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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of 
Representatives: 

September 2013: 

Polar Weather Satellites: 

NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but Contingency Plans and 
Schedules Require Further Attention: 

GAO-13-676: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-676, a report to the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

NOAA established the JPSS program in 2010 to replace aging polar 
satellites and provide critical environmental data used in forecasting 
weather and measuring variations in climate. However, program 
officials anticipate a gap in satellite data between the time that the 
S-NPP satellite reaches the end of its life and the JPSS-1 satellite 
becomes operational (see graphic). Given the criticality of satellite 
data to weather forecasts, the likelihood of a significant satellite 
data gap, and the potential impact of a gap on the health and safety 
of the U.S. population and economy, GAO added this issue to its High 
Risk List in 2013. 

GAO was asked to review the JPSS program because of the importance of 
polar satellite data. GAO’s objectives were to (1) evaluate NOAA's 
progress in sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting 
satellite system through S-NPP and JPSS satellites; (2) evaluate the 
quality of NOAA's program schedule; and (3) assess NOAA’s plans to 
address potential gaps in polar satellite data. To do so, GAO analyzed 
program management status reports, milestone reviews, and schedule 
data; examined polar gap contingency plans; and interviewed agency and 
contractor officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made 
noteworthy progress on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program 
by delivering data from its first satellite-—the Suomi National Polar-
orbiting Partnership (S-NPP)-—to weather forecasters, completing 
significant instrument development for the next satellite (called JPSS-
1), and reducing the program’s life cycle cost estimate from $12.9 
billion to $11.3 billion by refocusing on weather products. However, 
key challenges remain. Specifically, S-NPP has not yet achieved full 
operational capability because the program is behind schedule in 
validating the readiness of satellite products. Also, the program does 
not track whether key users are using its products or if the products 
meet the users’ needs. In addition, issues with the JPSS ground system 
schedules have delayed the delivery of key system capabilities. Until 
the program addresses these challenges, it may continue to experience 
delays in delivering actionable S-NPP data to system users and in 
meeting JPSS-1 development schedules. 

A program’s success depends in part on having an integrated master 
schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how 
activities are related to each other; however, the JPSS program office 
does not yet have a complete integrated master schedule and weaknesses 
exist in component schedules. Specifically, the program established an 
integrated master schedule in June 2013 and is reporting a 70 percent 
confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date. However, about one-third 
of the program schedule is missing information needed to establish the 
sequence in which activities occur. In addition, selected component 
schedules supporting the JPSS-1 satellite have weaknesses including 
schedule constraints that have not been justified. Until the program 
completes its integrated schedule and addresses weaknesses in 
component schedules, it will lack the information needed to 
effectively monitor development progress and have less assurance of 
meeting the planned JPSS-1 launch date. 

While NOAA developed a mitigation plan to address a potential 14 to 18 
month gap in afternoon polar satellite data in October 2012 and 
subsequently identified additional alternatives for addressing 
potential gaps, it has not yet established a comprehensive contingency 
plan. Specifically, NOAA has not yet revised its mitigation plan to 
include the new alternatives, and the plan lacks several key elements, 
such as triggers for when to take key actions and detailed procedures 
for implementing them. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive plan, it 
may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate anticipated gaps in polar 
satellite coverage. 

Figure: Timeline for a Potential Gap in Polar Satellite Data in the 
Afternoon Orbit: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

One possible scenario: S-NPP lasts for 5 years and JPSS-1 launches in 
March 2017. 

Satellite: S-NPP; 
On-orbit check out: 2011-2013; 
Expected life: 2013-2019. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: 2017-2018; 
Expected life: 2018-2024. 

Potential data gap: 
Late 2016-early 2018. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending NOAA develop a mechanism to track the usage of its 
satellite products, establish a complete integrated master schedule, 
address weaknesses in component schedules, and address shortfalls in 
polar satellite gap contingency plans. NOAA concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-676]. For more 
information, contact Dave Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

NOAA Has Made Progress on JPSS Development, but Continues to Face 
Challenges in Completing S-NPP Products, Revising the Program's Scope, 
and Meeting Schedules: 

JPSS Schedules Demonstrate Multiple Best Scheduling Practices, but 
Integration Problems and Other Weaknesses Reduce Confidence in the 
JPSS-1 Launch Date: 

NOAA Has Analyzed Alternatives for Addressing Gaps in Satellite Data, 
but Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: NOAA Plans to Transfer Selected JPSS Program Components 
to the Polar Free Flyer Program: 

Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component Schedules Implementation of 
Best Practices in Scheduling: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002: 

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and JPSS, at Different Points in Time: 

Table 3: Estimated Completion Dates for S-NPP Products, as of July 
2013: 

Table 4: JPSS Projects and Components: 

Table 5: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the 
JPSS-1 Satellite, as of July 2013: 

Table 6: Reported Cost Reductions Associated with JPSS Changes: 

Table 7: The Four Characteristics and Ten Best Practices of a High-
Quality and Reliable Schedule: 

Table 8: Assessment of JPSS-1 Component Schedule Quality: 

Table 9: Summary of NOAA's Polar Satellite Gap Mitigation Plan: 

Table 10: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan: 

Table 11: Assessment of NOAA's Gap Mitigation Plan for its Polar 
Environmental Satellites: 

Table 12: Detailed Assessment of Ground System Schedule Quality: 

Table 13: Detailed Assessment of Spacecraft Schedule Quality: 

Table 14: Detailed Assessment of VIIRS Schedule Quality: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

Figure 4: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 
Orbit: 

Abbreviations: 

A-DCS: Advanced Data Collection System: 

ATMS: Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder: 

CERES: Cloud and Earth's Radiant Energy System: 

CrIS: Cross-Track Infrared Sounder: 

DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IDPS: Interface Data Processing Segment: 

JCL: Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level: 

JPSS: Joint Polar Satellite System: 

MetOp: Meteorological Operational (satellite): 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NESDIS: National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 
Service: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System: 

S-NPP: Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership: 

OMPS: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite: 

POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 

TSIS: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor: 

VIIRS: Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 11, 2013: 

The Honorable Lamar Smith: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ralph Hall: 
Chairman Emeritus: 
The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment-
monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-
orbiting environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the 
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the 
program was considered critical to the nation's ability to maintain 
the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global 
climate monitoring through the year 2026. 

However, in the 8 years after the development contract was awarded in 
2002, the NPOESS cost estimate had more than doubled--to about $15 
billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant 
functionality had been removed from the program, and the program's tri-
agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. Importantly, 
delays in launching the satellites put the program's mission at risk. 
To address these challenges, a task force led by the White House's 
Office of Science and Technology Policy reviewed the management and 
governance of the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the Director of 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a decision to 
disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, have NOAA and DOD 
undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites 
in the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early 
morning orbit. After that decision, NOAA began developing plans for 
the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). In October 2011, the JPSS 
program successfully launched the Suomi National Polar-orbiting 
Partnership (S-NPP) demonstration satellite, the first in a series of 
satellites to be launched as part of NOAA's JPSS program. 

Given your interest in the progress NOAA has made on the JPSS program, 
our objectives were to (1) evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting program 
objectives of sustaining the continuity of the polar-orbiting 
satellite system through the S-NPP and JPSS satellites, (2) evaluate 
the quality of the JPSS program schedule, and (3) assess NOAA's plans 
to address potential gaps in polar satellite data. 

To evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting its program objectives, we 
analyzed plans and reports on the satellites' system development 
efforts and on the maturity of S-NPP products. We compared current 
requirements to prior iterations to assess how recent changes in 
capabilities have impacted program goals and objectives. We also 
interviewed JPSS program officials to discuss S-NPP product 
development, JPSS system development, and changes in requirements for 
JPSS satellites. To evaluate the quality of NOAA's program schedule, 
we used an exposure draft of GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide[Footnote 
1] to assess component contractor schedules as well as the program's 
schedule risk analysis and interviewed cognizant JPSS program office 
and contractor officials. To assess NOAA's plans to address potential 
gaps in polar satellite data, we compared NOAA's gap mitigation plan 
and contracted alternatives study against risk mitigation and 
contingency best practices from GAO and advocated by leading 
organizations,[Footnote 2] determined planning shortfalls and key 
remaining activities for NOAA to accomplish, and interviewed NOAA 
headquarters and JPSS program officials about their plans. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through 
September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Additional details on our objectives, scope, and 
methodology are provided in appendix I. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.[Footnote 3] These 
satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide 
graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These 
satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical weather 
prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather 
days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of 
hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the 
potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency 
managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. Polar satellites 
also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as 
ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are 
used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate 
monitoring. 

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position 
relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the 
earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of 
conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes 
about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite 
views the entire earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there is one 
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that 
are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning, 
midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government relies on 
a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) 
satellite, for satellite observations in the midmorning 
orbit.[Footnote 4] In addition to the operational satellites, NOAA, 
the Air Force, and a European weather satellite organization maintain 
older satellites that still collect some data and are available to 
provide limited backup to the operational satellites should they 
degrade or fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 
2009. The Air Force plans to launch its two remaining DMSP satellites 
as needed. Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar 
satellite constellation. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Notional local equatorial crossing times: 

DMSP: 0530 hours; 
DMSP: 0800 hours; 
MetOp: 0930 hours; 
POES: 1330 hours. 

Sources: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office and DOD data, 
Map Resources (globe). 

[End of figure] 

Polar Satellite Data and Products: 

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed 
into a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands 
of radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely 
determining information about the earth's atmosphere, land surface, 
oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data 
are considered raw data. To make them usable, processing centers 
format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth-
location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are 
called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data 
records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records 
and temperature data records. These data records are then used to 
derive weather and climate products called environmental data records. 
These environmental data records include a wide range of atmospheric 
products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone 
distribution; land surface products showing snow cover, vegetation, 
and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface temperatures, sea 
ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space environment. 
Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor, temperature, and 
environmental data records) are also used to derive more sophisticated 
products, including outputs from numerical weather models and 
assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified depiction of 
the various stages of satellite data processing, and figure 3 depicts 
examples of two different weather products. 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Raw data; 
Raw data records; 
Sensor data records and temperature data records; 
Environmental data records; 
Derived products and output from numerical weather prediction models. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA information. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 illustrations] 

Source: NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information 
Service. 

Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005; the figure on the right is an analysis of ozone concentration 
produced from POES satellite data. 

[End of figure] 

The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence: 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 
two satellite programs into a single satellite program--NPOESS--
capable of satisfying both civilian and military 
requirements.[Footnote 5] The converged program, NPOESS, was 
considered critical to the nation's ability to maintain the continuity 
of data required for weather forecasting and global climate 
monitoring. NPOESS satellites were expected to replace the POES and 
DMSP satellites in the morning, midmorning, and afternoon orbits when 
they neared the end of their expected life spans. 

To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 
Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program 
management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the 
Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for 
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies 
into the converged system. 

When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the 
program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. The 
program was to include the procurement and launch of 6 satellites over 
the life of the program, with each satellite hosting a subset of 13 
instruments. The planned instruments included 11 environmental 
sensors, and two systems supporting specific user services (see table 
1). To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to 
maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch the 
demonstration satellite in May 2006.[Footnote 6] This satellite was 
intended to demonstrate the functionality of selected instruments that 
would later be included on the NPOESS satellites. The first NPOESS 
satellite was to be available for launch in March 2008. 

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002: 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the 
atmosphere; to be used in combination with the cross-track infrared 
sounder to produce daily global atmospheric temperature, humidity, and 
pressure profiles. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Retrieves specific aerosol (liquid droplets or solid 
particles suspended in the atmosphere, such as sea spray, smog, and 
smoke) and cloud measurements. 

Instrument: Conical microwave imager/sounder; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain 
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the 
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at 
different atmospheric levels. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects measurements of the infrared radiation emitted 
and scattered by the Earth and atmosphere to determine the vertical 
distribution of temperature, moisture, and pressure in the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Instrument type: System providing services to users; 
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the 
world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave 
radiation released by the Earth back into space on a worldwide scale 
to enhance long-term climate studies. 

Instrument: Global positioning system occultation sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures the refraction of radio wave signals from the 
Global Positioning System and Russia's Global Navigation Satellite 
System to characterize the ionosphere and information related to the 
vertical distribution of temperature and moisture of the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and 
distribution of ozone in the Earth's atmosphere. Consists of two 
components (nadir and limb) that can be provided separately. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and 
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface 
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to 
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction 
models. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite-aided tracking system; 
Instrument type: System providing services to users; 
Description: A subsystem that detects and locates aviators, mariners, 
and land-based users in distress. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the 
effects of space weather on technological systems, including 
satellites and radio links. 

Instrument: Total and spectral solar irradiance sensor; 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance 
data. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS); 
Instrument type: Environmental sensor; 
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide 
information on the Earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land 
surfaces. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the former NPOESS Integrated Program 
Office. 

[End of table] 

In the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered 
significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost 
growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the 
program's cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the 
first launch was delayed by almost 2 years.[Footnote 7] These issues 
led to a 2006 decision to restructure the program, which reduced the 
program's functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites 
from 6 to 4, and the number of instruments from 13 to 9. As part of 
the decision, officials decided to reduce the number of orbits from 
three (early morning, midmorning, and afternoon) to two (early morning 
and afternoon) and to rely solely on the European satellites for 
midmorning orbit data. 

Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to 
encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri-
agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost 
increases. Because the schedule delays could lead to satellite data 
gaps, in March 2009 agency executives decided to use S-NPP as an 
operational satellite.[Footnote 8] Later, in August 2009, faced with 
costs that were expected to reach about $15 billion and launch 
schedules that were delayed by over 5 years, the Executive Office of 
the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition 
options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this 
review, in February 2010, the Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy announced that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly 
procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead each agency would plan 
and acquire its own satellite system.[Footnote 9] Specifically, NOAA 
would be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations 
planned for the first and third satellites. DOD would be responsible 
for the early morning orbit and the observations planned for the 
second and fourth satellites. The partnership with the European 
satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit was to continue as 
planned. When this decision was announced, NOAA and NASA immediately 
began planning for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit 
called JPSS. DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the 
morning orbit, called the Defense Weather Satellite System, but later 
decided to terminate the program and reassess its requirements, as 
directed by Congress. 

Overview of Initial NOAA Plans for the JPSS Program: 

After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010, 
NOAA began the JPSS satellite program. Key plans included: 

* relying on NASA for system acquisition, engineering, and integration; 

* completing, launching, and supporting S-NPP; 

* acquiring and launching two satellites for the afternoon orbit, 
called JPSS-1 and JPSS-2; 

* developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites; 

* finding alternative host satellites for selected instruments that 
would not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites; and: 

* providing ground system support for S-NPP, JPSS, and the Defense 
Weather Satellite System; data communications for MetOp and DMSP; and 
data processing for NOAA's use of microwave data from an international 
satellite. 

In 2010, NOAA estimated that the life cycle costs of the JPSS program 
would be approximately $11.9 billion for a program lasting through 
fiscal year 2024, which included $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on 
NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 10] Subsequently, the agency 
undertook a cost estimating exercise where it validated that the cost 
of the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal 
year 2028 would be $11.3 billion. After adding the agency's sunk 
costs, which had increased to $3.3 billion through fiscal year 2011, 
the program's life cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6 billion.[Footnote 
11] This amount was $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion 
estimate for JPSS when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010. 

In working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish the 
president's fiscal year 2013 budget request, NOAA officials stated 
that they agreed to cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion 
through 2028, to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 
2017, and to merge funding for two climate sensors into the JPSS 
budget. Because this cap was $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 
billion life cycle cost of the full program, NOAA decided to remove 
selected elements from the satellite program. Table 2 compares the 
planned cost, schedule, and scope of NOAA's satellite programs at 
different points in time. 

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and JPSS, at Different Points in Time: 

Key area: Life cycle range; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 1995-2020; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 1995-2026; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 1995-
2026; 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): 1995-2024; 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): 1995-2028. 

Key area: Estimated life cycle cost; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): $8.4 
billion; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): $12.5 
billion; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): $13.95+ 
billion[A]; 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): $11.9 billion (which includes about 
$2.9 billion spent through fiscal year 2010 on NPOESS); 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): $12.9 billion (which includes about 
$3.3 billion spent through fiscal year 2011 on NPOESS and JPSS). 

Key area: Number of satellites; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 6 (in 
addition to S-NPP); 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 4 (in 
addition to S-NPP); 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 4 (in 
addition to S-NPP); 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): 2 (in addition to S-NPP); 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): 2 (in addition to S-NPP). 

Key area: Number of orbits; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 3 (early 
morning, midmorning, afternoon); 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 2 (early 
morning and afternoon; 
would rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data); 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 2 
(early morning and afternoon; 
would rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data); 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): 1 (afternoon orbit); 
(DOD and European satellites would provide early and midmorning 
orbits, respectively); 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): 1 (afternoon orbit); 
(DOD and European satellites would provide early and midmorning 
orbits, respectively). 

Key area: Launch schedule; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 
S-NPP by October 2006; 
First NPOESS (C1) by November 2009; 
Second NPOESS (C2) by June 2011; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 
S-NPP by January 2010; 
C1 by January 2013; 
C2 by January 2016; 
C3 by January 2018; 
C4 by January 2020; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 
S-NPP no earlier than September 2011; 
C1 by March 2014; 
C2 by May 2016; 
C3 by January 2018; 
C4 by January 2020; 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): 
S-NPP--no earlier than September 2011; 
JPSS-1 available in 2015; 
JPSS-2 available in 2018; 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): 
S-NPP--successfully launched in October 2011; 
JPSS-1 by March 2017; 
JPSS-2 by December 2022. 

Key area: Number of sensors; 
NPOESS program before it was restructured (as of May 2006): 
11 sensors and 2 user services systems; 
NPOESS program after it was restructured (as of June 2006): 
S-NPP: 4 sensors; 
C1: 6 sensors; 
C2: 2 sensors; 
C3: 6 sensors; 
C4: 2 sensors; 
NPOESS program prior to being disbanded (as of February 2010): 
S-NPP: 5 sensors; 
C1: 7 sensors[B]; 
C2: 2 sensors; 
C3: 6 sensors; 
C4: 2 sensors; 
JPSS program (as of May 2010): 
S-NPP: 5 sensors; 
JPSS-1: 5 sensors[C]; 
JPSS-2: 5 sensors; 
JPSS program (as of June 2012): 
S-NPP: 5 sensors; 
JPSS-1: 5 sensors[C]; 
JPSS-2: 5 sensors; 
Free flyer-1: 3 sensors[D]; 
Free flyer-2: 3 sensors. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA, DOD, and task force data. 

[A] Although the program baseline was $13.95 billion in February 2010, 
we estimated in June 2009 that this cost could grow by about $1 
billion. In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the 
President stated that they reviewed life cycle cost estimates from DOD 
and the NPOESS program office of $15.1 billion and $16.45 billion, 
respectively. 

[B] In May 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee approved an additional 
sensor--the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor--for the C1 
satellite. 

[C] The five sensors are ATMS, the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant 
Energy System (CERES), CrIS, OMPS, and VIIRS. NOAA also committed to 
finding an alternative spacecraft and launch accommodation for the 
Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor, the Advanced Data 
Collection System, and the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking 
system. 

[D] NOAA planned to launch two stand-alone satellites, called free 
flyer satellites, to accommodate the Total and Spectral Solar 
Irradiance Sensor, Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system, 
and an Advanced Data Collection System. 

[End of table] 

Prior GAO Work Recommended Actions to Address the Risk of Gaps in 
Polar Satellite Data: 

We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS and JPSS programs 
highlighting technical issues, cost growth, and key management 
challenges affecting the tri-agency program structure.[Footnote 12] In 
June 2012, we reported that while NOAA officials communicated publicly 
and often about the risk of a polar satellite data gap, the agency had 
not established plans to mitigate the gap.[Footnote 13] At the time, 
NOAA officials stated that the agency would continue to use existing 
satellites as long as they provide data and that there were no viable 
alternatives to the JPSS program. However, our report noted that a 
more comprehensive mitigation plan was essential since it is possible 
that other governmental, commercial, or foreign satellites could 
supplement the polar satellite data. Because it could take time to 
adapt ground systems to receive, process, and disseminate an 
alternative satellite's data, we noted that any delays in establishing 
mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to leverage its 
alternatives. We recommended that NOAA establish mitigation plans for 
risks associated with pending satellite gaps in the afternoon orbit as 
well as potential gaps in the early morning and midmorning orbits. 
NOAA agreed with the report's recommendation and noted that the 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service--a 
NOAA component agency--had performed analyses on how to mitigate 
potential gaps in satellite data and planned to provide a report by 
August 2012. 

More recently, in February 2013, we added the potential gap in weather 
satellite data to our biennial High-Risk list.[Footnote 14] In that 
report, we noted that satellite data gaps in the morning or afternoon 
polar orbits would lead to less accurate and timely weather 
forecasting; as a result, advanced warning of extreme events would be 
affected. Such extreme events could include hurricanes, storm surges, 
and floods. For example, the National Weather Service performed case 
studies to demonstrate how its forecasts would have been affected if 
there were no polar satellite data in the afternoon orbit, and noted 
that its forecasts for the "Snowmaggedon" winter storm that hit the 
Mid-Atlantic coast in February 2010 would have predicted a less 
intense storm further east, with about half of the precipitation at 3, 
4, and 5 days before the event. Specifically, the models would have 
under-forecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. Similarly, 
a European weather organization[Footnote 15] recently reported that 
NOAA's forecasts of Hurricane Sandy's track could have been hundreds 
of miles off without polar-orbiting satellites--rather than 
identifying the New Jersey landfall within 30 miles 4 days before 
landfall, the models would have shown the storm remaining at sea. Such 
degradation in forecasts and warnings would place lives, property, and 
our nation's critical infrastructure in danger. 

We reported that the length of an afternoon polar satellite data gap 
could span from 17 months to 3 years or more. In one scenario, S-NPP 
would last its full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 
would launch as soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit 
checkout for a year (until March 2018). In that case, the data gap 
would extend 17 months. In another scenario, S-NPP would last only 3 
years as noted by NASA managers concerned with the workmanship of 
selected S-NPP sensors. Assuming that the JPSS-1 launch occurred in 
March 2017 and the satellite data were certified for official use by 
March 2018, this gap would extend for 41 months. Of course, any 
problems with JPSS-1 development could delay the launch date and 
extend the gap period. Figure 4 depicts four possible gap scenarios. 

Figure 4: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 
Orbit: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Scenario 1: S-NPP lasts for 5 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2017: 

Satellite: S-NPP; 
On-orbit check out: 2011-2013; 
Expected life: 2013-2016. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: 2017-2018; 
Expected life: 2018-2024. 

Potential data gap: 
Late 2016-early 2018. 

Scenario 2: S-NPP lasts for 3 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2017: 

Satellite: S-NPP; 
On-orbit check out: 2011-2013; 
Expected life: 2013-2014. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: 2017-2018; 
Expected life: 2018-2024. 

Potential data gap: 
Late 2014-early 2018. 

Scenario 3: S-NPP lasts for 5 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2018: 

Satellite: S-NPP; 
On-orbit check out: 2011-2013; 
Expected life: 2013-2016. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: 2018-2019; 
Expected life: 2019-2024. 

Potential data gap: 
Late 2016-early 2019. 

Scenario 4: S-NPP lasts for 3 years and JPSS-1 launches in March 2018: 

Satellite: S-NPP; 
On-orbit check out: 2011-2013; 
Expected life: 2013-2015. 

Satellite: JPSS-1; 
On-orbit check out: 2018-2019; 
Expected life: 2019-2024. 

Potential data gap: 
Late 2014-early 2019. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

We also noted that NOAA had recently established a mitigation plan for 
a potential 14-to 18-month gap in the afternoon orbit, which 
identified and prioritized options for obtaining critical 
observations, including alternative satellite data sources and 
improvements to data assimilation in models and listed technical, 
programmatic, and management steps needed to implement these options. 
However, these plans were only a beginning. We suggested that NOAA 
must make difficult decisions on which steps it would implement to 
ensure that its mitigation plans are viable when needed, including how 
these plans would be integrated with the agency's broader end-to-end 
plans for sustaining weather forecasting capabilities. 

NOAA Has Made Progress on JPSS Development, but Continues to Face 
Challenges in Completing S-NPP Products, Revising the Program's Scope, 
and Meeting Schedules: 

NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of sustaining 
the continuity of NOAA's polar-orbiting satellite capabilities through 
the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering S-NPP data 
to weather forecasters and (2) by completing significant instrument 
and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite. However, the 
program is behind schedule in validating the readiness of S-NPP 
products and has experienced delays on the ground system schedules for 
the JPSS-1 satellite. Moreover, the program is moving to revise its 
scope and objectives to reduce costs and prioritize NOAA's weather 
mission. Until it addresses challenges in product and ground system 
development, the program office may continue to experience delays in 
delivering actionable S-NPP data to users and in meeting program 
development schedules. 

Weather Forecasters Are Using Selected S-NPP Products, but the JPSS 
Program Is Behind Schedule in Validating Products and Unaware of the 
Full Extent to Which They Are Being Used: 

In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities 
through the S-NPP satellite, over the past 18 months the JPSS program 
had planned to complete activation and commissioning of the S-NPP 
satellite, transition the satellite from interim to routine 
operations, and deliver 76 data products that were precise enough for 
use in operational weather observations and forecasts. To develop the 
precise data products, NOAA established a process for calibrating and 
validating its products. Under this process, most products (which are 
primarily sensor data records and environmental data records) proceed 
through three different levels of algorithm maturity--the beta, 
provisional, and validated levels.[Footnote 16] NOAA had originally 
planned to complete efforts to validate S-NPP products by October 
2013, which was 2 years after the S-NPP satellite was launched. It is 
not enough, however, to simply deliver validated products. Both the 
Software Engineering Institute and GAO recommend tracking whether 
customers are receiving the expected value from products once they are 
deployed, and whether corrective actions are needed.[Footnote 17] 
Moreover, in April 2013 the Executive Office of the President's 
National Science and Technology Council released a national strategy 
for civil earth observations that called for agencies to, among other 
things, track the extent to which earth observation data are actually 
being used, track whether the data had an impact, and provide data 
users a mechanism to provide feedback regarding ease of use, suspected 
quality issues, and other aspects of the data.[Footnote 18] 

The JPSS program has made progress on S-NPP since launching the 
satellite in October 2011. Specifically, the program completed 
satellite activation and commissioning in March 2012, and transitioned 
from interim operations under NASA to routine operations under NOAA in 
February 2013. The program also made key upgrades to the ground system 
supporting S-NPP. For example, in November 2012 the office completed 
an interim backup command and control facility that could protect the 
health and safety of the satellite if unexpected issues occurred at 
the primary mission operations facility. In addition, the JPSS program 
office has been working to calibrate and validate S-NPP products in 
order to make them precise enough for use in weather-related 
operations. 

While the program office plans to have 18 products validated for 
operational use by September 2013, it is behind schedule for the other 
products. Specifically, the program expects to complete validating 35 
S-NPP products by the end of September 2014 and 1 other product by the 
end of September 2015, almost 1 and 2 years later than originally 
planned. In addition, the program office reported that 15 products do 
not need to be validated, one product's validation date has not been 
established, and 6 products do not have estimated validation dates 
because the program plans to remove them from its requirements. The 
program categorized its products by their priority, ranging from 
priority-1 for the highest priority products, to priority-4 for the 
lowest priority products. According to NOAA and NASA officials, the S-
NPP products' validation has been delayed in part because of issues 
initially identified on VIIRS that had to be corrected and additional 
time needed to validate environmental data record products that 
require observations of seasonal weather phenomena. Further, program 
officials stated that they rebaselined the planned product validation 
timelines in November 2011 and have been generally meeting the target 
dates of this revised plan. Table 3 illustrates program-reported data 
on the number of products in each priority level, examples of 
products, and the estimated validation date for the last product at 
each level. 

Table 3: Estimated Completion Dates for S-NPP Products, as of July 
2013: 

Number of products: 18; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority 1 or 2: 4; 
Examples of products: 
ATMS land surface emissivity; 
Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer-2 sensor data record; 
VIIRS polar winds; 
VIIRS vegetation fraction; 
Validated by: End of September 2013. 

Priority level (number of products): Priority 3 or 4: 14; 
Examples of products: 
ATMS rainfall rate; 
OMPS-nadir profile ozone; 
OMPS-nadir ozone total column; 
Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer-2 cloud liquid water; 
Validated by: End of September 2013. 

Number of products: 35; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority 1 or 2: 5; 
Examples of products: 
ATMS sensor data record; 
CrIS sensor data record; 
VIIRS sensor data record; 
VIIRS imagery; 
Validated by: End of September 2014. 

Priority level (number of products): Priority 3 or 4: 29; 
Examples of products: 
OMPS-nadir sensor data record; 
VIIRS active fires; 
VIIRS cloud optical thickness; 
CrIS infrared ozone profile; 
Validated by: End of September 2014. 

Priority level (number of products): No priority: 1; 
Examples of products: 
VIIRS ocean color/chlorophyll; 
Validated by: End of September 2014. 

Number of products: 1; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority 3 or 4: 1; 
Examples of products: 
VIIRS vegetation health index suite; 
Validated by: End of September 2015. 

Number of products: 15; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority not assigned; 
Examples of products: 
Application packets and raw data records; 
Validated by: Not applicable[A]. 

Number of products: 1; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority 1 or 2: 1; 
Examples of products: 
Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer-2 temperature data record; 
Validated by: Date is still to be determined. 

Number of products: 6; 
Priority level (number of products): Priority 1 or 2: 0; 
Examples of products: Not applicable; 
Validated by: Planned to be removed from requirements[B]. 

Priority level (number of products): Priority 3 or 4: 5; 
Examples of products: CERES sensor data record; 
Validated by: Planned to be removed from requirements[B]. 

Priority level (number of products): No priority: 1; 
Examples of products: OMPS-limb profiler sensor data record; 
Validated by: Planned to be removed from requirements[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documents. 

Notes: 

[A] Program officials stated that selected products, including raw 
data records and application packets, do not undergo validation. 

[B] Program officials expect that these requirements will be removed 
once the transfer of instruments is approved through the fiscal year 
2014 budget process. 

[End of table] 

Even though S-NPP products are not at the validated stage in which 
products are ready for operational use, the National Weather Service 
(NWS) has accepted certain products for use in its operational 
systems. For example, the JPSS program office reported that NWS is 
using ATMS temperature data records in its operational forecasts, and 
that the Alaska Weather Forecast Offices are using VIIRS imagery in 
its forecasts. In addition, NWS's National Centers for Environmental 
Prediction is evaluating CrIS sensor data records for use in numerical 
weather prediction, but has not yet used the data operationally 
because it is in the midst of a computer upgrade. Officials also 
stated that the program obtains information on the operational use of 
S-NPP data from other NOAA offices, including the National Ocean 
Service and the National Marine and Fisheries Service. 

While NOAA is aware of these uses, it does not track the extent to 
which key satellite data users--including users from the Air Force, 
Navy, Forest Service, European weather offices, and academic 
institutions--have incorporated S-NPP data into their operations or if 
corrective actions are needed to make the products more accurate or 
more effective for the specific users. Program officials noted that 
they are not required to tailor products to meet non-NOAA user 
requirements, and that they do not have a tracking mechanism that 
would allow them to identify which entities are using the data. They 
noted, however, that the program obtains informal reports from 
customer representatives through various working groups and forums, 
such as the Low-earth Orbiting Requirements Working Group and the JPSS 
Customer Forum. While these efforts obtain information from known 
customer groups, they do not meet best practices for actively tracking 
whether customers are using the products, receiving the expected 
value, or in need of product corrections. Until the program office 
tracks the use of S-NPP and future JPSS products, it will not have 
full knowledge of the extent to which products are being used to 
assess the value they provide to end users and whether corrective 
actions are needed. More significantly, without information on who is 
using S-NPP data, NOAA will be unable to ensure that the significant 
investment made on this satellite is not wasted. 

Development of JPSS Flight Project Is on Track, but Scheduling Issues 
on the Ground System Have Caused Delays: 

In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities, the 
program is working to complete development of the JPSS-1 systems in 
preparation for a March 2017 launch date. To manage this initiative, 
the program office organized its responsibilities into two separate 
projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors, spacecraft, 
and launch vehicles and (2) the ground project, which includes ground-
based data processing and command and control systems. Table 4 shows 
the JPSS projects and their key components. 

Table 4: JPSS Projects and Components: 

Project: Flight; 
Key components and responsibilities: 
Sensors: ATMS, CERES, CrIS, OMPS, VIIRS; 
Spacecraft; 
Launch vehicle. 

Project: Ground; 
Key components and responsibilities: 
Satellite command, control, and communications; 
Interface data processing segment. 

Source: NOAA's JPSS program office. 

[End of table] 

JPSS projects and components are at various stages of system 
development. The flight project has nearly completed instrument 
hardware development for the JPSS-1 satellite and has begun testing 
certain instruments. Also, the flight project completed a major design 
review for the JPSS-1 satellite's spacecraft. While the flight 
project's development is on track, the ground project experienced 
delays in its planned schedule that could further delay major program 
milestones, including key reviews required to establish the program's 
cost and schedule baseline. 

Flight Project: JPSS-1 Instrument and Spacecraft Development Is On 
Track: 

The flight project is generally on track with respect to planned JPSS-
1 instrument and spacecraft development efforts. According to program 
reports of instrument development, the instruments for the JPSS-1 
satellite are nearly complete. Specifically, as of July 2013, the 
instrument hardware ranged from 80 to 100 percent complete. Also, all 
of the instruments have completed or are scheduled to complete 
environmental testing reviews in 2013 and are to be delivered to the 
spacecraft by 2014. The spacecraft completed its critical design 
review--which evaluates whether the design is appropriately mature to 
continue with the final design and fabrication--in January 2013. 

While individual instruments have experienced delays, the key testing 
milestones and delivery dates for the instruments and spacecraft have 
generally held constant since the last key decision point in July 
2012. CERES experienced a 10-month slip in its delivery date due to a 
technical issue with the instrument's internal calibration monitor, 
and ATMS experienced an 8-month slip to its pre-environmental review 
due to an issue in one of the sensor's channels, but even accounting 
for these slips, the instruments have a schedule reserve of 14 and 10 
months, respectively. VIIRS is expected to be the last instrument to 
be delivered to the spacecraft and has a schedule reserve of 6 months. 
Also, between July 2012 and December 2012 instrument contractors' 
estimated costs at completion increased by $29 million for ATMS, CrIS, 
and OMPS, while the cost for VIIRS decreased by $46 million. In 
addition, based on program reports of technical performance, the 
instruments and the spacecraft are generally meeting expected 
technical performance. Table 5 describes the current status of the 
components of the JPSS-1 flight project. 

Table 5: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the 
JPSS-1 Satellite, as of July 2013: 

Instrument: Component: ATMS; 
Status: The instrument completed its hardware development and is in 
environmental testing. The instrument experienced a technical issue 
beginning in November 2012 in which science counts in one of the 
channels were lower than expected. The program replaced channel 
components with spares and performed additional regression testing. 
This issue delayed the planned pre-environmental review by 6 months 
from November 2012 to May 2013. ATMS is expected to be delivered for 
integration on the spacecraft in March 2014. 

Instrument: Component: CERES; 
Status: The instrument completed its hardware development and is in 
environmental testing. The instrument's internal calibration monitor 
exhibited unstable performance during calibration, which delayed its 
delivery by 13 months. The cause of this issue is still unknown. CERES 
underwent pre-environmental review in February 2012. The program 
office plans to perform additional calibration testing, vacuum 
performance testing, and regression testing prior to its delivery in 
October 2013. 

Instrument: Component: CrIS; 
Status: The instrument completed 80 percent of its hardware 
development and is in subsystem integration. The instrument's 
electronic components have been experiencing a power-up issue, 
possibly due to a timing issue with the digital power supply. The 
program office replaced the power supply with a spare and is working 
on resolving the issue and completing acceptance testing. Additional 
work remaining on the instrument includes completing the subsystems, 
integrating the complete instrument, conducting the pre-environmental 
review in September 2013, and completing its environmental test 
program. The expected delivery date for the instrument is August 2014. 

Instrument: Component: OMPS-Nadir; 
Status: The instrument completed its hardware development and is in 
environmental testing. The instrument's diffuser experienced 
degradation during calibration and the adhesive was deemed the root 
cause. There was no performance impact but the instrument's delivery 
date slipped 3 months. The program office planned to complete 
cleaning, regression testing, and preparation of the nadir unit for 
testing. The instrument completed a pre-environmental review in April 
2013, is conducting environmental testing, and is expected to be 
delivered in August 2014. 

Instrument: Component: VIIRS; 
Status: The instrument completed 80 percent of its hardware 
development and is in subsystem integration. Several sensor components 
have been delivered, installed, and integrated. VIIRS is expected to 
undergo pre-environmental review in October 2013 with an expected 
delivery in October 2014. 

Component: Spacecraft; 
Status: The spacecraft completed its critical design review in 
December 2012; 
hardware development is ongoing. The spacecraft has an expected 
delivery in October 2014. 

Component: Launch vehicle; 
Status: NASA awarded a contract for launch services in July 2012. 
Previously accepted risks for the launch program on S-NPP are being 
reviewed for applicability and potential mitigation. 

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office data. 

[End of table] 

Ground Project: Progress Made, but Facility Scheduling Problems Have 
Caused Delays: 

The JPSS ground project has made progress in developing the ground 
system components, but scheduling issues have caused delays in the 
deployment of system upgrades. Specifically, between August 2012 and 
February 2013, the program office defined the ground system's 
technical performance baseline, ordered and received the first 
increment of hardware for the next major software release, and 
transitioned S-NPP operational management from the JPSS program to 
NOAA's office responsible for satellite operations. 

However, the program has delayed the delivery of key ground system 
upgrades needed to support JPSS-1 because the facilities needed for 
hardware installation, software development, and testing activities 
were not available when needed. The ground system upgrades, called 
block 1.5 and 2.0, were originally scheduled to be delivered in 
January and December 2015, respectively. To address the problem in 
scheduling the facilities, NOAA delayed the delivery of block 1.5 and 
merged it with block 2.0. The program is now expecting to deliver both 
upgrades in December 2015. We have previously reported that 
compressing system development schedules introduces program risk 
because it implies the need to accomplish a larger number of 
activities in parallel and on time before the next major event can 
occur as planned.[Footnote 19] As a result, any complications in the 
merged ground system upgrades could affect the system's readiness to 
support the JPSS-1 launch date. 

NOAA Revised Program Scope to Focus on Weather Priorities and Reduce 
Costs: 

While NOAA is moving forward to complete product development on the S-
NPP satellite and system development on the JPSS-1 satellite, the 
agency recently made major revisions to the program's scope and 
planned capabilities and is moving to implement other scope changes as 
it finalizes its plans pending congressional approval. We previously 
reported that, as part of its fiscal year 2013 budget process, NOAA 
was considering removing selected elements of the program in order to 
reduce total program costs from $14.6 billion to $12.9 billion. 
[Footnote 20] By October 2012, NOAA made the following changes in the 
program's scope: 

* develop two (instead of three) TSIS instruments as well as two free-
flyer spacecraft and launch vehicles to accommodate the instruments; 

* reduce the previously planned network of fifteen ground-based 
receptor stations to two receptor sites at the north pole and two 
sites at the south pole; 

* increase the time it takes to obtain satellite data and deliver it 
to the end user from 30 minutes to 80 minutes on the JPSS-2 
satellite;[Footnote 21] 

* not install an interface data processing segment at the two Navy 
locations or at the Air Force Weather Agency; and: 

* withdraw future support for ground operations for DOD's Defense 
Weather Satellite System, which was subsequently canceled. 

More recently, as proposed by the administration, NOAA began 
implementing additional changes in the program's scope and objectives 
in order to meet the agency's highest-priority needs for weather 
forecasting and reduce program costs from $12.9 billion to $11.3 
billion. Specifically, NOAA has begun to: 

* Transfer requirements for building the OMPS-limb and CERES follow-on 
climate sensors for the JPSS-2 satellite to NASA. 

* Transfer the first free-flyer mission from the JPSS program to a 
separate NOAA program, called the Polar Free Flyer program, and cancel 
the second free-flyer mission. More information on the Polar Free 
Flyer program is provided in appendix II. 

* Eliminate requirements for a legacy type of broadcast transmitter, 
which, according to NOAA officials, is in a spectrum range being 
crowded out by terrestrial users and is consistent with its European 
partners' plans. 

* Reduce science and algorithm requirements for lower-priority data 
products. 

* Reduce operations and sustainment costs based on increased 
efficiencies through moving from customized components to more off-the-
shelf solutions. 

* Reduce the mission life cycle by 3 years from 2028 to 2025. 

While we were unable to precisely itemize the reductions in costs 
associated with various program changes, program officials provided 
rough estimates. The following table summarizes the reported cost 
reductions associated with key changes to the JPSS program. 

Table 6: Reported Cost Reductions Associated with JPSS Changes: 

Timing of revisions: June 2012; 
Program reported cost reductions: $1.7 billion through 2028; 
(from the $14.6 billion to $12.9 billion life cycle cost estimates); 
Major scope changes and other revisions: 
Restructured free flyer missions ($800M); 
Revised operations and sustainment concept ($700M); 
Reduced reserve estimates ($200M). 

Timing of revisions: April 2013; 
Program reported cost reductions: $1.6 billion through 2025; 
(from the $12.9 billion to $11.3 billion life cycle cost estimates); 
Major scope changes and other revisions: 
Transferred first free flyer mission to Polar Free Flyer program and 
transferred a TSIS, CERES, and OMPS-Limb instrument to NASA ($750M); 
Reduced program lifetime by 3 years, from 2028 to 2025 ($390M); 
Eliminated second free-flyer mission and one type of communication 
downlink ($240M); 
Lowered expected costs for the JPSS-1 launch vehicle and launch 
services ($9M); 
Saved in other areas, including costs saved by acquiring VIIRS spare 
parts from the Air Force and eliminating enhanced data processing of 
data obtained from the Global Change Observation Mission-Water 
satellite ($211M). 

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program data. 

[End of table] 

While there are a number of reasons for individual changes in the 
program, the key reason for the June 2012 changes was to meet the 
program's $12.9 billion cost cap. The reasons for the more recent 
changes were to reduce mission costs and complexity, focus JPSS 
priorities on NOAA's weather forecasting mission, and identify 
opportunities to reduce potential gaps between JPSS satellites, all of 
which an independent study on NOAA's satellite program recommended in 
July 2012. 

While these are worthy goals, the changes NOAA implemented over the 
last 2 years will have an impact on those who rely on polar satellite 
data. Specifically, satellite data products will be delivered more 
slowly than anticipated because of the reduction in the number of 
ground stations, and military users may not obtain the variety of 
products once anticipated at the rates anticipated because of the 
removal of their ground-based processing subsystems. Further, while 
not as obvious, the impact of other changes, including the removal of 
the communications downlink and the reduction of requirements for 
certain algorithms, could also affect specific groups of satellite 
data users. As NOAA moves to implement these program changes, it will 
be important to assess and understand the impact the changes will have 
on satellite data users. 

JPSS Schedules Demonstrate Multiple Best Scheduling Practices, but 
Integration Problems and Other Weaknesses Reduce Confidence in the 
JPSS-1 Launch Date: 

The JPSS program office has established a preliminary integrated 
master schedule and implemented multiple scheduling best practices, 
but the integrated master schedule is not complete and weaknesses in 
component schedules significantly reduce the program's schedule 
quality as well as management's ability to monitor, manage, and 
forecast satellite launch dates. The incomplete integrated master 
schedule and shortfalls in component schedules are due in part to the 
program's plans to further refine the schedule as well as schedule 
management and reporting requirements that varied among contractors. 
Further, while the program is reporting a 70 percent confidence level 
in the JPSS-1 launch date, its analysis is likely to be overly 
optimistic because it was not conducted with an integrated schedule 
and included a component schedule with weaknesses. Until the program 
office completes its integrated master schedule and addresses 
weaknesses in component schedules, it will lack the information it 
needs to effectively monitor development progress, manage dependencies 
between schedules, and forecast the JPSS-1 satellite's completion and 
launch. 

The JPSS Program Has Not Yet Established a Complete Integrated Master 
Schedule: 

According to our guidance on best practices in scheduling,[Footnote 
22] the success of a program depends in part on having an integrated 
and reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will 
occur and how each activity is related to the others. The program 
schedule provides not only a road map for systematic project execution 
but also the means by which to gauge progress, identify and resolve 
potential problems, and promote accountability at all levels of the 
program. An integrated master schedule constitutes a program schedule 
as a network of logically linked sequences of activities that includes 
the entire required scope of effort, including the effort necessary 
from the government, contractors, and other key parties for a 
program's successful execution from start to finish. Although the 
integrated master schedule includes all government, contractor, and 
external effort, the government program management office is 
ultimately responsible for its development and maintenance. 

The JPSS program office provided a preliminary integrated master 
schedule in June 2013, but this schedule is incomplete. The program's 
June 2013 schedule is its first attempt to document a programwide 
integrated master schedule since it began in October 2010. The 
schedule contains the scope of work for key program components, such 
as the JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 satellites and the ground system, and cites 
linkages to more detailed component schedules. However, significant 
weaknesses exist in the program's schedule. Specifically, about one-
third of the schedule is missing logical relationships called 
dependencies that are needed to depict the sequence in which 
activities occur. Because a logic relationship dictates the effect of 
an on-time, delayed, or accelerated activity on subsequent activities, 
any missing or incorrect logic relationship is potentially damaging to 
the entire network. Complete network logic between all activities is 
essential if the schedule is to correctly forecast the start and end 
dates of activities within the plan. Program documentation 
acknowledges that this schedule is not yet complete and the program 
office plans to refine it over time. Until the program office 
completes its integrated schedule and includes logically linked 
sequences of activities, it will lack the information it needs to 
effectively monitor development progress, manage dependencies, and 
forecast the JPSS-1 satellite's completion and launch. 

The Quality of JPSS-1 Component Schedules Is Inconsistent: 

Our scheduling guidance identifies ten best practices that support 
four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable schedule--
comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled.[Footnote 
23] A comprehensive schedule includes all government and contractor 
activities, reflects resources (labor, materials, and overhead) needed 
to do the work, and realistically reflects how long each activity will 
take. A well-constructed schedule includes activities that are 
sequenced with the most straightforward logic possible, a critical 
path[Footnote 24] that represents a true model of the activities that 
drive the project's earliest completion date, and total float that 
accurately depicts schedule flexibility. A credible schedule reflects 
the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or 
outcomes (horizontal traceability) and maps varying levels of the 
schedule to one another (vertical traceability). Also, a credible 
schedule includes data about risks and opportunities that are used to 
predict a level of confidence in meeting the project's completion 
date. A controlled schedule is updated periodically by trained 
schedulers using actual progress and logic to realistically forecast 
dates for program activities and is compared against a designated 
baseline schedule to measure, monitor, and report the project's 
progress. The JPSS program office is applying NASA's schedule 
management handbook guidance to manage its schedules, which is largely 
consistent with our guidance on scheduling best practices. Table 7 
provides more detail on the best practices and key characteristics of 
a reliable schedule. 

Table 7: The Four Characteristics and Ten Best Practices of a High-
Quality and Reliable Schedule: 

Characteristic: Comprehensive; 

Best practice: Capturing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect all activities as defined in 
the project's work breakdown structure, which defines in detail the 
work necessary to accomplish a project's objectives, including 
activities both the owner and contractors are to perform. 

Best practice: Assigning resources to all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect the resources (labor, 
materials, overhead) needed to do the work, whether they will be 
available when needed, and any funding or time constraints. 

Best practice: Establishing the duration of all activities; 
Description: The schedule should realistically reflect how long each 
activity will take. When the duration of each activity is determined, 
the same rationale, historical data, and assumptions used for cost 
estimating should be used. Durations should be reasonably short and 
meaningful and allow for discrete progress measurement. Schedules that 
contain planning and summary planning packages as activities will 
normally reflect longer durations until broken into work packages or 
specific activities. 

Characteristic: Well-constructed; 

Best practice: Sequencing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should be planned so that critical project 
dates can be met. To do this, activities need to be logically 
sequenced--that is, listed in the order in which they are to be 
carried out. In particular, activities that must be completed before 
other activities can begin (predecessor activities), as well as 
activities that cannot begin until other activities are completed 
(successor activities), should be identified. Date constraints and 
lags should be minimized and justified. This helps ensure that the 
interdependence of activities that collectively lead to the completion 
of events or milestones can be established and used to guide work and 
measure progress. 

Best practice: Confirming that the critical path is valid; 
Description: The schedule should identify the program critical path--
the path of longest duration through the sequence of activities. 
Establishing a valid critical path is necessary for examining the 
effects of any activity's slipping along this path. The program 
critical path determines the program's earliest completion date and 
focuses the team's energy and management's attention on the activities 
that will lead to the project's success. 

Best practice: Ensuring reasonable total float; 
Description: The schedule should identify reasonable float (or slack)--
the amount of time by which a predecessor activity can slip before the 
delay affects the program's estimated finish date--so that the 
schedule's flexibility can be determined. Large total float on an 
activity or path indicates that the activity or path can be delayed 
without jeopardizing the finish date. The length of delay that can be 
accommodated without the finish date's slipping depends on a variety 
of factors, including the number of date constraints within the 
schedule and the amount of uncertainty in the duration estimates, but 
the activity's total float provides a reasonable estimate of this 
value. As a general rule, activities along the critical path have the 
least float. 

Characteristic: Credible; 

Best practice: Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally 
and vertically; 
Description: The detailed schedule should be horizontally traceable, 
meaning that it should link products and outcomes associated with 
other sequenced activities. These links are commonly referred to as 
"handoffs" and serve to verify that activities are arranged in the 
right order for achieving aggregated products or outcomes. The 
integrated master schedule should also be vertically traceable--that 
is, varying levels of activities and supporting subactivities can be 
traced. Such mapping or alignment of levels enables different groups 
to work to the same master schedule. 

Best practice: Conducting a schedule risk analysis; 
Description: A schedule risk analysis uses a good critical path method 
schedule and data about project schedule risks and opportunities as 
well as statistical simulation to predict the level of confidence in 
meeting a program's completion date, determine the time contingency 
needed for a level of confidence, and identify high-priority risks and 
opportunities. As a result, the baseline schedule should include a 
buffer or reserve of extra time. 

Characteristic: Controlled; 

Best practice: Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic; 
Description: Progress updates and logic provide a realistic forecast 
of start and completion dates for program activities. Maintaining the 
integrity of the schedule logic at regular intervals is necessary to 
reflect the true status of the program. To ensure that the schedule is 
properly updated, people responsible for the updating should be 
trained in critical path method scheduling. 

Best practice: Maintaining a baseline schedule; 
Description: A baseline schedule is the basis for managing the project 
scope, the time period for accomplishing it, and the required 
resources. The baseline schedule is designated the target schedule, 
subject to a configuration management control process, against which 
project performance can be measured, monitored, and reported. The 
schedule should be continually monitored so as to reveal when 
forecasted completion dates differ from planned dates and whether 
schedule variances will affect downstream work. A corresponding 
baseline document explains the overall approach to the project, 
defines custom fields in the schedule file, details ground rules and 
assumptions used in developing the schedule, and justifies 
constraints, lags, long activity durations, and any other unique 
features of the schedule. 

Source: GAO Schedule Assessment Guide, GAO-12-120G (exposure draft). 

[End of table] 

The quality of three selected component schedules supporting the JPSS-
1 mission--VIIRS, the spacecraft, and the ground system--was 
inconsistent with respect to implementing the characteristics of a 
high-quality, reliable schedule.[Footnote 25] Each schedule had 
strengths and weaknesses with respect to sound scheduling practices, 
but VIIRS was a stronger schedule with fewer weaknesses compared to 
the ground system and spacecraft schedules. Since the reliability of 
an integrated schedule depends in part on the reliability of its 
subordinate schedules, schedule quality weaknesses in these schedules 
could transfer to an IMS derived from them. Table 8 identifies the 
quality of each of the selected JPSS-1 component schedules based on 
the extent to which they met ten best practices of high-quality and 
reliable schedules; the discussion that follows highlights observed 
strengths and weaknesses from each schedule.In addition, appendix III 
includes a more detailed assessment of each schedule against the ten 
best practices. 

Table 8: Assessment of JPSS-1 Component Schedule Quality: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Comprehensive: 

Capturing all activities; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Assigning resources to all activities; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Substantially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Establishing the duration of all activities; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Met. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Well-constructed: 

Sequencing all activities; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Confirming that the critical path is valid; 
Ground system: Minimally met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Ensuring reasonable total float; 
Ground system: Partially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Credible: 

Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically; 
Ground system: Partially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Conducting a schedule risk analysis; 
Ground system: Minimally met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Partially met. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Controlled: 

Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Substantially met; 
VIIRS: Met. 

Maintaining a baseline schedule; 
Ground system: Substantially met; 
Spacecraft: Partially met; 
VIIRS: Substantially met. 

Source: GAO analysis of detailed schedules and related documentation 
for the VIIRS instrument, spacecraft, and ground system. 

Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that 
satisfies the entire criterion. 

Substantially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence 
that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. 

Partially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that 
satisfies about half of the criterion. 

Minimally met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that 
satisfies a small portion of the criterion. 

Not met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that 
satisfies any of the criterion. 

[End of table] 

Ground Schedule: 

Of the ten best practices, the ground system schedule minimally met 
two best practices, partially met two best practices, and 
substantially met six best practices. There were strengths in the 
ground schedule in that the contractor established a clear process for 
integrated information between the schedule and its resource 
management software and the contractor has performed resource leveling 
on the schedule. In addition, the contractor stated that people 
responsible for the activities estimated activity durations. Also, the 
contractor stated that it performs wellness checks on the quality of 
the schedule after each update to identify issues associated with 
missing logic or date constraints and provides a monthly status 
briefing to the JPSS program office that addresses the status of 
external schedule handoffs. 

However, there were also weaknesses in the ground schedule. For 
example, activities on the critical path with date constraints are 
preventing accurate calculations of the schedule's total float, or 
flexibility. In order for the critical path to be valid, the 
activities on the critical path must also have reasonable total float. 
Without a critical path that accurately calculates schedule 
flexibility, the program office will not be able to provide reliable 
timeline estimates or identify when problems or changes may occur and 
their effect on downstream work. Moreover, while the contractor 
conducted a schedule risk analysis on the schedule, that analysis was 
for select near-term milestones rather than the readiness of the 
ground system for the launch of JPSS-1 and it did not include the 
risks most likely to delay the project. A schedule risk analysis 
should be conducted through the finish milestone and should include 
risk data to determine activities that most often end up on the 
critical path. 

Spacecraft Schedule: 

Of the ten best practices, the spacecraft schedule partially met eight 
best practices, and substantially met two best practices. There were 
strengths in the spacecraft schedule in that it was horizontally and 
vertically traceable; the contractor provided evidence of monthly 
progress updates to management, including status reporting of key 
milestones, handoffs, explanations of date changes, and an analysis of 
the critical and near-critical paths; the contractor conducted a 
schedule risk analysis; and the schedule included baseline dates of 
activities for comparisons of actual performance to date. 

However, there were also weaknesses in the spacecraft schedule. For 
example, the schedule had a low level of detail and included one-third 
of remaining activities with durations greater than 44 days, even 
after accounting for undefined and procurement-related activities. 
When establishing the durations of activities, they should be 
reasonably short and meaningful and allow for discrete progress 
measurement. Durations longer than 2 months do not facilitate 
objective measurement of accomplished effort and the milestone to 
detail activity ratio does not allow for effective progress 
measurement and reporting. As another example of a quality shortfall, 
the schedule was overly flexible with high float values that were not 
justified in schedule documentation. Specifically, 70 percent of 
remaining activities had about 5 business weeks of float, including 67 
activities that had over 1,000 days of float, meaning that these 
activities could slip approximately 3.5 years without affecting the 
project's completion date. In order to establish reasonable total 
float, there should be documented justification for high float values 
in the schedule. Without this, it is unclear whether float values are 
high due to factors accepted by management and which are due to 
incomplete logic or other issues. 

VIIRS Schedule: 

The VIIRS schedule partially met one best practice, substantially met 
seven best practices, and fully met two best practices. There were 
strengths in the VIIRS schedule in that the contractor established a 
clear process for integrating information between the schedule and 
resource management software, stated that durations were estimated by 
the people responsible for the activities based on work to be done, 
and justified in its schedule documentation activities with durations 
longer than 44 days. In addition, the contractor justified in schedule 
documentation the use of all date constraints, identified a valid 
driving path of activities for managing the program, and identified 
reasonable float values or justified them to the JPSS program office. 
Further, the contractor provided a schedule narrative accompanying 
each status update, which describes the status of key milestone dates 
(including the program finish date); explanations for changes in key 
dates; and a description of critical paths. 

However, there were also weaknesses in the VIIRS schedule. For 
example, the schedule had milestones that represented handoffs between 
contractor integrated product teams, but it did not include handoffs 
to the JPSS program office. In order to verify a schedule's horizontal 
traceability, handoffs should link products and outcomes associated 
with other sequenced activities. Without this, there could be 
different expectations between management and activity owners. As 
another example, the contractor conducted a schedule risk analysis 
with a good schedule network and obtained three different duration 
estimates from subject matter experts. However, the duration estimates 
did not reflect risks from the project's risk register and the 
analysis was focused only on activities on the critical path. This 
approach is flawed because activities that are not currently on the 
critical path could become critical as risks occur. 

The inconsistency in quality among the three schedules has multiple 
causes. Program and contractor officials explained that certain 
weaknesses have been corrected with updated schedules. In other cases, 
the weaknesses lacked documented explanation in part because the JPSS 
program office did not require contractors to provide such 
documentation. Based on program schedule documentation, the schedule 
management and reporting requirements varied across contractors 
without documented justification for tailored approaches, which may 
partially explain the inconsistency in practices among the schedules. 
Since the reliability of an integrated schedule depends in part on the 
reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule quality weaknesses 
in these schedules will transfer to an integrated master schedule 
derived from them. Consequently, the extent to which there are quality 
weaknesses in JPSS-1 support schedules further constrains the 
program's ability to monitor progress, manage key dependencies, and 
forecast completion dates. Until the program office addresses the 
scheduling shortfalls in its component schedules, the JPSS schedule 
will have lower quality and reduced reliability as a management tool 
for monitoring and forecasting satellite launch dates. 

Program Has Confidence in the JPSS-1 Schedule, but Its Assumptions Do 
Not Reflect Weaknesses in the Underlying Data: 

According to our guidance on best practices in scheduling,[Footnote 
26] a schedule risk analysis uses statistical techniques to predict a 
level of confidence in meeting a program's completion date. This 
analysis focuses on key risks and how they affect the schedule's 
activities. The analysis does not focus solely on the critical path 
because, with risk considered, any activity may potentially affect the 
program's completion date. By relying on statistical simulations to 
randomly vary activity durations according to the probability of 
occurrence for certain durations and risks, the analysis seeks to 
develop a probability distribution of possible completion dates that 
reflect the program plan and enable an organization to match a date to 
its degree of risk tolerance. 

The JPSS program office has conducted a schedule risk analysis on the 
JPSS-1 mission schedule (and launch date) through NASA's joint cost 
and schedule confidence level (JCL) process.[Footnote 27] The JCL 
implemented by the JPSS program office represents a best practice in 
schedule management for establishing a credible schedule and reflects 
a robust schedule risk analysis conducted on key JPSS-1 schedule 
components. For example, the analysis assessed the impacts of key 
risks from the risk register and how multiple duration estimates for 
activities, based on documented uncertainty distributions, could 
affect the schedule. Based on the results of the JCL, the program 
office reports that its level of confidence in the JPSS-1 schedule is 
70 percent and that it has sufficient schedule reserve to maintain a 
launch date of no later than March 2017. 

However, the program office's level of confidence in the JPSS-1 
schedule may be overly optimistic for two key reasons. First, the 
model that the program office used was based on flight project 
activities rather than an integrated schedule consisting of flight, 
ground, program office, and other activities relevant to the 
development and launch of JPSS-1. As a result, the JPSS program 
office's confidence level projections do not factor in the ongoing 
scheduling issues that are impacting the ground project. Had those 
issues been considered, the JPSS-1 confidence level would have been 
lower. Second, there are concerns regarding the spacecraft schedule's 
quality as discussed in the previous section. Factoring in these 
concerns, the confidence of the JPSS-1 satellite's schedule and 
projected launch date would be lower. We have previously reported that 
when using the JCL, NASA projects did not always include relevant cost 
and risk inputs.[Footnote 28] 

While program officials noted that they included key ground system 
risks in their calculations, they did not include ground system scope 
in the JCL because it was too difficult to allocate ground system 
components to individual missions. Moreover, officials stated that 
they do not plan to include ground project or program office 
activities in future JCL updates. While it may have been difficult to 
include ground system scope in the JCL, without this, the program's 
schedule risk analysis and JCL do not reflect the full amount of work 
to be performed leading to JPSS-1 launch. Until the program office 
conducts a schedule risk analysis on an integrated schedule that 
includes the entire scope of effort and addresses quality shortfalls 
of relevant component schedules, it will have less assurance of 
meeting the planned March 2017 launch date for JPSS-1. 

NOAA Has Analyzed Alternatives for Addressing Gaps in Satellite Data, 
but Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan: 

While NOAA has identified multiple ways to help mitigate expected gaps 
in polar satellite data, it has not yet developed and implemented a 
comprehensive contingency plan. In October 2012, NOAA established a 
plan to address the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon 
satellite data and contracted for a technical assessment that 
generated additional alternatives for the agency to consider. However, 
NOAA's mitigation plan has shortfalls when compared to government and 
industry best practices. Moreover, NOAA intends to update its plan by 
fall 2013 by integrating alternatives generated from the contractor's 
technical assessment. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive 
contingency plan that addresses key shortfalls, it may not be 
positioned to effectively mitigate anticipated gaps in polar satellite 
coverage. 

NOAA Identified Multiple Ways to Mitigate Polar Satellite Data Gaps: 

Polar satellites are essential to NOAA's mission to understand and 
predict changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts. Satellite 
data gaps in the morning or afternoon polar orbits would lead to less 
accurate and timely weather forecasting; as a result, advanced warning 
of extreme events would be affected. In June 2012, we reported that 
while NOAA officials communicated publicly and often about the risk of 
a polar satellite data gap, the agency had not established plans to 
mitigate the gap.[Footnote 29] We recommended that NOAA establish 
mitigation plans for pending satellite gaps in the afternoon orbit as 
well as potential gaps in the early morning and midmorning orbits and 
NOAA agreed with the report's recommendation. 

In October 2012, NOAA established a mitigation plan to address the 
impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon satellite data. This plan 
identifies alternatives for mitigating the risk of a 14-to 18-month 
gap in the afternoon orbit beginning in March 2016, between the 
current polar satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite. Key alternatives 
include utilizing different satellites as data sources and improving 
data assimilation in models. The plan also lists technical, 
programmatic, and management actions needed to implement these 
options. Table 9 provides an overview of NOAA's polar satellite gap 
mitigation plan. 

Table 9: Summary of NOAA's Polar Satellite Gap Mitigation Plan: 

Key assumptions: 
* There would be a polar afternoon gap of 14 to 18 months between 
March 2016 and October 2017 (the date that JPSS-1 is to become 
operational); 
* Mission critical data from S-NPP's ATMS, CrIS, and VIIRS instruments 
would be lost; 
* DOD and European satellites would continue providing data in the 
early morning and midmorning orbits, respectively. 

Alternatives: 
* Use similar data from available sources, such as existing DOD, NOAA, 
and NASA polar satellites; 
* Improve NOAA data assimilation; 
* Rely on foreign data, including radio occultation data or future 
polar satellites from other nations such as Russia or China; 
* Use non-satellite sources, such as aircraft observations; 
* Use commercial solutions (although none were identified); 

Key actions: 
Technical: 
* Conduct data denial experiments eliminating afternoon polar-orbiting 
sounder data from forecast models; 
* Calculate, obtain, and distribute the estimated end-of-life of all 
sounder and imagery satellite assets; 
Programmatic: 
* Monitor and report monthly on the health of instruments on existing 
polar satellites; 
* Augment NOAA research and development computing capability as soon 
as possible to run data impact experiments; 
Management: 
* Commit to augmenting NOAA operational computing capability; 
* Maintain international relationships that can result in partnerships 
for satellite data; 

Implementation status: Actions were not implemented or funded. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

However, NOAA did not implement the actions identified in its 
mitigation plan and decided to identify additional alternatives. In 
October 2012, at the direction of the Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Oceans and Atmosphere (who is also the NOAA Administrator), NOAA 
contracted for a detailed technical assessment of alternatives to 
mitigate the degradation of products caused by a gap in satellite data 
in the afternoon polar orbit. This assessment solicited input from 
experts within and outside of NOAA and resulted in the following 
alternatives: 

* rely on DOD's DMSP satellite; 

* expand the use of radio occultation data, including funding the 
ground segment for a follow-on United States/Taiwan radio occultation 
mission; 

* use atmospheric motion vectors (observed wind data); 

* utilize future geostationary advanced imagery data; 

* expand the use of aircraft observations; 

* expand the use of targeted observations for high-impact events; 

* implement a 4-dimensional hybrid data assimilation system (by adding 
a time dimension); 

* improve data assimilation of cloud-impacted radiances; 

* implement blends of global models, such as European and Canadian 
models; 

* accelerate global model research to operations; 

* sustain the use of high-latitude direct readout imagery; and: 

* rely on China's future Feng Yun-3 satellite. 

Moving forward, NOAA officials stated that they are currently 
considering the additional alternatives and that the agency intends to 
integrate a final set of alternatives into its existing mitigation 
plan by the fall of 2013. 

NOAA Does Not Yet Have a Comprehensive Contingency Plan: 

Government and industry best practices call for the development of 
contingency plans to maintain an organization's essential functions in 
the case of an adverse event.[Footnote 30] As a complement to risk 
mitigation, contingency planning includes strategies that attempt to 
reduce or control the impact of risks should they occur. These 
practices identified by, for example, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology and the Software Engineering Institute, 
include key elements such as defining failure scenarios, identifying 
and selecting strategies to address failure scenarios, developing 
procedures and actions to implement the selected strategies, testing 
the plans, and involving affected stakeholders. These elements can be 
grouped into categories, including (1) identifying failure scenarios 
and impacts, (2) developing contingency plans, and (3) validating and 
implementing contingency plans (see table 10). 

Table 10: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan: 

Category: Identifying failure scenarios and impacts; 
Description: This category includes activities such as defining 
failure scenarios; conducting impact analyses that show the impact of 
failure scenarios; defining minimum acceptable levels of outputs and 
recovery time objectives; and establishing resumption priorities. 

Category: Developing contingency plans; 
Description: This category includes activities such as identifying 
alternative solutions to address failure scenarios; selecting 
contingency strategies from among alternatives based on costs, 
benefits, and impacts; defining actions, roles and responsibilities, 
triggers, and timelines for implementing contingency plans; developing 
"zero-day" procedures; ensuring that steps reflect priorities for 
resumption of products and recovery objectives; and obtaining review 
and approval of the contingency plan from designated officials. 

Category: Validating and implementing contingency plans; 
Description: This category includes activities such as identifying 
steps for testing contingency plans and conducting training exercises; 
preparing for and executing tests; validating test results for 
consistency against minimum performance levels; executing applicable 
actions for implementation of contingency strategies; communicating 
and coordinating with stakeholders to ensure that contingency 
strategies remain optimal for reducing potential impacts; and updating 
and maintaining contingency plans as warranted. 

Source: GAO analysis of guidance documents from the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, Software Engineering Institute, and GAO. 

[End of table] 

By documenting its mitigation plan and conducting a study on 
additional alternatives, NOAA has taken positive steps towards 
establishing a contingency plan for handling the potential impact of 
satellite data gaps in the afternoon polar orbit. However, NOAA does 
not yet have a comprehensive contingency plan because it has not yet 
selected the strategies to be implemented, or established procedures 
and actions to implement the selected strategies. In addition, there 
are shortfalls in the agency's current plans as compared to government 
and industry best practices, such as not always identifying specific 
actions with defined roles and responsibilities, timelines, and 
triggers. Moreover, multiple steps remain in testing, validating, and 
implementing the contingency plan. The following table provides an 
assessment of the extent to which NOAA's mitigation plan met 
contingency planning practices in three general categories. 

Table 11: Assessment of NOAA's Gap Mitigation Plan for its Polar 
Environmental Satellites: 

Contingency planning category: Identifying failure scenarios and 
impacts; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Description: 
* The plan identifies key scenarios, such as an earlier than expected 
loss of data from the S-NPP satellite, a slip in the JPSS-1 launch 
date, a failure of JPSS-1 on launch, and a longer than expected 
calibration and validation period for JPSS-1; 
* The plan includes analyses of the impact to users from losing key 
weather products from ATMS, CrIS, and VIIRS. The plan also identifies 
minimum performance outputs for key weather data and reflects the top 
priorities identified in JPSS program requirements; 
* However, the plan does not address other scenarios, including the 
possibility of a loss of data from Department of Defense and European 
partner satellites in morning orbits or a partner mission in the 
afternoon orbit; 
* Further, the plan does not include recovery time objectives for key 
data products. 

Contingency planning category: Developing contingency plans; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Description: 
* The plan describes the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon 
satellite data, identifies alternative strategies for mitigating the 
gap, and lists technical, programmatic, and management actions needed 
to implement gap mitigation strategies; 
* However, the plan has not yet been integrated with the other 
alternatives that were subsequently identified; 
NOAA has not yet assessed its alternative strategies based on costs, 
benefits, and potential impacts; 
* The plan does not identify options for preventing gaps from 
occurring; 
* The plan does not identify opportunities for accelerating the 
calibration and validation phase--the time between launch and 
availability of operational products--on JPSS-1; 
* The plan does not identify specific actions for executing two of the 
five alternatives; identify roles and responsibilities for three 
alternatives; identify timelines for any of the alternatives; or 
identify triggers to signal when steps should be taken on any of the 
alternatives. 

Contingency planning category: Validating and implementing contingency 
plans; 
GAO assessment: Not met; 
Description: 
* NOAA has not yet initiated efforts to validate or implement its gap 
mitigation plan. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

NOAA officials stated that the agency is continuing to work on 
refinements to its gap mitigation plan, and that they anticipate 
issuing an updated plan in fall 2013 that will reflect additional 
alternatives. While NOAA expects to update its plan, the agency does 
not yet have a schedule for adding key elements--such as specific 
actions, roles and responsibilities, timelines, and triggers--for each 
alternative. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive contingency plan 
that integrates its strategies and addresses the elements identified 
above to improve its plans, it may not be sufficiently prepared to 
mitigate potential gaps in polar satellite coverage. 

Conclusions: 

While NOAA has made noteworthy progress over the past year in 
utilizing S-NPP data in weather forecasts and developing instrument 
and spacecraft components of the JPSS-1 satellite, the agency is 
facing challenges in its efforts to ensure sustained satellite 
observations. Specifically, NOAA does not expect to validate key S-NPP 
products until September 2014--nearly 3 years after the satellite's 
launch. Also, the agency does not track the usage of its satellite 
products or obtain feedback on them, which limits the program's 
ability to ensure that satellite products are useful. Further, the 
program experienced scheduling problems on its ground systems, which 
led to a delay in planned system upgrades. Until NOAA establishes a 
way to track which agencies are using its products and to obtain 
feedback on those products, the program office may continue to 
experience delays in delivering actionable S-NPP data to users. 

Almost 3 years after the JPSS program was established, it lacks a 
complete integrated master schedule. While program officials recently 
established a preliminary integrated master schedule, the schedule 
lacks proper linkage among dependent activities, which limits its 
ability to calculate dates and predict changes in the future. Further, 
the quality of component schedules varied for certain practices. These 
issues raise questions about the program's 70 percent joint cost and 
schedule confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date. Until the program 
office develops a complete integrated schedule and addresses 
weaknesses in component schedules, it will lack the information needed 
to effectively monitor development progress and ensure the planned 
JPSS-1 launch date. 

NOAA has taken steps to mitigate an anticipated gap in polar afternoon 
satellite data, but its efforts are incomplete. Specifically, the 
agency has not yet established a comprehensive contingency plan that 
identifies specific actions with defined roles and responsibilities, 
timelines, and triggers for contingency strategies. Moreover, the 
agency's recent assessment of a larger set of alternatives has not yet 
been integrated with its mitigation plans. As a result, the agency 
faces important decisions as to whether and how the various 
alternatives should be carried out. While NOAA plans to add 
alternatives to its mitigation plan by fall 2013, it does not yet have 
plans to add the other key components. Until NOAA establishes a 
comprehensive contingency plan that addresses these shortfalls, its 
plan for mitigating potential gaps in the polar orbit may not be 
effective in avoiding significant impacts to NOAA's weather mission. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Given the importance of having reliable schedules for managing JPSS 
satellite launch dates and the significance of polar-orbiting 
satellite data to weather forecasts, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to: 

* track the extent to which key groups of satellite data users are 
using S-NPP and JPSS products, and obtain feedback on these products; 

* establish a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule that 
includes a logically linked sequence of activities; 

* address the shortfalls in the ground system and spacecraft component 
schedules outlined in this report; 

* after completing the integrated master schedule and addressing 
shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost and schedule 
confidence level for JPSS-1, if warranted and justified; 

* establish a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite 
data gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent with contingency 
planning best practices identified in this report. The plan should 
include, for example, specific contingency actions with defined roles 
and responsibilities, timelines, and triggers; analysis of the impact 
of lost data from the morning orbits; and identification of 
opportunities to accelerate the calibration and validation phase of 
JPSS-1. 

Agency Comments: 

We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of 
Commerce and NASA. We received written comments from Commerce 
transmitting NOAA's comments. NOAA concurred with all five of our 
recommendations and identified steps that it is taking to implement 
them. It also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated 
into our report, as appropriate. NOAA's comments are reprinted in 
appendix IV. 

NASA did not provide comments on the report's findings or 
recommendations, but noted that it would provide any input it might 
have to NOAA for inclusion in NOAA's comments. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this 
report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this 
report will be available on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or at 
pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) progress in meeting the Joint 
Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program's objectives of sustaining the 
continuity of NOAA's polar-orbiting satellite system through the Suomi 
National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) and JPSS satellites, (2) 
evaluate the quality of the JPSS program schedule, and (3) assess 
NOAA's plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data. 

To evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting JPSS program objectives, we 
assessed (1) the status of activities supporting the operational S-NPP 
satellite, (2) progress on efforts to develop the JPSS-1 satellite, 
and (3) recent changes in JPSS program scope. A more detailed 
description of our activities in each of these areas follows. 

* S-NPP progress: We reviewed monthly program reports to identify the 
status of key upgrades to the ground system supporting S-NPP and the 
efforts to transition operational control of the satellite to NOAA. In 
addition, we compared the program's current estimated completion dates 
for S-NPP products to original program estimates for when the products 
would be available for operational use. We compared program office 
information on the extent to which S-NPP products were being used to 
best practices in evaluating the use of completed products. We also 
interviewed program officials about algorithm maturity and the extent 
to which users are using S-NPP products. 

* JPSS-1 progress: We analyzed plans and reports on system development 
efforts for the JPSS-1 satellite. Specifically, we reviewed the JPSS-1 
mission preliminary design review package to assess completion of work 
on the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system as well as cost, 
schedule, and technical performance for the JPSS-1 satellite. We also 
examined JPSS program office monthly status reports on system 
development progress to identify variances and corrective actions 
being taken to address the most critical issues and risks to the 
program. We interviewed JPSS program officials to discuss system 
development status. We assessed the reliability of reported milestone 
dates for top-level milestones by examining multiple project status 
reports at different points in time for consistent reporting of dates 
or explanations of any changes and compared reported dates to source 
schedule data. We determined that the milestone data were sufficiently 
reliable for our reporting purposes. 

* Changes in JPSS program scope: We compared the program's 
requirements as of September 2011 to the program's updated plans and 
requirements as of May 2013 to identify key changes and to assess 
whether changes in capabilities have impacted program goals and 
objectives. We interviewed program officials about changes in the JPSS 
program's scope. We assessed the reliability of the program's 
estimated savings from program scope changes by comparing them to 
program documentation on prior and current cost estimates and found 
that the estimates were sufficient for our purposes. 

To evaluate the quality of NOAA's program schedule, we used an 
exposure draft of GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide[Footnote 31] to 
assess schedule management practices and characteristics of selected 
contractor schedules. We selected and analyzed three component 
contractor schedules--the ground system, the spacecraft, and the 
Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite instrument--because these 
schedules represented the critical path for flight and the entire 
ground system development schedule that was either already or likely 
to be driving the JPSS-1 satellite launch date. We also analyzed 
schedule metrics as a part of that analysis to highlight potential 
areas of strengths and weakness in, among other things, schedule 
logic, use of resources, task duration, float, and task completion. In 
order to assess each schedule against the ten best practices, we 
traced and verified underlying support and determined whether the 
program office or contractor provided a small portion, about half, a 
large portion, or complete evidence that satisfied the criterion and 
assigned a score depicting that the practices were met, minimally met, 
partially met, substantially met, or fully met. By examining the 
schedules against our guidance, we conducted a reliability assessment 
on each of the schedules and incorporated our findings on reliability 
limitations in the analysis of each component schedule. We reviewed 
documentation on a schedule risk assessment the JPSS program office 
conducted on JPSS-1 flight project schedules to identify assumptions 
and results of its analysis and to assess the reliability of the 
reported JPSS joint cost and schedule confidence level. We interviewed 
government and contractor officials to discuss reasons for observed 
shortfalls in schedule management practices. We determined that the 
schedules were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes and 
our report notes the instances where reliability concerns affect the 
quality of the schedules as well as the program's schedule risk 
assessment. 

To assess plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data, we 
reviewed NOAA's October 2012 polar satellite gap mitigation plan and a 
subsequent technical assessment as well as NOAA's plans for 
implementing recommendations from the assessment. We compared elements 
of the plan and assessment against best practices developed from 
leading government and industry sources such as the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, the Software Engineering Institute's 
Capability Maturity Model® Integration, and our prior report. Based on 
that analysis, we identified shortfalls in NOAA's current plans as 
well as key remaining activities for the agency to accomplish. We 
interviewed NOAA headquarters staff and JPSS program officials about 
the technical assessment and their plans. 

We performed our work at NASA and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C. 
area. We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through 
September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: NOAA Plans to Transfer Selected JPSS Program Components 
to the Polar Free Flyer Program: 

In order to reduce Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program costs 
and increase the program's focus on its weather mission, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to transfer key 
program components to a separate program, called the Polar Free Flyer 
program. After establishing JPSS in 2010, NOAA committed to developing 
three units of the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) 
and to finding a spacecraft and launch accommodation for three 
instruments that would not be on the JPSS satellite: TSIS, the 
Advanced Data Collection System (A-DCS), and the Search and Rescue 
Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) system. As of June 2012, the JPSS 
program planned to launch two stand-alone satellites (called free 
flyers) to accommodate two suites of these instruments. However, NOAA 
recently made several decisions that affect these commitments, and 
expects to finalize these plans by the end of September 2013: 

* NOAA plans to transfer responsibility for developing TSIS and 
accommodating the launch of the three instruments out of the JPSS 
program and into a newly established Polar Free Flyer program. 
According to JPSS program officials, a transition plan for the new 
program is under review and selected staff positions have been filled. 

* The Polar Free Flyer program will deliver a single free flyer 
mission instead of the two missions planned under the JPSS program. 

* NOAA will transfer the responsibility for developing the second TSIS 
instrument to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), rely on an Air Force Global Positioning System mission to 
continue SARSAT coverage, and find a launch vehicle to accommodate an 
additional A-DCS instrument. 

* NOAA plans to use the JPSS ground system to support the Polar Free 
Flyer Program. 

The JPSS program plans to award a contract in fiscal year 2014 for a 
spacecraft that is to accommodate the TSIS, A-DCS, and SARSAT 
instruments. The three instruments are in development and testing, and 
are expected to be delivered to the satellite by 2015. The planned 
launch readiness date for the free-flyer mission was originally July 
2016, but that date may change pending the outcome of the spacecraft 
contract award. Also, the program is looking to share a launch vehicle 
with some other mission to reduce launch costs. However, the program 
office is not aware of any ride-sharing opportunities that could 
accommodate the mission's planned launch readiness date. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component Schedules Implementation of 
Best Practices in Scheduling: 

The following tables identify detailed assessments of the extent to 
which three component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 schedule met the 
ten best practices and four characteristics of a high-quality, 
reliable schedule. Table 12 provides an assessment of the ground 
system contractor's schedule, which integrates activities from seven 
components of the ground system; table 13 provides an assessment of 
the spacecraft contractor's detailed schedule; and table 14 provides 
an assessment of the VIIRS contractor's detailed schedule. 

The following information describes the key that we used in tables 12 
through 14 to convey the results of our assessment of the schedules' 
consistency with an exposure draft of GAO best practices for schedule 
management.[Footnote 32] 

Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that 
satisfies the entire criterion. 

Substantially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence 
that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. 

Partially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that 
satisfies about half of the criterion. 

Minimally met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that 
satisfies a small portion of the criterion. 

Not met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that 
satisfies any of the criterion. 

Table 12: Detailed Assessment of Ground System Schedule Quality: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Comprehensive: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Capturing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule largely reflects 
the statement of work. However, the schedule only partially reflects 
the work breakdown structure and includes 40 activities that are 
marked as both summary activities and milestones. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Assigning resources to all 
activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The contractor has established a 
clear process for integrating information between the schedule and the 
resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 
performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of 
the process. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Establishing the duration of 
all activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: According to the contractor, 
durations were estimated by the people responsible for the activities 
based on work to be done. Additionally, calendars were used to specify 
valid working times for all activities. However, over 35 percent of 
the activities in the schedule were of long duration, and only half of 
these were justified in schedule documentation. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Well-constructed: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Sequencing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: A majority of the activities in 
the schedule had dependencies, and the schedule's relationships were 
largely finish-to-start. However, program officials did not justify in 
schedule documentation the small number of activities with missing 
dependencies, date constraints, and lags. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Confirming that the critical 
path is valid; 
GAO assessment: Minimally met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The critical path and driving 
path are not fully valid because they are not free of long activities, 
constraints, and lags. Moreover, considering the schedule as a whole, 
the schedule software may not be calculating the true critical path of 
the project because the use of more than 800 constraints. These may 
result in float values that present an unrealistic view of the 
critical path. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Ensuring reasonable total 
float; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: According to contractor 
officials, float values have been assessed as part of regularly 
scheduled health checks and they have determined that for certain 
cases float values are necessarily high. However, not all float values 
calculated by the schedule are reasonable and many values do not 
accurately reflect true schedule flexibility. Additionally, the JPSS 
program office did not provide a documented assessment of total float 
values that appear to be excessive to show that the team agrees with 
the logic and that the float is consistent with the plan. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Credible: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Verifying that the schedule 
can be traced horizontally and vertically; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule is vertically 
traceable in all but one of the milestones that we reviewed, meaning 
that it allows activity owners to trace activities to higher-level 
milestones with intermediate and summary schedules. However, the 
schedule is not fully horizontally traceable--that is, although the 
schedule includes giver/receiver milestones that are defined in the 
schedule documentation, the schedule was not always affected by 
activities whose durations were extended by hundreds of days. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Conducting a schedule risk 
analysis; 
GAO assessment: Minimally met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The contractor conducted a 
schedule risk analysis with a schedule network that partially meets 
the characteristics associated with a good schedule network, as well 
three point duration estimates that were captured from control account 
managers. However, the analysis was conducted for select near-term 
milestones--not to the readiness of the ground system for the launch 
of JPSS-1. Additionally, the analysis did not include risks most 
likely to delay the project, the paths or activities that are most 
likely to delay the project, and the activities that most often ended 
up on the critical path. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Controlled: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Updating the schedule using 
actual progress and logic; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Responsibility for changing the 
schedule has been assigned to someone who has the proper training and 
experience in critical path method scheduling and the schedule is free 
of clearly erroneous progress information. However, although the 
contractor provides a monthly program management briefing that 
addresses the status of external giver/receiver activities, it does 
not address the status of key milestone dates, changes in network 
logic, or critical paths. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Maintaining a baseline 
schedule; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: A baseline schedule exists and 
is compared to the current schedule to track variances from the plan. 
According to contractor officials, a formal change control process is 
used to make changes to the baseline. However, the contractor's 
rolling wave reports do not satisfy all elements of a baseline 
schedule document. A baseline schedule document is a single document 
that describes, among other things, the organization of the IMS; 
the logic of the network; 
the basic approach to managing resources; 
the schedule's unique features; 
and justification for lags, date constraints, and long activity 
durations. 

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule 
data. 

[End of table] 

Table 13: Detailed Assessment of Spacecraft Schedule Quality: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Comprehensive: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Capturing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule reflects the work 
necessary to build the spacecraft, and schedule activities are mapped 
to the contract data requirements list and contractor work breakdown 
structure numbers. The schedule contains a low level of detail, which 
reflects the contractor's role as integrator for multiple vendors in a 
fixed-price environment. However, with a nearly 1: 1 ratio of detail 
activities to milestones, the schedule would benefit from increased 
detail into work activities. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Assigning resources to all 
activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The contractor has established a 
clear process for integrating information between the schedule and the 
resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 
performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of 
the process. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Establishing the duration of 
all activities; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The contractor has experience in 
developing spacecraft similar to JPSS-1, including S-NPP. Contractor 
officials stated that they obtained duration estimates for activities 
from engineers that were responsible for them while other engineers 
conducted peer reviews on those estimates. However, durations in 
general appear too long to facilitate objective measurement of 
accomplished effort. Even accounting for procurement-related 
activities and level-of-effort type recurring meeting activities, one-
third of all remaining activities are longer than 2 business months. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Well-constructed: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Sequencing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule was partially 
logically sequenced. Approximately 20 percent of all remaining 
activities and milestones were missing predecessor links, successor 
links or both. Officials stated that many of these activities were 
related to contract data requirements list deliveries and internal or 
external handoffs (called givers/receivers). We found other areas of 
questionable sequencing logic. For instance, there are about 10 
percent of remaining activities in the schedule that have lags and 
leads, including some instances of leads with start-to-finish logic--a 
particularly abnormal logical relationship. We also found date 
constraints pervasive throughout the schedule: 140 activities have 
soft constraints and 17 have hard constraints. Hard constraints are 
useful for calculating the amount of float available in the schedule 
and, therefore, the realism of the required project finish date and 
available resources during schedule development. However, they may be 
abused if they force activities to occur on specific dates that are 
determined off-line without much regard for the realism of the 
assumptions necessary to achieve them. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Confirming that the critical 
path is valid; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule defines activities 
with zero total float as critical. However, partly because of logic 
issues, the critical path as calculated by the scheduling software was 
convoluted and most likely unreliable. The path includes lags, leads, 
long-duration activities, and activities with hard constraints, which 
by definition will appear as critical. Officials stated they agreed 
that software-calculated critical paths cannot be relied upon in a 
complex schedule, and said they report the longest (or driving path) 
to management. Ideally, the critical path and the longest path should 
be the same, but our analysis found the longest path to be somewhat 
different than the default critical path; 
it does not include several activities that appeared on the critical 
path because of their date constraints. In addition, the longest path 
also includes several near-term, nonprocurement-related activities 
with long durations, spanning between 84 and 365 days. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Ensuring reasonable total 
float; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Officials stated that the total 
float values calculated by the schedule accurately reflect true 
schedule flexibility. However, we found that the schedule appears 
overly flexible due to high amounts of total float. 70 percent of 
remaining activities and milestones have greater than 30 days (about 5 
business weeks) of total float. This includes 67 activities (8 percent 
of remaining) with over 1,000 days of float, meaning these activities 
can slip more than 3.5 business years before impacting the planned 
finish date of the project. Without documented justification for high 
float values in the schedule, it is not clear which are explained by 
milestones without successors, which are due to schedule maintenance, 
and which are due to incomplete logic. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Credible: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Verifying that the schedule 
can be traced horizontally and vertically; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule is vertically 
traceable, with dates in the detail schedule mapping to higher-level 
management briefing charts. The schedule is generally horizontally 
traceable. The schedule clearly identifies givers and receivers and 
negative total float calculations respond appropriately when 
significant delays are introduced into the network. However, negative 
float is calculated because key milestones are constrained. While the 
negative float may be an accurate assessment of potential delay, 
management may not be aware of potential delays when constrained dates 
are reported in summary-level schedules. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Conducting a schedule risk 
analysis; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Officials stated that they 
follow an internal process to perform schedule risk analyses on the 
schedule. Officials also stated that three-point durations are applied 
to activities, correlation is accounted for, and a Monte Carlo 
analysis is run on the schedule to derive probabilities for forecasted 
dates. Although the contractor has no contractual requirement to share 
schedule risk analysis results with the JPSS program office, it 
provided a summary of its risk assessment report and instructions. 
However, this summary information did not include supporting details 
such as risk data inputs and data normalization techniques and the 
contractor did not incorporate correlation or perform the schedule 
risk analysis on a logically sound (well-constructed) schedule. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Controlled: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Updating the schedule using 
actual progress and logic; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Schedule progress is updated 
monthly and the schedule is delivered to the JPSS program office in 
accordance with contractual requirements. While a formal schedule 
narrative does not accompany the schedule delivery to the government, 
much of the narrative information--such as the status of key 
milestones and handoffs, explanations for changes in key dates, and an 
overview of critical and near-critical paths--is conveyed in monthly 
management meetings. However, 26 activities had start or finish dates 
in the past. Of these, 12 activities could be explained by obsolete 
scope of work. We also found 12 out-of-sequence activities, 
representing 13 percent of in-progress activities. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Maintaining a baseline 
schedule; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Contractor officials stated that 
they maintain schedule baseline information in the default baseline 
fields in the schedule and we found that baseline dates were set in 
the schedule. However, a schedule baseline document was not created 
for the schedule baseline. We found 104 activities in the schedule 
without baseline dates, 72 of which are complete or are planned to 
start by 2014. The majority of start variances appear reasonable, but 
we did find start variances ranging from -221 days (221 days ahead of 
schedule) to 237 days (237 days delayed). Despite the significant 
variances noted, it is commendable that the schedule includes baseline 
information that allows for analysis and monitoring of dates' 
variances. 

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule 
data. 

[End of table] 

Table 14: Detailed Assessment of VIIRS Schedule Quality: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Comprehensive: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Capturing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule largely reflects 
the work breakdown structure and statement of work. However, the 
schedule does not reflect work to be performed by a subcontractor and 
includes 10 activities that are marked as both summary activities and 
milestones. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Assigning resources to all 
activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The contractor has established a 
clear process for integrating information between the schedule and the 
resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 
performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of 
the process. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Establishing the duration of 
all activities; 
GAO assessment: Met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: According to the contractor, 
durations were estimated by the people responsible for the activities 
based on work to be done, realistic assumptions about available 
resources, productivity, normal interferences and distractions, and 
reliance on others. Further, the contractor justified in its schedule 
documentation virtually all activities with durations longer than 44 
days. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Well-constructed: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Sequencing all activities; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: All but one activity in the 
schedule has at least one predecessor and one successor, and that 
activity was justified in the schedule documentation. Additionally, 
every schedule date constraint was justified in schedule 
documentation. However, the schedule has a very small number of 
activities with dangling logic. Further, although explanations were 
provided for most of the small number of lags, the explanations did 
not justify their use. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Confirming that the critical 
path is valid; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Program office and contractor 
officials use the driving path to manage the program, which is 
preferred because it represents the activities that are driving the 
sequence of start dates directly affecting the estimated finish date. 
However, the driving path and the critical path to key milestones 
should be the same, and they are not. Also, the critical path is not 
valid because it contains level of effort activities. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Ensuring reasonable total 
float; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The program office has defined 
reasonable float values, and the values associated with the schedule 
largely fit that definition. For those float values that were not 
reasonable, the program office provided a documented assessment of 
those values to show that the team agrees with the logic and that the 
float is consistent with the plan. However, the schedule has a small 
number of activities that have unrealistic float values. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Credible: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Verifying that the schedule 
can be traced horizontally and vertically; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: The schedule is largely 
horizontally traceable. In particular, the schedule is affected by 
activities whose durations are extended by hundreds of days, and it 
includes giver/receiver milestones that represent handoffs between 
contractor integrated project teams. However, the schedule does not 
include all givers/receivers between the contractor and the program 
office. Additionally, the schedule is vertically traceable. 
Specifically, it allows activity owners to trace activities to higher-
level milestones with intermediate and summary schedules. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Conducting a schedule risk 
analysis; 
GAO assessment: Partially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: A schedule risk analysis was 
conducted with a good schedule network, and three point duration 
estimates that were captured from subject matter experts. However, the 
duration estimates did not reflect risks from the project's risk 
register and the analysis was focused on only the deterministic 
critical path and near-critical path. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Controlled: 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Updating the schedule using 
actual progress and logic; 
GAO assessment: Met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: Responsibility for changing or 
updating the schedule has been assigned to someone who has the proper 
training and experience in critical path method scheduling. 
Additionally, the schedule is free of clearly erroneous progress 
information. Further, the contractor provides a schedule narrative 
accompanying each status update, which describes the status of key 
milestone dates (including the program finish date); explanations for 
changes in key dates; and a description of the critical paths. 

Schedule characteristic or best practice: Maintaining a baseline 
schedule; 
GAO assessment: Substantially met; 
Examples of strengths and weaknesses: A baseline schedule exists and 
is compared to the current schedule to track variances. However, the 
contractor did not have a baseline schedule document. A baseline 
schedule document is a single document that describes, among other 
things, the organization of the IMS; the logic of the network; the 
basic approach to managing resources; the schedule's unique features; 
and justification for lags, date constraints, and long activity 
durations. 

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule 
data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

The Deputy Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

August 26, 2013: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 0 Street NW: 
Washington. DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled"Polar Weather 
Satellites: NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but 
Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further Attention (GAO-13-
676). On behalf of the Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's programmatic 
comments to the draft report. At your request, we are conducting a 
sensitivity review and will notify you of the results when our review 
is complete. 

If you have any questions, please contact me or Margaret Cummisky, 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs at 
(202) 482-3663. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Patrick Gallagher: 
Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce: 

Enclosure: 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Response to GAO Draft 
Report "Polar Weather Satellites - NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate 
Data Gaps, but Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further 
Attention" (GAO-13-676): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report on Polar Weather 
Satellites. The draft report on Polar Weather Satellites product 
development, program schedule, and potential gaps does a fair job of 
assessing the state of the program. Given the history and changes in 
the polar-orbiting operational environment satellite programs over the
past decade, NOAA recommends the following changes and updates to the 
report to ensure that the information presented is complete, up-to-
date, and reflects current plans. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

The draft GAO report states "Given the importance of having reliable 
schedules for managing JPSS satellite launch dates and the 
significance of polar-orbiting satellite data to weather forecasts, we 
recommend the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA 
to"... 

Recommendation 1: "Track the extent to which groups of satellite data 
users are using S-NPP and JPSS products and obtain feedback on these 
products." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA is already 
tracking the use of S-NPP products by key user groups such as the 
NWSINCEP. For example, NOAA uses the Joint Center for Satellite Data 
Assimilation (JCSDA) to assess the impacts of new data sources on 
Numerical Weather Predication. NOAA also utilizes existing partner 
forums to receive feedback from non-NOAA users such as EUMETSAT and 
000. NOAA will expand its tracking to include all S-NPP and JPSS 
products used by NOAA programs and partner organizations. 

Recommendation 2: "establish a complete JPSS program integrated master 
schedule that includes a logically linked sequence of activities;" 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA could not 
complete two parts of the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) by the time 
of the System Definition Review (SDR) due to contracting efforts 
underway but not completed. However, risk was mitigated by including 
the preliminary schedules and having an acceptable plan for closure. 
The IMS will be completed by January 2014 when contractual 
modifications required to support the ground segment have been 
finalized. Nevertheless, the JPSS program has made tremendous progress 
on maturing its schedule and has confidence in it. This is supported 
by independent review results of the SDR and the confirmation of the 
JPSS performance baseline (indicated by completing the Key Decision 
Point-I) by the Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce. 

Recommendation 3: "address the shortfalls in the ground system and 
spacecraft component schedules outlined in this report;" 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will address 
this recommendation by updating the ground system and spacecraft 
component schedules based on the recent completion of its SRR and KDP-
I reviews. In addition, we will continue to monitor and analyze these 
schedules on a monthly basis. 

Recommendation 4: "after completing the integrated master schedule and 
addressing shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost 
and schedule confidence level for JPSS-J, if warranted and justified;" 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will update 
the JPSS-l joint cost and schedule confidence levels after completing 
the IMS, if warranted and justified. 

Recommendation 5: "establish a comprehensive contingency plan for 
potential satellite data gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent 
with the contingency planning best practices identified in this 
report. The plan should include, for example, specific contingency 
actions with defined roles and responsibilities, timelines, and 
triggers; analysis of the impact of lost data from the morning orbits, 
and identification of opportunities to accelerate the calibration and 
validation phases of JPSS-l." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA acknowledges 
the need to develop a more comprehensive contingency plan for polar-
orbiting satellite data gaps, including gaps in the early and mid-
morning orbits. NOAA plans to update the current Gap Mitigation Plan 
in the fall of2013 and continue to update the plan approximately every 
6 months. This update will include a first iteration addressing items 
identified in the recommendation. 

Contingency actions are of two categories: (I) those which may be 
taken to decrease the probability of a gap occurring once a triggering 
event occurs (or decreasing the duration of a gap that occurs), and 
(2) those mitigating the impact of a gap once a triggering event 
occurs. It should be noted that for applications such as numerical 
weather prediction modeling, the methods of mitigating the impact of a 
gap include improving the NWP models themselves, improving the data 
assimilation system to optimize the impact of the data used in the 
model, and developing means of increasing the fraction of available 
data assimilated, for example using satellite data that are affected 
by clouds and precipitation. These methods would be the same no matter 
which gap or combination of gaps might occur--early, mid-morning, or 
afternoon. Hence the usefulness of assessing the impact of gaps in 
each orbit is limited. Moreover, efforts to quantify each gap impact 
will compete for resources with efforts that would limit the impact of
any of the potential gaps. Therefore, our plan must be judicious in 
applying resources. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

* David A. Powner (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

* In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant 
Director), Paula Moore (Assistant Director), Shaun Byrnes, Juaná 
Collymore, Lynn Espedido, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, 
Kaelin Kuhn, Jason Lee, Joshua Leiling, and Maria Stattel made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012). 

[2] See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and 
Contingency Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.19] (Washington, D.C.: 
August 1998); National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-
34 (May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, 
Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010). 

[3] NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP 
satellites after they are in orbit. 

[4] The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting 
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are 
planned to be flown sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 
satellites was launched in 2006, the second was launched in 2012, and 
the final satellite in the series is expected to launch in 2017. 

[5] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

[6] Originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project, in January 2012, 
the satellite's name was changed to the Suomi National Polar-orbiting 
Partnership satellite. 

[7] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need 
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2005). 

[8] Using S-NPP as an operational satellite means that the satellite's 
data will be used to provide climate and weather products. 

[9] The announcement accompanied the release of the President's fiscal 
year 2011 budget request. 

[10] This figure does not include approximately $2.9 billion in sunk 
costs that DOD spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010. 

[11] NOAA's $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through 
fiscal year 2010 and about $400 million in fiscal year 2011. 

[12] See, for example, GAO, Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address 
Potential Gaps in Weather and Climate Data Coverage, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-945T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 
2011); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act 
Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and 
Climate Data, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010); Polar-orbiting Environmental 
Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, 
Improvements Needed in Tri-Agency Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-772T] (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2009); and Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs 
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
Agency Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2009). 

[13] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require 
Focused Attention, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-604] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012). 

[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283] (Washington, D.C.: February 
2013). 

[15] The European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts is an 
independent, intergovernmental organization supported by 34 European 
nations, providing global medium-to-extended range forecasts. 

[16] According to NOAA and NASA officials, the products go through a 
beta stage (in which products have been minimally validated, but are 
available to users so that they can begin working with the data); a 
provisional stage (in which products are not optimal, but are ready 
for operational evaluation by users); and a validated stage (in which 
products are ready for operational use). 

[17] Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 
1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010) and GAO, Information Technology 
Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process 
Maturity, Version 1.1, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2004). 

[18] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology 
Council, National Strategy for Civil Earth Observations (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2013). 

[19] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(exposure draft). 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-604]. 

[21] In January 2013, program officials revised this delay to 96 
minutes to more precisely reflect the time it takes to send products 
from the ground system to the end users. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (exposure 
draft). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (exposure 
draft). 

[24] The critical path is generally defined as the longest continuous 
sequence of activities in a schedule. As such, it defines the 
program's earliest completion date or minimum duration. 

[25] These three component schedules represent the critical path for 
the flight project and the entire ground system schedule. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (exposure 
draft). 

[27] The JCL is a probabilistic analysis that includes, among other 
things, all cost and schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies 
potential risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to date, 
and addresses available annual resources to arrive at development cost 
and schedule estimates associated with various confidence levels. 

[28] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-207SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: March 1, 2012). 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-604]. 

[30] See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and 
Contingency Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.19] (Washington, D.C.: 
August 1998); National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-
34 (May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, 
Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010). 

[31] GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012). 

[32] GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012). 

[End of section] 

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