implemented:

Risk management is a continuous process to identify potential problems 
before they occur. By identifying potential problems early, activities 
can be planned and invoked as needed across the life of a project to 
avoid or mitigate the adverse impacts of program problems. Effective 
risk management involves early and aggressive risk identification 
through the collaboration and involvement of relevant stakeholders. 
Government and industry risk management guidance divides risk 
management activities into four key areas--preparing for risk 
management, identifying and analyzing risks, mitigating risks, and 
reviewing risks with executive oversight. Table 10 describes 
recognized best practices in these areas.

Table 10: Description and Examples of Recognized Risk Management Best 
Practices:

Risk practice: Risk preparation; 
Description: Risk preparation involves establishing and maintaining a 
strategy for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating risks. The risk 
management strategy addresses the specific actions and management 
approach used to apply and control the risk management program. It 
also includes identifying and involving relevant stakeholders in the 
risk management process. 

Risk practice: Risk identification and analysis; 
Description: Risks must be identified and described in an 
understandable way before they can be analyzed and managed properly. 
This includes identifying risks from both internal and external 
sources and evaluating each risk to determine its likelihood and 
consequences. Analyzing risks includes risk evaluation, 
categorization, and prioritization, and is used to determine when 
appropriate management attention is required. 

Risk practice: Risk mitigation; 
Description: Risk mitigation involves developing alternative courses 
of action, workarounds, and fallback positions, with a recommended 
course of action for the most important risks to the project. 
Mitigation includes techniques and methods used to avoid, reduce, and 
control the probability of occurrence of the risk; the extent of 
damage incurred should the risk occur; or both. Examples of activities 
for mitigating risks include documented handling options for each 
identified risk; risk mitigation plans; contingency plans; a list of 
persons responsible for tracking and addressing each risk; and updated 
assessments of risk likelihood, consequence, and thresholds. 

Risk practice: Executive risk oversight; 
Description: Reviews of the project teams' risk management activities, 
status, and results should be held on a periodic and event-driven 
basis. The reviews should include appropriate levels of management, 
such as key NOAA and NASA executives, who can provide visibility into 
the potential for project risk exposure and appropriate corrective 
actions. 

Source: GAO analysis based on the Software Engineering Institute's 
Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (Version 1.3), 
the International Organization for Standardization, Defense 
Acquisition University, and GAO guidance on risk management practices. 

[End of table] 

GOES-R Has Defined a Comprehensive Risk Management Process:

NOAA has established policies and procedures for effective risk 
management for GOES-R. For example, the program has documented a 
strategy for managing risks that includes important elements, such as 
relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities and the criteria for 
evaluating, categorizing, and prioritizing risks. The program's 
approved risk management plan also includes requirements for risk 
mitigation--such as required actions, deadlines, and assigned risk 
owners--as well as requirements that risks' status and changes are 
periodically reviewed by appropriate managers, including senior NOAA 
and NASA managers. Table 11 compares GOES-R's risk management policies 
and procedures with recognized risk management practices for four areas.

Table 11: Comparison of GOES-R Risk Management Policies and Procedures 
to Recognized Practices:

Risk practice: Risk preparation; 
GOES-R policies and procedures: Fully meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program has established and maintains its strategy in 
an approved risk management plan. The plan defines important aspects 
of the program's risk process, including relevant stakeholders and 
designated responsibilities for risk management. It also defines other 
important aspects of the program's risk process, relevant sources of 
risks, and the criteria to be used in risk evaluation, categorization, 
and prioritization. The approved plan requires the use of a risk 
database application as the official risk repository and formal 
training on the program's risk process as needed. 

Risk practice: Risk identification and analysis; 
GOES-R policies and procedures: Fully meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program's approved risk plan requires projects to 
identify internal and external program risks, defines the evaluation 
parameters and categories to be used in evaluating and grouping risks, 
and requires assessments of the relative priority of its risks. Also, 
the program's schedule management plan requires the program to conduct 
a schedule risk assessment. 

Risk practice: Risk mitigation; 
GOES-R policies and procedures: Fully meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program's approved risk plan requires risks to have 
documented handling options along with the required steps, deadlines, 
triggers, and assigned risk owners for mitigating the risk. The plan 
also requires program and project review boards to monitor risk status 
and make official decisions regarding risk review, acceptance, and 
closure as well as updates to track the status of mitigation efforts. 

Risk practice: Executive risk oversight; 
GOES-R policies and procedures: Fully meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program's approved risk plan requires appropriate 
levels of management to review the activities, status, and results of 
the risk management process covering the most critical risks, key risk 
parameters, and the status of mitigation efforts. It also requires 
that the program's risk manager track actions assigned by a risk 
review board. 

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA and NASA data.

[End of table]

With such policies and procedures in place, NOAA has established a 
comprehensive framework to support its identification, mitigation, and 
oversight of risks across the program, and laid a foundation for 
consistent implementation.

The Program Has Not Fully Implemented Its Risk Management Process or 
Adequately Mitigated Key Risks:

While the program has a well-defined risk management process, this 
process has not been fully implemented. Table 12 identifies the extent 
to which the program has implemented recognized risk management 
practices through its risk process. Of particular note, the program 
has not conducted and documented adequate or timely evaluations for 
all potential risks--called candidate risks in the risk management 
plan--in its risk list. In addition, the program did not always 
document its risk handling strategies and time frames and did not 
always provide adequate rationale for its decision to close risks.

Table 12: GOES-R Implementation of Risk Practices:

Risk practice: Risk preparation; 
GOES-R application of its risk process: Substantially meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program has established a risk database to communicate 
risk information and provided risk training to the Ground Project 
Office in October 2011; 
However, the program has not provided formal risk training to the 
Flight Project Office. Program officials stated that they plan to 
provide formal training to the flight project when its critical design 
is complete. Until the program completes training for both projects, 
the program will have less assurance that all staff are consistently 
applying its risk management process and associated tools for 
communicating risk assessments and status. 

Risk practice: Risk identification and analysis; 
GOES-R application of its risk process: Partially meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program has identified certain internal and external 
program risks, has generally evaluated open risks based on defined 
parameters, and has assessed the relative priority of its risks; 
However, the program has not provided adequate or timely evaluations 
for certain candidate risks. Specifically, the program did not assess 
likelihood or potential impact for 49 out of its 100 open candidate 
risks as required by the program's risk plan. Further, 40 candidate 
risks had not yet been examined by project review boards for more than 
3 months, and 15 of these were first identified in 2010. According to 
the program's risk manager, candidate risks are generally to be 
assessed and presented to a project risk board within 1 to 3 months; 
In addition, the program is not categorizing its risks, thus managers 
may be limited in their ability to provide timely attention and 
efficient handling of these risks in context with the source of the 
risk. Also, the program only recently completed a schedule risk 
assessment in February 2012, the lack of which may have limited 
managers' ability to understand which risks may be most critical to 
address in maintaining the program's schedule. 

Risk practice: Risk mitigation; 
GOES-R application of its risk process: Partially meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program has generally developed mitigation plans for 
critical risks to include required steps and deadlines, assigned 
owners responsibility for managing risks, and monitored the status of 
risk mitigation efforts through monthly project review board meetings; 
However, the program did not always document mitigation options for 
open and candidate risks and did not always include triggers or 
thresholds for when fallback actions were to be executed. In addition, 
the program did not include adequate rationale for its decision to 
close active risks. Thus, it is not clear whether these risks had been 
adequately mitigated prior to closure. 

Risk practice: Executive risk oversight; 
GOES-R application of its risk process: Substantially meets criteria; 
Rationale: The program and lower-level project review boards review 
risk status and results monthly. Further, the NOAA Program Management 
Council reviews the risk status and results for the program's top 
risks monthly; 
However, the program has not tracked corrective actions from risk 
review board meetings or meetings with the NOAA Program Management 
Council. This may limit management's ability to understand the number 
or status of outstanding actions and future GOES acquisitions' ability 
to learn from the current program's risk resolution approach. 

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA and NASA data.

[End of table] 

The GOES-R Program Office has identified 11 risks that it considers 
critical (medium-or high-level risks) and could significantly impact 
the program's development cost or schedule, documented mitigation 
approaches for each risk, and tracked mitigation progress. For these 
and its other risks, the program generally has mitigation plans in 
place that typically include actions to be taken, deadlines, and 
assigned responsibilities that could help to minimize or control the 
occurrence of these critical risks. Table 12 describes the program-
identified critical risks, as of February 2012.

Table 13: GOES-R Program Critical Risks, as of February 2012:

Program-identified critical risks: Program funding stability; 
Program risk description: If the program's funding profile continues 
to be changed, then its life cycle cost will increase; 
Program-identified risk level: High.

Program-identified critical risks: GOES-R development schedule; 
Program risk description: If flight and ground project developments 
(including their dependencies) are delayed, then development schedule 
will be impacted through delayed work or rework, which will increase 
costs and may adversely affect launch readiness; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Global positioning system (GPS) 
timing and frequency interference with GOES-R; 
Program risk description: If GPS timing or frequency interference 
occurs, then there will be a degradation or loss of GOES-R 
capabilities with dependencies on GPS resulting in schedule delays and 
cost increases from rework or redesign; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: GOES-R user readiness; 
Program risk description: If user or NOAA infrastructure upgrades 
necessary to ensure compatibility with GOES-R do not align with 
planned deployment schedules, then there is a possibility that 
specific users will be unable to use the data products; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Interference at the spacecraft with 
the GPS receiver; 
Program risk description: If radiated emissions from instruments or 
other satellite hardware exceed specifications, then GOES-R satellite 
performance may be significantly degraded; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Impact of spacecraft changes on 
launch critical release; 
Program risk description: If there are significant schedule changes in 
the final spacecraft and ground system-related documents regarding 
telemetry tracking and control, spacecraft navigation, and product 
monitoring, then there could be impacts to a major ground software 
release; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Inertial Reference Unit delivery; 
Program risk description: If Inertial Reference Unit development and 
compliance continues to be delayed, then the mission readiness review 
may not be successful, resulting in delayed GOES-R hardware delivery 
and cost and schedule impacts; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Geostationary Lightning Mapper 
(GLM) late delivery; 
Program risk description: If the GLM instrument is delayed beyond 
planned delivery, then spacecraft integration and test will be 
impacted; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: GLM ground processing algorithm 
correction for ghosting; 
Program risk description: If the GLM ground processing algorithm is 
not available from the contractor in time, then the instrument's 
algorithm will be degraded for post-launch testing; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Program budget carryover; 
Program risk description: If funding is not made available in a timely 
manner before carryover is expended, then there is the potential for 
additional program cost and schedule delays; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Program-identified critical risks: Program budget contingency 
(reserve); 
Program risk description: If the flight or ground project experiences 
future difficulties in maintaining agreed-to contingency levels, then 
additional adjustments or descopes may be required with impacts to 
program scope or launch readiness dates; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data. 

[End of table] 

While the program has documented mitigation plans in place for most of 
its critical risks, the program is not mitigating its most critical 
risk--program funding stability. Although the program has included 
this risk on its top risk list and presented it to the NOAA Program 
Management Council, it has not devised options for required replanning 
or functionality descopes should the program experience reduced 
funding. Program officials stated that the risk is external and beyond 
their control. However, given that the program has made trade-off 
decisions regarding available funding, functionality, and the timing 
of its work, it is reasonable to expect the program to have plans in 
place that include possible trade-off decisions based on different 
outcomes, including triggers for when decisions need to be executed.

Further, there is at least one critical risk that is not on the 
program's top risk list that could further jeopardize the program's 
launch readiness dates and life cycle costs: GOES-S milestones may be 
affected by delays that have occurred or may still occur during GOES-R 
development. As discussed earlier in this report, further delays in 
the development of the first satellite could result in problems for 
the second satellite's scheduled milestones since the program is 
planning to complete the second satellite's activities during periods 
of time set aside as reserve to complete the first satellite's 
activities. Program officials stated that a risk has recently been 
added to the flight project's risk list to reflect the potential 
delays to the GOES-S development schedule. Until this risk is added to 
the program's risk list with a documented mitigation approach and 
regular monitoring, NOAA could delay the analysis, planning, and 
actions that would limit the impacts and occurrence of the risk, and 
would thus be unprepared to face the significant consequences to the 
program should this risk be realized.

While the program has well-defined policies and procedures, it has not 
fully implemented its risk process. Fully implementing the recognized 
risk management practices defined in GOES-R policies and procedures 
would provide program officials with the assurance that all risks--
including those that are new and most critical--are adequately 
addressed.

Conclusions:

NOAA has made progress toward achieving GOES-R program goals by 
completing certain preliminary and critical design milestones for its 
flight and ground projects. However, associated reviews, including the 
programwide critical design review planned for August 2012, have been 
delayed by many months. Progress was also accompanied by technical and 
programmatic challenges, such as initial failures of instrument 
components and replanning of ground project software releases. 
Although these two specific challenges are being addressed, others 
such as instrument signal problems and a 2-year cost growth of more 
than 30 percent for program development contracts point to troubling 
patterns that will require ongoing remediation and monitoring. NOAA 
has allocated budget reserves for such situations according to its 
established guidelines and reports that project reserve levels are 
currently within those guidelines. However, the program has used 
approximately 30 percent of its reserves over the last 3 years and 
significant portions of development remain for major components--
including the spacecraft and Core Ground System. In addition, the 
program did not change its reserves when it restored two satellites 
adding approximately $3.2 billion to the program's baseline. Unless 
NOAA assesses the reserve allocations across all of the program's 
development efforts, it may not be able to ensure that its reserves 
will cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems for the 
remaining development of all four satellites in the series.

The unreliability of the program's integrated master schedule and some 
contractor schedules adds further uncertainty to whether the program 
will meet its commitments. The issues that exist among these 
schedules, such as a lack of a full and consistent allocation of 
resources, incomplete logic, and gaps in the critical path to project 
completion, are inconsistent with our and agency best practices. NOAA 
has taken steps to improve schedule reliability through more automated 
schedule integration, a cross-project deliverable-tracking database, 
and its first schedule risk assessment. However, unless the program 
addresses the full set of scheduling weaknesses we identified, its 
schedules may not provide a fully reliable basis for decision making.

NOAA has defined the policies and procedures it needs to effectively 
manage and mitigate these and other program risks. Nevertheless, 
officials do not have a current and comprehensive view of program risk 
because these policies and procedures have not been fully implemented. 
Most significantly, not all known candidate risks have been evaluated; 
corrective actions have not been consistently tracked; and risks we 
identified in this review are not being tracked or adequately 
mitigated. Until program officials diligently execute all of the 
program's defined risk management practices and integrate these with 
improvements in the management of reserves and schedules, the program 
is at risk of exceeding cost and schedule targets and further slipping 
launch dates for satellites in the GOES-R series.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To improve NOAA's ability to execute GOES-R's remaining planned 
development with appropriate reserves, improve the reliability of its 
schedules, and address identified program risks, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that the 
following four actions are taken:

* Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council the 
reserves needed for completing remaining development for each 
satellite in the series.

* For all satellites in the GOES-R program, including those for which 
detailed scheduling has yet to begin, address shortfalls in the 
schedule management practices we identified, including but not limited 
to incorporating appropriate schedule logic, eliminating unnecessary 
constraints, creating a realistic allocation of resources, ensuring an 
unbroken critical path from the current date to the final satellite 
launch, and ensuring that all subcontractor activities are 
incorporated in contractors' integrated master schedules.

* Execute the program's risk management policies and procedures to 
provide more timely and adequate evaluations and reviews of newly 
identified risks, documented handling strategies for all ongoing and 
newly identified risks in the risk register, time frames for when risk 
mitigation and fallback plans are to be executed, adequate rationale 
for decisions to close risks, and documentation and tracking of action 
items from risk review board meetings or other meetings with senior 
NOAA and NASA managers through completion.

* Given the potential impact to the program, add the risk that GOES-S 
milestones may be affected by GOES-R development to the program's 
critical risk list, and ensure that this risk and the program-
identified funding stability risk are adequately monitored and 
mitigated.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA's comments. The department 
concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred 
with one recommendation. It also provided general comments, which are 
addressed below, and technical comments, which we have incorporated 
into our report, as appropriate. A copy of NOAA's comments is provided 
in appendix II.

NOAA concurred with our first recommendation to assess and report on 
the reserves needed for completing the remaining development for each 
satellite in the series to the agency's Program Management Council. It 
stated that the GOES-R program would continue to provide status 
reports on contingency reserves to the Goddard Space Flight Center and 
the Program Management Council, and would work with NOAA to ensure 
contingency reporting meets its needs. It also stated in its general 
comments that contingency reserve for GOES-T and GOES-U (amounting to 
20 percent of their projected development costs) was included when the 
$3.2 billion for these satellites was added to the program budget 
baseline in February 2011. NOAA did not provide any additional data on 
its fiscal year 2012 contingency budget allocations by satellite to 
support this statement and, as we discussed in this report, the 
program did not report a significant change in overall program reserve 
levels when it revised the baseline from two satellites to four 
satellites.

NOAA concurred with our second recommendation to address shortfalls 
that we identified in schedule management practices and stated that 
the program will continue to bring down the number of errors in the 
schedules and improve the fidelity of the program's integrated master 
schedule.

NOAA partially concurred with our third recommendation to fully 
execute the program's risk management policies and procedures, to 
include timely review and disposition of candidate risks. NOAA stated 
that it did not consider the "concerns" listed in its risk database to 
be risks or candidate risks, and that the risk management board 
actively determines whether recorded concerns should be elevated to a 
risk. However, the program has not treated concerns in accordance with 
its risk management plan, which considers these to be "candidate 
risks" and requires their timely review and disposition, as evidenced 
by the many concerns in the database that were more than 3 months old 
and had not been assessed or dispositioned. Unless NOAA follows its 
risk management plan by promptly evaluating "concerns," it cannot 
ensure that it is adequately managing the full set of risks that could 
impact the program.

NOAA concurred with our fourth recommendation to add to the program's 
critical risk list that GOES-S milestones may be affected by GOES-R 
development and to ensure that this risk and the program-identified 
funding stability risk are adequately monitored and mitigated. NOAA 
stated that it currently has identified and reported on the GOES-S 
milestone risk and that the program is working with NOAA to monitor 
and mitigate the funding stability risk.

In a general comment on our discussion of contractors' estimated cost 
growth, NOAA stated that certain growth in contract costs was due to 
scope changes, including instrument options that were exercised in 
2010 and 2011, and stated that such changes should be distinguished 
from cost growth due to efforts to resolve problems. We consider scope 
changes to be a valid component of program cost growth. Nevertheless, 
we revised our report to state that approximately $60 million of the 
$757 million growth in contractors' estimated costs at completion from 
January 2010 through November 2011 was due to scope changes associated 
with new instrument flight model development. If these scope changes 
are excluded, contractors' estimated costs for flight and ground 
project components still grew by approximately $700 million, or 
approximately 30 percent, between January 2010 and January 2012.

NOAA commented that the GOES-R launch readiness date changed from 
December 2014 to October 2015 due to a protest against the spacecraft 
contract award. We acknowledged the reasons for delays in GOES-R's 
launch readiness date in our draft report submitted to NOAA and in our 
prior reports on this program, and have added language to this report 
that relates to the bid protest and NASA's response in delaying the 
award.

NOAA also commented that the revised incremental schedule was less 
risky than its original waterfall schedule. While we acknowledged the 
reduced risk in our draft report and have further revised our report 
to reflect NOAA's comments on our draft, we also note that the revised 
development methodology introduced other risks to the program--such as 
additional contractor staff and software development and verification 
activities that require government oversight and continuous monitoring.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 
other interested parties. The report also will be available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staffs have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 
Director Information Technology Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's (NOAA) progress in developing the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2) 
evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the 
program, and (3) determine whether the program is applying best 
practices in managing and mitigating its risks.

To assess progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, we 
compared the program's planned completion dates for key milestones 
identified in its management control plan and system review plan 
against actual and current estimated completion dates of milestones. 
We analyzed program monthly status briefings to identify the current 
status and recent development challenges of flight and ground project 
components and instruments. We also analyzed contractor-and program-
reported data of development costs and reserves. Finally, we conducted 
several interviews with GOES-R program staff to better understand 
milestone time frames, to discuss current status and recent 
development challenges for work currently being performed on GOES-R, 
and to understand how the program reports costs and reserve totals.

To evaluate whether NOAA has a reliable schedule for executing the 
program, we evaluated contractor schedules to determine the extent to 
which GOES-R is following our identified best practices in creating 
and maintaining its schedules.[Footnote 20] We analyzed four 
contractor schedules--two of which represent the overall schedules for 
the flight and ground projects (spacecraft and Core Ground System), 
the program's critical flight instrument (Advanced Baseline Imager), 
and an instrument that had been experiencing implementation issues at 
the time of our review (Geostationary Lightning Mapper). We also 
populated workbooks as a part of that analysis to highlight potential 
areas of strengths and weakness in schedule logic, use of resources, 
task duration, float, and task completion; analyzed programwide 
initiatives undertaken by GOES-R such as the Joint Cost and Schedule 
Confidence Level and the Giver-Receiver Intersegment Database; 
assessed GOES-R's progress against their own scheduling requirements, 
and interviewed government and contractor officials regarding their 
scheduling practices.

To determine whether the GOES-R program is applying best practices in 
managing and mitigating its risks, we analyzed the program's risk 
management plan to identify the program's policies and procedures and 
compared these to outputs from the program's risk register and other 
program risk management documentation, such as risk mitigation status 
reports. We also reviewed documents such as monthly briefings to the 
NOAA Program Management Council and program risk status reports to 
determine how individual risks are managed and reviewed on a regular 
basis. We assessed the extent to which the program's policies and 
procedures met government and industry recognized risk management 
practices from the Software Engineering Institute's Capability 
Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (Version 1.3), the 
International Organization for Standardization, the Defense 
Acquisition University, and GAO, and whether the program fully 
implemented its policies and procedures. We also examined the 
program's risk status reports and risk register to identify risks for 
which the program did not have an adequate mitigation plan or were not 
being actively monitored by the program. Finally, we interviewed GOES-
R officials to gain further insight into the program's risk management 
process and the program's application of its process.

We primarily performed our work at NOAA and National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area. We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to June 
2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department of Commerce: 
The Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, DC 20230: 

June 7, 2012: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled "Geostationary Weather 
Satellites: Design Progress Made, but Schedule Uncertainty Needs to be 
Addressed" (GAO-12-576). On behalf of the Department of Commerce, I 
have enclosed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
programmatic comments to the draft report. 

If you have any questions, please contact me or Jim Stowers, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs at 
(202) 482-3663. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John E. Bryson: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

Comments to the Draft GAO Report Entitled: 

"Geostationary Weather Satellites: Design Progress Made, but Schedule 
Uncertainty Needs to be Addressed" (GA0-12-576, June 2012): 

General Comments: 

The GAO draft report does not distinguish between contract cost growth 
that is due to scope changes and cost growth that is the result of 
resolving problems (hardware development issues) and the appropriate 
use of reserves. All growth is lumped together. For example, in 2010, 
all of the FM-3 instrument options were exercised as spares. In 2011, 
the SEISS FM-4 instrument option was exercised. These are not 
overruns. The GOES-R budget is based on program office cost estimates 
and independent cost estimates that reflect the development 
uncertainties and risks associated with this type of development in 
addition to the anticipated contract costs. 

In the GAO draft report, GAO raises a concern that the Ground Segment 
replan effort has "...led to increased complexity for the development 
of GOES-R..." The Ground Segment replan is, in fact, less risky than 
the original waterfall schedule, and was a prudent management decision 
to change the delivery of software capabilities at major software 
releases to an approach where software capabilities could be delivered 
incrementally (prior to major releases) as the project received data 
inputs from flight project instrument contractors. This approach was 
independently reviewed by the program's Standing Review Board, which 
also concluded that the approach was robust. 

The change in the GOES-R launch readiness date (LRD) from December 
2014 to October 2015 was due to a nine month protest against the 
spacecraft contract award. The LRD for GOES-R has remained constant 
since 2009, and currently the program schedule reflects 164 days of 
slack to the October 2015 LRD. 

GAO raises a concern that, "Although the program restored two 
satellites to its budget baseline in February 2011, thereby adding 
approximately $3.2 billion to its total budget, it did not 
correspondingly change its program reserves." The budget addition for 
GOES-T and GOES-U did, in fact, include contingency reserves. The 
added contingency amounted to 20 percent of the projected GOES-T and 
GOES-U development costs, per NASA reserve standards. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management 
Council the reserves needed for completing remaining development for 
each satellite in the series. 

NOAA Response: Concur. GOES-R Series Program currently reports 
contingency amounts (reserves) to the Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) monthly Management Status Reviews and the NOAA monthly Program 
Management Council (PMC) meeting. The unliened contingency amount is 
reported as a dollar amount and as a percentage of unexecuted work-to-
go. This approach inherently provides a tripwire to notify management 
of contingency falling below the required levels for work-to-go, 
including work on GOES-R,S, T, and U. The GOES-R Series Program will 
continue the ongoing process of working with NOAA to ensure 
contingency reporting meets its needs, and revise reporting 
accordingly. The percent of unliened contingency on work-to-go, which 
is reported monthly to management by the GOES-R Program, specifically 
addresses the expressed GAO's concern regarding sufficient reserves to 
complete the GOES-R Series. 

Recommendation 2: For all satellites in the GOES-R program, including 
those for which detailed scheduling has yet to begin, address 
shortfalls in the schedule management practices we identified, 
including but not limited to incorporating appropriate schedule logic, 
eliminating unnecessary constraints, creating a realistic allocation 
of resources, ensuring an unbroken critical path from the current date 
to the final satellite launch, and ensuring that all subcontractor 
activities are incorporated in contractors' integrated master 
schedules. 

NOAA Response: Concur. GOES-R conducts monthly health checks of the 
spacecraft, instrument, and ground segment schedules and works with 
the contractors to resolve the issues identified. The Program 
Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) is built from the contractor schedule 
submissions, which are summarized into flight and ground segment 
schedules that are then integrated to form the Program IMS. The 
contractor schedules do reflect the appropriate subcontractor 
activities. The integration and summarization process provides an end-
to-end critical path and the amount of schedule slack for that 
critical path. Schedule performance information is also monitored and 
reported in a number of nonschedule ways. For example, milestones 
executed versus planned, engineering products executed versus planned, 
reviews (requirements, design, manufacturing, etc.) executed versus 
planned, and progress on subcontract and procurement activities. 
Flight, Ground, and Program schedule information is reported to the 
GSFC monthly Management Status Reviews and the NOAA monthly PMC 
meetings. The GOES-R Series Program will continue to bring down the 
number of errors in the schedules and improve the fidelity of the 
Program IMS. 

Recommendation 3: Execute the program's risk management policies and 
procedures to provide more timely and adequate evaluations and reviews 
of newly identified risks, documented handling strategies for all 
ongoing and newly identified risks in the risk register, time frames 
for when risk mitigation and fallback plans are to be executed, 
adequate rationale for decisions to close risks, and documentation and 
tracking of action items from risk review board meetings or other 
meetings with senior NOAA and NASA managers through completion. 

NOAA Response: Partially concur. GOES-R recognizes that the Program 
needs to develop a stronger process for tracking corrective actions 
from the risk management board. However, we believe the aspects of the 
recommendation pertaining to timeliness are due to a misunderstanding 
of our process. Concerns in the system are not being currently 
considered as "risks" or "candidate risks." Concerns can be, and are, 
maintained and statused within the system as "concerns" but do not 
necessarily need to be elevated to "risks." Those items that are being 
considered as risks are in fact boarded within 1 to 3 months, and the 
risk management board actively determines whether recorded concerns 
should be elevated to a risk. 

GOES-R Series Program continues to utilize our Risk Management Plan to 
identify and manage concerns, watch items, and candidate risks. The 
GOES-R Series Program does recognize and has an action underway to 
improve—documentation regarding risk management and closure decisions, 
as well as tracking and resolution of risk board action items.

Recommendation 4: Given the potential impact to the program, add the 
risk that GOES-S milestones may be affected by GOES-R development to 
the program's critical risk list, and ensure that this risk and the 
program-identified funding stability risk are adequately monitored and 
mitigated. 

NOAA Response: Concur. The GOES-R Series Program currently has this 
risk identified and, as such, it is reported to the GSFC monthly 
Management Status Reviews and the NOAA monthly PMC meetings. All 
appropriate risks, including the risk in question, are addressed 
monthly at the program-level Risk Management Board. The risk posture 
presented monthly to the NOAA PMC is an integrated composite of all 
the appropriate risks across the program, which also includes the risk 
in question. 

With respect to the funding stability risk, the program office works 
closely with NOAA and the Department of Commerce to support actions 
and activities to monitor and mitigate.

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to the contact named above, individuals making 
contributions to this report included Colleen Phillips (assistant 
director), Paula Moore (assistant director), Shaun Byrnes, Nancy 
Glover, Franklin Jackson, Jason Lee, and Josh Leiling.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet 
when they are on the ground (before launch) and by numbers once they 
are in orbit.

[2] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other 
Satellite Programs, GAO-06-1129T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006) 
and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain 
in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-
993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

[3] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Acquisition Has Increased Costs, Reduced Capabilities, and Delayed 
Schedules, GAO-09-596T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2009); 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is 
Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight, GAO-09-
323 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2009); Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Further Actions Needed to Effectively Manage 
Risks, GAO-08-183T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2007); and 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Progress Has Been 
Made, but Improvements Are Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, GAO-08-
18 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2007).

[4] GAO-09-323.

[5] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key 
Users, GAO-10-799 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 1, 2010). See also GAO-09-
596T.

[6] GAO-10-799.

[7] The program established planned dates for key program and system 
milestones in its management control plan documented in December 2007. 
This plan was approved by NOAA's Assistant Administrator for Satellite 
and Information Services and formed the basis of flight and ground 
project plans prior to entering the development phase of the program.

[8] Completion of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper's CDR was 16 
months later than the planned milestone documented in December 2007 
when the program entered into its development phase, and 13 months 
later than the revised milestone established in March 2010.

[9] These options included 31 additional products--such as low cloud 
and fog, sulfur dioxide detection, and cloud liquid water--as well as 
enhancements to the time to deliver the remaining products and how 
often these products are updated with new satellite data.

[10] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, 
D.C., Mar. 2009).

[11] Reserve levels are to be based on all planned remaining 
development and do not include operations and maintenance costs.

[12] NOAA uses the terms liens and encumbrances to represent potential 
risks or issues for which the program is to address with reserves. We 
refer to these as reserve commitments. 

[13] See, for example, GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale 
Projects, GAO-11-239SP (Washington, D.C., March 3, 2011) and NASA: 
Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-12-207SP, 
(Washington, D.C., March 1, 2012).

[14] The restoration of GOES-T and GOES-U to the program resulted in 
an increase of $3.2 billion to the program's cost estimate.

[15] These practices are based on GAO-09-3SP. 

[16] The subordinate schedules used in creating the IMS each contain 
detailed activities for discrete segments of the GOES-R program, such 
as instruments, which are assigned to a specific contractor. We did 
not analyze the programwide IMS itself due to the limitations inherent 
in manual creation of this schedule. However, conclusions drawn from 
analysis of contractors' schedules that feed directly into the 
programwide IMS can therefore be applied to the program's IMS as well.

[17] Our rationale for the selection and analysis of schedules is 
discussed in appendix I.

[18] Total float is the amount of time that an activity can slip 
before the delay affects the finish milestone.

[19] The Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level is a probabilistic 
analysis that includes, among other things, all cost and schedule 
elements, incorporates and quantifies potential risks, assesses the 
impacts of cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual 
resources to arrive at development cost and schedule estimates 
associated with various confidence levels.

[20] The subordinate schedules analyzed were the Advanced Baseline 
Imager, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, and the schedules for GOES-
R's flight and ground projects--the spacecraft and Core Ground System. 

[End of section] 

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