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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of 
Representatives: 

September 2013: 

Geostationary Weather Satellites: 

Progress Made, but Weaknesses in Scheduling, Contingency Planning, and 
Communicating with Users Need to Be Addressed: 

GAO-13-597: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-597, a report to the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of 
geostationary weather satellites. The GOES-R series is to replace the 
current series of satellites (called GOES-13, -14, and -15), which 
will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 2015. This 
new series is considered critical to the United States’ ability to 
maintain the continuity of satellite data required for weather 
forecasting through 2036. 

GAO was asked to evaluate GOES-R. GAO’s objectives were to (1) assess 
GOES-R progress and efforts to address key cost and schedule risks; 
(2) evaluate efforts to manage changes in requirements and whether any 
significant changes have recently occurred; and (3) evaluate the 
adequacy of GOES-R contingency plans. To do so, GAO analyzed program 
and contractor data, compared GOES-R schedules, requirements changes, 
and contingency plans to best practices by leading organizations, and 
interviewed officials at NOAA, NASA, and at other federal agencies 
that rely on GOES. 

What GAO Found: 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has 
completed the design of its Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R (GOES-R) series and made progress in building flight and 
ground components. While the program reports that it is on track to 
stay within its $10.9 billion life cycle cost estimate, it has not 
reported key information on reserve funds to senior management. Also, 
the program has delayed interim milestones, is experiencing technical 
issues, and continues to demonstrate weaknesses in the development of 
component schedules. These factors have the potential to affect the 
expected October 2015 launch date of the first GOES-R satellite, and 
program officials now acknowledge that the launch date may be delayed 
by 6 months. A launch delay would increase the time that NOAA is 
without an on-orbit backup satellite. It would also increase the 
potential for a gap in GOES satellite coverage should one of the two 
operational satellites (GOES-14 or -15) fail prematurely (see graphic)—
a scenario given a 36 percent likelihood of occurring by an 
independent review team. 

Figure: Potential Gap in GOES Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES-13: 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2009-2010; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2010-2015. 

GOES-14: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2009; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2009; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2010-2015; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2015-2020. 

GOES-15: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2010; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2010; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2010-2011; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2012-2017. 

GOES-R: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2015; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2015-2016; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2016; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2017-2023. 

GOES-S: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2017; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2017; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2017-2020; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2020-2023. 

Projected gap in backup coverage: mid-2015-mid 2015. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

While the GOES-R program has established a process for managing 
requirements changes, it has not effectively involved key satellite 
data users. Since 2007, the GOES-R program decided not to develop 31 
of the original set of GOES products and modified specifications on 20 
remaining products. For example, NOAA decreased the accuracy 
requirement for the hurricane intensity product and decreased the 
timeliness of the lightning detection product. However, key satellite 
data users were not fully informed about changes and did not have a 
chance to communicate their concerns about the impact of these changes 
on their operations. Until NOAA improves its communication with 
external satellite data users, obtains input from the users, and 
addresses user concerns when considering product changes, its changes 
could cause an unexpected impact on critical user operations.
NOAA has established contingency plans for the loss of its GOES 
satellites and ground systems that are generally in accordance with 
best practices; however, these plans are missing key elements. For 
example, NOAA did not work with the user community to address 
potential reductions in capability under contingency scenarios or 
identify alternative solutions for preventing a delay in the GOES-R 
launch date. Until NOAA addresses the shortfalls in its contingency 
plans and procedures, the plans may not work as intended in an 
emergency and satellite data users may not obtain the information they 
need to perform their missions 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that NOAA address weaknesses in managing reserves 
and scheduling, improve communications with satellite data users, and 
address shortfalls in contingency planning. NOAA concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-597]. For more 
information, contact David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

NOAA Has Made Progress in Developing GOES-R, but Continues to Face 
Challenges that Could Increase the Risk of a Satellite Data Gap: 

NOAA Has a Process for Managing Changes in GOES-R Requirements, but 
Changes Could Affect Some Users: 

NOAA Developed GOES-R Contingency Plans, but Weaknesses Increase the 
Impact of a Potential Coverage Gap: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Table 2: Key Changes to the Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Program over Time: 

Table 3: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series 
Instruments: 

Table 4: Key Components of the Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Ground Project: 

Table 5: Major Development Reviews for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series: 

Table 6: Development Status of Flight Project Components for the 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Satellite, as of 
August 2013: 

Table 7: Development Status of the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Ground Project Components, as of 
August 2013: 

Table 8: Reserve Levels for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Program, as of March 2013: 

Table 9: Delays in Milestones for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Program: 

Table 10: Description of Scheduling Best Practices: 

Table 11: Assessment of Selected Schedules Use of Best Practices over 
Time: 

Table 12: Best Practices in Managing Requirements Changes: 

Table 13: Assessment of Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Program Practices in Managing Changes in 
Requirements: 

Table 14: Summary of Key Changes in Product and Program Requirements 
between 2007 and 2012: 

Table 15: User Concerns about Key Changes or Deviations in 
Requirements: 

Table 16: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan: 

Table 17: Implementation of Key Contingency Planning Elements for 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Approximate Geographic Coverage of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Figure 2: Generic Data Relay Pattern for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: 

Figure 3: Organizational Structure and Staffing of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series Program: 

Figure 4: NASA's Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

Figure 5: Potential Gap in Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite Coverage: 

Abbreviations: 

CDR: critical design review: 

FOR: flight operations review: 

GOES: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite: 

GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series: 

KDP: key decision point: 

MDR: mission definition review: 

MOR: mission operations review: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NESDIS: National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 
Service: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NSOF: NOAA Satellite Operations Facility: 

ORR: operational readiness review: 

PDR: preliminary design review: 

SDR: system definition review: 

SIR: system integration review: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 9, 2013: 

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ralph Hall: 
Chairman Emeritus: 
The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

Geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in our 
nation's weather forecasting. These satellites--which are managed by 
the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)--provide information on atmospheric, oceanic, 
climatic, and solar conditions that help meteorologists observe and 
predict regional and local weather events. They also provide a means 
of identifying the large-scale evolution of severe storms, such as 
forecasting a hurricane's path and intensity. 

NOAA, through collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of 
geostationary weather satellites, called the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series consists 
of four satellites and is to replace the current series of 
geostationary environmental satellites as they reach the end of their 
useful lives. This new series is expected to provide the first major 
improvement in the technology of GOES instruments since 1994 and, as 
such, is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain 
the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the 
year 2036. 

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA's GOES-R 
series program (GOES-R program). Specifically, our objectives were to 
(1) assess GOES-R progress and efforts to address key cost and 
schedule risks that we identified in our prior report, (2) evaluate 
efforts to manage changes in requirements and whether any significant 
changes have recently occurred, and (3) evaluate the adequacy of GOES-
R contingency plans. To assess NOAA's progress in developing GOES-R 
and addressing key risks, we compared estimated and actual program 
deliverables and analyzed monthly program status briefings to identify 
current status and recent development challenges. We also followed up 
on our prior concerns regarding reserve funds and scheduling practices 
by comparing the program's current level of reserve funding and two 
component schedules to best practices.[Footnote 1] By recalculating 
reserve percentages based on supporting data and examining schedule 
anomalies through use of a standard template, we determined data in 
both areas to be reliable for the purposes of this audit. To assess 
NOAA's efforts to manage changes in requirements, we compared the 
agency's policies and practices to best practices identified by 
leading organizations[Footnote 2] and identified major changes to the 
program over time. To evaluate the adequacy of the GOES-R contingency 
plan, we compared the GOES-R contingency plan to best practices in 
contingency planning identified by leading organizations.[Footnote 3] 
We also interviewed program officials as well as key internal and 
external satellite data users. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See 
appendix I for a complete description of our objectives, scope, and 
methodology. 

Background: 

Since the 1970s, geostationary satellites have been used by the United 
States to provide meteorological data for weather observation, 
research, and forecasting. NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, 
Data, and Information Service is responsible for managing the civilian 
operational geostationary satellite system, called GOES. Geostationary 
satellites can maintain a constant view of the earth from a high orbit 
of about 22,300 miles in space. 

NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused 
on the United States (see fig. 1). These satellites provide timely 
environmental data about the earth's atmosphere, surface, cloud cover, 
and the space environment to meteorologists and their audiences. They 
also observe the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes 
and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to 
reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. The ability of the 
satellites to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of 
atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's 
weather forecasting operations. 

Figure 1: Approximate Geographic Coverage of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated world map] 

Map depicts coverage by: 
GOES-West; 
GOES-East; 
Overlap of the two. 

Sources: NOAA (data), Mapart (map). 

[End of figure] 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 
every few years (see table 1). NOAA's policy is to have two 
operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times. 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Series name: Original GOES[C]; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987; 
Satellites[B]: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

Series name: GOES I-M; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001; 
Satellites[B]: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 

Series name: GOES N; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2010; 
Satellites[B]: 13, 14, 15, Q[D]. 

Series name: GOES-R; 
Procurement duration[A]: 2008-2024; 
Satellites[B]: R, S, T, U. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite 
launch. 

[B] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet 
when they are on the ground (before launch) and by numbers once they 
are in orbit. 

[C] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate 
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and 
GOES-7. 

[D] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

[End of table] 

Four GOES satellites-GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15-are 
currently in orbit. Both GOES-13 and GOES-15 are operational 
satellites with GOES-13 covering the eastern United States and GOES-15 
in the western United States (see fig. 1). GOES-14 is currently in an 
on-orbit storage mode and available as a backup for the other two 
satellites should they experience any degradation in service. GOES-12 
is at the end of its service life, but it is being used to provide 
limited coverage of South America. The GOES-R series is the next 
generation of satellites that NOAA is planning. The first two 
satellites in the series (called GOES-R and GOES-S) are planned for 
launch in October 2015 and February 2017, respectively.[Footnote 4] 

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously 
transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are 
processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the 
satellite for broadcast to primary weather services and the global 
research community in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed 
data are also distributed to users via ground stations through other 
communication channels, such as dedicated private communication lines 
and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from a 
geostationary satellite to the ground stations and commercial 
terminals. 

Figure 2: Generic Data Relay Pattern for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Ground station: 
Communications link to users. 

GOES satellite: 
Raw environmental data sent to ground station; 
Processed environmental data sent back to GOES; 
Processed environmental data broadcast to users. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

Overview of the GOES-R Program: 

NOAA established the GOES-R program to develop and launch the next 
series of geostationary satellites and to ensure the continuity of 
geostationary satellite observations. Since its inception, the GOES-R 
program has undergone several changes in cost and scope. As originally 
envisioned, GOES-R was to encompass four satellites hosting a variety 
of advanced technology instruments and providing 81 environmental 
products. The first two satellites in the series were expected to 
launch in September 2012 and April 2014. However, in September 2006, 
NOAA decided to reduce the scope and technical complexity of the GOES-
R program because of expectations that total costs, which were 
originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach $11.4 billion. 
Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of satellites from four 
to two, canceled plans for developing an advanced instrument (which 
reduced the number of planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and 
divided another instrument into two separate acquisitions. The agency 
estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion and kept the 
planned launch dates unchanged. 

Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the 
cost and scope of the GOES-R program. In May 2007, NOAA had an 
independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. After 
reconciling the program office's cost estimate of $7 billion with the 
independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency established 
a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an increase of 
$670 million from the previous estimate. The program also moved the 
launch dates for the first two satellites to December 2014 and April 
2016. Further, in November 2007, to mitigate the risk that costs would 
rise, program officials decided to remove selected program 
requirements from the baseline program and treat them as contract 
options that could be exercised if funds allowed. These requirements 
included the number of products to be distributed, the time to deliver 
the remaining products (product latency), and how often these products 
would be updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). For example, 
program officials eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 
34 of the 68 envisioned products, including low cloud and fog, sulfur 
dioxide detection, and cloud liquid water. Program officials included 
the restoration of the requirements for the products, latency times, 
and refresh rates as options in the ground system contract that could 
be acquired at a later time. Program officials later reduced the 
number of products that could be restored as a contract option (called 
option 2) from 34 to 31 because they determined that two products were 
no longer feasible and two others could be combined into a single 
product. 

In late 2009, NOAA changed the launch dates for the first two 
satellites to October 2015 and February 2017, in part due to a bid 
protest related to award of the spacecraft contract. More recently, 
NOAA restored two satellites to the program's baseline, making GOES-R 
a four-satellite program once again. In February 2011, as part of its 
fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA requested funding to begin 
development for two additional satellites in the GOES-R series--GOES-T 
and GOES-U. The program estimates that the development for all four 
satellites in the GOES-R series--GOES-R, GOES-S, GOES-T, and GOES-U--
is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036, an increase of $3.2 billion 
over its prior life cycle cost estimate of $7.67 billion for the two-
satellite program. See table 2 for an overview of key changes to the 
GOES-R program. 

Table 2: Key Changes to the Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Program over Time: 

Number of satellites: 
August 2006 (baseline program): 4; 
September 2006: 2; 
November 2007: 2; 
February 2011: 4. 

Instruments or instrument changes: 
August 2006 (baseline program): 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Imaging Suite (which included the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, 
and Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor); 
* Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
September 2006: 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
* Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
November 2007: No change; 
February 2011: No change. 

Number of satellite products: 
August 2006 (baseline program): 81; 
September 2006: 68; 
November 2007: 34 baseline 34 optional; 
February 2011: 34 baseline 31 optional. 

Life cycle cost estimate (in then-year dollars): 
August 2006 (baseline program): $6.2 billion--$11.4 billion (through 
2034); 
September 2006: $7 billion (through 2028); 
November 2007: $7.67 billion (through 2028); 
February 2011: $10.9 billion (through 2036)[A]. 

Estimated launch dates for GOES-R and S: 
August 2006 (baseline program): GOES-R: September 2012; 
GOES-S: April 2014; 
September 2006: GOES-R: September 2012; GOES-S: April 2014; 
November 2007: GOES-R: December 2014; GOES-S: April 2016; 
February 2011: GOES-R: October 2015; GOES-S: February 2017. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Based on NOAA's fiscal year 2012 budget baseline, $7.64 billion of 
this cost estimate was for the first two satellites in the series, 
GOES-R and GOES-S. The cost for the remaining two satellites--GOES-T 
and GOES-U--was estimated at $3.22 billion. 

[End of table] 

Program and Program Office Structure: 

The GOES-R program is divided into flight and ground projects that 
have separate areas of responsibility and oversee different sets of 
contracts. The flight project, which is managed by NASA, includes 
instruments, spacecraft, launch services, satellite integration, and 
on-orbit satellite initialization. Table 3 summarizes the GOES-R 
instruments and their planned capabilities. 

Table 3: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series 
Instruments: 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key 
features include: 
* monitoring and tracking severe weather; 
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and; 
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 
simultaneously. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor total lightning (in-
cloud and cloud-to-ground) activity over the United States and 
adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete dataset than previously 
possible. Key features include: 
* detecting lightning activity as an indicator of severe storms and 
convective weather hazard impacts to aviation and; 
* providing a new capability to GOES for long-term mapping of total 
lightning that only previously existed on NASA low-earth-orbiting 
research satellites. 

Planned instrument: Magnetometer; 
Description: Expected to provide information on the general level of 
geomagnetic activity, monitor current systems in space, and permit 
detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm commencements, and 
substorms. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid 
in the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance 
and disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key 
features include: 
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles; 
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons 
and protons; and; 
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Planned instrument: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range 
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, and 
will provide quantitative estimates of the physical conditions in the 
Sun's atmosphere. Key features include: 
* providing information used for geomagnetic storm 
forecasts, and power grid performance, and; 
* providing observations of solar energetic particle events related to 
flares. 

Planned instrument: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Description: Expected to detect solar soft X-ray irradiance and solar 
extreme ultraviolet spectral irradiance. Key features include: 
* monitoring solar flares that can disrupt communications and degrade 
navigational accuracy, affecting satellites, astronauts, high latitude 
airline passengers, and; 
* monitoring solar variations that directly affect satellite 
drag/tracking and ionospheric changes, which impact communications and 
navigation operations. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

The ground project is directed by NOAA and is made up of three main 
components: the core ground system, an infrastructure of antennas, and 
a product access subsystem. In turn, the core ground system comprises 
four functional modules supporting operations, product generation, 
product distribution, and configuration control. Key components of the 
ground project are described in table 4. 

Table 4: Key Components of the Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Ground Project: 

Component: Core Ground System; 
Description: Expected to (1) provide command of operational functions 
of the spacecraft and instruments, (2) receive and process information 
from the instruments and spacecraft, (3) distribute satellite data 
products to users, and (4) provide configuration control and a common 
infrastructure and set of services for the satellite and instruments. 

Component: Antennas; 
Description: Expected to provide six new antenna stations and modify 
four existing antennas to receive GOES-R data. The antenna contract is 
also expected to include the construction of related infrastructure, 
software development for control systems, and maintenance. 

Component: Product Distribution and Access System; 
Description: Expected to provide ingestion of data and distribution 
for GOES-R products and data to authorized users. When completed, this 
system will be integrated into the core ground system. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission 
success. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by 
NOAA's Deputy Undersecretary, is the oversight body for the GOES-R 
program. However, since it relies on NASA's acquisition experience and 
technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA 
implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for 
the GOES-R program (see fig. 3). NOAA also located the program office 
at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. 

Figure 3: Organizational Structure and Staffing of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series Program: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organizational structure] 

Top level: 
* Commerce; 
* NASA. 

Next level: 
* NOAA, reports to Commerce; 

Next level: 
* NOAA/NASA Program Management Council, communicates with NOAA; 

Next level: 
* National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 
(NESDIS), reports to NOAA; 
* Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council (with NOAA 
representation), reports to NASA; communicates with National 
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS). 

Next level: 
* NESDIS/Science Mission Directorate Program Management Council; 
communicates with NOAA/NASA Program Management Council and National 
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS). 

Next level: 
* GOES-R Program: System Program Director: NOAA; Deputy System Program 
Director: NASA; Assistant System Program Director: NOAA; reports to 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 
(NESDIS); communicates with Goddard Space Flight Center Management 
Council (with NOAA representation); 
* Program Scientist: NOAA; reports to National Environmental 
Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS); communicates with 
GOES-R Program. 

Next level: 
* Flight Project: Project Manager: NASA; reports to GOES-R Program; 
* Ground Project: Project Manager: NOAA; reports to GOES-R Program. 

Source: NOAA. 

[End of figure] 

Prior Reports Made Recommendations to Address Program Weaknesses: 

In recent years, we issued a series of reports aimed at addressing 
weaknesses in the GOES-R program.[Footnote 5] Key areas of focus 
included (1) improving communications with external data users, (2) 
developing contingency plans, and (3) addressing key cost and schedule 
risks. 

* Improving communications with external users. In September 2010, we 
reported that while NOAA had identified GOES data users and involved 
internal NOAA users in developing and prioritizing GOES-R 
requirements, it had not adequately involved other federal users who 
rely on GOES data by documenting their input and communicating major 
changes to the program.[Footnote 6] We recommended that the program 
establish processes for satellite data requirements definition and 
prioritization that include documented input from external users, as 
well as processes to notify these non-NOAA agencies of GOES-R program 
status and changes. In February 2012, the GOES-R program developed a 
communications plan that described how external stakeholders would be 
notified of GOES-R progress, status changes, and other relevant 
activities. However, NOAA has not yet fully implemented the plan, as 
demonstrated by the communication shortfalls discussed later in this 
report. 

* Developing contingency plans. In September 2010, we reported that 
while there was a potential gap in backup coverage due to satellite 
launch delays, NOAA had not established adequate continuity plans for 
its geostationary satellites.[Footnote 7] We recommended that the 
program's plan include implementation procedures, resources, staff 
roles, and timetables needed to transition to a single satellite, a 
foreign satellite, or other solution. In December 2012, NOAA finalized 
a contingency plan that generally included these elements. However, 
more work remains to ensure that the plan is viable. 

More recently, in February 2013, we added the potential gaps in 
weather satellite data to our biennial High-Risk list.[Footnote 8] In 
that report, we noted that NOAA had established a contingency plan for 
a potential gap in the GOES program, but it needed to demonstrate its 
progress in coordinating with the user community to determine their 
most critical requirements, conducting training and simulations for 
contingency operations scenarios, evaluating the status of viable 
foreign satellites, and working with the user community to account for 
differences in product coverage under contingency operations 
scenarios. We also stated that NOAA should update its contingency plan 
to provide more details on its contingency scenarios, associated time 
frames, and any preventative actions it is taking to minimize the 
possibility of a gap. 

* Addressing key cost and schedule risks. In June 2012, we reported 
that the GOES-R program might not be able to ensure that it had 
adequate resources to cover unexpected problems in remaining 
development, and that unresolved schedule deficiencies existed in its 
integrated master schedule and contractor schedules. We also reported 
that the program estimated a 48 percent chance that the planned GOES-R 
launch date of October 2015 would be reached.[Footnote 9] We 
recommended that the program assess and report on the reserves needed 
for completing remaining development for each satellite in the series, 
and address shortfalls in the schedule management practices we 
identified such as eliminating unnecessary constraints and creating a 
realistic allocation of resources, in order to minimize the likelihood 
of a potential gap. The agency agreed with these recommendations and 
took steps to address them by identifying needed reserve levels and 
refining program schedules. 

NOAA Has Made Progress in Developing GOES-R, but Continues to Face 
Challenges that Could Increase the Risk of a Satellite Data Gap: 

NOAA has completed its design of the GOES-R program, and has made 
progress in building components of the flight and ground segments. 
Program officials also report that the program is operating within its 
estimated budget of $10.9 billion. However, key information on 
reserves has not been reported to management. Further, both the flight 
and ground segments have experienced delays in achieving major 
milestones due to technical challenges, and weaknesses in the 
development of master schedules could cause further delays. Program 
officials stated that they have made improvements on how they manage 
cost reserves and schedules, but acknowledged that there will always 
be opportunities for improvement because the reserves and schedules 
are so dynamic on a big program like GOES-R. These challenges have the 
potential to impact the expected launch date of the first GOES-R 
satellite, which would delay the availability of an on-orbit backup 
and increase the potential for a gap in GOES satellite coverage should 
either of the two operational satellites fail prematurely. 

Program Has Completed Design and Begun Building Components of the 
First Satellite: 

NASA and NOAA are following NASA's standard space system life cycle on 
the GOES-R program. This life cycle includes distinct phases, 
including concept and technology development; preliminary design and 
technology completion; final design and fabrication; system assembly, 
integration and testing, launch and checkout; and operations and 
sustainment. There are key program reviews throughout each of the 
phases, including preliminary design review, critical design review, 
and system integration review. NOAA and NASA jointly conduct key 
reviews on the flight and ground segments individually as well as for 
the program as a whole, and then make decisions on whether to proceed 
to the next phase. Figure 4 provides an overview of the life cycle 
phases, key program reviews, and associated decision milestones. In 
addition, the key reviews are described in table 5. 

Figure 4: NASA's Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

[Refer to PDF for image: life cycle illustration] 

Formulation: 

Pre-phase: A Concept Studies; 
KDP A. 

Phase A: Concept and Technology Development; 
KDP B; 
SDR/MDR: system definition review/mission definition review. 

Phase B: Preliminary Design and Technology Completion; 
KDP C (confirmation review); 
Program Start; 
PDR: preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 

Phase C: Final Design and Fabrication; 
CDR: critical design review; 
MOR: mission operations review; 
SIR: system integration review; 
KDP D. 

Phase D: System Assembly, Integration and Test, Launch; 
FOR: flight operations review; 
ORR: operational readiness review; 
KDP E. 

Phase E: Operations and Sustainment; 
KDP F. 

Phase F: Closeout. 

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis. 

Note: According to a NASA official, the MOR and FOR are considered 
lower-level reviews and are not required by NASA's primary procedural 
requirements. They are, however, key mission reviews required by NASA's 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

[End of figure] 

Table 5: Major Development Reviews for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series: 

Review: System Definition; 
Review; 
Description: Performed on the flight 
and ground segments individually, and then on the program as a whole, 
this review is to examine the proposed system architecture/design and 
demonstrate that a system that fulfills the mission objectives can be 
built within existing constraints. 

Review: Preliminary Design Review; 
Description: Performed on the flight 
and ground segments individually, and then on the program as a whole, 
this review is to demonstrate that the preliminary design meets all 
system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and 
schedule constraints and to establish the basis for proceeding with 
detailed design. 

Review: Critical Design Review; 
Description: Performed on the flight 
and ground segments individually, and then on the program as a whole, 
this review is to evaluate the completed detailed design of the element 
and subsystem products in sufficient detail to provide approval for a 
production stage. 

Review: Mission Operations Review; 
Description: Performed programwide, 
this review is to establish the adequacy of plans and schedules for 
ground systems and flight operations preparation, and to justify 
readiness to proceed with implementation of the remaining required 
activities. It is typically held subsequent to completion of detail 
design and fabrication activity, but prior to initiation of major 
integration activities of flight or ground-system elements. 

Review: System Integration Review; 
Description: Performed programwide, 
this review is to evaluate the readiness of the project to start system 
assembly, test, and launch operations. The objectives of the review 
include ensuring that planning is adequate for all remaining system 
activities and that available cost and schedule resources support 
completion of all necessary remaining activities with adequate margin. 

Review: Flight Operations Review; 
Description: This review is to 
present the results of mission operations activities and show that the 
program has verified compliance with all requirements and demonstrated 
the ability to execute all phases and modes of mission operations, data 
processing, and analysis. 

Review: Operational Readiness Review; 
Description: This review is to 
examine characteristics and procedures used in the system's operation 
and ensures that all system and support hardware, software, personnel, 
and procedures are ready for operations and that user documentation 
accurately reflects the deployed state of the system. It is typically 
held near the completion of pre-launch testing between the flight 
segment and the ground system. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

The GOES-R program has completed final design and begun building 
components of the flight and ground systems. Specifically, the program 
completed critical design reviews for the flight and ground projects 
and for the overall program between April and November 2012. In its 
evaluation of the program as part of the critical design review, an 
independent review board complimented the program on several recent 
achievements, stating that the program was beyond the level of 
maturity expected at that phase, and that the program's planning was a 
major factor in the launch date of the first satellite remaining 
October 2015. 

As the spacecraft and instruments are developed, NASA conducts several 
interim reviews and tests before proceeding to the next major program-
level review, the system integration review. These include a pre-
environmental review, which represents the conclusion of an initial 
round of testing before exposing the instrument to testing under 
adverse environmental conditions; environmental testing of key 
functions under adverse conditions; and a pre-shipment review, which 
is conducted on each instrument to ensure it is ready to be shipped 
for integration and testing on the spacecraft. 

The GOES-R flight components are in various stages leading up to the 
system integration review. Of the six GOES-R instruments, one has 
completed environmental testing and its pre-shipment review; four 
instruments are in the midst of these reviews and tests; and one 
instrument has not yet passed its pre-environmental review. In 
addition, the program began building the spacecraft in February 2013. 
Table 6 provides more information on progress made on the key flight 
project components. 

Table 6: Development Status of Flight Project Components for the 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Satellite, as of 
August 2013: 

Key components: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Recent progress: 
* Pre-environmental review completed in November 2012; 
* Environmental testing under way. 

Key components: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Recent progress: 
* Instrument fully assembled and tested; 
* Pre-environmental review conducted in July 2012; 
* Pre-ship review conducted in April 2013. 

Key components: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Recent progress: 
* Assembly of some subcomponents completed, others continuing; 
* Subcomponent testing is under way. 

Key components: Magnetometer; 
Recent progress: 
* Selected components have completed readiness reviews and tests; 
* Environmental testing is underway. 

Key components: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Recent progress: 
* Pre-environmental review completed in November 2012; 
* Environmental testing is under way; 
* Pre-ship review scheduled for July 2013. 

Key components: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Recent progress: 
* Individual component testing completed; 
* Pre-environmental review conducted in May 2013. 

Key components: Spacecraft; 
Recent progress: 
* Core structure testing completed; multiple components delivered; 
* Integration of subsystems under way; 
* Construction of; the system module that will host instruments is 
under way. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

Similar to the flight project, major ground system milestones are 
focused on building and testing components and the program has made 
progress in this area. Specifically, on the core ground system, a 
prototype for the operations module was delivered in late 2012 and 
used for initial testing and training.[Footnote 10] In July 2013, the 
ground project delivered the iteration of the operations module that 
will be used to support the first satellite. In addition, the program 
has installed antenna dishes at NOAA's primary satellite 
communications site, and completed two key reviews of antennas at the 
GOES remote backup site. The Product Distribution and Access System 
recently completed a review that will allow testing to begin on its 
first release. An integration review for ground components is also 
expected to take place in January 2014. More detail on the progress of 
the ground project can be seen in table 7. 

Table 7: Development Status of the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Ground Project Components, as of 
August 2013: 

Key components: Core Ground Segment; 
Recent progress: 
* Critical design review completed in November 2012; 
* Completed readiness review for receipt of GOES-R antennas; 
* Prototype delivery and installation for the mission operations 
function completed; first release scheduled for June 2013. 

Key components: Antenna System; 
Recent progress: 
* Contractor demonstrated ability to produce 8 of 13 components; 
remainder due in May 2013; 
* Installation of the first two antenna structures has been completed; 
the third antenna structure is scheduled to be completed in fiscal 
year 2014; 
* Supporting infrastructure built, and two key reviews completed, for 
remote back-up antenna site. 

Key components: Product Distribution and Access System; 
Recent progress: 
* Testing begun on first increment/release. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

The program's next major milestone is a programwide system integration 
review, which is scheduled for March 2014. Based on the results of 
that review, NOAA and NASA will decide whether to move the program to 
the next phase: the system assembly, integration and test, and launch 
and checkout phase. 

Contingency Reserves Are Generally in Line with Goals for Overall 
Program Development; Reporting on Reserve Values Remains Limited: 

The GOES-R program is estimated to cost $10.9 billion. As of February 
2013, the program estimated that this amount was divided into four 
categories, with $6.0 billion for the flight project, $1.7 billion for 
the ground project, $2.0 billion for other program costs (including, 
among other things, program/project support and formulation) and $1.2 
billion for operations and support. Program officials reported that 
the program is currently operating without cost overruns on any of its 
main components, but noted that the program life cycle costs may 
increase by $150 to $300 million if full funding in the current fiscal 
year is not received. 

A portion of the amounts planned for the flight project and ground 
project are allocated to contingency reserves (also called management 
reserve). The program also keeps a programwide contingency allocation 
separate from those of the flight and ground projects. A contingency 
reserve provides program managers ready access to funding in order to 
resolve problems as they occur and may be necessary to cover increased 
costs resulting from unexpected design complexity, incomplete 
requirements, or other uncertainties.[Footnote 11] NASA's Goddard 
Space Flight Center requires its flight projects, including GOES-R, to 
maintain contingency reserves during system development, at a level of 
25 percent of development costs.[Footnote 12] The GOES-R program 
requires its flight and ground projects to maintain 20 percent of 
planned remaining development costs as reserve funding.[Footnote 13] 
The program office also maintains contingency reserves equal to 10 
percent of planned remaining development costs to cover program 
support costs and to supplement the flight and ground projects' 
reserves if necessary. According to a NOAA program official, the GOES-
R program is able to meet NASA's requirement through the combination 
of the 20 percent flight and ground project requirements and the 
supplemental 10 percent program-level reserve. An official also stated 
that the method of keeping separate reserves at the program and 
project levels was chosen as it was successful on past projects. 

The GOES-R flight project, ground project, and program office are at 
or above the amount of reserves they are required to carry. 
Specifically, as of March 2013, the overall contingency reserve 
percentages for the flight and ground projects were at 20 and 28 
percent, respectively, which are at or above the required level of 20 
percent. The program reserves were at 11 percent, slightly above the 
required level of 10 percent. Reserve values and percentages are 
provided in table 8. 

Table 8: Reserve Levels for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Program, as of March 2013: 

Component: Flight; 
Required reserve: 20%; 
Remaining reserve[B]: 20%. 

Component: Ground; 
Required reserve: 20%; 
Remaining reserve[B]: 28%. 

Component: Program; 
Required reserve: 10%; 
Remaining reserve[B]: 11%. 

Component: Total; 
Required reserve: 25%[A]; 
Remaining reserve[B]: 29%. 

Source: NOAA data and GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

Notes: 

[A] NASA and NOAA officials stated that the allocation of reserves 
among flight, ground, and program components meets NASA's requirement 
of 25 percent because the program category includes reserve funds that 
can be used to supplement the flight and ground components. 

[B] A series of adjustments are made to the flight, ground, and 
program budget amounts before the reserve percentage is calculated; 
thus the reserve percentage cannot be reached by dividing contingency 
reserves by total budget authority. 

[End of table] 

Reporting on Reserves Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Transparent: 

We previously reported that, in order to oversee GOES-R contingency 
funding, senior managers should have insight into the amount of 
reserves set aside for each satellite in the program and detailed 
information on how reserves are being used on both the flight and 
ground components. While the GOES-R program continues to regularly 
report on contingency funds, it does not report key information on the 
status of its reserve funding to senior level management.[Footnote 14] 

At monthly program management council meetings, the program reports 
summary information, such as the total value of contingency reserves 
and reserve percentage held for each fiscal year. Reserve totals are 
given for the flight and ground projects as well as for the program 
overall. However, the program does not report on the reserves needed 
for completing remaining development for each satellite in the series 
or provide detailed information on how reserves are being used. Thus, 
for example, if the later satellites in the series have a high level 
of reserves, they could mask low reserve values for earlier satellites 
in the series. Further, in its monthly presentations to senior 
managers and NOAA executives, the program does not include information 
on the cause of any changes in reserve values from the prior month or 
the assumptions it makes when calculating reserves. For example, the 
flight reserve value recently went up by 2 percentage points because 
the program decided to include reserve funding for the GOES-T 
satellite in 2018, and the ground reserve values went down by 10 
percentage points because the program shifted reserve funding from the 
ground to the flight projects. Neither of these changes was identified 
or explained in the monthly presentations. The lack of insight on how 
the reserves are calculated and modified could lead executives to 
misinterpret the size of the remaining reserves. Program officials 
noted that they took steps after our previous report to clarify what 
they report about reserves, but noted that the amount of information 
needed to fully explain reserve calculations and changes could be too 
much information for an executive-level briefing. Without regularly 
providing sufficiently detailed budget information, it may be more 
difficult for program management to have the information they need to 
make the best decisions possible regarding the program's future 
funding. 

Recent and Potential Milestone Delays and Continued Weaknesses in 
Scheduling Practices Increase the Potential for a Delayed Launch: 

The GOES-R program established programwide milestones, including the 
mission operations review and flight operations review, to determine 
the program's ability to proceed to system integration and to complete 
mission operations, respectively. It also established five end-to-end 
system tests to validate compatibility between the space and ground 
segments before the launch of the first satellite. 

However, over the past year, the program delayed many of these key 
milestones and tests. Delays in the mission operations review means 
that the large-scale integration of flight and ground components will 
not occur until 21 months prior to launch. Similarly, delaying end-to-
end tests until 17 months prior to launch will allow the program less 
time to respond to any problems that occur. Table 9 highlights key 
milestones and the extent of recent delays. 

Table 9: Delays in Milestones for the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R Series Program: 

Program milestone: Mission operations review; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): January 2013; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): January 2014; 
Delay: 12 months[A]. 

Program milestone: End-to-end test #1; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): February 2014; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): May 2014; 
Delay: 3 months. 

Program milestone: End-to-end test #2; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): May 2014; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): August 2014; 
Delay: 3 months. 

Program milestone: End-to-end test #3; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): August 2014; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): December 2014; 
Delay: 4 months. 

Program milestone: Flight operations review; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): September 2014; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): January 2015; 
Delay: 4 months. 

Program milestone: End-to-end test #4; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): December 2014; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): March 2015; 
Delay: 3 months. 

Program milestone: End-to-end test #5; 
Date planned (as of April 2012): July 2015; 
Date completed or planned (as of March 2013): July 2015; 
Delay: No change. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Program officials stated that they had erroneously scheduled the 
mission operations review too soon, and moved the date by 9 months to 
better reflect when the review was needed. Therefore, only 3 of the 12 
months were attributable to a delay. 

[End of table] 

Continued Technical Issues Could Cause Further Delays: 

The GOES-R program is also experiencing technical issues on the flight 
and ground projects that could cause further schedule delays. 

* The original supplier for a key component on the spacecraft moved to 
a different facility, introducing risk due to the loss of experienced 
personnel and the impact on schedule. This led the program to find an 
alternative supplier. While a design review was performed to confirm 
resolution of the issue in April 2013, this change may lead to a delay 
of up to 6 months in integrating the component on the spacecraft. 
Program officials noted that this delay is not expected to impact the 
program's critical path or major milestones. 

* The Geostationary Lightning Mapper's electronics unit experienced 
problems during testing, which led the program office to delay the 
tests.[Footnote 15] The program is considering several options to 
address this issue, including using the electronics unit being 
developed for a later GOES satellite to allow key components to 
proceed with testing. If the issue cannot be resolved, it would affect 
the instrument's performance. As a result, the program is also 
considering excluding the Geostationary Lightning Mapper from the 
first GOES satellite. The program plans to make its decision on 
whether or not to include the instrument in late 2013. The removal of 
this instrument would cause a significant reduction in the satellite's 
functionality. Key GOES users have stated that they would prefer that 
NOAA delay launching the GOES-R satellite rather than launch it 
without the Geostationary Lightning Mapper. 

* The program delayed the start of work on the ground system at the 
NOAA satellite operations facility by three months, from a planned 
date of October 2012 to January 2013, following a bid protest of the 
award of a contract to upgrade the facility. This delay compressed an 
already tight schedule for testing the ground system. 

* Testing for a number of ground system requirements has been 
postponed until future releases and builds, potentially causing 
modification to the schedule for these future products. 

* Power amplifiers for the antenna systems experienced higher than 
expected failure rates, which could lead to schedule delays and 
decreases in operational availability. 

Given that fewer than 3 years remain before GOES-R's expected launch 
in October 2015, continued delays in key milestones and reviews 
decrease the likelihood that the launch date will be met. Program 
officials recently acknowledged that the GOES-R launch date may be 
delayed by about 6 months, and attributed the cause of the delay to a 
shortfall of $54 million in anticipated funding in fiscal year 2013. 
[Footnote 16] 

Scheduling Practices Improved, but Weaknesses Remain: 

Delays in the program's remaining schedule are also at risk of further 
growth due to weaknesses in the program's scheduling methods. Program 
schedules not only provide a road map for systematic program 
execution, but also provide the means by which to gauge progress, 
identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. 
Achieving success in managing large-scale programs depends in part on 
having an integrated and reliable schedule that defines, among other 
things, when work activities and milestone events will occur, how long 
they will take, and how they are related to one another. Without such 
a reliable schedule, program milestones may slip. 

In June 2012, we reported on weaknesses in program schedules that 
comprised portions of the program's Integrated Master Schedule, 
including subordinate schedules for the spacecraft and core ground 
system. At that time, our work identified nine best practices 
associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. 
[Footnote 17] These are (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing 
all activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities, (4) 
establishing the duration of all activities, (5) integrating schedule 
activities horizontally and vertically, (6) establishing the critical 
path for all activities, (7) identifying reasonable float time between 
activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating 
the schedule using logic and durations. See table 10 for a description 
of each of these best practices. 

Table 10: Description of Scheduling Best Practices: 

Practice: Capturing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect all activities (steps, 
events, outcomes, etc.) as defined in the program's work breakdown 
structure to include activities to be performed by both the government 
and its contractors. 

Practice: Sequencing all activities; 
Description: The schedule should sequence activities in the order that 
they are to be implemented. In particular, activities that must finish 
prior to the start of other activities (i.e., predecessor activities), 
as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities have 
been completed (i.e., successor activities) should be identified. 

Practice: Assigning resources to all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect who will do the work 
activities, whether all required resources will be available when they 
are needed, and whether there are any funding or time constraints. 

Practice: Establishing the duration of all activities; 
Description: The schedule should reflect the duration of each 
activity. These durations should be as short as possible and have 
specific start and end dates. 

Practice: Integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically; 
Description: The schedule should be horizontally integrated, meaning 
that it should link the products and outcomes associated with sequenced 
activities. The schedule should also be vertically integrated, meaning 
that there is traceability among varying levels of activities and 
supporting tasks and subtasks. 

Practice: Establishing the critical path for all activities; 
Description: The critical path represents the chain of dependent 
activities with the longest total duration in the schedule. 

Practice: Identifying reasonable float time between activities; 
Description: The schedule should identify a reasonable amount of 
float--the time that an activity can slip before the delay affects the 
finish milestone--so that schedule flexibility can be determined. As a 
general rule, activities along the critical path typically have the 
least amount of float. 

Practice: Conducting a schedule risk analysis; 
Description: A schedule risk analysis is used to predict the level of 
confidence in the schedule, determine the amount of time contingency 
needed, and identify high-priority schedule risks. 

Practice: Updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine 
the dates; 
Description: The schedule should use logic and durations in order to 
reflect realistic start and completion dates, be continually monitored 
to determine differences between forecasted completion dates and 
planned dates, and avoid logic overrides and artificial constraint 
dates. 

Source: GAO analysis of government and industry practices in GAO-09-
3SP. 

[End of table] 

In a previous report, we observed that important schedule components 
in GOES-R related schedules had not been included or completed, and 
recommended that these shortfalls be addressed.[Footnote 18] NOAA has 
since improved selected practices on its spacecraft and core ground 
schedules, but other practices stayed the same or worsened. 
Specifically, for the spacecraft, 2 practices were improved, 5 stayed 
the same, and 2 became weaker. For the core ground system, 4 practices 
were improved, 3 stayed the same, and 2 became weaker. Table 11 
compares our assessments of the spacecraft and core ground system 
schedules in July 2011 and November 2012. 

Table 11: Assessment of Selected Schedules Use of Best Practices over 
Time: 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 1: Capturing all activities; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has substantially met the 
criteria for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 2: Sequencing all activities; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 3: Assigning resources to all 
activities; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria 
for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 4: Establishing the duration of 
all activities; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has substantially met the 
criteria for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has substantially met the 
criteria for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 5: Integrating schedule 
activities horizontally and vertically; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria 
for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 6: Establishing the critical 
path for all activities; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: T The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice. 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has substantially met the 
criteria for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 7: Identifying float on 
activities and paths; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice. 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria 
for this best practice. 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria 
for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 8: Conducting a schedule risk 
analysis; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for 
this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria 
for this best practice. 

Scheduling best practice: Best practice 9: Updating the schedule using 
logic and durations to determine the dates; 
Spacecraft schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for this 
best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has substantially met the 
criteria for this best practice; 
Core ground schedules: 
July 2011: The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria 
for this best practice; 
November 2012: The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for 
this best practice. 

Source: GAO analysis of schedules provided by GOES-R, documents and 
information received from GOES-R officials. 

[End of table] 

NOAA has improved elements of the schedules for both components. 
Specifically, the spacecraft schedule has eliminated level of effort 
activities[Footnote 19] and has assigned resources for a greater 
percentage of activities. The core ground schedule now has an 
automated process by which all subcontractor records are combined to 
create an integrated schedule. It has a series of connected activities 
that lead to what contractor officials consider its main milestone 
delivery, and has implemented a detailed schedule risk analysis for a 
key upcoming release. 

However, scheduling issues remain on the schedules for both 
components. For example, both schedules have issues with sequencing 
remaining activities and integration between activities. Regarding the 
spacecraft schedule, there is a small subset of activities with 
incomplete links between activities, and more than 20 percent of 
remaining detail activities have lags, or a set number of days between 
an activity and its successor. In the core ground schedule, a number 
of activities are missing either predecessor or successor activities, 
and there are several activities representing the end of the project 
on or about the same date. Without the right linkages, activities that 
slip early in the schedule do not transmit delays to activities that 
should depend on them. When this happens, the schedule will not 
provide a sufficient basis for understanding the program as a whole, 
and users of the schedule will lack confidence in the dates and the 
critical path. 

Both schedules also have a very high average of total float time for 
detailed activities.[Footnote 20] Specifically, total float time is 
greater than two months for nearly two-thirds of remaining detailed 
activities in the spacecraft schedule, and at least a year for more 
than 10 percent of remaining detail activities in the core ground 
schedule. In the case of spacecraft, officials stated that high levels 
of float time were often due to activities that had been completed at 
one time for several satellites, only one of which was immediately 
needed. Officials also provided detailed information on the activities 
with the highest amount of float. In the case of the core ground 
schedule, officials stated that many activities occurring after the 
main milestone date, which occurs nearly five years prior to the end 
of the schedule, do not have a true successor, and therefore are 
calculated only to the end of the contract. Officials also stated that 
values and trends in float time are monitored regularly for both 
schedules. Such high values of total float time can falsely depict 
true project status, making it difficult to determine which activities 
drive key milestone dates. Without reasonable values of total float 
time, it cannot be used to identify activities that could be permitted 
to slip and thus release and reallocate resources to activities that 
require more resources to be completed on time. 

In addition, the project's critical path does not match up with 
activities that make up the driving path[Footnote 21] on the core 
ground schedule. Contractors monitor a driving path monthly to both 
major and minor milestone deliveries. However, until the schedule can 
produce a true critical path, it will be more difficult for the 
program office to provide reliable time line estimates or identify 
when problems or changes may occur and their effect on downstream 
work. Also, without a valid critical path to the end of the schedule, 
management cannot focus on activities that will have a detrimental 
effect on the key project milestones and deliveries if they slip. 

Further, neither schedule file has fully integrated resources with 
schedule activities. As of November 2012, contractor officials stated 
that the ground system schedule was not feasible given available 
resources and that they were in the process of revising their 
immediate schedules to make them feasible. The spacecraft schedule 
contains major resource categories that correspond to contractor sites 
and work phases. However, thresholds for overruns of resource 
allocations are functionally disabled within the schedules through the 
setting of an arbitrarily high value for maximum resources per 
category. In response, contractor officials stated that account 
managers are responsible for monitoring resource levels and that 
weekly meetings are held to ensure that resource issues are discussed. 
Information on resource needs and availability in each work period 
assists the program office in forecasting the likelihood that 
activities will be completed as scheduled. If the current schedule 
does not allow insight into current or project allocation of 
resources, then the risk of delays in the program's schedule is 
significantly increased. 

Deficiencies in scheduling practices such as the ones outlined here 
could increase the likelihood of launch date delays, because decision 
making would be based on data that does not accurately depict current 
status, thus impeding management's ability to conduct meaningful 
oversight on the program's schedules. Program officials noted that 
they have made improvements in scheduling practices, but explained 
that because the schedules are so dynamic there are always areas for 
improvement. Lack of the proper understanding of current program 
status due to schedules that are not fully reliable undercuts the 
ability of the program office to manage a high-risk program like GOES-
R. 

Delays in the GOES-R Launch Date Could Increase the Risk of a 
Satellite Data Gap: 

Potential delays in the launch date of the first GOES-R satellite 
would increase the risk of a gap in GOES satellite coverage. NOAA's 
policy is to have two operational satellites and one backup satellite 
in orbit at all times. This policy proved useful in December 2008 and 
again in September 2012, when the agency experienced problems with one 
of its operational satellites, but was able to move its backup 
satellite into place until the problems had been resolved. 

NOAA is facing a period of at least a year when it will not have a 
backup satellite in orbit. Specifically, in April 2015, NOAA expects 
to retire one of its operational satellites (GOES-13) and move its 
backup satellite (GOES-14) into operation. Thus, the agency will have 
only two operational satellites in orbit--and no backup satellite--
until GOES-R is launched and completes an estimated 6-month post-
launch test period. If GOES-R is launched in October 2015, the soonest 
it could be available for operational use would be April 2016. Any 
delay to the GOES-R launch would extend the time without a backup to 
more than one year. Figure 5 shows anticipated operational and test 
periods for the two most recent series of GOES satellites. 

Figure 5: Potential Gap in Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES-13: 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2009-2010; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2010-2015. 

GOES-14: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2009; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2009; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2010-2015; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2015-2020. 

GOES-15: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2010; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2010; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2010-2011; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2012-2017. 

GOES-R: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2015; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2015-2016; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2016; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2017-2023. 

GOES-S: 
Launch date: Calendar year 2017; 
Post launch test period: Calendar year 2017; 
Available as backup: Calendar year 2017-2020; 
Operational period: Calendar year 2020-2023. 

Projected gap in backup coverage: mid-2015-mid 2015. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to the year or more during which no back-up satellite 
would be available, there is a chance that NOAA would have to operate 
with a single operational satellite. In December 2012, an independent 
review board estimated that there is a 36 percent chance that the GOES 
constellation would have only one operational satellite at the 
expected date of GOES-R's launch. Thus, if NOAA were to experience a 
problem with either of its operational satellites before GOES-R is in 
orbit and operational, it would need to rely on older satellites that 
are beyond their expected operational lives and may not be fully 
functional. Without a full complement of operational GOES satellites, 
the nation's ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
effective weather forecasting could be compromised. This, in turn, 
could put the public, property, and the economy at risk. 

NOAA Has a Process for Managing Changes in GOES-R Requirements, but 
Changes Could Affect Some Users: 

System requirements describe the functionality needed to meet user 
needs and perform as intended in an operational environment. According 
to leading industry, academic, and government entities, a disciplined 
process for developing and managing requirements can help reduce the 
risks of developing or acquiring a system.[Footnote 22] One key aspect 
of effective requirements management involves managing changes to 
requirements through a standardized process. Table 12 outlines best 
practices of a sound change management process and key questions for 
evaluating the process. 

Table 12: Best Practices in Managing Requirements Changes: 

Practice: Manage changes to requirements throughout the life cycle 
using a standard process; 
Key questions: 
Does the program (or project) have a requirements management plan? 
Does the program maintain a current and approved set of requirements? 
Does the program have an approved set of baseline requirements? 
Does the program's change management process provide guidance for the 
identification, review, and management of all requirements changes? 
Do change management processes apply throughout the program's life 
cycle? 
Does change management documentation, such as meeting notes or change 
records, indicate that the organization is following its change 
management policies and procedures? 

Practice: Document changes to requirements; 
Key questions: 
Does the organization maintain records for all changes? 
Are all approved requirements changes documented according to a 
standard process? 
Are other work products in consistent alignment with requirements 
changes? 

Practice: Document rationale for change and analyze impact; 
Key questions: 
Does the program document rationales for proposed changes? 
Does the program maintain a history of these rationales? 
Do they analyze the impact of a proposed change to the project and to 
users in impact assessments? 
Do these assessments address impacts to cost, schedule, risk, and 
project capabilities? 

Practice: Have an approval body with appropriate representation review 
and approve all requirements changes; 
Key questions: 
Has the program established an approval body for requirements changes 
and defined its responsibilities? 
Do change management policies require appropriate representation on 
the approval body? 
Do change management policies require that the approval body review 
and approve all changes? 
Does documentation show that the approval body reviewed and approved 
program requirements changes? 

Practice: Ensure that requirements changes are aligned with user needs; 
Key questions: 
Are requirements analyzed according to a standard process to determine 
if they continue to meet user needs? 
Do impact assessments show that the requirements remain in alignment 
with user needs? 
Has the program traced the changed requirements back to user needs? 
Has the program verified and validated that changed requirements align 
with user needs? 

Practice: Communicate requirements changes to users; 
Key questions: 
When requirements changes occur, are they communicated to end users? 
Is change information disseminated as part of a standard process? 

Source: GAO analysis of government and industry practices. 

[End of table] 

The GOES-R program has a change management process that satisfied 
three practices, partially satisfied two practices, and did not 
satisfy one practice. Specifically, GOES-R has established a change 
management process that tracks and documents changes in requirements, 
documents the rationale for the changes as well as the potential 
impact of the change on cost and schedule, and ensures that changes 
are reviewed and approved by a change control board. In addition, the 
program has evaluated the impact of key changes on selected users and 
communicated with those users. However, as we first reported in 2010, 
the program is still weak in evaluating the impact of changes on 
external users who rely on GOES data products and in effectively 
communicating changes to those satellite data users.[Footnote 23] 
Specifically, table 13 outlines how the GOES-R program performed on 
each of the best practices for managing changes in requirements, and 
is followed by a more detailed discussion of key shortfalls. 

Table 13: Assessment of Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite-R Series Program Practices in Managing Changes in 
Requirements: 

Practice: Manage changes to requirements throughout the life cycle 
using a standard process; 
Assessment: Satisfied; 
Discussion: The GOES-R program has a requirements management plan and 
has established a change management process to apply throughout the 
project's life cycle. In order to change a high-level requirement, the 
program must follow a detailed process that begins with proposing a 
change request, evaluating it, and obtaining approval or rejection of 
the request. The program also maintains an approved set of high-level 
baseline requirements and updates them regularly in response to 
requirements changes. 

Practice: Document changes to requirements; 
Assessment: Satisfied; 
Discussion: The GOES-R program documents requirements changes in a 
public change log associated with its high-level requirements document. 
More detailed information on the changes is tracked in an internal 
database. The changes documented in the change log align with those 
documented in the internal tracking database. 

Practice: Document rationale for change and analyze impact; 
Assessment: Partially satisfied; 
Discussion: The GOES-R program documented the rationale for individual 
requirements changes as well as the cost and schedule impact of 
selected changes. In addition, the program has assessed the impact of 
key changes on selected users within NOAA. However, the program has 
not assessed the cost and schedule impact of all changes, and has not 
assessed the impact of key changes on external users who rely on GOES 
satellite data. Program officials noted that they assessed the cost 
and schedule impact of changes that were expected to negatively impact 
the program's cost or schedule, and that they focus their impact 
assessments on users within NOAA because they are considered the 
primary users. 

Practice: Have an approval body with appropriate representation review 
and approve all changes; 
Assessment: Satisfied; 
Discussion: The GOES-R program has a configuration change board with 
representation from key NOAA and NASA officials. The board's 
responsibilities are formalized in program documentation. Further, the 
board members review and approve requirements changes. 

Practice: Ensure that requirements changes are aligned with user needs; 
Assessment: Not; satisfied; 
Discussion: The program's change management process does not require 
taking steps to ensure that changes in requirements are aligned with 
user needs. Specifically, the process does not require officials to 
trace applicable changes to user needs or to test or simulate whether 
the change still meets user needs. Moreover, for seven selected 
changes we reviewed, the program did not demonstrate the steps it took 
to test or validate the changes to ensure they were aligned with user 
needs. Program officials noted that they utilize a user working group 
to communicate changes to users and elevate concerns raised by users. 

Practice: Communicate requirements changes to users; 
Assessment: Partially satisfied; 
Discussion: The GOES-R program generally communicates requirements 
changes to key users within NOAA and NOAA's National Weather Service 
through mechanisms such as email correspondence and working groups, 
while it communicates changes to external users through periodic 
conferences, such as the GOES users' conferences. However, it does not 
alert external users who rely on GOES data to perform their missions 
about specific changes in requirements that will likely affect their 
operations. These external users include the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Department 
of the Navy. Officials at all three agencies reported that they were 
not informed about key changes in requirements that could affect their 
operations. Program officials stated that they work through a variety 
of working groups to try to communicate changes with those who utilize 
the satellite data. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

While the program generally communicates requirements changes to key 
users within NOAA's National Weather Service community, it does not 
communicate as well with satellite data users external to NOAA. Many 
such users are dependent on GOES satellite data for their respective 
missions. Officials responsible for working with satellite weather 
observations at three agencies were unaware of selected changes in 
GOES-R requirements. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration 
uses the satellites' data and images to manage air traffic across the 
country, and the Navy uses the data for oceanic weather forecasting, 
as well as tactical ocean analysis of regions of interest. They stated 
that NOAA had not reached out to them to alert them to these changes 
or ask if the changes would impact them. Similarly, Forest Service 
officials were concerned that potential changes in spectrum 
allocations could affect their ability to obtain data from their own 
ground-based weather observation systems because they currently rely 
on GOES-R communication channels to obtain this data. 

GOES-R program officials noted that they provide regular briefings to 
the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, an interagency 
council with membership from fifteen federal departments and agencies 
involved in meteorological activities (including the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, and Transportation) and that the Air Force 
represents the Department of Defense community on the GOES-R Series 
Independent Advisory Committee. However, they acknowledged that they 
cannot ensure that the information they provide is disseminated within 
the agencies. Further, GOES officials explained that one reason for 
the distinction between the internal and external users is that the 
internal users belong to formal working groups and receive regular 
updates from the GOES-R program, while the other users generally have 
more informal or indirect connections with the program. Instead of 
direct communications such as e-mails, the other users may receive 
information about GOES-R requirements changes from publicly available 
information or through other meteorological partnerships with NOAA. 
Without consistent and direct communication, users may be unaware of 
changes to program requirements that are critical to their respective 
missions. Because GOES-R users across the country have missions that 
preserve and protect property and life, it is critical that these 
organizations are made aware of any changes as soon as they are made, 
so that they can assess and mitigate any significant impacts. 

GOES-R Program Has Undergone Multiple Changes in Requirements; 
Selected Changes Could Affect User Operations: 

Since 2007, NOAA has changed multiple system requirements on the GOES-
R program. These changes involved strengthening or relaxing 
specifications on selected products, finalizing a decision not to 
develop 31 products, and modifying programmatic requirements not tied 
to any individual product. For example, NOAA strengthened 
specifications for the geographic coverage, image resolution, and 
refresh rate on a product depicting total precipitable water, and 
strengthened accuracy specifications for a product depicting cloud 
layers and heights. NOAA also relaxed specifications to provide less 
measurement accuracy on a product depicting hurricane intensity, less 
geographic coverage on a product depicting sea surface temperatures, 
less resolution on a product that tracks the motion of clouds through 
the atmosphere, and less timely updates on a product depicting 
lightning detection. The GOES-R program also documented NOAA's earlier 
decision not to develop or provide 31 products that it labeled as 
optional, noting that the products will only be developed if funding 
becomes available. In addition, programmatic changes include the 
elimination of 97 percent mission availability as a measure of minimum 
performance success and the decision not to transmit raw satellite 
data to users. Table 14 provides an overview of key changes in product 
and program requirements since 2007. 

Table 14: Summary of Key Changes in Product and Program Requirements 
between 2007 and 2012: 

Type of Change: Product; 
November 2007: 34 products, each with specifications for accuracy, 
geographic coverage, resolution, and timeliness; October 2012: 34 
products, of which: 20 (59%) were modified; 
* 14 had changes in accuracy measurement; 
* 7 had changes in geographic coverage; 
* 3 had changes in horizontal resolution; 
* 8 had changes in refresh rate/latency. 

Type of Change: Product; 
November 2007: 34 optional products; 
October 2012: 2 optional products were eliminated; 1 optional product 
was combined with another optional product; 
31 optional products are not being developed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: The satellites shall be capable of being configured to 
accommodate additional instrumentation with minimal redesign of the 
spacecraft; 
October 2012: Requirement removed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: The GOES-R series is required to meet or exceed the 
level of capability of the prior series of satellites (GOES-N,O,P) for 
system continuity; 
October 2012: Requirement removed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: The GOES-R satellites are required to acquire and 
transmit the raw environmental data to ground stations to allow for the 
timely and accurate processing of data; 
October 2012: While the program is still required to relay GOES-R 
sensor data, the requirement to acquire and transmit raw data has been 
removed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: GOES-R is required to meet or exceed the prior series of 
satellites' capabilities for storage of environmental data; 
October 2012: The program is required to make products available to 
NOAA Archival Data Centers, but capabilities for storing the data are 
not specified. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: The GOES-R system need date is specified as December 
2014; 
October 2012: Requirement removed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: GOES-R is required to achieve "full operational 
capability," which is defined, in part, as full coverage of the east 
and west positions; 
October 2012: The requirement for full operational capability was 
strengthened to include the production and availability of the full 
product set of satellite data to users. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: Minimum performance success is defined as 97 percent 
mission availability for collecting, generating, and distributing key 
products over a defined central coverage zone; 
October 2012: Minimum performance success is redefined as the 
successful generation and availability of key functions to users. The 
availability percentage has been removed. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: The operational lifetime of the GOES-R series shall 
extend through 2028; 
October 2012: The individual GOES-R satellites' lifetimes shall be 5 
years in on-orbit storage plus 10 years in operation. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: Requirements for a remote backup facility not specified; 
October 2012: Addition of requirements for a remote backup facility. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: Failover time to backup satellite or backup ground 
facility not mentioned; 
October 2012: This information is now included. 

Type of Change: Program; 
November 2007: Requirements do not specify the locations of the 
satellites in on-orbit storage; 
October 2012: Added requirements that specify the satellites' checkout 
location and the location of on-orbit satellite storage. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

While NOAA officials stated that they believe that only one of the 
changes that were made since 2007 was significant,[Footnote 24] 
internal and external users noted that they found many of the changes 
to be significant. In addition, selected satellite data users noted 
concern at the loss of 17 of the optional products that are no longer 
being developed. The changes that users found significant, along with 
user reasoning for why these changes are significant, are listed in 
table 15. GOES-R program officials acknowledged that the National 
Weather Service and other users will have impacts from the loss or 
degradation of products, but that it is not always accurate to assume 
that GOES-R could have met the original requirements. In 2011, an 
algorithm development executive board reported that several original 
requirements could not have been met because, among other reasons, 
they relied on a hyperspectral instrument that was removed from the 
program, the requirements were poorly stated and it only became 
evident later that GOES could not support them, and there were 
scientific limitations on the development of the products that only 
became evident after development had started. Program officials stated 
that they have identified alternative methods for obtaining certain 
products (some outside the scope of GOES-R) and that they are 
proactively trying to develop alternative products in coordination 
with users and other development organizations. 

Table 15: User Concerns about Key Changes or Deviations in 
Requirements: 

Product: Cloud top height; 
Change: Relaxation of accuracy requirements; 
User concerns: Navy officials reported that this change will likely 
cause significant errors, which will reduce the utility of the cloud 
top height measurements. 

Product: Downward shortwave radiation; 
Change: Relaxation of accuracy requirements; 
User concerns: Navy officials reported that the larger accuracy ranges 
might make this product difficult to use in a statistically 
significant way. 

Product: Reflected shortwave radiation; 
Change: Relaxation of accuracy requirements; 
User concerns: Navy officials reported that the larger accuracy ranges 
might make this product difficult to use in a statistically 
significant way. 

Product: Derived stability indices; 
Change: Relaxation of resolution requirements; 
User concerns: Officials from both the Navy and the Federal Aviation 
Administration expressed concern about this change. The Federal 
Aviation Administration reported that the reduction in horizontal 
resolution might result in reduced forecast accuracy and a reduced 
ability to verify convection, which is useful for predicting severe 
storms. 

Product: Lightning detection; 
Change: Reduction in product timeliness; 
User concerns: Officials from the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about this change. They reported that a delay in 
refresh times could be significant for aviation operations, especially 
over water areas that rely on satellite data for coverage. In these 
areas, lightning will be used as an indicator of storm formation and 
delays in detection and transmission could impact situational 
awareness. 

Product: Magnetometer (geomagnetic field); 
Change: Reduction of magnetic field accuracy requirements; 
User concerns: The National Weather Service's Space Weather Prediction 
Center found this change acceptable for the purposes of GOES-R data, 
but determined that the reduction of the accuracy requirements would 
noticeably increase error in the instrument's readings of solar energy 
and the geomagnetic field. 

Product: Aerosol particle size; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the Department of Agriculture's Forest 
Service and the Navy expressed concern about not receiving this 
product. The Forest Service reported that this product would help them 
monitor and manage air quality. 

Product: Aircraft icing threat; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that this product would be useful because 
icing is a major hazard for safe air travel. 

Product: Cloud layers/heights; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center and the Navy expressed concern about not receiving this 
product. The Aviation Weather Center reported that this product would 
help prevent aviation accidents caused by low visibility. Low cloud 
ceiling and visibility was associated with about 20 percent of all 
aviation accidents from 1994 to 2003. 

Product: Cloud liquid water; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center and the Navy expressed concern about not receiving this 
product. The Aviation Weather Center reported that this product might 
help identify regions with low visibility. Because low visibility is 
associated with airline accidents, this product would help prevent 
aviation accidents. 

Product: Cloud type; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that, as it is related to the icing threat, 
this product would help air traffic controllers know if a cloud was 
made of ice, water, or a mixture of the two. 

Product: Convective initiation; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center expressed concern about not receiving this product 
because new convection is critical to air traffic flow management, and 
convection is a major hazard for safe and efficient flight. In 
addition, officials from the Navy, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service 
were concerned by the loss of this product. The Forest Service 
officials reported that the loss of this product could impact its 
ability to locate potential ignition areas for wildland fires. The 
National Weather Service's Storm Prediction Center also stated that 
this product was likely to have had a positive impact on its mission, 
which is to predict and monitor high impact weather events such as 
tornadoes. 

Product: Enhanced "V"/overshooting top detection; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that this product would indicate the location 
of turbulence and convection, thereby helping to improve the safety 
and efficiency of air travel. The National Weather Service's Storm 
Prediction Center also stated that this product was likely to have had 
a positive impact on its mission. 

Product: Flood/standing water; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the Department of Agriculture's Forest 
Service and the Navy expressed concern about not receiving this 
product. Forest Service officials are concerned that the removal of 
this product would impact their management of and response to hazards 
and disasters. 

Product: Ice Cover; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's 
Environmental Modeling Center and the Navy expressed concern about not 
receiving this product. The Environmental Modeling Center reported 
that ice cover data would help assimilate data received from the 
sounding sensors. 

Product: Low cloud and fog; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that this product would help prevent aviation 
accidents caused by low visibility. Low ceiling and visibility 
accounted for about 20% of all aviation accidents from between 1994 to 
2003. 

Product: Ozone total; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the Department of Agriculture's Forest 
Service are concerned that the removal of this product would impact 
its ability to monitor and manage air quality. 

Product: Probability of rainfall; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that the loss of this product is significant 
because heavy rainfall relates to air traffic planning and the 
efficiency of airport operations, and heavy rainfall is correlated 
with low ceiling and low visibility and/or convection. Officials from 
the Department of Agriculture were also concerned that the loss of 
this product would impact their predictive services. 

Product: Rainfall potential; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that the loss of this product is significant 
because heavy rainfall relates to air traffic planning and the 
efficiency of airport operations, and heavy rainfall is correlated 
with low ceiling and low visibility and/or convection. Officials from 
the Department of Agriculture were also concerned that the loss of 
this product would impact their predictive services. 

Product: Tropopause folding turbulence prediction; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
expressed concern about not receiving this product. The Aviation 
Weather Center reported that the loss of this product is significant 
because turbulence is a major hazard for safe air travel. 

Product: Vegetation fraction (green vegetation); 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the Department of Agriculture's Forest 
Service are concerned by the loss of this product because it would 
help with forest health monitoring and fire danger assessments. 
Officials from the National Weather Service's Environmental Modeling 
Center also expressed concern about not receiving this product because 
it would help them analyze and predict temperature differences and 
precipitation. 

Product: Vegetation index; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the Department of Agriculture's Forest 
Service are concerned by the loss of this product because it would 
help with forest health monitoring and fire danger assessments. 

Product: Visibility; 
Change: An optional product; not planned to be developed or provided; 
User concerns: Officials from the National Weather Service's Aviation 
Weather Center, the Navy, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the 
Department of Agriculture's Forest Service expressed concern about the 
loss of this product. The Aviation Weather Center reported that this 
product would help prevent aviation accidents caused by low 
visibility, and the Forest Service reported that it would have helped 
with air quality monitoring and management. 

Source: GAO analysis of federal agency responses. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the changes that have already been implemented on the 
GOES-R program, there are other potential changes that could occur. 
For example, by the end of 2013, the program plans to decide whether 
or not to include the Geostationary Lightning Mapper on the GOES-R 
satellite. Also, there could be changes in the spectrum allocated to 
weather satellite data. Officials from the National Weather Service 
and Forest Service raised concerns that these potential changes could 
also affect their operations. Because these changes have the potential 
to impact satellite data user operations, it is critical that the GOES-
R program communicates program changes to the extended user community. 
By doing so, satellite data users can establish plans to mitigate any 
shortfalls in data and minimize the impact of the changes on their 
operations. 

NOAA Developed GOES-R Contingency Plans, but Weaknesses Increase the 
Impact of a Potential Coverage Gap: 

GOES satellite data are considered a mission-essential function 
because of their criticality to weather observations and forecasts. 
These forecasts--such as those for severe storms, hurricanes, and 
tornadoes-
-can have a substantial impact on our nation's people, infrastructure, 
and economy. Consequently, NOAA policy requires that there must be two 
in-orbit GOES satellites and one on-orbit spare in operation at all 
times. If one of the operational satellites were to fail, the on-orbit 
spare could be moved into position to take the place of the failed 
satellite. However, if there are delays in the launch of the GOES-R 
satellite or if either of the two satellites currently in operation 
were to fail, NOAA would not have an on-orbit spare to fill the gap. 

Government and industry best practices call for the development of 
contingency plans to maintain an organization's essential functions in 
the case of an adverse event.[Footnote 25] These practices include key 
elements such as defining failure scenarios, identifying and selecting 
strategies to address failure scenarios, developing procedures to 
implement the selected strategies, identifying any actions needed to 
implement the strategies, testing the plans, and involving affected 
stakeholders. These elements can be grouped into categories, including 
(1) identifying failure scenarios and impacts, (2) developing 
contingency plans, and (3) validating and implementing contingency 
plans (see table 16). 

Table 16: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan: 

Category: Identifying failure scenarios and impacts; 
Key elements: 
* Define likely failure scenarios; 
* Conduct impact analyses showing impact of failure scenarios on 
business processes and user requirements; 
* Define minimum acceptable level of outputs and recovery time 
objectives, and establish resumption priorities. 

Category: Developing contingency plans; 
Key elements: 
* Define roles and responsibilities for implementing contingency plans; 
* Identify alternative solutions to address failure scenarios; 
* Select contingency strategies from among alternatives based on 
costs, benefits, and impacts; 
* Develop "zero-day" procedures; 
* Define actions needed to implement contingency strategies; 
* Define and document triggers and time lines for enacting the actions 
needed to implement contingency plans; 
* Ensure that steps reflect priorities for resumption of products and 
recovery objectives; 
* Designated officials review and approve contingency plan. 

Category: Validating and implementing contingency plans; 
Key elements: 
* Identify steps for testing contingency plans and conducting training 
exercises; 
* Prepare for and execute tests; 
* Execute applicable actions for implementation of contingency 
strategies; 
* Validate test results for consistency against minimum performance 
levels; 
* Communicate and coordinate with stakeholders to ensure that 
contingency strategies remain optimal for reducing potential impacts; 
* Update and maintain contingency plans as warranted. 

Source: GAO analysis of guidance documents from the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, Software Engineering Institute, GAO, 
NOAA, and the GOES-R program. 

[End of table] 

NOAA has established contingency plans for both its GOES satellites 
and its associated ground systems. In September 2010, we recommended 
that NOAA develop and document continuity plans for the operation of 
geostationary satellites that include the implementation procedures, 
resources, staff roles, and timetables needed to transition to a 
single satellite, a foreign satellite, or other solution. In September 
2011, the GOES-R program provided a draft plan documenting a strategy 
for conducting operations if there were only a single operational 
satellite. In December 2012, the program provided us with a final 
version of this plan. It included scenarios for three, two, and one 
operational satellites. In addition to this satellite contingency 
plan, NOAA has another contingency-related plan with activation 
procedures for its satellites. 

Furthermore, the NOAA office responsible for ground-based satellite 
operations and products has created plans for contingency operations 
at the GOES ground system facility, the Satellite Operations Control 
Center. Specifically, NOAA's plans describe the transfer of critical 
functions to a backup facility during an emergency. The continuity 
plan contains, among other things, descriptions of the alternate 
locations for resources, and the performance of key functions and 
implementation procedures. 

When compared to best practices, NOAA's satellite and ground system 
contingency plans had many strengths and a few weaknesses. 
Specifically, the satellite contingency plan fully implemented seven 
elements, partially implemented nine elements, and did not implement 
one element. The ground system contingency plan fully implemented ten 
elements, partially implemented six elements, and one element was not 
applicable. Table 17 shows the extent to which the satellite and 
ground system contingency plans fully implemented, partially 
implemented, or did not implement key contingency planning elements. 

Table 17: Implementation of Key Contingency Planning Elements for 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Category: Identifying failure scenarios and impacts; 

Key element: Define likely failure scenarios; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA has defined three likely failure scenarios for its 
satellite system--the loss of one, two, or all three satellites in the 
GOES constellation. The agency also defines the conditions that would 
constitute a satellite failure. NOAA's scenarios are broad enough that 
they cover a wide range of situations, including a gap caused by a 
delay in the GOES-R launch. NOAA has defined likely ground system 
failure scenarios. 

Key element: Conduct impact analyses showing impact of failure 
scenarios on business processes and user requirements; 
Satellite system: Not implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: NOAA did not conduct impact analyses showing the impact of 
satellite failure scenarios on business processes or user 
requirements. NOAA conducted impact analyses of ground system outages 
and disruptions on business processes and user requirements; however, 
these analyses do not reflect each failure scenario. 

Key element: Define minimum acceptable level of outputs and recovery 
time objectives, and establish resumption priorities; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA defined minimum acceptable output criteria for 
satellites, instruments and products in its satellite plans as well as 
for business processes and subsystems in the ground system plans. 

Category: Developing contingency plans; 

Key element: Define roles and responsibilities for implementing 
contingency plans; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: NOAA has defined roles and responsibilities for some, but 
not all, contingency operations in both the satellite and ground system 
plans. For example, the satellite contingency plan identifies roles and 
responsibilities for briefing management in the event of losing an 
operational satellite, but does not define responsibility for notifying 
users. The ground system contingency plans describe roles and 
responsibilities of three contingency teams, but do not clearly define 
the roles and responsibilities for the contingency coordinator. 

Key element: Identify alternative solutions to address failure 
scenarios; 
Satellite system: Partially; implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: In its satellite contingency plan, NOAA identified 
alternative solutions to address satellite failure scenarios, 
including relocating and using older GOES satellites and requesting 
coverage by foreign satellites. However, NOAA did not identify 
alternative solutions for preventing delays in the GOES-R launch, 
which could cause a reduction in the number of satellites. For its 
ground systems, NOAA identified a solution for its failure scenarios: 
to switch operations to one of several backup locations. 

Key element: Select contingency strategies from among alternatives 
based on costs, benefits, and impacts; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: In both sets of plans, NOAA has selected contingency 
strategies to address failure scenarios; however, it did not provide 
evidence that it had selected these strategies from alternatives based 
on costs, benefits, and impacts. Moreover, NOAA did not select 
strategies to prevent one of the most likely situations that would 
trigger a failure scenario: a delay in the launch of the GOES-R 
satellite. 

Key element: Develop "zero-day" procedures; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA identified strategies and procedures for addressing 
GOES satellites failure scenarios, but did not establish associated 
time frames. NOAA developed zero-day strategies and procedures for the 
GOES ground system. 

Key element: Define actions needed to implement contingency strategies; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA has defined high-level activities to implement 
satellite contingency strategies, such as relocation of a satellite to 
a central location and user notification of a switch to a single 
satellite--however, no detailed procedure steps are given for 
performance of these activities. NOAA has defined the steps to 
implement GOES ground system contingency strategies. 

Key element: Define and document triggers and time lines for enacting 
the actions needed to implement contingency plans; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: NOAA has identified triggers and specific time lines for 
implementing satellite contingency plans. However, it has not 
established triggers or time lines for any actions it might take to 
prevent a delay in the GOES-R launch. NOAA has identified two 
different triggers for enacting the ground system plan, but the plan 
does not describe which trigger is to be used. 

Key element: Ensure that steps reflect priorities for resumption of 
products and recovery objectives; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: NOAA's satellite contingency plan describes its recovery 
objectives and prioritizes GOES instruments and products; however, the 
steps for implementing contingency strategies do not reflect these 
priorities and objectives. Ground system contingency strategies 
establish priorities for resuming operations, but do not define 
recovery time objectives. 

Key element: Designated officials review and approve contingency plan; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: A designated official has reviewed and approved both sets 
of contingency plans. 

Category: Validating and implementing contingency plans; 

Key element: Identify steps for testing contingency plans and 
conducting training exercises; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA has identified steps for testing GOES satellite 
contingency plans and has conducted exercises and simulations. NOAA 
has also identified steps for testing and conducting exercises and 
simulations on its ground system contingency plans. NOAA provides 
training to its operations staff on contingency operations for both 
the satellite and ground systems. 

Key element: Prepare for and execute tests; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA officials provided documentation showing preparation 
for and execution of regular maneuvers of on-orbit satellites. 
According to officials, these maneuvers are similar to the maneuvers 
identified as an action in the contingency plans. NOAA also prepared 
for and executed tests of its ground system contingency plans. 

Key element: Execute applicable actions for implementation of 
contingency strategies; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Not Applicable; 
Description: NOAA has performed actions to implement contingency 
strategies, including activities to monitor the health and safety of 
the satellites, and to provide status information to management. 
Executing actions is not applicable for the ground system contingency 
plan, because that plan does not identify actions to be taken. 

Key element: Validate test results for consistency against minimum 
performance levels; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA tested a series of satellite maneuvers similar to 
those that would be used in the event of a failure, but did not 
demonstrate how these or other scenario tests would meet minimum 
performance levels. On the ground systems, NOAA performed tests to 
validate the contingency operations, and demonstrated that the 
transfer of responsibility meets minimum recovery performance levels. 

Key element: Communicate and coordinate with stakeholders to ensure 
that contingency strategies remain optimal for reducing potential 
impacts; 
Satellite system: Partially implemented; 
Ground system: Partially implemented; 
Description: According to users, NOAA is proactive in communicating 
potential changes and impacts when issues develop, and responded 
quickly to a recent outage in a GOES satellite. However, the 
contingency strategies currently in place of (1) switching to single 
satellite operations and (2) using a foreign satellite as a temporary 
replacement would have a major effect on user operations; NOAA has not 
provided key external users with information on meeting data needs 
under these scenarios. For example, the Forest Service relies on GOES 
satellites to obtain data from its distributed ground-based 
observation network, but NOAA has not discussed potential mitigation 
options specific to this scenario. 

Key element: Update and maintain contingency plans as warranted; 
Satellite system: Fully implemented; 
Ground system: Fully implemented; 
Description: NOAA has updated and maintained contingency plans for both 
the GOES satellite and ground systems. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documentation. 

[End of table] 

NOAA has implemented most of the best practices on both the GOES 
satellite and ground contingency plans. Specifically, NOAA identified 
failure scenarios, recovery priorities, and minimum levels of 
acceptable performance. NOAA also established contingency plans that 
identify solutions and high-level activities and triggers to implement 
the solutions. Further, the agency has tested its contingency plans, 
trained staff on how to implement the contingency plans, and updated 
the plans when warranted. The agency also successfully implemented its 
contingency plans when it experienced problems with one of its 
operational satellites. Specifically, when GOES-13 experienced 
problems in September and October 2012, NOAA activated its contingency 
plans to move its back-up satellite into position to provide 
observations until GOES-13 was once again operational. While the 
agency has not needed to address the loss of a back-up satellite in 
recent years, contingency plans cover this situation by determining if 
older GOES satellites could provide coverage, moving the single 
satellite into a central position over the country, and seeking data 
from foreign satellites. 

However, both satellite and ground contingency plans contain areas 
that fall short of best practices. For example, NOAA has not 
demonstrated that the contingency strategies for both its satellite 
and ground system are based on an assessment of costs, benefits, and 
impact on users. Further, the satellite plan does not specify 
procedures for working with the user community to account for 
potential reductions in capability under contingency operations. For 
example, officials from the Federal Aviation Administration noted that 
NOAA's contingency plans do not define the compatibility, security, 
and standard protocol language they should use if a foreign satellite 
were to be utilized. Also, while selected users reported that, in the 
past, they have been well informed by NOAA when changes in service 
occur, including the problems with GOES-13, others were either not 
informed or received information on outages through a third party. 
Moreover, selected users stated that certain contingency operations 
could have a significant impact on their operations. For example, 
Federal Aviation Administration officials stated that flight 
approaches in Alaska that were enabled using the Global Positioning 
System were affected by the GOES-13 outage in late 2012. As another 
example, Forest Service officials explained that if GOES were to 
experience an outage and not have a backup satellite available, it was 
their understanding that NOAA would either move a single satellite 
into a central position over the country or obtain observations from a 
foreign satellite. Under both of these scenarios, they could lose 
views of wildland fires and their ability to obtain data from ground-
based observation networks. Nearly all users stated that the effects 
of a switch to a single satellite or foreign satellite configuration 
would be significant. 

In addition, while NOAA's failure scenarios for its satellite system 
are based on the number of available satellites--and the loss of a 
backup satellite caused by a delayed GOES-R launch would fit into 
these scenarios--the agency did not identify alternative solutions or 
time lines for preventing a GOES-R launch delay. According to NOAA 
officials, a gap caused by a delayed launch would trigger the same 
contingency actions as a failure on launch or the loss of a currently 
on-orbit satellite. However, this does not take into account potential 
actions that NOAA could undertake to prevent a delayed launch, such as 
removing selected functionality or compressing test schedules. 

NOAA officials stated that their focus on primary users and on the 
number of available satellites is appropriate for their contingency 
plans. Given the potential for a delay in the launch of the GOES-R 
satellite and the expectation that there will be at least a year with 
no backup satellite in orbit, it is important that NOAA consider ways 
to prevent a delay in the GOES-R launch, and ensure its contingency 
plans are fully documented, tested, and communicated to affected 
stakeholders. Further, it is critical that NOAA and users are aware of 
how contingency scenarios will affect user operations. Until 
comprehensive plans are developed, it is less certain that NOAA can 
provide a consistent level of service and capabilities in the event of 
an early failure or late launch. This in turn could have a devastating 
effect on the ability of meteorologists to observe and report on 
severe weather conditions. 

Conclusions: 

The GOES-R program is well on its way toward developing the first 
satellite in the series, but it continues to face risks that could 
delay the first satellite's launch. Among these risks are issues we 
have previously raised on how the program manages reserve funds and 
implements sound scheduling practices. Specifically, the agency does 
not provide important details on its contingency reserve funds to 
senior executives, including the reserves allocated for each of the 
four satellites or key assumptions made in calculating reserves. 
Without this information, program officials could misinterpret the 
size of the remaining reserves and make poor decisions regarding the 
program's future funding. The agency has improved selected scheduling 
practices, but others remain weak--in part, according to agency 
officials, due to the dynamic nature of scheduling a program as 
complex as the GOES-R satellite program. As the agency closes in on 
its expected launch date, technical issues in developing the space and 
ground segments and scheduling problems could make it more difficult 
to launch on schedule, and program officials now acknowledge that the 
launch date may be delayed by 6 months. Any delay in the anticipated 
launch date would expand a potential one-year gap in the availability 
of an on-orbit backup GOES satellite, and raise the risk of a gap in 
geostationary satellite data should one of the two operational 
satellites experience a problem. 

While the agency has made multiple changes to GOES-R requirements in 
recent years, it has not effectively involved satellite data users in 
those changes. Specifically, internal NOAA and external satellite data 
users were not fully informed about changes in GOES-R requirements and 
did not have a chance to communicate their concerns about the impact 
these changes could have on their ability to perform their missions. 
Many of these users expressed concerns about the effect these changes 
could have on their ability to fulfill their missions, including 
facilitating air traffic, conducting military operations, and fighting 
wildland fires. Until NOAA improves its outreach and communication 
with external satellite data users, its changes in requirements could 
cause unexpected impacts on critical user operations. 

Given the possibility of a gap in geostationary satellite coverage, 
NOAA has established contingency plans for both its GOES satellites 
and ground systems; these plans include the likely scenario in which 
there will not be an on-orbit backup. While these plans include many 
elements called for in industry best practices, the satellite 
contingency plan did not assess the potential impacts of a failure on 
users, or specify actions for working with the user community to 
address these potential reductions in capability under contingency 
operations. They also did not identify alternative solutions or time 
lines for preventing a delay in the GOES-R launch date. The absence of 
a fully-tested and complete set of GOES-R-related contingency plans 
and procedures could have a major impact on levels of service provided 
in the event of a satellite or ground system failure. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To address risks in the GOES-R program development and to help ensure 
that the satellite is launched on time, we are making the following 
four recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce. Specifically, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator 
to: 

* Direct program officials to include information on the amount of 
reserve funding for each of the four satellites in the program as well 
as information on the calculation and use of reserves in regular 
briefings to NOAA senior executives, so that executives are fully 
informed about changes in reserve levels. 

* Given the likely gap in availability of an on-orbit GOES backup 
satellite in 2015 and 2016, address the weaknesses identified in this 
report on the core ground system and the spacecraft schedules. These 
weaknesses include, but are not limited to, sequencing all activities, 
ensuring there are adequate resources for the activities, and 
conducting a schedule risk analysis. 

* Improve communications with internal and external satellite data 
users on changes in GOES-R requirements by (a) assessing the impact of 
changes on user's critical operations; (b) seeking information from 
users on any concerns they might have about past or potential changes; 
and (c) disseminating information on past and potential changes in 
requirements to satellite data users. 

* Revise the satellite and ground system contingency plans to address 
weaknesses identified in this report, including providing more 
information on the potential impact of a satellite failure, 
identifying alternative solutions for preventing a delay in GOES-R 
launch as well as time lines for implementing those solutions, and 
coordinating with key external stakeholders on contingency strategies. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of 
Commerce and NASA. We received written comments on a draft of this 
report from Commerce transmitting NOAA's comments. NOAA concurred with 
all four of our recommendations and identified steps that it is taking 
to implement them. It also provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated into our report, as appropriate. NOAA's comments are 
reprinted in appendix II. 

While NOAA concurred with our recommendation to include information on 
reserve funding for each of the four satellites in the program and 
information on the calculation and use of reserves in regular 
briefings to senior executives, and suggested that its current 
processes fulfill this recommendation, we do not believe they do. 
Specifically, NOAA stated that the GOES-R program currently reports on 
reserve funding at two major monthly management meetings, which alerts 
management if reserves fall below designated thresholds for the 
remaining work on all four satellites. The agency also stated that its 
reporting of the percent of "unliened" contingency funding--the amount 
of contingency funding not allocated to a potential risk or issue--for 
the remaining work addresses our concern regarding whether there are 
sufficient reserves to complete the GOES-R series. 

However, the GOES-R program does not currently identify the reserve 
funding needed for each individual satellite or provide details on how 
reserves are being calculated and used at the monthly management 
meetings. By not providing reserve information on the individual 
satellites, the program is not alerting management about potential 
near-term funding shortfalls. For example, maintaining a high level of 
reserves on the later satellites could mask a low level of reserves in 
the near-term for GOES-R and S. Such a scenario could affect the 
satellites' development schedules and launch dates. Further, by not 
obtaining details on the assumptions made when calculating reserves 
and the causes of changes in reserve values, management is unable to 
determine if changes in reserve levels are due to the addition, 
subtraction, or use of funds, or to changes in the assumptions used in 
the calculations. Given the importance of reserve funds in ensuring 
the satellite development remains on track, management should be aware 
of reserve funding levels for each individual satellite and of the 
underlying reasons for changes in reserve levels. Therefore, we 
continue to believe that additional action is needed by NOAA to 
respond to our recommendation. 

After we received agency comments and while our report was in final 
processing, NOAA notified us that the launch dates of the first and 
second GOES-R series satellites would be delayed. Given the late 
receipt of this information, our report reflects the previous launch 
date. 

NASA did not provide comments on the report's findings or 
recommendations, but noted that it would provide any input it might 
have to NOAA for inclusion in that agency's comments. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 
other interested parties. The report also will be available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or at 
pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's (NOAA) progress in developing the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program and in 
addressing key cost and schedule risks that we identified in a prior 
report, (2) evaluate the program's efforts to manage changes in 
requirements and whether any significant changes have recently 
occurred, and (3) evaluate the adequacy of GOES-R contingency plans. 

To assess NOAA's progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, 
we compared the program's planned completion dates for key milestones 
identified in its management control plan and system review plan 
against actual and currently estimated completion dates. We analyzed 
monthly program status briefings to identify the current status and 
recent development challenges of flight and ground project components 
and instruments. To assess NOAA's efforts to address key cost risks, 
we compared program-reported data on development costs and reserves to 
best practices in reserve funding as identified by the program's 
management control plan, which, in turn, reflects National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration requirements. We calculated reserve 
percentages using program office data on development costs and 
reserves, and compared these calculations to the reserve percentages 
reported by the program to management. To assess NOAA's efforts to 
address key schedule risks, we compared schedules for two key GOES-R 
components to best practices in schedule development as identified in 
our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.[Footnote 26] Similar to our 
previous report, we used a five-part rating system. We then compared 
our previous assessment to our current assessment to identify 
practices that were improved, stayed the same, or became weaker over 
time. We conducted interviews with GOES-R program staff to better 
understand milestone time frames, to discuss current status and recent 
development challenges for work currently being performed on GOES-R, 
and to understand how the program reports costs and reserve totals. We 
also examined the reliability of data on cost reserves and program 
schedules. Regarding cost reserves, we examined reliability by 
recalculating reserve percentages based on supporting data over a 
period of one year, and compared the results to those presented by the 
program to management. Regarding schedules, we created a template that 
examined each schedule in areas such as missing logic, tasks completed 
out of sequence, and completed tasks with start or finish dates in the 
future. As a result, we found both the reserve information and the 
schedules to be reliable for the purposes of conducting our analyses. 

To evaluate the program's efforts to manage changes in requirements, 
we compared GOES-R practices for managing requirements changes against 
best practices, which we drew from several leading industry sources 
including the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity 
Model®-Integration, the Program Management Institute's Program 
Manager's Body of Knowledge, the Federal Information Security Controls 
Audit Manual and the Information Technology Governance Institute's 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology governance 
framework. We assessed GOES-R practices as having satisfied, partially 
satisfied, or not satisfied each best practice. We analyzed changes 
from 2007 to the present in the program's Level I Requirements 
Document to determine the extent of the changes. We also identified 
concerns about these changes from a subset of satellite data users. We 
selected users from both inside and outside NOAA's National Weather 
Service, the main GOES satellite user, based on several factors: the 
importance of GOES data to the organization's core mission, the user's 
reliance on GOES products that have changed or may change, and--for 
agencies outside of NOAA--the percentage of spending devoted to 
meteorological operations. The user organizations outside of NOAA 
included in our review were: the US Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration, and 
the Department of Defense's Navy and Air Force. User organizations 
inside of NOAA's National Weather Service included the Aviation 
Weather Center, Space Weather Prediction Center, Storm Prediction 
Center, Environmental Modeling Center, and a Weather Forecast Office. 

To evaluate the adequacy of GOES-R contingency plans, we compared 
contingency plans and procedures for both GOES satellites and the GOES 
ground system against best practices developed from leading industry 
sources such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model®-
Integration, and our prior work. We analyzed the contingency plans to 
identify strategies for various failure scenarios and determined 
whether the satellite and ground system contingency plans fully 
implemented, partially implemented, or did not implement each of the 
practices. We also interviewed selected satellite data users to better 
determine the impact of a GOES failure scenario on their operations, 
and the level of communication they have had with NOAA satellite 
offices on current contingency plans. 

We performed our work at NOAA, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and US Department of Agriculture offices in the 
Washington, D.C., area and at National Weather Service offices in 
Kansas City, Missouri; Norman, Oklahoma; and Sterling, Virginia. We 
conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

The Deputy Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

July 5, 2013: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office's draft report entitled, 
"Geostationary Weather Satellites: Progress Made, but Weaknesses in 
Scheduling, Contingency Planning, and Communicating with Users Need to
be Addressed" (GAO-13-597). On behalf of the Department of Commerce, I 
have enclosed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
programmatic comments to the draft report. 

If you have any questions, please contact me or Jim Stowers, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, at 
(202) 482-3663. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Patrick Gallagher: 
Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce: 

Enclosure: 

U.S. Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

Comments to the Draft GAO Report Entitled, "Geostationary Weather 
Satellites: Progress Made, but Weaknesses in Scheduling, Contingency 
Planning, and Communicating with Users Need to be Addressed" 
(GAO-13-597, July 2013): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce appreciates the opportunity to review the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report. Throughout 
the report, when referring to the program in whole, use "the GOES-R 
Series Program." This is to ensure a clear distinction between the 
overall program and the first satellite in this series (i.e., GOES-R). 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: "Direct program officials to include information on 
the amount of reserve funding for each of the four satellites in the 
program as well as information on the calculation and use of reserves 
in regular briefings to NOAA senior executives, so that executives are 
fully informed about changes in reserve levels." 

NOAA Response: Concur. The GOES-R Series Program currently reports 
contingency amounts (reserves) to the Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) monthly Management Status Review (MSR) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) monthly Program Management 
Council (PMC) meeting. The unliened contingency amount is reported as 
a dollar amount and as a percentage of unexecuted work-to-go. This 
approach alerts management to a contingency falling below the required 
levels for work-to-go, including work on GOES-R, S, T, and U. NOAA 
Leadership will continue the ongoing process of working with GOES-R 
Series Program to ensure contingency reporting meets its requirements
for detailed information, and ensure reporting is revised accordingly. 
The percent of unliened contingency on work-to-go, which is reported 
monthly to management by the GOES-R Program, specifically addresses 
GAO's concern regarding sufficient reserves to complete the GOES-R 
Series. 

Recommendation 2: "Given the likely gap in availability of an on-orbit 
GOES backup satellite in 2015 and 2016, address the weaknesses 
identified in this report on the core ground systems and spacecraft 
schedules. These weaknesses include, but are not limited to, 
sequencing all activities, ensuring there are adequate resources for 
the activities, and conducting a schedule risk analysis." 

NOAA Response: Concur. The GOES-R Series Program conducts monthly 
health checks of the spacecraft, instrument, and ground segment 
schedules and works with the contractors to resolve the issues 
identified. The Program Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) is built from 
the contractor schedule submissions, which are summarized into flight 
and ground segment schedules that are then integrated to form the 
Program IMS. The contractor schedules do reflect the appropriate 
subcontractor activities. The integration and summarization process 
provides an end-to-end critical path and the amount of schedule slack 
for that critical path. Schedule performance information is also 
monitored and reported in a number of non-schedule ways. For example, 
milestones executed versus planned, engineering products executed 
versus planned, reviews (requirements, design, manufacturing, etc.) 
executed versus planned, and progress on subcontract and procurement 
activities. Flight, Ground, and Program schedule information is
reported to the GSFC monthly Management Status Reviews and the NOAA 
monthly PMC meetings. The GOES-R Series Program will continue to bring 
down the number of errors in the schedules and improve the fidelity of 
the Program IMS. 

Recommendation 3: "Improve communications with internal and external 
satellite data users on changes in GOES-R requirements by (a) 
assessing the impact of changes on user's critical operations; (b) 
seeking information from users on any concerns they might have about 
past or potential changes; and (c) disseminating information on past 
and potential changes in requirements to satellite data users." 

NOAA Response: Concur. The GOES-R Series Program has an active process 
for communicating Program status to stakeholders and soliciting their 
input. GOES-R Series Program has extensive interaction with users 
which takes place at meetings such as the recent NOAA Satellite 
Conference, the NOAA Satellite Science Week, GOES-R Risk Reduction and
Algorithm Development Executive Board (ADEB) meetings. Additional 
interaction takes place at the GOES User's Conference, the Annual 
American Meteorological Society (AMS) Meeting, sponsor meetings 
(including DoD and Canada) at the Cooperative Program for Meteorology
Education and Training (COMET), and the annual GOES-R status briefing 
to the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM). 

The GOES-R Series Program will endeavor to further improve its 
communications with its internal and external satellite data users and 
will consider new opportunities to disseminate information about 
forthcoming changes in the GOES-R era. These may include: National
Weather Service (NWS) Customer Forums which are held twice per year to 
discuss "Family of Service" and other NWS data flows to the private 
sector, increased engagement with broadcast meteorologists, and 
improved dissemination of information with the direct read-out 
community. 

Recommendation 4: "Revise the satellite and ground system contingency 
plans to address weaknesses identified in the report, including 
providing more information on the potential impact of a satellite 
failure, identifying alternative solutions for preventing a delay in 
GOES-R launch as well as time lines for implementing those solutions, 
and coordinating with key external stakeholders on contingency 
strategies." 

NOAA Response: Concur. NOAA will update its satellite and ground 
system contingency plans to address weaknesses identified in the 
report. In addition, the GOES-R Series Program will provide regular 
updates to NOAA, the Department, the Office of Management and Budget,
and Congress on efforts underway to protect the launch schedule, as 
part of the regular monthly and quarterly program reviews and will 
continue to use existing mechanisms to communicate program status to 
key stakeholders. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals making 
contributions to this report included Colleen Phillips (assistant 
director), Paula Moore (assistant director), Shaun Byrnes, Kathleen 
Feild, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, Kaelin Kuhn, Jason Lee, Scott 
Pettis, Meredith Raymond, Maria Stattel, and Jessica Waselkow. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009); 
NOAA, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites--R Series 
Management Control Plan (Silver Spring, Md.: January 2013). 

[2] NASA, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2007), Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Development, 
Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010); Project Management 
Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(Newtown Square, Pa.: 2004); GAO, Federal Information System Controls 
Audit Manual, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-232G] 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2009); IT Governance Institute, Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology 4.1 (Rolling 
Meadows, Ill.: 2007). 

[3] GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and 
Contingency Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.19] (Washington, D.C.: 
August 1998); National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-
34 (Gaithersburg, Md.: May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, 
CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010). 

[4] While our report was in final processing, NOAA announced that it 
would delay the launch dates for its GOES-R and GOES-S satellites to 
the second quarter of fiscal year 2016 and the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2017, respectively. 

[5] GAO, Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to 
Mitigate Program Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-841T], (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 
2012); GAO, Geostationary Weather Satellites: Design Progress Made, 
but Schedule Uncertainty Needs to be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-576], (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 
2012); GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key 
Users, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-799] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2010); GAO, Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Has Increased Costs, Reduced 
Capabilities, and Delayed Schedules, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-596T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 
2009); GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and 
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2009); GAO, Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Further Actions Needed to Effectively Manage 
Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-183T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2007); GAO, Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Progress Has Been Made, but Improvements Are 
Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-18] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 
2007); GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other 
Satellite Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1129T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 
2006); and GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-799]. 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-799]. 

[8] GAO, 2013 High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-359T] (Washington, D.C.: February 
14, 2013). 

[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-756]. 

[10] This module is called the Mission Management function. 

[11] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009). 

[12] While NOAA has ultimate responsibility for GOES-R, NOAA shares 
program management responsibilities with NASA, and the program office 
is located at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. 

[13] Until late 2012, NOAA required the ground project to maintain 30 
percent of its development cost as a reserve. However, program 
officials recently revised the requirement down to 20 percent to 
reflect the shorter amount of development time before launch and the 
retirement of some risks. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-576]. 

[15] Under testing, the electronics board emitted unexpectedly high 
levels of radiation, which would cause a high number of false alarms 
and hinder the program's ability to assess the instrument's 
observations. 

[16] While our report was in final processing, NOAA announced that it 
would delay the launch date for its GOES-R satellite from October 2015 
to the second quarter of fiscal year 2016. 

[17] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. In May 
2012, we published updated guidance on scheduling best practices. See 
GAO, Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules--
Exposure Draft, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012). The updated guidance identifies 10 
best practices. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-576]. 

[19] Level-of-effort activities represent work that has no measurable 
output and cannot be associated with a physical product or defined 
deliverable. These activities are typically related to management and 
other oversight that continues until the detailed activities they 
support have been completed. 

[20] Total float time is the amount of time an activity can be delayed 
or extended before the delay affects its successors or the program's 
finish date. 

[21] A driving path is the longest path of successive activities that 
drives the finish date for a key milestone. The driving path often 
corresponds to a schedule's critical path. 

[22] Leading industry and governments sources--including the Software 
Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model®-Integration, the 
Project Management Institute's Project Management Body of Knowledge, 
the Federal Information Security Controls Audit Manual, the IT 
Governance Institute's Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology governance framework, and NASA system development policies-
-provide extensive guidance on managing requirements. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-799]. 

[24] NOAA officials stated that the sole significant change was a 
reduction in the accuracy requirement for the magnetometer, and 
demonstrated that they had obtained approval from the most pertinent 
user community, the National Weather Service's Space Weather 
Prediction Center, before making the change. 

[25] See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and 
Contingency Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.19] (Washington, D.C.: 
August 1998); National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-
34 (Gaithersburg, Md.: May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, 
CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010). 

[26] See GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices 
for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
2009).In May 2012, GAO published updated guidance on scheduling best 
practices. See GAO, Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Project Schedules--Exposure Draft, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 
2012). The updated guidance identifies 10 best practices. In order to 
compare past and current results, we conducted our current assessment 
using the original 9 practices. 

[End of section] 

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