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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of 
Representatives: 

June 2012: 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: 

Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require 
Focused Attention: 

GAO-12-604: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-604, a report to the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Environmental satellites provide critical data used in forecasting 
weather and measuring variations in climate over time. NPOESS—-a 
program managed by NOAA, DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration—-was planned to replace two existing polar-orbiting 
environmental satellite systems. However, 8 years after a development 
contract for the NPOESS program was awarded in 2002, the cost estimate 
had more than doubled—to about $15 billion, launch dates had been 
delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality had been removed 
from the program, and the program’s tri-agency management structure 
had proven to be ineffective. In February 2010, a presidential task 
force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD 
undertake separate acquisitions. 

GAO was asked to evaluate (1) efforts to transfer responsibilities 
from the NPOESS program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) 
NOAA’s progress in developing its satellite system, and (3) NOAA’s 
efforts to mitigate key project risks. To do so, GAO analyzed program 
management, contract, cost, and risk data, attended executive program 
reviews, and interviewed agency and contractor officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Following the decision to disband the National Polar-orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program in 2010, 
both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the Department of Defense (DOD) made initial progress in transferring 
key management responsibilities to their separate program offices. 
Specifically, NOAA established a Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) 
program office, documented its requirements, and transferred existing 
contracts for earth-observing sensors to the new program. DOD 
established its Defense Weather Satellite System program office and 
modified contracts accordingly. However, recent events have resulted 
in major program changes at both agencies. NOAA plans to revise its 
program requirements to remove key elements, including sensors and 
ground-based data processing systems, to keep the program within 
budget. Further, in early 2012, DOD decided to terminate its program 
and reassess its requirements. 

Over the past year, NOAA has made progress in developing its satellite 
system, but critical decisions and milestones lie ahead. In October 
2011, the JPSS program office successfully launched a satellite 
originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). Data from the 
satellite are currently being calibrated and validated, and NOAA 
meteorologists started using selected satellite data products in their 
weather forecasts in May 2012. Further, the three major components of 
the JPSS program (the flight, ground, and free-flyer projects) are at 
different stages of development. Within the flight project, 
development of the sensors for the first JPSS satellite is well under 
way; however, selected sensors are experiencing technical issues. The 
ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP and NOAA is 
planning to upgrade parts of the ground system infrastructure to 
increase its security and reliability. The free-flyer project, 
intended to integrate and launch key instruments that could not be 
accommodated on the JPSS satellites, is still in a planning stage 
because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the 
instruments or when these satellites will launch. 

The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an effective risk 
management process; however, the program still faces significant 
risks. It does not yet have a cost and schedule baseline in place, the 
program office is not yet fully staffed, and there will likely be a 
gap in satellite data lasting 17 to 53 months from the time NPP is 
projected to cease operations and the first JPSS satellite begins to 
operate. There are also potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and 
European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary 
information to NOAA forecasts. The JPSS program office is managing the 
first two risks, but NOAA has not established plans to mitigate 
potential satellite gaps. Until these risks are mitigated and 
resolved, civilian and military satellite data users may not have the 
information they need for timely weather forecasting, thereby risking 
lives, property, and commerce. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making a recommendation to NOAA to establish mitigation plans 
to address the risk of satellite data gaps. NOAA agreed with GAO’s 
recommendation and noted that the agency is developing a report to 
address the risk of data gaps. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-604]. For more 
information, contact David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Polar Satellite Data and Products: 

Agencies Transferred Responsibilities to Their Respective Programs, 
but NOAA's Is Being Downsized, and DOD's Has Been Terminated: 

NPP Is in Orbit and Transmitting Data; Development of the First JPSS 
Satellite Has Begun, but Critical Steps Remain: 

JPSS Risk Management Process in Place; Key Risks Remain: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments by the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002: 

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and the NOAA and DOD Plans for 
Replacing NPOESS, at Different Points in Time: 

Table 3: JPSS Projects and Components: 

Table 4: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the 
First JPSS Satellite, as of April 2012: 

Table 5: Status of Key Free Flyer Components, as of April 2012: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

Figure 4: Composite of VIIRS Images: 

Figure 5: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 
Orbit: 

Figure 6: The Polar Satellite Constellation: 

Abbreviations: 

ATMS: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder: 

CERES: Cloud and Earth's Radiant Energy System: 

CrIS: Cross-Track Infrared Sounder: 

DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DWSS: Defense Weather Satellite System: 

IDPS: Interface Data Processing Segment: 

JPSS: Joint Polar Satellite System: 

MetOp: Meteorological Operational (satellite): 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System: 

NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project (original)/National Polar-orbiting 
Partnership (current): 

OMPS: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite: 

POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 

VIIRS: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 15, 2012: 

The Honorable Ralph Hall: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment-
monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-
orbiting environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the 
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the 
program was considered critical to the nation's ability to maintain 
the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global 
climate monitoring through the year 2026. 

However, in the 8 years after the development contract was awarded in 
2002, the NPOESS cost estimate had more than doubled--to about $15 
billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant 
functionality had been removed from the program, and the program's tri-
agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. Importantly, 
delays in launching the satellites put the program's mission at risk. 
To address these challenges, a task force led by the White House's 
Office of Science and Technology Policy reviewed the management and 
governance of the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the Director of 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a decision to 
disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD 
undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites 
in the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early 
morning orbit. After that decision, both agencies began developing 
plans for their separate programs, called the Joint Polar Satellite 
System (JPSS) and the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), 
respectively. 

This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate efforts to 
transfer management and contract responsibilities from the NPOESS 
program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) assess NOAA's 
progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and JPSS, 
and (3) evaluate NOAA's efforts to mitigate key project risks. 

To evaluate efforts to transfer management and contract 
responsibilities from NPOESS programs to separate NOAA and DOD 
programs, we compared NOAA's and DOD's plans for establishing program 
management offices and transferring contracts to each agency's actual 
accomplishments. We also observed NOAA's monthly program management 
briefings and interviewed NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials to obtain 
insights into risks, issues, and transition schedules. To assess 
progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite systems, we compared 
NOAA's plans for key milestones to its accomplishments and interviewed 
agency and contractor officials. We also interviewed key NOAA and DOD 
satellite data users to determine their experiences in working with 
NPP data as well as their plans for working with JPSS data. To 
evaluate NOAA's efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared the 
agency's risk management process to best practices in risk management 
as identified by leading systems engineering organizations, and 
interviewed agency officials. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional 
details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in 
appendix I. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.[Footnote 1] These 
satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide 
graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These 
satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical weather 
prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather 
days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of 
hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the 
potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency 
managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. Polar satellites 
also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as 
ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are 
used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate 
monitoring. 

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position 
relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the 
earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of 
conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes 
about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite 
views the entire earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there is one 
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that 
are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning, 
midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government relies on 
a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) 
satellite, for satellite observations in the midmorning orbit. 
[Footnote 2] Together, the satellites ensure that, for any region of 
the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 
hours old. Besides the operational satellites, six older satellites 
are in orbit that still collect some data and are available to provide 
limited backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or 
fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 2009. The Air 
Force plans to launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. 
Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar satellite 
constellation. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Depicts notional local equatorial crossing times as follows: 

DMSP: 0530 hours; 
POES: 1330 hours; 
MetOp: 0930 hours; 
DMSP: 0800 hours. 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office and DOD data; 
Map Resources (globe). 

[End of figure] 

Polar Satellite Data and Products: 

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed 
into a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands 
of radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely 
determining information about the earth's atmosphere, land surface, 
oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data 
are considered raw data. To make them usable, processing centers 
format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth-
location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are 
called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data 
records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records 
and temperature data records. These data records are then used to 
derive weather and climate products called environmental data records. 
These environmental data records include a wide range of atmospheric 
products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone 
distribution; land surface products showing snow cover, vegetation, 
and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface temperatures, sea 
ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space environment. 
Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor, temperature, and 
environmental data records) are also used to derive more sophisticated 
products, including outputs from numerical weather models and 
assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified depiction of 
the various stages of satellite data processing, and figure 3 depicts 
examples of two different weather products. 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 
                  
Raw data; 
Raw data records; 
Sensor data records and temperature data records; 
Environmental data records; 
Derived products and output from numerical weather prediction models. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA information. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 satellite images] 

Source: NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information 
Service. 

Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005; the figure on the right is an analysis of ozone concentration 
produced from POES satellite data. 

[End of figure] 

The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence: 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 
two satellite programs into a single satellite program--NPOESS--
capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. 
[Footnote 3] The converged program, NPOESS, was considered critical to 
the nation's ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
weather forecasting and global climate monitoring. NPOESS satellites 
were expected to replace the POES and DMSP satellites in the morning, 
midmorning, and afternoon orbits when they neared the end of their 
expected life spans. 

To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 
Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program 
management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the 
Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for 
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies 
into the converged system. 

When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the 
program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. The 
program was to include the procurement and launch of 6 satellites over 
the life of the program, with each satellite hosting a subset of 13 
instruments. The planned instruments included 11 environmental 
sensors, and two systems supporting specific user services (see table 
1). To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to 
maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch the 
NPP demonstration satellite in May 2006.[Footnote 4] NPP was to 
demonstrate selected instruments that would later be included on the 
NPOESS satellites. The first NPOESS satellite was to be available for 
launch in March 2008. 

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002: 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the 
atmosphere; to be used in combination with the cross-track infrared 
sounder to produce daily global atmospheric temperature, humidity, and 
pressure profiles. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Retrieves specific aerosol (liquid droplets or solid 
particles suspended in the atmosphere, such as sea spray, smog, and 
smoke) and cloud measurements. 

Instrument: Conical microwave imager/sounder; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain 
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the 
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at 
different atmospheric levels. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects measurements of the infrared radiation emitted 
and scattered by the Earth and atmosphere to determine the vertical 
distribution of temperature, moisture, and pressure in the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Instrument type: System providing services to selected users; 
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the 
world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave 
radiation released by the Earth back into space on a worldwide scale 
to enhance long-term climate studies. 

Instrument: Global positioning system occultation sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures the refraction of radio wave signals from the 
Global Positioning System and Russia's Global Navigation Satellite 
System to characterize the ionosphere and information related to the 
vertical distribution of temperature and moisture of the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and 
distribution of ozone in the Earth's atmosphere. Consists of two 
components (nadir and limb) that can be provided separately. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and 
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface 
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to 
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction 
models. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite-aided tracking system; 
Instrument type: System providing services to selected users; 
Description: A subsystem that detects and locates aviators, mariners, 
and land-based users in distress. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the 
effects of space weather on technological systems, including 
satellites and radio links. 

Instrument: Total and spectral solar irradiance sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance 
data. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide 
information on the Earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land 
surfaces. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the former NPOESS Integrated Program 
Office. 

[End of table] 

In the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered 
significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost 
growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the 
program's cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the 
first launch was delayed by almost 2 years.[Footnote 5] These issues 
led to a 2006 decision to restructure the program, which reduced the 
program's functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites 
from 6 to 4, and the number of instruments from 13 to 9. As part of 
the decision, officials decided to reduce the number of orbits from 
three (early morning, midmorning, and afternoon) to two (early morning 
and afternoon) and to rely solely on the European satellites for 
midmorning orbit data. 

Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to 
encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri-
agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost 
increases. Because the schedule delays could lead to satellite data 
gaps, in March 2009, agency executives decided to use NPP as an 
operational satellite.[Footnote 6] Later, in August 2009, faced with 
costs that were expected to reach about $15 billion and launch 
schedules that were delayed by over 5 years, the Executive Office of 
the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition 
options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this 
review, in February 2010, the Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy announced that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly 
procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would plan 
and acquire its own satellite system.[Footnote 7] Specifically, NOAA 
would be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations 
planned for the first and third satellites. DOD would be responsible 
for the early morning orbit and the observations planned for the 
second and fourth satellites. The partnership with the European 
satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit was to continue as 
planned. When this decision was announced, NOAA immediately began 
planning for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit--called 
JPSS--and DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the 
morning orbit--called DWSS. 

Overview of Initial NOAA and DOD Plans for Replacement Satellite 
Programs: 

After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010, 
NOAA and DOD began planning for their respective satellite programs. 
For NOAA, these plans included: 

* relying on NASA for system acquisition, engineering, and integration; 

* completing, launching, and supporting NPP; 

* acquiring and launching two satellites for the afternoon orbit, 
called JPSS-1 and JPSS-2; 

* developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites; 

* finding alternate host satellites for selected instruments that 
would not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites; and: 

* providing ground system support for NPP, JPSS, and DWSS; data 
communications for MetOp and DMSP; and data processing for NOAA's use 
of microwave data from an international satellite. 

In 2010, NOAA estimated that the life cycle costs of the JPSS program 
would be approximately $11.9 billion for a program lasting through 
fiscal year 2024, which included $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on 
NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 8] 

Alternatively, DOD planned that its DWSS program would be comprised of 
two satellites, the first to be launched no earlier than 2018. Each 
satellite was to have three sensors: a Visible/Infrared Imager/ 
Radiometer Suite, a Space Environment Monitor, and a microwave imager/ 
sounder. As of September 2011, DOD planned to conduct a thorough 
system requirements review before finalizing DWSS functionality, cost, 
and schedule. Table 2 compares the planned cost, schedule, and scope 
of the three satellite programs at different points in time. 

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and the NOAA and DOD Plans for 
Replacing NPOESS, at Different Points in Time: 

Key area: Life cycle range; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 1995-2020; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 1995-2026; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 1995-
2026; 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): JPSS: 1995-2024; 
DWSS: not determined. 

Key area: Estimated life cycle cost; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): $8.4 
billion; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): $12.5 
billion; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): $13.95+ 
billion[A]; 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): JPSS: $11.9 billion 
(which includes about $2.9 billion spent through fiscal year 2010 on 
NPOESS); 
DWSS: not determined. 

Key area: Number of satellites; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 6 (in 
addition to NPP); 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 4 (in 
addition to NPP); 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 4 (in 
addition to NPP); 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): JPSS: 2 (in addition 
to NPP); 
DWSS: 2. 

Key area: Number of orbits; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 3 (early 
morning, midmorning, and afternoon); 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 2 (early 
morning and afternoon; would rely on European satellites for 
midmorning orbit data); 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 2 
(early morning and afternoon; would rely on European satellites for 
midmorning orbit data); 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): JPSS: 1 (afternoon 
orbit); 
DWSS: 1 (early morning orbit); (European satellites would provide 
midmorning orbit). 

Key area: Launch schedule; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): NPP by 
October 2006; 
First NPOESS (C1) by November 2009; Second NPOESS (C2) by June 2011; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): NPP by 
January 2010; C1 by January 2013; C2 by January 2016; C3 by January 
2018; C4 by January 2020; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): NPP no 
earlier than September 2011; C1 by March 2014; C2 by May 2016; C3 by 
January 2018; C4 by January 2020; 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): JPSS: 
* NPP no earlier than September 2011; 
* JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent) available in 2015; 
* JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent) available in 2018; 
DWSS: no earlier than 2018. 

Key area: Number of sensors; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 11 sensors 
and 2 user services systems; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): NPP: 4 
sensors; C1: 6 sensors; C2: 2 sensors; C3: 6 sensors; C4: 2 sensors; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): NPP: 5 
sensors; C1: 7 sensors[B]; C2: 2 sensors; C3: 6 sensors; C4: 2 sensors; 
NOAA and DOD acquisition plans (as of May 2010): NPP: 5 sensors; 
JPSS-1 and 2: 5 sensors[C]; 
DWSS: 3 sensors. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA, DOD, and task force data. 

[A] Although the program baseline was $13.95 billion in February 2010, 
we estimated in June 2009 that this cost could grow by about $1 
billion. In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the 
President stated that they reviewed life-cycle cost estimates from DOD 
and the NPOESS program office of $15.1 billion and $16.45 billion, 
respectively. 

[B] In May 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee approved an additional 
sensor--the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor--for the C1 
satellite. 

[C] The five sensors are ATMS, the Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy 
System (CERES), CrIS, OMPS, and VIIRS. NOAA also committed to finding 
an alternative spacecraft and launch accommodation for the Total and 
Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor, the Advanced Data Collection System, 
and the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system. 

[End of table] 

Prior GAO Work Recommended Actions to Solidify Plans and Address Risks: 

We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS program highlighting 
technical issues, cost growth, and key management challenges affecting 
the tri-agency program structure.[Footnote 9] For example, in June 
2009, we added to our previous concerns about the tri-agency oversight 
of the NPOESS program.[Footnote 10] We reported that the Executive 
Committee responsible for providing direction to the program was 
ineffective because the DOD acquisition executive did not attend 
committee meetings; the committee did not track action items to 
closure; and many of the committee's decisions did not achieve the 
desired outcomes. We also reported that the program's cost estimates 
were expected to rise and that the launch schedules were expected to 
be delayed. To help address these issues, we made recommendations to, 
among other things, improve executive-level oversight and develop 
realistic time frames for revising cost and schedule baselines. Agency 
officials agreed with our recommendations and took steps to improve 
executive oversight. 

More recently, in May 2010, we reported on NOAA's and DOD's 
preliminary plans for initiating new environmental satellite programs 
and noted that agency officials had not yet made key decisions on 
their programs' cost, schedule, and capabilities and we highlighted 
key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their new programs.[Footnote 
11] These risks included the loss of key staff and capabilities, 
delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program 
offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, and 
insufficient oversight of new program management. We recommended that 
the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce direct their respective NPOESS 
follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, 
schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs, and to develop 
plans to address the key transition risks we identified. As discussed 
later in this report, both agencies subsequently made decisions about 
the scope of their respective programs and took steps to mitigate the 
transition risks we identified. For example, NOAA transferred key 
staff from the NPOESS program to the JPSS program and coordinated with 
the Air Force to negotiate contract changes. 

Agencies Transferred Responsibilities to Their Respective Programs, 
but NOAA's Is Being Downsized, and DOD's Has Been Terminated: 

Following the decision to disband NPOESS, both NOAA and DOD were 
responsible for transferring key management responsibilities to their 
respective programs. This entailed (1) establishing separate program 
offices for their respective follow-on programs, (2) establishing 
requirements for their respective programs, and (3) transferring 
contracts from NPOESS to the new programs. 

Both agencies made progress on these activities, but recent events 
have resulted in major program changes. Specifically, NOAA established 
its JPSS program office, established program requirements, and 
transferred most sensor contracts. However, the agency now plans to 
remove key requirements, including selected sensors and ground 
systems, to keep the program within budget. DOD established its DWSS 
program office and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding 
in early 2012 to terminate the program and reassess its requirements 
(as directed by Congress). 

NOAA Established the JPSS Program and Contracts for Most Components, 
but Plans to Modify Requirements to Limit Costs: 

After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA transferred 
management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its 
requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. 
Specifically, NOAA established a program office to guide the 
development of the NPP and JPSS satellites. NOAA also worked with NASA 
to establish its program office to oversee the acquisition, system 
engineering, and integration of the satellite program. By 2011, the 
two agencies had established separate--but colocated--JPSS program 
offices, each with different roles and responsibilities. NOAA's 
program office is responsible for programmatic activities related to 
the satellites' development, including managing requirements, budgets, 
and interactions with satellite data users. Alternatively, NASA's 
program office is responsible for the development and integration of 
the sensors, satellites, and ground systems. In January 2012, both 
agencies approved a management control plan that delineates the two 
agencies' roles, responsibilities, and executive oversight structure. 

In September 2011, NOAA established its official requirements document 
for the JPSS program. This document defines the components of the 
program as well as the expected performance of the satellites and 
ground systems. Key components include NPP, the two JPSS satellites, 
the five sensors, a distributed ground-based network of satellite data 
receptor sites, and four ground-based data processing systems. This 
system is to deliver 31 satellite data products within 80 minutes of 
observation on the first satellite and within 30 minutes on the second 
satellite. 

Over the 2 years since the decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA has also 
been working to transfer and refine the contracts for four of the 
sensors that are to be launched on the first JPSS satellite from the 
Air Force to NASA.[Footnote 12] The program completed the transfer of 
all of the contracts by September 2011 and then began the process of 
updating the contracts to match JPSS' requirements. This process has 
been completed for three sensors (CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS). Program 
officials expect to finalize changes to the contract for the last 
sensor (VIIRS) in June 2012. 

NOAA Plans to Modify Requirements and May Remove Program Elements to 
Keep Costs at $12.9 Billion: 

While NOAA and NASA have made progress in transferring management and 
contract responsibilities from NPOESS to the JPSS program, NOAA 
recently decided to modify its requirements in order to limit program 
costs. From January to December 2011, the agency went through a cost 
estimating exercise for the JPSS program. This exercise included 
identifying key program elements, documenting assumptions, performing 
historical and parametric analysis to determine reasonable estimates 
for the elements, seeking an independent cost estimate, and 
reconciling the two estimates. At the end of this exercise, NOAA 
validated that the cost of the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal 
year 2012 through fiscal year 2028 would be $11.3 billion. After 
adding the agency's sunk costs of $3.3 billion, the program's life 
cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6 billion.[Footnote 13] This amount is 
$2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion estimate for JPSS when 
NPOESS was disbanded in 2010. According to NOAA officials, this 
increase is primarily due to a 4-year extension of the program from 
2024 to 2028, the addition of previously unbudgeted items such as the 
free flyers, cost growth associated with transitioning contracts from 
DOD to NOAA, and the program's decision to slow down work on lower-
priority elements because of budget constraints in 2011. 

In working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish the 
president's fiscal year 2013 budget request, NOAA officials stated 
that they agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 
2017, to merge funding for two climate sensors into the JPSS budget, 
and to cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion through 2028. 
Because this cap is $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 billion life 
cycle cost of the full program, NOAA decided to remove selected 
elements from the satellite program. While final decisions on what 
will be removed are expected by the end of June 2012, NOAA may 
discontinue: 

* support for OMPS operations on JPSS-1; 

* development of two of the three planned Total and Spectral Solar 
Irradiance Sensors, the spacecraft for all three of these sensors, and 
the launch vehicle for the three sensors; 

* development of the OMPS and CERES sensors on JPSS-2; 

* plans for a network of ground-based receptor stations; 

* planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain satellite data 
from JPSS-2 (the requirement was to provide data in 30 minutes; 
instead, the requirement will remain at the JPSS-1 level of 80 
minutes); 

* plans to install an Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) at two 
Navy locations; and: 

* plans to support ground operations for DOD's future polar satellite 
program. 

NOAA anticipates modifying its official requirements documents to 
reflect these changes by the end of 2012. The removal of these 
elements will affect both civilian and military satellite data users. 
The loss of OMPS and CERES satellite data could cause a break in the 
over 30-year history of satellite data and would hinder the efforts of 
climatologists and meteorologists focusing on understanding changes in 
the earth's ozone coverage and radiation budget.[Footnote 14] The loss 
of ground-based receptor stations means that NOAA may not be able to 
improve the timeliness of JPSS-2 satellite data from 80 minutes to the 
current 30 minute requirement, and as a result, weather forecasters 
will not be able to update their weather models using the most recent 
satellite observations. Further, the loss of the data processing 
systems at the two Navy locations means that NOAA and the Navy will 
need to establish an alternative way to provide data to the Navy. 

DOD Established and Subsequently Terminated Its DWSS Program: 

After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, DOD transferred 
management responsibilities to its new satellite program, started 
defining its requirements, and modified contracts to reflect the new 
program. Specifically, in 2010, DOD established a DWSS program office 
and started developing plans for what the satellite program would 
entail. The DWSS program office, located at the Space and Missile 
Systems Center in Los Angeles, California, was given responsibility 
for the acquisition, development, integration, and launch of the DWSS 
satellites. Because this is considered a major acquisition, it is 
overseen by the Defense Acquisition Board and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

In August 2010, the agency determined that the DWSS program would 
include two satellites and that each satellite would host three 
sensors.[Footnote 15] Over the following year, the program office 
developed a program plan and a technical description, and planned to 
define requirements in early 2012. Further, the agency started 
modifying its existing contracts with the NPOESS contractor to reflect 
the new program. By May 2011, the program office had contracted for 
DWSS activities through the end of 2012. 

These efforts, however, have been halted. In early 2012, with 
congressional direction, DOD decided to terminate the DWSS program 
because it still has two DMSP satellites to launch and it did not yet 
need the DWSS satellites.[Footnote 16] In January 2012, the Air Force 
halted work on the program. DOD is currently identifying alternative 
means to fulfill its future environmental satellite requirements. 

NPP Is in Orbit and Transmitting Data; Development of the First JPSS 
Satellite Has Begun, but Critical Steps Remain: 

In September 2010, shortly after NPOESS was disbanded, NOAA and NASA 
established plans for both NPP and JPSS. These plans included: 

* launching NPP by the end of October 2011 and completing an early on-
orbit check out of the NPP spacecraft and sensors (called 
commissioning) by the end of January 2012; 

* completing all NPP calibration and validation activities[Footnote 
17] by October 2013; and: 

* developing, testing, and launching JPSS-1 by the end of 2014 and 
JPSS-2 by the end of 2017.[Footnote 18] 

Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 will launch by March 
2017 and JPSS-2 will launch by December 2022. NOAA officials explained 
that part of the reason for the change in launch dates is that the 
program's budget under the 2011 continuing resolution was only one 
third of what NOAA had anticipated. Thus, program officials decided to 
defer development of the first JPSS satellite in order to keep NPP on 
track. 

NPP Is in Orbit; Sensor Data Are Being Calibrated for Use: 

NPP was successfully launched on October 28, 2011. After launch, NASA 
began the process of activating the satellite and commissioning the 
instruments. This process ended at the beginning of March 2012, which 
was a little over a month after the planned completion date at the end 
of January 2012. The delay was caused by an issue on the VIIRS 
instrument that caused the program to halt commissioning activities in 
order to diagnose the problem. Specifically, the quality of VIIRS data 
in certain bands was degrading much more quickly than expected. NASA 
and the JPSS program office subsequently identified the problem as 
contamination on VIIRS mirrors. NOAA and NASA program officials, 
including the JPSS director and project manager, reported that this 
issue is not expected to cause the instrument to fall below its 
performance specifications. Figure 4 depicts an image of Earth using 
VIIRS data from NPP. 

Figure 4: Composite of VIIRS Images: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

Program officials are working to complete NPP calibration and 
validation activities by October 2013, but they acknowledge that they 
may encounter delays in developing satellite products. NOAA is 
receiving data from the five sensors on the NPP satellite, and has 
begun calibration and validation. According to NOAA and NASA 
officials, during this time, the products go through various levels of 
validation, including a beta stage (products have been minimally 
validated, but are available to users so that they can begin working 
with the data); a provisional stage (products are not optimal, but are 
ready for operational evaluation by users); and a validated stage 
(products are ready for operational use). The amount of time it takes 
for a product to be fully validated depends on the sensor and the type 
of product. For example, NOAA provided a provisional ozone 
environmental data record from the OMPS sensor in April 2012 and 
expects to provide three beta environmental data records from the CrIS 
sensor by October 2012. NOAA's users began to use validated ATMS 
products in May 2012, and NOAA expects that they will increase the 
amount and types of data they use in the following months. 

Development of JPSS Is Under Way; Critical Decisions and Milestones 
Are Pending: 

The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of 
development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead. 
NASA's JPSS program office organized its responsibilities into three 
separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors, 
spacecraft, and launch vehicles; (2) the ground project, which 
includes ground-based data processing and command and control systems, 
and (3) the free-flyer project, which involves developing and 
launching the instruments that are not going to be included on the 
JPSS satellites. Table 3 shows the three JPSS projects and their key 
components. 

Table 3: JPSS Projects and Components: 

Project: Flight; 
Key components and responsibilities: 
* Sensors: ATMS, CERES, CrIS, OMPS, VIIRS; 
* Spacecraft; 
* Launch vehicle. 

Project: Ground; 
Key components and responsibilities: 
* Satellite command, control, and communications; 
* Interface data processing segment (IDPS). 

Project: Free Flyer; 
Key components and responsibilities: 
* Sensor: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor; 
* Subsystems: Search and Rescue Satellite-aided Tracking System and 
the Advanced Data Collection System; 
* Spacecraft; 
* Launch vehicle. 

Source: NOAA's JPSS Program Office. 

[End of table] 

Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first 
JPSS satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are 
experiencing technical issues and the impact of these issues had not 
yet been determined. The ground project is currently in operation 
supporting NPP, and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the 
ground systems to increase security and reliability. The free-flyer 
project is still in a planning stage because NOAA has not yet decided 
which satellites will host the instruments or when these satellites 
will launch. One of these projects has recently completed a major 
milestone and one project has its next milestone approaching. 
Specifically, the flight project completed a separate system 
requirements review in April 2012, while the ground project's system 
requirements review is scheduled for August 2012. 

Flight Project: Development of JPSS-1 Sensors Is Well Under Way, but 
Technical Issues Continue to Surface: 

Because development of the sensors for JPSS-1 began during the NPOESS 
era, NASA estimates that as of March 2012, all of the sensors have 
been at least 60 percent completed. However, selected sensors are 
encountering technical issues and the full impact of these issues on 
cost and schedule has not been determined. Further, the program has 
not yet made a decision on which launch vehicle will be used. NASA and 
NOAA officials reported that the technical issues thus far are routine 
in nature, and that they plan to select a launch vehicle by the end of 
2012. Table 4 describes the current status of the components of the 
JPSS-1 flight project. 

Table 4: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the 
First JPSS Satellite, as of April 2012: 

Component: Sensor; ATMS; 
Status: NASA estimates that this sensor is about 85 percent complete. 
However, the sensor is experiencing technical issues in development. 
For example, a mixer used in support of high-frequency sensing failed 
during development, and needs to be replaced. Program officials have 
not yet determined the impact of this issue on the sensor's cost and 
schedule. 

Component: Sensor; CERES; 
Status: According to NASA, this sensor has been developed, and 
completed environmental testing in May 2012. Pre-ship review is 
currently planned for June 2012. 

Component: Sensor; CrIS; 
Status: NASA estimates that this sensor is about 60 percent complete. 
The program office decided to move to a new data bus[A] because the 
one used on NPP is now obsolete. At present, this sensor has an 8-
month schedule buffer. 

Component: Sensor; OMPS-Nadir; 
Status: NASA estimates that OMPS-Nadir is approximately 70 percent 
complete. Unlike NPP, there will not be a Limb component on JPSS-1. 

Component: Sensor; VIIRS; 
Status: NASA estimates the sensor is about 65 percent complete. The 
sensor has encountered a number of technical and workmanship issues 
that need to be addressed. For example, program and contract officials 
reported experiencing problems with the manufacturing and testing of 
parts by subcontractors, including a recent issue with one of the 
sensor's mirrors. In addition, the program office decided to move to a 
new data bus because the one used on NPP is now obsolete. Further, the 
program will need to address communication issues that could affect 
VIIRS' ability to provide data in every orbit, but they have not 
identified the potential cost and schedule impact of this issue. 

Component: Spacecraft; 
Status: Development of the spacecraft has begun. A key milestone, the 
spacecraft's critical design review, is currently planned for early 
2013. The spacecraft is currently on the critical path, which means 
that any delay in development will delay the launch date of the 
satellite. 

Component: Launch vehicle; 
Status: The launch vehicle is currently being competed and NASA 
officials anticipate making a selection this year. However, each 
potential launch vehicle has different risks and costs associated with 
it. We recently reported that multiple NASA projects have encountered 
challenges with their launch vehicles, including the cost and 
availability of the vehicles and the uncertainty of using new, 
unproven vehicles.[B] 


Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data. 

[A] A data bus is used to allow high-speed communications and data 
transfer between the sensor and the spacecraft. 

[B] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Programs, GAO-12-
207SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2012). 

[End of table] 

Ground Project: NOAA Plans Upgrades to Strengthen the Infrastructure: 

While NOAA ground systems for satellite command, control, and 
communications and for data processing are currently supporting NPP 
operations, the agency plans to upgrade the ground systems to improve 
their availability and reliability. In 2010, we reported that NPP's 
ground systems had weaknesses because they were developed using 
outdated security requirements approved in 1998. These weaknesses were 
highlighted soon after NPP was launched, when the communications links 
providing satellite data from the satellite receiver in Svalbard, 
Norway, to the United States were severed. NOAA immediately 
established a temporary backup capability, and plans to upgrade its 
communications systems to establish permanent backup capabilities by 
the end of 2012. In addition, NOAA plans to enhance the backup 
capabilities of its data processing system infrastructure by November 
2015. 

Free Flyer Project: Key Decisions Have Been Made; Others Are Pending: 

The instruments in the free flyer project, including the Total and 
Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor and two user services systems (the 
Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system and an Advanced Data 
Collection system), are currently under development. However, in early 
2012, NOAA decided to consider not launching the Total and Spectral 
Solar Irradiance Sensor as an option for staying within its budget 
cap. Moreover, the agency is still considering its options for the 
spacecraft that will carry the other two instruments to space. For 
example, it is considering contracting for a spacecraft or having the 
instruments hosted on some other organization's satellite. Table 5 
depicts the status of the components of the free-flyer project. 

Table 5: Status of Key Free Flyer Components, as of April 2012: 

Component: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor; 
Status: Delivery of the first of three sensors is expected in March 
2013. 

Component: Advanced Data Collection System; 
Status: Delivery of this system by France's space agency is expected 
in May 2013. 

Component: Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system; 
Status: While one component of this system is five months behind 
schedule, delivery of this system, provided jointly by the France and 
Canadian space agencies, is scheduled for January 2015. 

Component: Free Flyer-1 spacecraft; 
Status: NOAA is considering the possibility of not acquiring a 
spacecraft for the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor. It is 
considering its alternatives for a spacecraft for the two other 
subsystems. 

Component: Launch vehicle; 
Status: NOAA is considering the possibility of not launching the Total 
and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor. The program office has not 
decided on the launch vehicle for the two other subsystems. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data. 

[End of table] 

JPSS Risk Management Process in Place; Key Risks Remain: 

The JPSS program has a structured risk management process in place and 
is working to mitigate key program risks; however, NOAA faces key 
risks involving the potential for satellite gaps and does not yet have 
mitigation plans. According to best practices advocated by leading 
system engineering and program management organizations, effective 
risk management addresses four key areas: preparing for risk 
management, identifying and analyzing risks, mitigating risks, and 
providing executive oversight.[Footnote 19] The JPSS program office 
has implemented elements of an effective risk management process. 
Specifically, the program documented its risk management strategy; 
identified relevant stakeholders and designated responsibilities for 
risk management activities; established and implemented standards for 
categorizing and prioritizing risks; instituted a program to identify, 
track, and mitigate risks; and established a process for regularly 
communicating risks to senior NASA and NOAA management. 

The JPSS program is working to mitigate the risks of a lack of a cost 
and schedule baseline and program office staffing shortfalls, but NOAA 
has not established mitigation plans to address the risk of a gap in 
the afternoon orbit or potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and 
European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary 
information to NOAA forecasts. Because it could take time to adapt 
grounds systems to receive alternative satellites' data, delays in 
establishing mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to 
leverage its alternatives. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation 
options, it may miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite 
data sources. Moreover, until NOAA establishes mitigation plans for a 
satellite data gap, it runs the risk of not being able to fulfill its 
mission of providing weather forecasts to protect lives, property, and 
commerce. 

NOAA Is Working to Mitigate Delays in Establishing Cost and Schedule 
Baselines: 

NOAA oversaw the establishment of contracts for the JPSS-1 sensors and 
spacecraft and NASA is managing the cost, schedule, and deliverables 
on these contracts using discrete task orders, but the agencies have 
not established a contractual cost and schedule baseline that would 
allow them to monitor contractor deliverables within an earned value 
management system.[Footnote 20] In addition, program officials have 
not yet established an overall program baseline that delineates the 
cost, schedule, and content of the entire program. Under NASA's 
acquisition life cycle, a program baseline is due at the key decision 
milestone scheduled to be completed by July 2013. Managing a program 
without a baseline makes it more difficult for program officials to 
make informed decisions and for program overseers to understand if the 
program is on track to successfully deliver expected functionality on 
cost and schedule. 

Program officials acknowledge that the lack of a baseline is a risk, 
and they are tracking it through their risk management program. 
Program officials explained that after transferring the contracts from 
the Air Force to NASA, they needed to definitize the contracts to 
reflect JPSS program requirements instead of NPOESS program 
requirements. The JPSS program office has completed this process for 
three sensors (CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS) and is working to complete the 
process for one other sensor (VIIRS) by June 2012. After definitizing 
each contract to JPSS requirements and schedules, NASA and the 
contractors will perform an integrated baseline review before 
implementing an earned value management system. NOAA officials 
reported that they are working to establish contractual baselines as 
rapidly as practical for each of the contracts. 

Program officials also plan to establish an overall program baseline. 
Actions planned to mitigate this risk include: 

* establishing a stable and realistic 5-year budget profile, which was 
completed in December 2011; 

* refining the program requirements to match the expected budget by 
October 2012; 

* definitizing contracts to address any changes in requirements in 
September 2012; and: 

* establishing the overall program baseline by the end of November 
2012. 

NOAA Is Working to Mitigate Risks in Program Staffing: 

NOAA and NASA have not yet fully staffed their respective JPSS program 
offices. While having a knowledgeable and capable program management 
staff is essential to any acquisition program, it is especially 
critical given the history of management challenges on the NPOESS 
program. However, NOAA has not yet filled 18 of the 64 positions it 
plans for the program office, including those for a program scientist 
and system engineers for the JPSS satellite, ground systems, and 
overall mission. In addition, NASA has not yet filled 6 positions it 
plans for its ground project. Until these positions are filled, other 
staff members are supporting the workload and this could delay the 
schedule for implementing improvements in the ground systems. 

Both agencies are actively tracking their respective program offices' 
staffing and plans for filling vacancies. According to NOAA officials, 
the agency is mitigating this risk by filling three of the vacant 
positions with long-term detailees. Further, NOAA plans to fill most 
of the positions, including that of the technical director, by July 
2012. NASA has started the process to fill its vacancies, and plans to 
fill these by the end of September 2012. 

NOAA Has Not Established Plans to Mitigate an Expected Gap in 
Satellite Data Continuity: 

In September 2011, we reported that NOAA was facing a gap in satellite 
data continuity; the risk of that gap is higher today. When NPOESS was 
first disbanded, program officials anticipated launching the JPSS 
satellites in 2015 and 2018 (while acknowledging that these dates 
could change as the program's plans were firmed up). Over the past 
year, as program officials made critical decisions to defer work on 
JPSS in order to keep NPP on track, the launch dates for JPSS-1 and 
JPSS-2 have changed. Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 
will be launched by March 2017 and JPSS-2 will be launched by December 
2022. 

NOAA officials acknowledge that there is a substantial risk of a gap 
in satellite data in the afternoon orbit, between the time when the 
NPP satellite is expected to reach the end of its life and the time 
when the JPSS-1 satellite is to be in orbit and operational. This gap 
could span from 17 months to 3 years or more. In one scenario, NPP 
would last its full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 
would launch as soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit 
checkout for a year (until March 2018). In that case, the data gap 
would extend 17 months. In another scenario, NPP would last only 3 
years as noted by NASA managers concerned with the workmanship of 
selected NPP sensors. Assuming that the JPSS-1 launch occurred in 
March 2017 and the satellite data was certified for official use by 
March 2018, this gap would extend for 41 months. Of course, any 
problems with JPSS-1 development could delay the launch date and 
extend the gap period. Given the history of technical issues and 
delays in the development of the NPP sensors and the current technical 
issues on the sensors, it is likely that the launch of JPSS-1 will be 
delayed. Figure 5 depicts four possible gap scenarios. 

Figure 5: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 
Orbit: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timeline] 

Scenario 1: NPP lasts for 5 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2017: 

Satellite: NPP; 
On-orbit check out: late 2011 to early 2013; 
Expected life: mid 2013 to early 2018. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: early 2017 to early 2018; 
Expected life: early 2018 to early 2024. 

Potential data gap: late 2016 to early 2018. 

Scenario 2: NPP lasts for 3 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2017: 

Satellite: NPP; 
On-orbit check out: late 2011 to early 2013; 
Expected life: late 2011 to late 2014. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: early 2017 to early 2018; 
Expected life: early 2018 to early 2024. 

Potential data gap: late 2014 to early 2018. 

Scenario 3: NPP lasts for 5 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2018: 

Satellite: NPP; 
On-orbit check out: late 2011 to early 2013; 
Expected life: mid 2013 to early 2018. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: early 2018 to early 2019; 
Expected life: early 2018 to late 2024. 

Potential data gap: late 2016 to early 2019. 

Scenario 4: NPP lasts for 3 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2018: 

Satellite: NPP; 
On-orbit check out: late 2011 to early 2013; 
Expected life: late 2011 to late 2014. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: early 2018 to early 2019; 
Expected life: early 2018 to late 2024. 

Potential data gap: late 2014 to early 2019. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.                     

[End of figure] 

According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely 
weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and 
advanced warning of extreme events--such as hurricanes, storm surges, 
and floods--would be diminished. To illustrate this, the National 
Weather Service performed several case studies to demonstrate how its 
weather forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar 
satellite data in the afternoon orbit. For example, when the polar 
satellite data were not used to predict the "Snowmaggedon" winter 
storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic coast in February 2010, weather 
forecasts predicted a less intense storm, slightly further east, and 
producing half of the precipitation at 3, 4, and 5 days before the 
event. Specifically, weather prediction models under-forecasted the 
amount of snow by at least 10 inches. The agency noted that this level 
of degradation in weather forecasts could place lives, property, and 
critical infrastructure in danger. 

NOAA officials have communicated publicly and often about the risk of 
a satellite data gap; however, the agency has not established plans to 
mitigate the gap. NOAA officials stated that the agency will continue 
to use existing POES satellites, as well as NPP, as long as they 
provide data and that there are no viable alternatives to the JPSS 
program. However, it is possible that other governmental, commercial, 
or international satellites could supplement the data. If there are 
viable options for obtaining data from external sources, it would take 
time to adapt NOAA systems to receive, process, and disseminate the 
data. Until NOAA identifies these options, it may miss opportunities 
to leverage these satellite data sources. 

NOAA Has Not Established Plans to Mitigate the Risk That the Polar 
Satellite Constellation Is Becoming Increasingly Unreliable: 

Since its inception, NPOESS was seen as a constellation of satellites 
providing observations in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon 
orbits. Having satellites in each of these orbits ensures that 
satellite observations covering the entire globe are no more than 6 
hours old, thereby allowing for more accurate weather predictions. 
Even after the program was restructured in 2006 and eventually 
terminated in 2010, program officials and the administration planned 
to ensure coverage in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon 
orbits by relying on DOD satellites for the early morning orbit, the 
European satellite program for the midmorning, and NOAA's JPSS program 
for the afternoon orbit. However, recent events have made the future 
of this constellation uncertain: 

* Early morning orbit--As discussed earlier in this report, in early 
fiscal year 2012, DOD terminated its DWSS program. While the agency 
has two more satellites to launch and is working to develop 
alternative plans for a follow-on satellite program, there are 
considerable challenges in ensuring that a new program is in place and 
integrated with existing ground systems and data networks in time to 
avoid a gap in this orbit. 

DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and DMSP-
20 when it is needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a chance that 
DMSP will not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a best-case scenario, 
the follow-on satellites will not need to be launched until roughly 
2026. However, civilian and military satellite experts have expressed 
concern that the DMSP satellites are quite old and may not work as 
intended. If they do not perform well, DOD could be facing a satellite 
data gap in the early morning orbit as early as 2014. 

* Midmorning orbit--The European satellite organization plans to 
continue to launch MetOp satellites that will provide observations in 
the midmorning orbit through October 2021. The organization is also 
working to define and gain support for the follow-on program, called 
the Eumetsat Polar System-2nd Generation program. However, in 2011, 
NOAA alerted European officials that, because of the constrained 
budgetary environment, they will no longer be able to provide sensors 
for the follow-on program. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the 
program, there is a chance that the first European follow-on satellite 
will not be ready in time to replace MetOp at the end of its expected 
life. In that case, this orbit, too, would be in jeopardy. 

* Afternoon orbit--As discussed previously, there is likely to be a 
gap in satellite observations in the afternoon orbit that could last 
well over one year. While our scenarios demonstrated gaps lasting 
between 17 and 53 months, NOAA program officials believe that the most 
likely scenario involves a gap lasting 18 to 24 months. 

Figure 6 depicts the polar satellite constellation and the uncertain 
future coverage in selected orbits. 

Figure 6: The Polar Satellite Constellation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated schedule] 

Orbit: Early Morning: 

Satellite operating beyond its design life: 
DMSP-17: 2012-2014. 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
DMSP-19: 2014-2018. 

Possible future satellite: 
DMSP Replacement: 2020-2023. 
 
Orbit: Mid-Morning: 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
DMSP-18: 2012-2014. 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
DMSP-20: 2014-2019. 

Satellite operating beyond its design life: 
MetOp A: 2012-2013. 

Possible future satellite: 
MetOp Replacement: 2020-2028. 
                  
On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
MetOp B: 2012-2017. 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
MetOp C: 2016-2021. 
 
Orbit: Afternoon: 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
NPP: 2012-2016. 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
JPSS-1: 2017-2024. 

On-orbit check out/Expected life: 
JPSS-2: 2023-2029. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

The NOAA Administrator and other senior executives acknowledge the 
risk of a data gap in each of the orbits of the polar satellite 
constellation and are working with European and DOD counterparts to 
coordinate their respective requirements and plans; however, they have 
not established plans for mitigating risks to the polar satellite 
constellation. As in the case of the anticipated gap in the afternoon 
orbit, NOAA plans to use older polar satellites to provide some of the 
necessary data for the other orbits. However, it is also possible that 
other governmental, commercial, or international satellites could 
supplement the data. For example, foreign nations continue to launch 
polar-orbiting weather satellites to acquire data such as sea surface 
temperatures, sea surface winds, and water vapor. Also, over the next 
few years, NASA plans to launch satellites that will collect 
information on precipitation and soil moisture.[Footnote 21] If there 
are viable options from external sources, it could take time to adapt 
NOAA systems to receive, process, and disseminate the data to its 
satellite data users. Until NOAA identifies these options and 
establishes mitigation plans, it may miss opportunities to leverage 
alternative satellite data sources. 

Conclusions: 

After spending about $3.3 billion on the now-defunct NPOESS program, 
NOAA officials have established a $12.9-billion JPSS program and made 
progress in launching NPP, establishing contracts for the first JPSS 
satellite, and enhancing the ground systems controlling the satellites 
and processing the satellite data. JPSS program officials are 
currently working to calibrate NPP data so that they are usable by 
civilian and military meteorologists and to manage the development of 
sensors for the first JPSS satellite. In coming months, program 
officials face changing requirements, technical issues on individual 
sensors, key milestones in developing the JPSS satellite, and 
important decisions on how to accommodate instruments that are not 
included on the JPSS satellite. 

While the JPSS program office is working to mitigate risks associated 
with not having a program baseline or a fully staffed program 
management office, NOAA has not established plans to mitigate the 
almost certain satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit or the 
potential gaps in the early and mid-morning orbits. These gaps will 
likely affect the accuracy and timeliness of weather predictions and 
forecasts and could affect lives, property, military operations, and 
commerce. Because it could take time to adapt ground systems to 
receive an alternative satellite's data, delays in establishing 
mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to leverage 
alternatives. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation options, it may 
miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Given the importance of polar-orbiting satellite data to weather 
forecasts, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the 
Administrator of NOAA to establish mitigation plans for risks 
associated with pending satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit as 
well as potential gaps in the early morning and midmorning orbits. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of 
Commerce, DOD, and NASA. We received written comments from the 
Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA's comments. In its 
comments, NOAA agreed with the report's recommendation and noted that 
the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service--a 
NOAA component agency--has performed analyses on how to mitigate 
potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this 
information into a report. The agency plans to provide a report to 
NOAA by August 2012. The department's comments are provided in 
appendix II. The department also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

While neither DOD nor NASA provided comments on the report's findings 
or recommendations, they offered technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the Staff Action Officer 
for the Space and Intelligence Office within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
provided technical comments both orally and via e-mail, and a 
commander within the Navy's Oceanographer staff provided oral 
technical comments. In addition, the Project Manager of the JPSS 
flight project--a NASA employee--provided technical comments via e-
mail. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this 
report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested 
parties. In addition, this report will be available on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate efforts to transfer management and 
contract responsibilities from the National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program to the separate 
satellite programs being established at the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Department of Defense (DOD), (2) 
assess NOAA's progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory Project 
(NPP) satellite and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), and (3) 
evaluate NOAA's efforts to mitigate key project risks. 

To evaluate efforts to transfer responsibilities from NPOESS to the 
separate NOAA and DOD programs, we compared the agencies' plans for 
establishing program management offices, developing program 
requirements, and transferring contracts to each agency's actual 
accomplishments. We analyzed key program documents, including 
acquisition decision memorandums, requirements documents, and the 
management control plan. We observed NOAA's monthly program management 
briefings and obtained detailed briefings on efforts to establish a 
program cost estimate, NOAA's fiscal year 2013 budget for JPSS, and 
decisions to remove selected program elements. To assess the 
reliability of the program's cost estimate, we compared agency 
documentation of the program office estimate and the independent cost 
estimate, and interviewed program officials and cost estimators to 
understand key aspects of and differences between the estimates. We 
determined that the estimates were sufficient for our purposes of 
providing summary data. We interviewed program officials from NOAA, 
DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to 
obtain information on transition schedules, progress, program 
requirements, and challenges. 

To assess NOAA's progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite 
systems, we compared NOAA's plans for key milestones to its actual 
accomplishments. We reviewed monthly progress reports, draft program 
schedules, and the NPP operational readiness review package. We 
observed NOAA's monthly program management briefings to determine the 
status of key components. We interviewed both agency and contractor 
officials, including officials at Ball Aerospace, Inc. and Raytheon 
Space and Airborne Systems, Inc. We also interviewed key NOAA 
satellite data users, including officials involved in weather 
forecasting and numerical weather prediction, to identify their 
experiences in working with NPP data as well as their plans for 
working with JPSS data. 

To evaluate NOAA's efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared 
the agency's risk management process to best practices in risk 
management as identified by the Software Engineering Institute. We 
reviewed NOAA's program risk lists on a monthly basis to obtain 
insights into management issues and actions. We interviewed agency and 
contractor officials to evaluate actions to address each transition 
risk. In addition, we interviewed NOAA satellite data users to 
determine the impact of any changes in requirements. 

We performed our work at NASA, NOAA, and DOD offices in the 
Washington, D.C., area and at contractor facilities in Los Angeles, 
California; Aurora, Colorado; and Boulder, Colorado. We conducted this 
performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments by the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department of Commerce: 
The Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

May 16, 2012:  

Mr. David A. Powner:  
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:  
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 0 Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548:  

Dear Mr. Powner:  

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Polar-Orbiting 
Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and 
Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention (GA0-12-604). On behalf 
of the Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments to the draft 
report.  

If you have any questions, please contact Jim Stowers, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs at 
(202) 482-3663.  

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John E. Bryson: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

Comments to the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Polar-orbiting 
Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and 
Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention" (GA0-12-604, June 2012): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review the 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report on the Polar-
orbiting Environmental Satellites. The draft report on Polar-Orbiting 
Environmental Satellites requirements, technical issues, and potential 
gaps does a fair job of assessing the state of the program. Given the 
history and changes in the polar-orbiting environmental satellite 
programs over the last decade, a number of recommended changes and 
updates have been provided that will ensure that the information 
presented is complete, up-to-date, and reflects the most current plans. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation: "Given the importance of polar-orbiting satellite data 
to weather forecasts, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce 
direct the Administrator of NOAA to establish mitigation plans for 
risks associated with pending satellite data gaps in the afternoon 
orbit as well as potential gaps in the morning and midmorning orbits." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. The National 
Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS) has 
performed these analyses, but have not compiled them in a single 
report for formal review and approval, NESDIS plans to finalize this 
report by August 31, 2012 for NOAA approval. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David A. Powner (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant 
Director), Kathleen Lovett Epperson, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, 
Franklin Jackson, and Fatima Jahan made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-207SP]. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2012). 

Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather 
and Climate Data Coverage. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-945T]. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 
2011). 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to 
Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate 
Data. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558]. 
(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and 
Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision 
Making. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-772T]. 
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009). 

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and 
Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision 
Making. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009). 

Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces 
Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data 
Continuity. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-899T]. 
(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008). 

Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces 
Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data 
Continuity. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518]. 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008). 

Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1099T]. (Washington, 
D.C.: July 11, 2007). 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is 
Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-910T]. (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 
2007). 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is 
Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498]. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 
2007). 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases 
Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T]. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 
2006). 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical 
Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for 
Difficult Trade-off Decisions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T]. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2005). 

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost 
and Schedule Changes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054]. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2004). 

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect 
Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-987T]. (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2003). 

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future 
Data Management Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-684T]. (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 
2002). 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP 
satellites after they are in orbit. 

[2] The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting 
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are 
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 
satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational. The next 
two are expected to launch in 2012 and 2017, respectively. 

[3] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

[4] In January 2012, the name of the satellite was changed to the 
Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite. The NPP acronym 
remained the same. 

[5] GAO, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need 
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2005). 

[6] Using NPP as an operational satellite means that the satellite's 
data will be used to provide climate and weather products. 

[7] The announcement accompanied the release of the President's fiscal 
year 2011 budget request. 

[8] This figure does not include approximately $2.9 billion in sunk 
costs that DOD spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010. 

[9] For a full list of our reports on polar-orbiting environmental 
satellites, see "Related GAO Products" at the end of this report. 

[10] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs 
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2009). 

[11] GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act 
Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and 
Climate Data, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

[12] CERES was already a NASA contract during the NPOESS program, so 
this contract did not need to be transferred from the Air Force. 

[13] NOAA's $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through 
fiscal year 2010 and about $400 million in fiscal year 2011. 

[14] The radiation budget is the amount of the solar energy entering 
and leaving the earth's atmosphere. 

[15] These sensors included VIIRS, a space environment monitor, and a 
microwave imager/sounder. 

[16] DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and 
DMSP-20 when needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a chance that 
DMSP-20 would not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a best-case 
scenario, the follow-on satellites would not need to be launched until 
2026. 

[17] After a satellite has been launched, scientists perform an on-
orbit accuracy check, called calibration and validation, to verify 
that the sensors accurately report ground and atmospheric conditions. 
These activities ensure that satellite data products are ready for 
operational use. 

[18] NOAA officials noted that the JPSS launch dates could change as 
the agency finalized its program planning activities. 

[19] See, for example, Carnegie Mellon University's Software 
Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model® Integration for 
Acquisition, Version 1.3 (CMMI-ACQ, V1.3) and Project Management 
Institute Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK® Guide) - Third Edition, (Newtown Square, PA: 2004). 

[20] Earned value management is a technique for monitoring the cost 
and schedule of each work activity performed. It allows managers 
insights into the contractor's productivity and provides an early 
warning on cost and schedule variances. 

[21] NASA plans to launch the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission 
satellite by June 2014 and the Soil Moisture Active and Passive 
satellite by January 2015. 

[End of section] 

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