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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

April 2014: 

NASA: 

Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects: 

GAO-14-338SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-338SP, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

This is GAO's annual assessment of NASA's major projects. This report
provides a snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its major
acquisitions. In 2013, GAO reported that the performance of NASA's major
projects had improved since GAO's first assessment in 2009, due, in 
part, to some underperforming projects launching and some demonstrating
progress meeting practices that GAO has reported decrease cost and
schedule risk. 

In response to an explanatory statement of the House Committee on
Appropriations accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, this
report assesses (1) the current status of NASA's portfolio of major 
projects, (2) NASA's progress in developing and maturing critical 
technologies (3) efforts NASA has taken to improve design stability of 
its projects, and (4) any challenges to NASA's management of the 
portfolio. GAO assessed 2013 and 2014 data on NASA's 18 major projects 
and the Commercial Crew program all with an estimated life-cycle cost 
of over $250 million, such as data on the projects' cost, schedule, 
technology maturity, design stability, and contracts; analyzed monthly 
project status reports; and interviewed NASA and contractor officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) total 
portfolio of major projects saw cost and schedule growth that remains 
low compared to GAO's first review of the portfolio. Some projects in 
this year's portfolio launched within their cost and schedule 
baselines; however, several others are undergoing replans, which could 
temper the portfolio's positive performance. For example, the Mars 
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN project launched on time and cost
about $35 million less than its baseline estimate, but NASA officials 
are reporting that issues with the Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation 
Satellite-2 project's primary instrument are driving costs to exceed 
the original baseline by at least 15 percent, and that the project 
will miss its committed launch date. 

NASA projects have continued to make progress in maturing technologies 
prior to the preliminary design review. This year, 63 percent of 
projects met this standard, up from only 29 percent of projects in 
2010. For example, in preparation for its upcoming confirmation 
review, one project has matured all 10 of its critical technologies, 
which GAO's past work has shown is important to decrease the 
likelihood of cost and schedule growth. NASA's heightened awareness of 
reducing technology risk is further evidenced by new guidance
aimed at ensuring continued focus on technical maturity. As NASA 
continues to undertake more complex projects it will be important to 
maintain heightened attention to best practices to lessen the risk of 
technology development and continue positive cost and schedule 
performance. 

NASA projects are maintaining steady performance toward meeting GAO's 
best practices for design stability, and the agency has also increased 
its focus on design stability. GAO has found over past several years 
that projects have consistently reported higher percentages of 
drawings releasable at the critical design review and lower 
percentages of drawing growth after that time, which indicates that 
project design stability has increased overall. NASA has taken steps 
to enhance its ability to assess design maturity. For example, NASA
implemented three technical indicators to assess design maturity, and 
projects in the portfolio are tracking the required indicators. 
Additionally, experts in the space community have identified other 
design stability metrics, which can be used in tandem with GAO's and 
NASA's indicators in order to provide a more complete and robust 
assessment of a project's design stability. 

NASA faces several challenges that could impact its ability to 
effectively manage its portfolio. A primary challenge in the next few 
years will be to complete a series of complex and expensive projects 
within constrained budgets and competing priorities. Any cost or 
schedule growth on NASA's largest, most complex projects, such as the 
James Webb Space Telescope, could have a ripple effect across the 
portfolio. While NASA has implemented a plan for improving its
acquisition management, monitoring NASA's performance against that 
plan over time will be important in determining if the agency's 
efforts to improve its acquisition management practices have become 
institutionalized. For example, in 2013, two projects experienced 
significant issues immediately after being confirmed, indicating that 
neither project had completed an adequate assessment of risk which is 
necessary to ensure that the project's cost and schedule baseline 
estimates were realistic. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report, but provides 
further evidence to support the importance of continuing to take 
action on recommendations GAO has made in prior reports. NASA generally
agreed with GAO's findings. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-338SP]. For more 
information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 
chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Positive Cost and Schedule Trends Continue, but Project Replans Weaken 
Overall Performance: 

NASA Has Made Progress in Meeting GAO's Best Practice of Maturing 
Project Technology Prior to the Preliminary Design Review: 

NASA Has Increased Focus on Design Stability by Tracking Several 
Metrics: 

NASA Faces Several Challenges That Could Impact Management of the 
Portfolio: 

Project Assessments: 

Global Precipitation Measurement Mission: 

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow On: 

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2: 

Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat 
Transport: 

James Webb Space Telescope: 

Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer: 

Magnetospheric Multiscale: 

Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN: 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2: 

Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-
Regolith Explorer: 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: 

Soil Moisture Active and Passive: 

Solar Probe Plus: 

Space Launch System: 

Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment: 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy: 

Surface Water and Ocean Topography: 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment: 

Commercial Crew Program: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's Annual 
Assessments: 

Appendix III: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's 2014 
Annual Assessment: 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix V: Elements of a Sound Business Case: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected Major NASA 
Projects Currently in the Implementation Phase: 

Table 2: Selected Major NASA Projects and Programs Reviewed in GAO's 
Annual Assessments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NASA's Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

Figure 2: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's 2014 
Assessment: 

Figure 3: Average Development Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected 
Major NASA Projects in Implementation Phase, Both Including and 
Excluding JWST: 

Figure 4: Percentage of Major Projects Meeting GAO Technology Maturity 
Criteria at the Preliminary Design Review: 

Figure 5: Average Number of Critical Technologies for Projects in 
Implementation: 

Figure 6: Average Percentage of Releasable Engineering Drawings at 
Critical Design Review: 

Figure 7: Average Percentage of Drawing Growth after Critical Design 
Review for Selected Projects from Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014: 

Figure 8: Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request for JWST, Orion, SLS, 
Commercial Crew, and All Other Major NASA Projects, 2014 through 2018: 

Figure 9: Illustration of a Sample Project Assessment: 

Abbreviations: 

AFB: Air Force Base: 

AFS: Air Force Station: 

ATLAS: Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System: 

CCP: Commercial Crew Program: 

CCDev: Commercial Crew Development: 

CCDev 2: Commercial Crew Development Round 2: 

CCiCap: Commercial Crew Integrated Capability: 

CCtCap: Commercial Crew Transportation Capabilities phase: 

CDR: critical design review: 

CNES: Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (French Government Space 
Agency): 

CSA: Canadian Space Agency: 

DCI: Data Collection Instrument(s): 

DLR: German Aerospace Center: 

EFT-1: The first Exploration Flight Test for the Orion vehicle, 
scheduled for September 2014: 

EM-1: Exploratory Mission 1, the first non-crewed launch of the Space 
Launch System and Orion vehicle, planned for December 2017: 

EM-2: Exploratory Mission 2, the first crewed launch of the Space 
Launch System and the Orion vehicle, planned for August 2021: 

EMTGO: ExoMars Trace Gas Orbiter: 

ESA: European Space Agency: 

EVM: earned value management: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

FPI: Fast Plasma Instrument: 

GFZ: German Research Center for Geosciences: 

GLAST: Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope: 

GNC: LIDAR guidance, navigation, and control light detection and 
ranging instrument: 

GPM: Global Precipitation Measurement (mission): 

GRACE-FO: Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow On: 

GRAIL: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory: 

ICESat-2: Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2: 

ICPS: Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage: 

InSight: Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, 
and Heat Transport: 

ISIM: Integrated Science Instrument Module: 

ISS: International Space Station: 

JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency: 

JCL: Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level: 

JWST: James Webb Space Telescope: 

KaRIn: Ka-band Radar Interferometer: 

KDP: key decision point: 

LADEE: Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer: 

LDCM: Landsat Data Continuity Mission: 

LRI: Laser Ranging Interferometer: 

LRO: Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter: 

MAVEN: Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN: 

MMS: Magnetospheric Multiscale: 

MDR: mission definition review: 

MSL: Mars Science Laboratory: 

NASA: National Aeronautic and Space Administration: 

NGIMS: Neutral Gas and Ion Mass Spectrometer: 

NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project: 

NPR: NASA Procedural Requirements: 

OCFO: NASA Office of the Chief Financial Officer: 

OCO: Orbiting Carbon Observatory: 

OCO-2: Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

Orion: Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: 

OSIRIS-REx: Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-
Security-Regolith Explorer: 

PDR: preliminary design review: 

RBSP: Radiation Belt Storm Probes: 

SDO: Solar Dynamics Observatory: 

SDR: system definition review: 

SGSS: Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment: 

SIR: system integration review: 

SLS: Space Launch System: 

SMAP: Soil Moisture Active and Passive: 

SMD: NASA Science Mission Directorate: 

SOFIA: Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy: 

SPP: Solar Probe Plus: 

SWOT: Surface Water and Ocean Topography: 

SwRI: Southwest Research Institute: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TDRS: Tracking and Data Relay Satellite: 

TRL: technology readiness level(s): 

WISE: Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 15, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is GAO's sixth annual assessment of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration's (NASA) major projects. Due to persistent cost 
and schedule growth associated with its major projects, this area is 
on GAO's high risk list. Last year we reported a positive trend in 
reducing cost and schedule growth.[Footnote 1] For example, NASA's 
Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) project launched in 
November 2013 on schedule and a cost of approximately $35 million less 
than estimated. This year's report includes assessments of NASA's key 
priorities: the development of the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion 
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) to carry astronauts beyond low-
Earth orbit, the transportation of astronauts to the International 
Space Station (ISS) by commercial companies, and the continued 
development of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). 

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 
accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 required GAO to 
prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA programs, 
projects, or activities.[Footnote 2] This report responds to that 
mandate. Specifically, we assess (1) the current status of NASA's 
portfolio of major projects, (2) NASA's progress in developing and 
maturing critical technologies, (3) efforts NASA has taken to improve 
the design stability of its projects, and (4) any remaining challenges 
to NASA's management of the portfolio. We are highlighting several key 
areas for NASA management's attention, including continued focus on 
implementing positive management practices. We have, however, made 
prior recommendations aimed at improving oversight of NASA's projects 
including improving the use of earned value management, implementing 
best practices for design stability and technology maturity, and 
providing more transparency into project costs.[Footnote 3] We are not 
making any new recommendations but we believe this report provides 
further evidence to support the importance of taking action on 
recommendations that GAO made in prior reports on improving 
acquisition management. 

Our approach included an examination of 18 major projects and the 
Commercial Crew program, each with an estimated life-cycle cost of 
over $250 million.[Footnote 4] Three projects are being assessed for 
the first time this year: (1) Interior Exploration using Seismic 
Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport (InSight); (2) Surface 
Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT); and (3) Gravity Recovery and 
Climate Experiment Follow On (GRACE-FO). 

In order to assess the current status of NASA projects in terms of 
cost and schedule, we compared the project's baseline cost and 
schedule data with current cost and schedule data for the 15 projects 
in implementation phase during our review.[Footnote 5] The remaining 3 
projects were in an early stage of development called formulation 
where there are still unknowns about requirements, technology, and 
design. For those projects, NASA provided preliminary cost ranges and 
schedule estimates. We reviewed and compared the 15 projects' current 
cost and schedule data to previously established cost and schedule 
baselines and characterized growth as significant if it exceeded the 
thresholds that trigger cost or schedule reporting to certain 
congressional committees by law.[Footnote 6] For the Commercial Crew 
program, we reviewed Space Act Agreement values for each of the three 
funded partners, as well as both partner and NASA generated 
information and partner milestone performance and schedules and NASA 
information on program risks and partner performance. To assess NASA's 
progress in developing and maturing its critical technologies, we 
identified the number of technologies each project was developing and 
compared them against historical levels, and compared projects' 
technology maturity against GAO best practices and NASA policy on 
technology maturity.[Footnote 7] To understand efforts taken by NASA 
to improve project's design stability, we assessed design stability by 
reviewing historical data on past projects and compared it to current 
performance. We also reviewed criteria for knowledge-based 
acquisitions, as well as NASA's new design stability metrics and 
metrics identified by a group of experts at a meeting convened by 
GAO.[Footnote 8] We compared projects' design stability against these 
criteria to the extent possible. To identify any remaining challenges 
to NASA's management of the portfolio, we reviewed outstanding issues 
identified in our prior work on NASA, such as cost and schedule growth 
on one of NASA's most technologically advanced and costly projects, 
and assessed NASA's efforts to make progress on these issues. We 
examined how NASA is managing its large and complex missions within 
the current budget environment by analyzing budget data and 
interviewing officials to understand the effects of sequestration and 
other budget uncertainties. We also assessed the extent to which NASA 
has made progress in improving its acquisition management; for 
example, through examination of NASA's progress toward meeting metrics 
related to its high risk designation. 

We interviewed project officials and analyzed information provided by 
project officials to identify other types of challenges that can 
affect project outcomes and reported on these challenges in the 
project summaries. This list of challenges is not exhaustive, and we 
believe these challenges will evolve, as they have in previous years, 
as we continue this work in the future. We took appropriate steps to 
address data reliability, such as clarifying data discrepancies. We 
determined that the data were reliable for the purposes of this 
report. The individual project offices were given an opportunity to 
provide comments and technical clarifications on our assessments prior 
to their inclusion in the final product, and their comments were 
incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I contains detailed information 
on our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to April 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

NASA's Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

NASA's life cycle for flight systems is defined by two phases--
formulation and implementation--and several key decision points. 
[Footnote 9] These phases are then further divided into incremental 
pieces: phase A through phase F. See figure 1 for a depiction of 
NASA's life cycle for flight systems. 

Figure 1: NASA's Life Cycle for Flight Systems: 

[Refer to PDF for image: life cycle illustration] 

Formulation: 
Pre-phase A: Concept Studies; 
KDP A; 
Phase A Concept and Technology Development; 
SDR/MDR; 
KDP B; 
Phase B: Preliminary Design and Technology Completion; 
PDR. 

Implementation: 
KDP C (confirmation review); 
Program Start; 
Phase C: Final Design and Fabrication; 
CDR; 
SIR; 
KDP D; 
Phase D: System Assembly, Integration and Test, Launch; 
KDP E; 
Phase E: Operations and Sustainment; 
KDP F; 
Phase F: Closeout. 

Management decision reviews: 
KDP = key decision point. 

Technical reviews: 
SDR/MDR = system definition review/mission definition review; 
PDR = preliminary design review; 
CDR = critical design review; 
SIR = system integration review. 

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Project formulation consists of phases A and B, during which the 
projects develop and define requirements and the cost/schedule basis 
and design for implementation, including developing an acquisition 
strategy. Prior to entering phase B, projects utilize a probabilistic 
analysis to develop a range of the project's expected cost and 
schedule which is used to inform the budget planning for that project. 
During the end of the formulation phase, leading up to the preliminary 
design review, the project team completes its preliminary design and 
technology development.[Footnote 10] NASA Procedural Requirements 
7120.5E, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements, specifies that during formulation, the project must 
complete a formulation agreement to establish the technical and 
acquisition work that needs to be conducted during this phase and 
define the schedule and funding requirements for that work. The 
formulation agreement is to identify new technologies and their 
planned development, the use of heritage technologies, risk mitigation 
plans, and testing plans to ensure that technologies will work as 
intended in a relevant environment. During the formulation phase, the 
project is also to develop programmatic measures and technical leading 
indicators which track various project metrics such as requirement 
changes, staffing demands, and mass and power growth. The formulation 
phase culminates in a review at key decision point C, known as project 
confirmation, where cost and schedule baselines are to be established 
and documented in the agency baseline commitment.[Footnote 11] Project 
progress can subsequently be measured against these baselines. 

After a project is confirmed, it begins implementation, consisting of 
phases C, D, E, and F. Senior NASA officials must approve the project 
before it can proceed from one phase of implementation to another. A 
second design review, the critical design review, is held during the 
latter half of phase C in order to determine if the design is stable 
enough to support proceeding with the final design and fabrication. 
After the critical design review and just prior to beginning phase D, 
the project is to complete a system integration review which an 
external review board uses to evaluate the readiness of the project 
and associated supporting infrastructure to begin system assembly, 
integration and test. In phase D, the project performs system 
assembly, integration, test, and launch activities. Phases E and F 
consist of operations and sustainment and project closeout. 

NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's Annual Assessment: 

NASA's mission is to drive advances in science, technology, and 
exploration to enhance knowledge, education, innovation, economic 
vitality, and stewardship of the Earth. To accomplish this mission, 
NASA establishes many programs and projects that rely on complex 
instruments and spacecraft. NASA's portfolio of major projects ranges 
from space satellites equipped with advanced sensors to study the 
Earth, to a spacecraft which plans to return a sample from an 
asteroid, to telescopes intended to explore the universe, to 
spacecraft to transport humans and cargo beyond low-Earth orbit. Some 
of NASA's projects are expected to incorporate new and sophisticated 
technologies that must operate in harsh, distant environments. 

This year, we assessed 18 major projects--3 projects in formulation 
and 15 projects in implementation. Four of the 15 projects in 
implementation covered in this year's review--Global Precipitation 
Measurement (GPM) Mission, Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment 
Explorer (LADEE), Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN), and 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment (TDRS K and L)--
successfully launched during 2013 and 2014. We also included our 
assessment of the Commercial Crew program--NASA's effort to facilitate 
the private demonstration of safe, reliable, and cost effective 
transportation services to low-Earth orbit. The year after a project 
launches or reaches full operational capability, we no longer include 
a project summary in our annual report. When NASA determines that a 
project will have a life-cycle cost estimate of more than $250 
million, we include that project in the next review. See figure 2 for 
information on the projects we reviewed in this year's assessment, and 
appendix II for a list of projects that we have reviewed from the 
inception of this review (2009) to present. 

Figure 2: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviews in GAO's 2014 
Assessment: 

[Refer PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Interactive Graphic Roll mouse over project name for more information. 
See Appendix III for the printed version. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

Positive Cost and Schedule Trends Continue, but Project Replans Weaken 
Overall Performance: 

Cost and schedule growth measured across projects remains low compared 
to previous GAO reviews as some projects in this year's portfolio have 
launched within their cost and schedule baselines. NASA's positive 
trends, however, could be tempered as several projects are currently 
undergoing replans that could lead to cost growth, schedule delays, or 
diminished capability. As seen in figure 3 below, the portfolio of 
projects in implementation--excluding JWST--has an average development 
cost growth from original baseline estimates of 3.0 percent, a 
decrease of 0.9 percentage points from 2013, and an average launch 
delay of 2.8 months, a decrease of 1.2 months from 2013.[Footnote 12] 
Since they were originally baselined, 8 of 15 projects have 
experienced cost or schedule growth, but this year, only 3 projects 
experienced cost or schedule growth. These figures reflect three 
projects that were recently confirmed and established cost and 
schedule baseline estimates. Therefore, no growth is to be expected 
and the overall average growth of the portfolio is lessened. Table 1 
provides a breakdown of each project's development cost and schedule 
growth. 

Figure 3: Average Development Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected 
Major NASA Projects in Implementation Phase, Both Including and 
Excluding JWST: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 12%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 11; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 12%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 11. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 13.6%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 12; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 13.4%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 11. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 17.8%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 9; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 14.6%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 8. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 14.6%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 8; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 46.5%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 11. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 3.9%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 4; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 46.4%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 8. 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/o JWST: 3.0%; 
Average launch delays in months w/o JWST: 2.8; 
Average development cost growth in percentage w/JWST: 37.8%; 
Average launch delays in months w/JWST: 6.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: In fiscal year 2009, NASA did not provide cost or schedule 
information for JWST, although the project had begun implementation. 

[End of figure] 

Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected Major NASA 
Projects Currently in the Implementation Phase: 

Project Name: GPM[A]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): -$45.3; 
Percentage cost growth: -8.16; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 7; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -4. 

Project Name: GRACE-FO[B]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: ICESAT-2[C]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $84.0; 
Percentage cost growth: 15.03; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $84.0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): Under review; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): Under review. 

Project Name: InSight[B]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: LADEE[D]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $23.2; 
Percentage cost growth: 13.79; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $15.3; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): -2; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -2. 

Project Name: MAVEN; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): -$77.8; 
Percentage cost growth: -13.72; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$62.3; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: MMS; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): -$0.7; 
Percentage cost growth: -0.08; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$0.6; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

[Shaded row] Project Name: OCO-2; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $122.6; 
Percentage cost growth: 49.24; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$0.2; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 24; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: OSIRIS-REX; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): -$57.0; 
Percentage cost growth: -7.32; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$57.0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

[Shaded row] Project Name: SOFIA[E]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $200.3; 
Percentage cost growth: 21.78; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$8.6; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 3; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -8. 

Project Name: SGSS[C]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): Under review; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): Under review. 

Project Name: SMAP; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $4.3; 
Percentage cost growth: 0.89; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $4.3; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: SPP[B]; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $0; 
Percentage cost growth: 0; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 0; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Project Name: TDRS Replenishment; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): -$24.8; 
Percentage cost growth: -11.84; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): $0; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 1; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -1. 

Portfolio excluding JWST: 

Average: 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $16.3; 
Percentage cost growth: 3.0; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$1.8; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 2.75; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -1.33. 

Portfolio including JWST: 

[Shaded row] Project Name: JWST; 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $3,609.3; 
Percentage cost growth: 139.8; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$7.5; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 52; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): 0. 

Average: 
Cumulative development cost growth (millions): $255.9; 
Percentage cost growth: 37.8; 
Development cost growth in last year (millions): -$2.2; 
Cumulative launch delay (months): 6.5; 
Launch delay reported in last year (months): -1.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: Shaded rows indicate projects that were rebaselined. None of 
these projects have experienced cost or schedule growth since they 
were rebaselined, and all three have since reduced their development 
costs. 

[A] GPM launched in February 2014, 4 months earlier than the project's 
schedule baseline. 

[B] GRACE-FO, InSight, and SPP received their individual cost and 
schedule baselines in 2014. 

[C] Project currently undergoing a replan which will likely affect 
project cost and/or schedule. For ICESat-2, these are preliminary 
results and reflect the minimum cost or schedule growth expected by 
the project. 

[D] LADEE launched in September 2013, 2 months earlier than the 
project's schedule baseline. 

[E] SOFIA expected to reach Full Operating Capability in April 2014, 8 
months earlier than the project's schedule baseline. 

[End of table] 

In the past year, several other projects in the portfolio have 
performed better than their confirmed baselines. For example, 
following its November 2013 launch, the MAVEN project returned 
approximately $35 million of its budget to NASA's Science Mission 
Directorate. Similarly, the GPM project launched in February 2014 and 
anticipates returning a portion of its budget to NASA's Science 
Mission Directorate.[Footnote 13] Finally, the TDRS Replenishment 
project office has estimated that TDRS L's cost at completion will 
show that it also launched within cost and schedule baselines. 

This positive cost and schedule performance could be tempered as 
several projects are currently being replanned, which could lead to 
increases in costs, delays in schedule, or reductions in capability. 

* Since our last report, ICESat-2's performance prompted NASA to 
notify Congress of its intention to replan cost and schedule baseline 
estimates for the project. NASA officials reported that they expected 
to exceed their original cost baseline by at least 15 percent and they 
did not expect to launch by their committed launch date in May 2017. 
Currently, NASA headquarters officials have begun to review the 
project's new cost and schedule proposals. Senior NASA officials told 
us that the need to replan ICESat-2 stemmed mainly from insufficient 
understanding of the systems engineering for the project's primary 
instrument, which resulted in a poor analysis of the risks associated 
with the instrument's design as the project prepared for its recent 
confirmation review. 

* The SGSS project's most likely estimate at completion exceeds the 
project's confirmed agency baseline commitment and the project reports 
a lack of adequate funding for activities planned for fiscal year 
2014. NASA managers had reviewed and noted concerns about the 
contractor's plans and estimates as they confirmed cost and schedule 
baselines for SGSS in April 2013. One month later, the project 
reported all fiscal year 2013 reserves were consumed as a result of 
significant issues with the contractor's performance, including 
expansion of planned design activities leading to slips in sub-system 
critical design reviews and unrealistic staffing estimates. As a 
result, project officials have started to replan the project's 
baselines. One replanning option under consideration by the project 
office involves no change to the current planned budget, but a 
reduction in the scope of the project, which would satisfy fewer 
mission requirements. 

* In Spring 2013, the MMS project encountered a significant testing 
failure with a key instrument. Since the mission involves four 
spacecraft each carrying identical instrument payloads, MMS requires 
288 of the parts identified as the source of the failure.[Footnote 14] 
Additionally, the project incurred 1 month of schedule delay during 
the October 2013 government shutdown. Currently, project managers are 
planning to slip from their manifest launch date, October 2014, to 
March 2015, which is the agency committed launch readiness date. The 
project has estimated that this launch delay will exceed their cost 
baseline by at least $26 million. 

NASA Has Made Progress in Meeting GAO's Best Practice of Maturing 
Project Technology Prior to the Preliminary Design Review: 

Over the past 2 years, major projects in the portfolio have continued 
to improve in meeting best practices for maturing technology. Our best 
practices work has shown that a technology readiness level (TRL) of 6-
-demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a 
relevant environment that simulates the harsh conditions of space--is 
the level of technology maturity that can minimize risks for space 
systems entering product development.[Footnote 15] Demonstrating that 
technologies--critical and heritage--will work as intended in a 
relevant environment serves as a fundamental element of a sound 
business case, and projects falling short of this standard before 
preliminary design review often experience subsequent technical 
problems, which can increase the risk of cost growth and schedule 
delays.[Footnote 16] In our review, 63 percent of projects that have 
held a preliminary design review have met the best practices standards 
for technology maturity, which is a significant improvement over prior 
years--particularly 2010, when only 29 percent of projects met the 
standards (see figure 4). Furthermore, of the 13 projects in our 
sample with critical technologies, 11 (or 85 percent) matured all of 
their critical technologies by preliminary design review. 

Figure 4: Percentage of Major Projects Meeting GAO Technology Maturity 
Criteria at the Preliminary Design Review: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2010; 
Percent of projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 71%; 
Percent of projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 29%. 

Year: 2011; 
Percent of projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 63%; 
Percent of projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 38%. 

Year: 2012; 
Percent of projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 63%; 
Percent of projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 38%. 

Year: 2013; 
Percent of projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 38%; 
Percent of projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 62%. 

Year: 2014; 
Percent of projects not meeting technology maturity criteria: 38%; 
Percent of projects meeting technology maturity criteria: 63%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

While there was a slight increase in the number of critical 
technologies per project in this year's portfolio, NASA continues to 
develop fewer critical technologies than it has historically. This 
year, NASA is developing an average of 2.6 critical technologies per 
project, down from 4.7 critical technologies per project in 2009 (see 
figure 5). 

Figure 5: Average Number of Critical Technologies for Projects in 
Implementation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2009; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 4.7. 

Year: 2010; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 3.8. 

Year: 2011; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 2.6. 

Year: 2012; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 2.6. 

Year: 2013; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 2.3. 

Year: 2014; 
Average Number of Critical Technologies: 2.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

NASA's increased focus on technology maturity is consistent with the 
recent decrease in cost and schedule growth in the portfolio compared 
to historical levels. However, over the past 6 years, the majority of 
new projects added to NASA's portfolio have generally relied on the 
use of existing technology and planned less technology development. 
Two exceptions are SWOT and SPP, which rely on 4 and 10 new critical 
technologies respectively. NASA managed the technology risk for SPP by 
maturing all 10 critical technologies to a TRL 6 by the project's 
preliminary design review. The agency is focused on reducing 
technology risk in the future as NASA's Science Mission Directorate 
recently issued new guidance that would ensure continued focus on 
technical maturity.[Footnote 17] For example, the guidance seeks to 
increase the credibility of cost and schedule estimates by more fully 
understanding the maturity of the technologies that will be used and 
whether back up options exist, are feasible, and included in cost 
estimates. As NASA continues to add more complex projects with a high 
number of new critical technologies to its portfolio, such as SWOT, it 
will be important to maintain heightened attention to best practices 
to lessen the risk of technology development and continue positive 
cost and schedule performance. 

NASA Has Increased Focus on Design Stability by Tracking Several 
Metrics: 

Over the past 4 years, we have seen NASA increase its focus on 
ensuring that projects regularly report on metrics that are intended 
to provide stakeholders with an indication of design stability. Our 
best practices work on product development has shown that at least 90 
percent of engineering drawings should be releasable by the critical 
design review to lower the risk of subsequent cost growth and schedule 
delays.[Footnote 18] NASA's Systems Engineering Handbook mirrors this 
metric. Despite nearly all of the projects not meeting the 90 percent 
metric, in general, over the past 4 years, projects have consistently 
reported higher percentages of drawings releasable at the critical 
design review than in 2010. Specifically, the nine projects in this 
year's portfolio that completed their critical design reviews averaged 
67 percent of engineering drawings releasable at the time of that 
review, while projects at the same stage of development only averaged 
31 percent in 2010. One project, ICESat-2, released 91 percent of 
their drawings at the critical design review. The project delayed this 
review three times over one year in order to complete engineering 
models for its primary instrument--which is currently undergoing a 
replan due to integration challenges. The knowledge gained during 
these delays should help to reduce risks to the project moving forward 
(see figure 6). 

Figure 6: Average Percentage of Releasable Engineering Drawings at 
Critical Design Review: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2010; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 31%. 

Year: 2011; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 62%. 

Year: 2012; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 62%. 

Year: 2012; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 73%. 

Year: 2014; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 67%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, while assessing this metric at the critical design review 
is a good way to understand the risks associated with the project's 
design going forward to assist in decision making, experts we met 
with, and some project officials, also find it a useful metric to 
assess progress toward maturing the project design at various points 
in the project lifecycle by measuring the number of drawings planned 
to be released versus the actual number released. For example, NASA 
officials from the SLS program are closely monitoring design drawing 
release as a key indicator of the core stage's readiness for its 
critical design review. If projects are not adhering to the planned 
drawing release schedule, it can be an indicator that will allow 
officials to determine if the project is tracking to its plan and the 
work will be completed on time or if significant deviations have 
occurred and the work will be delayed, increasing the potential for 
cost and schedule effects. 

Growth in the number of drawings after the critical design review can 
also provide an ongoing assessment of whether the stability of the 
design is being compromised late in the development cycle. We have 
tracked this metric for NASA's projects since 2010 and projects have 
generally improved in maintaining stability following the critical 
design review. For example, 10 projects that held their critical 
design review prior to 2010 averaged a 181.6 percent increase in 
engineering drawings after that review, whereas this figure has fallen 
to 20 percent for the 9 projects in this year's review (see figure 7). 

Figure 7: Average Percentage of Drawing Growth after Critical Design 
Review for Selected Projects from Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2010; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 181.6%. 

Year: 2011; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 36.4%. 

Year: 2012; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 35.9%. 

Year: 2012; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 11.7%. 

Year: 2014; 
Average Percentage of Drawings Releasable at CDR: 20%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of figure] 

Apart from metrics related to design drawings, in 2012, NASA 
established three technical leading indicators to assess design 
maturity. The indicators are (1) the percentage of actual mass margin 
versus planned mass margin, (2) the percentage of actual power margin 
versus planned power margin, and (3) the percentage of overdue 
requests for action.[Footnote 19] NASA has updated its project 
management policy and its systems engineering policy to require 
projects to track these metrics. Projects in the portfolio are 
tracking the applicable metrics and most have met their recommended 
mass and power margins.[Footnote 20] 

Experts in the space community have also identified other metrics that 
can be useful to assess the design stability of unique space systems. 
[Footnote 21] For example, some of these metrics include: 

* the program's level of funding reserves and schedule margin at 
various points in the development life cycle; 

* whether the project's top level requirements, that define mission 
success criteria and are imposed by NASA, to requirements at the sub-
system level, are defined by the time of preliminary design review; 

* the percent complete of verification and validation plans at the 
preliminary and critical design reviews; and: 

* the percentage of actual mass margin versus planned mass margin over 
time. 

Many of these metrics focus on an ongoing assessment of project 
progress and are less associated with measurement at any one point in 
a project's life cycle. In our discussion with NASA projects, we found 
that projects utilize various metrics to track design stability. For 
example, some projects monitor the completion of plans to verify and 
validate that requirements are met in the time period between the 
preliminary and critical design reviews and some projects monitor the 
amount of mass margin over time. We believe that our metrics, in 
conjunction with NASA's technical leading indicators and those 
identified by the experts in the space community, can be used together 
in order to provide a robust assessment of a project's design 
stability. 

NASA Faces Several Challenges That Could Impact Management of the 
Portfolio: 

Managing Competing Priorities within the Context of Constrained 
Budgets is a Primary Challenge: 

Within the context of constrained budgets, a primary challenge for 
NASA is effectively managing competing priorities, while completing a 
series of complex projects. Overall, the current portfolio of major 
projects is expected to require less funding over the next several 
years as projects are completed and launched. As figure 8 shows, 74 
percent of the major project budget is consumed by only four projects--
SLS, Orion, JWST, and the Commercial Crew program. 

Figure 8: Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request for JWST, Orion, SLS, 
Commercial Crew, and All Other Major NASA Projects, 2014 through 2018: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked line graph] 

Dollars in millions: 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
Commercial crew: $821.4; 
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: $658.2; 
Space Launch System: $1,384.9; 
James Webb Space Telescope: $1,026.8; 
Current Portfolio: $1,395.9; 
Total major project funding: $5,287.2. 

Fiscal year: 2015; 
Commercial crew: $821.4; 
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: $645.4; 
Space Launch System: $1,356.5; 
James Webb Space Telescope: $1,024.9; 
Current Portfolio: $1,237.8; 
Total major project funding: $5,287.2. 

Fiscal year: 2016; 
Commercial crew: $821.4; 
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: $620; 
Space Launch System: $1,360.2; 
James Webb Space Telescope: $1,027.1; 
Current Portfolio: $1,083.3; 
Total major project funding: $5,287.2. 

Fiscal year: 2017; 
Commercial crew: $590; 
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: $569.4; 
Space Launch System: $1,354.4; 
James Webb Space Telescope: $1,027.1; 
Current Portfolio: $611.1; 
Total major project funding: $5,287.2. 

Fiscal year: 2018; 
Commercial crew: $371; 
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: $534.9; 
Space Launch System: $1,345.4; 
James Webb Space Telescope: $1,028.3; 
Current Portfolio: $677.4; 
Total major project funding: $5,287.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: Budget data are from the fiscal year 2014 President's budget 
request. Total line indicates the 2014 request for major projects 
included in the current portfolio and assumes a relatively flat 
investment in future years for other major projects based on flat or 
declining budget estimates for all included projects. 

[End of figure] 

The remaining wedge of funding available--the difference between 
anticipated budgets and the current portfolio's budget requirements--
increases over the next 5 years. However, this wedge of funding is 
intended to fund new projects and will also be needed to cover any 
cost growth that may occur on NASA's largest, most complex projects, 
such as JWST, SLS, and Orion. Any cost or schedule overrun on NASA's 
largest, most complex projects could have a ripple effect on the 
portfolio and has the potential to postpone or even cancel altogether 
projects in earlier development stages. As an illustration, JWST will 
soon enter integration and testing--the point at which cost growth and 
schedule delays are most likely. We also recently reported that JWST 
is generally executing to its September 2011 revised cost and schedule 
baseline; however, monthly progress declined in fiscal year 2013 and 
several challenges remain.[Footnote 22] Additionally, there are 
questions about the realism of the SLS and Orion cost estimates. For 
example, according to NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the 
agency needs to ensure that budget forecasting for SLS and Orion is 
realistic as there are continued concerns that there is a mismatch 
between program planning and budget realities.[Footnote 23] An 
additional factor that makes planning difficult is the fact that--
especially in the case of large projects such as SLS and Orion--it is 
possible for the agency to invest billions of dollars during project 
formulation before the full cost of the project is known. Both SLS and 
Orion are only accounting for preliminary capabilities--such as the 
first flight of each system--not the full life cycle cost that is 
associated with each of the respective systems. If any of these 
projects exceed their budgets, the agency will be confronted with 
allocating out year funding to these projects. 

Budgetary Uncertainty Presents Additional Challenges: 

Budget uncertainty is creating an environment that makes planning for 
NASA more difficult. During fiscal year 2013, NASA faced mandatory 
across-the-board spending cuts, also known as sequestration, but the 
effects on the agency were relatively minor because the agency planned 
for lower budget levels. According to agency officials, by adjusting 
the Commercial Crew and Space Technology accounts, the agency was able 
to absorb the budget cuts without causing any major setbacks to the 
projects reviewed here. However, according to officials, future 
capabilities could be impacted as a result of these cuts. For projects 
that had been confirmed, transfers and reprogramming allowed NASA to 
maintain committed cost and schedule baselines.[Footnote 24] However, 
sequestration, the cancellation of budgetary resources previously 
provided by law, may complicate the agency's ability to effectively 
plan over the next several years. According to NASA's financial 
officials, the majority of NASA's major projects require significant 
budget planning across several years and this uncertainty prevents the 
agency from planning as effectively as possible. 

Additional budget uncertainties outside of NASA are also affecting 
NASA's ability to execute. For example, some of the agencies that NASA 
partners with to share the cost associated with its major projects may 
not be able to continue providing support. For example, as we found 
last year, ICESat-2 was initially planned to be launched along with a 
Department of Defense satellite and funding for that project was 
preliminarily established accordingly.[Footnote 25] However, the 
Department of Defense program was delayed in 2012 and NASA had to add 
$84 million to ICESat-2's budget to allow the project to acquire its 
own launch vehicle. Commercial Crew program officials have also 
explained that varying budget levels each fiscal year have affected 
their ability to manage the program. For example, the level of funding 
available in fiscal year 2014 could affect the program's ability to 
make a planned contract award before the end of 2014. 

Lastly, in October 2013, several major NASA projects were affected by 
the government shutdown that occurred due to a lapse in appropriations 
for fiscal year 2014. The shutdown resulted in schedule delays for 
JWST and OSIRIS-REx--which they were able to absorb through existing 
reserves--but, as a result, the projects are now carrying additional 
minor risks with unknown future implications. Additionally, the 
shutdown affected MMS and ICESat-2, which were already facing serious 
schedule, cost, and technical challenges. MMS had a very tight 
schedule prior to the shutdown, but as a result of the shutdown the 
project must now delay the project's planned launch date. 
Additionally, ICESat-2 was experiencing significant technical issues 
with its ATLAS instrument prior to the shutdown, which were causing 
cost and schedule effects for the project. As a result of the 
shutdown, the project has had to account for additional cost and 
schedule growth as part of its replanning effort that was initiated 
prior to the shutdown. 

NASA's Acquisition Management Remains a Concern, but Progress Has Been 
Made on Project Oversight: 

GAO has designated NASA's acquisition management as a high risk area 
because of NASA's history of persistent cost growth and schedule 
slippage in the majority of major projects. In 2013, we found that 
NASA implemented a plan for improving its acquisition management, 
which included points of accountability and metrics to assess 
progress.[Footnote 26] These metrics state that NASA will: 

1. maintain a cost performance level for its portfolio of major 
development projects that is within 110 percent of the budget-weighted 
aggregate cost baseline by 2013; 

2. meet the baseline schedule goals for its portfolio of major 
development projects, with aggregate schedule slippage falling within 
110 percent of baseline by 2013; and: 

3. sustain mission success by staying on-course to meet primary 
requirements for 90 percent of its portfolio of major projects by 2013. 

NASA reported that all of the criteria for the reporting period ending 
September 2013 were met. However, NASA's analysis does not 
consistently use original baseline data for measuring outcomes, 
including for JWST, one of the most expensive and complex projects in 
the portfolio, which underwent a significant rebaseline in 2011. 
According to NASA officials, this approach is a result of the evolving 
nature of their business and management practices. While excluding 
JWST may be an appropriate approach given the magnitude of the 
increases, it could hinder our ability to measure NASA's progress to 
improve its acquisition management. Baselines allow decision makers to 
measure and monitor progress by comparing the current estimates for 
performance, cost, and schedule goals against a baseline. Identifying 
and reporting deviations from the baseline in cost, schedule, or 
performance as a program proceeds provides valuable information for 
oversight by identifying areas of program risk and its causes to 
decision maker. Excluding original baseline information from its 
analysis does not make cost or schedule growth apparent and renders 
the metrics meaningless to determine real progress. We will continue 
to work with NASA to ensure the most appropriate reporting mechanism 
to enable assessment of progress towards improving acquisition 
management and we will report on these efforts in the next update to 
our High Risk report. 

Additionally, it is unclear whether the steps NASA has taken to 
improve acquisition management have been fully implemented across the 
agency, as we continue to see projects being approved for 
implementation without an adequate assessment of the resources 
necessary to address the known risks. For example, both ICESat-2 and 
SGSS experienced significant issues immediately after being confirmed. 
For both projects, an adequate assessment of risk was not completed to 
ensure that the baseline estimates of cost and schedule were realistic 
and risks that were raised were not fully understood. More 
specifically, project officials for ICESat-2 acknowledged that 
important information at KDP-C was likely overlooked as evidenced by 
how quickly the project's cost and schedule posture worsened in the 
months immediately following the milestone decision. Another example 
is SGSS, in which the Standing Review Board raised issues related to 
cost growth and declining schedule performance at KDP-C, but despite 
these concerns, the project was confirmed. Shortly after project 
confirmation, the project experienced significant cost growth. This 
growth necessitated a replan for the project, which is currently under 
way, and the project will experience either a delayed schedule and 
increased costs or a diminished capability as a result. 

To improve the management and oversight of its spaceflight projects, 
we previously recommended that NASA improve its earned value 
management (EVM) system.[Footnote 27] EVM is a project management tool 
that, when properly used, can provide accurate assessments of project 
progress, produce early warning signs of impending schedule delays and 
cost overruns, and provide unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at 
completion. NASA has taken some steps to address these 
recommendations.[Footnote 28] For example, NASA has begun rolling out 
its EVM process on selected major projects, but it has not established 
a time frame for implementing it across the portfolio of major 
projects. More time is needed to determine the extent to which 
positive trends to improve acquisition management observed across 
NASA's major projects have been institutionalized. 

NASA has taken other steps to improve its oversight of projects. In 
January 2009, NASA instituted the joint cost and schedule confidence 
level (JCL) process, with the goal of ensuring that projects are 
thoroughly planning for anticipated risks and that the cost and 
schedule estimates are realistic. The JCL quantifies potential risks 
and calculates cost, schedule, and reserve estimates based on all 
available data and is implemented in the last phase of formulation. 
Currently, of the 15 projects in the portfolio required to have a JCL, 
14 have developed a JCL. TDRS Replenishment was not required to 
develop a JCL due to being at an advanced stage of development when 
the JCL process was implemented. NASA has previously noted that a key 
to improving the use of the JCL process is increasing the consistency 
of practices used by NASA projects in developing their JCLs. To 
address this concern, NASA officials reported that they have developed 
additional guidance for projects on formulating JCLs, which is part of 
NASA's cost estimating handbook and will be issued in early 2014. 
Additionally, the agency's Science Mission Directorate issued a memo 
to projects that clarified the need for projects to have credible and 
reliable integrated cost and schedule estimates and to provide clear 
accountability for tracking to that estimate. Over the past several 
years, NASA has provided training to projects on how to develop their 
JCLs. Adoption of the JCL process has likely contributed to the recent 
decrease in cost and schedule growth in the portfolio compared to 
historical levels. However, some projects with JCL's have still faced 
issues with cost and schedule management. For example, ICESat-2 was 
confirmed at the 70 percent JCL level; however, the project has 
recently experienced technical difficulties and will not meet its 
committed launch with available funding. Additionally, we continue to 
have concerns about the utility of the JCL that was developed for 
NASA's most costly science project--JWST. In 2012, we found that the 
lack of detail in the summary schedule used for the development of 
JWST's JCL, which provided the basis for the project's new cost and 
schedule estimates, prevented us from sufficiently understanding how 
risks were incorporated, calling into question the results of that 
analysis and, therefore, the reliability of the replanned cost 
estimate.[Footnote 29] We recommended that the project redo the JCL 
with a more detailed schedule that incorporates current risks. 
Officials initially concurred with the recommendation; however, the 
project has since declined to take adequate steps to address our 
recommendation to develop an updated JCL that is based on current 
risks and a reliable schedule. Unless properly updated to include a 
reliable schedule that incorporates known risks, the current cost 
estimate will not provide decision makers with accurate information to 
assess the current status of the project. Thus we continue to believe 
our recommendation has merit and should be fully implemented and we 
raised this issue as a matter for Congressional Consideration in 
January 2014.[Footnote 30] In addition, the MMS project's 70 percent 
JCL level established a total budget to support a committed launch 
date of March 2015. While the project is working toward its earlier 
October 2014 manifest launch date, technical and schedule challenges 
have necessitated a launch delay to March 2015, the agency's baseline 
commitment date for launch. The project's committed level of funding 
is insufficient to cover the delay to its actual committed launch 
date, and, as a result, project costs are expected to exceed the 
agency baseline cost commitment by at least $26 million. The funding 
for the project at the 70 percent JCL level should have enabled the 
project to reach a March 2015 launch date with no additional funding 
required. The current estimated overrun calls into question how well 
the project's schedule and funding profile are integrated. We plan to 
continue to monitor this project and gain additional insight into this 
issue. 

NASA has also taken steps to improve early transparency into cost 
estimates and allow for better planning, oversight, and congressional 
insight on projects. For example, in response to our 2011 
recommendation, NASA includes preliminary cost estimates at KDP-B in 
the annual budget submission.[Footnote 31] These estimates are 
preliminary in nature as projects have yet to reach the point in 
development that allows for sufficient knowledge of risks and 
associated costs in order to commit to a specific baseline, but are 
used as the basis of long term budget planning. To date, NASA has 
provided us with initial cost estimates for eleven projects. Six of 
the eleven projects received a committed agency baseline within the 
preliminary life cycle cost estimate range and the remaining five 
projects established baselines that were, on average, 15.5 percent 
higher than the upper end of the preliminary range estimate. While it 
is a positive step that NASA is more realistically baselining its 
projects at KDP-C, the agency could better rely on the preliminary 
range estimates for planning purposes, consistent with our 2011 
recommendation, if more was done to ensure projects are adequately 
taking in to account unknown risks that will likely affect projects. 
Without doing so, NASA could be at risk of starting more projects than 
it can afford to adequately fund. 

Project Assessments: 

The individual assessments of the projects we reviewed provide a 
profile of each project and are tailored in length, from 1 to 3 pages, 
to capture information about the project. 

Each project assessment includes a description of the project's 
objectives, information about the related NASA center, primary 
contractor(s), and/or external partners involved in the project, the 
project's cost and schedule performance, a timeline identifying key 
project dates,[Footnote 32] and a brief narrative describing the 
current status of the project. The two-page assessments--15 in total--
describe the challenges we identified this year, as well as challenges 
that we have identified in the past. On the first page, the project 
profile presents the standard information listed above. On the second 
page of the assessment, we provide an analysis of the project 
challenges, and outline the extent to which each project faces cost, 
schedule, or performance risk because of these challenges, if 
applicable. The one-page assessments--3 in total--are structured 
similarly to the two-page assessments and capture the same information 
with the exception of an in-depth review of the program challenges 
since several projects that we reviewed had few, if any, challenges to 
report. As needed, the challenges are captured on the first page, in 
the project summary section. For the three-page assessment of the 
Commercial Crew program, we focused on each of the three funded 
partners' current status, milestone timelines, and challenges. NASA 
project offices were provided an opportunity to review drafts of the 
assessments prior to their inclusion in the final product, and the 
projects provided both technical corrections and more general 
comments. We integrated the technical corrections as appropriate and 
summarized the general comments below the project update. 

See figure 9 for an illustration of a sample assessment layout. 

Figure 9: Illustration of a Sample Project Assessment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

A. Project Challenges Summary listing of the challenges facing the 
project. 

B. General description of the mission's objectives. 

C. Project Essentials Programmatic information including the 
responsible NASA center, international or domestic partners, launch 
information, mission duration, and the driver for the mission's 
requirements. 

D. Contract Information Current highest value contractor, contractor 
activity, the type of contract and when it was awarded, and initial 
and current value of the contract. 

E. Illustration of the spacecraft, aircraft or ground system 

F. Project Performance Cost and schedule baseline estimates and the 
latest estimate updates. 

G. Project Summary Brief narrative describing the current status of 
the project. 

H. Schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project including 
when the project began formulation, major design reviews, confirmation 
to begin the implementation phase, and launch or operating capability 
information. 

I. Project Update Analysis of the project challenges and the extent to 
which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk because 
of these challenges. 

J. Project Office Comments General comments provided by the cognizant 
project office. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Global Precipitation Measurement Mission: 

Common Name: GPM. 

Formulation: 
07/02: Formulation start; 
12/05: Mission/System design review; 
11/08: Preliminary design review; 

Implementation: 
12/09: Project confirmation; 
12/09: Critical design review; 
02/12: System Integration review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
02/27/14: Launch date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Test and integration issues (new). 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Funding; 
* Development Partner; 
* Contractor; 
* Technology; 
* Design. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partner: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). 

Launch Location: 
Tanegashima Space Center (JAXA), Japan; 
Launch Vehicle: H-IIA (supplied by JAXA). 

Mission Duration: 3 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2007 Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives 
for the Next Decade and Beyond. 

Contract Information: 

Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: 
Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp. 

Contractor Activity: 
GPM Microwave Imager development. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: 2005; 
Initial Value of Contract: $97.6 million; 
Current Value: $234 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions: 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline estimate, FY 2010: $975.9;
Latest, February 2013: $28.1;
Change: -4.9%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline estimate, FY 2010: $349.2; 
Latest, February 2013: $349.2;
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost[A]: 
Baseline estimate, FY 2010: $555.2;
Latest, February 2013: $509.9;
Change: -8.2%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline estimate, FY 2010: $71.6; 
Latest, February 2013: $69.0; 
Change: -3.6%. 

Launch schedule: 
Baseline estimate, FY 2010: July 2013; 
Latest, February 2013: February 2014; 
Change: 7 months. 

The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission, a joint NASA and 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to improve 
the scientific understanding of the global water cycle and the accuracy 
of precipitation forecasts. GPM is composed of a core spacecraft 
carrying two main instruments: a Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar 
and a GPM Microwave Imager. GPM builds on the work of the Tropical 
Rainfall Measuring Mission, and will provide an opportunity to 
calibrate measurements of global precipitation. 

[Figure: Refer to PDF: photograph] 

Source: GPM Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

GPM launched as planned on February 27, 2014 within its cost and 
schedule baselines, despite lower than planned schedule reserves. 
Project officials resolved a risk related to unusually high 
electromagnetic interference readings on one instrument during testing 
of the spacecraft. The project identified a risk that conducting 
thermal vacuum testing before environmental testing due to a schedule 
conflict at the thermal vacuum test facility with the James Webb Space 
Telescope project could result in a missed opportunity to identify an 
issue with the spacecraft prior to launch that could lead to an on-
orbit failure. The project reported that this risk was closed 
following post-environmental testing deployments and comprehensive 
performance testing. 

Project Update: 

The project delivered the GPM observatory to Japan on November 27, and 
launched as planned on February 27, 2014. Prior to the launch, the 
project reported taking steps to bring schedule reserves into line 
with applicable policy. For example, the project reported adding 
shifts, and continuing to adjust the integration and test plan to 
recover schedule reserves. Project officials noted that an independent 
assessment of GPM's schedule in April 2013 concluded that the project 
held adequate schedule margin at that time. 

Test and Integration Issues: 

The project identified a risk related to conducting thermal vacuum 
testing before environmental testing due to a schedule conflict at the 
thermal vacuum test facility with the James Webb Space Telescope 
project. Project officials indicated that altering the test flow as 
they did leaves the project at risk of missing an opportunity to 
identify an issue with the spacecraft prior to launch that could lead 
to an on-orbit failure. The project mitigated this risk by performing 
additional testing and inspections, and reported that this risk was 
closed after completing post-environmental testing deployments and 
comprehensive performance testing. 

Project officials identified an instance of electromagnetic 
interference during testing which could degrade the science returned 
from the spacecraft while on orbit. Through testing, officials 
determined that the unexpected energy source did not reside in the 
spacecraft and have now closed this risk. 

Project Office Comments: 

The GPM project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of GPM assessment] 

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow On: 

Common name: GRACE-FO: 

Source: NASA. 

Formulation: 
01/12: Formulation start; 
07/12: Mission/system definition review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
01/14: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
02/14: Project confirmation; 
01/15: Critical design review; 
06/15: System Integration review; 
08/17: Projected launch date; 
02/18: Committed launch readiness date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Development Partner (new) project essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
International Partner: German Research Center for Geosciences (GFZ). 

Launch Location: 
Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan; 
Launch Vehicle: Dnepr. 

Mission Duration: 5 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2007 NASA 2010 Climate Plan (Directed Mission). 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Astrium. 

Contractor Activity: Satellite Buses. 

Type of Contract: Firm-Fixed-Price; 
Date of Award: January 2012; 
Initial Value of Contract: $118.2 million; 
Current Value: $121.4 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions: 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline FY 2014: $431.9 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $431.9 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost 
Baseline FY 2014: $107.4 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $107.4 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost 
Baseline FY 2014: $264 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $264 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost 
Baseline FY 2014: $60.5 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $60.5 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 02/2018. 

The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow On (GRACE-FO) is a 
follow on to the original GRACE mission, which launched in 2002 and is 
still in operation. GRACEFO is a joint effort with the German Research 
Center for Geosciences (GFZ) that will provide global high-resolution 
models of Earth's gravity field at a precision and temporal sampling 
equivalent to that achieved with GRACE. This information will provide 
insight into water movement on and beneath the Earth's surface over a 
5-year mission period. The system operates as an observatory with two 
spacecraft and instruments working concurrently to obtain the science 
measurements. The mission also includes a technology demonstration—-a 
new Laser Ranging Interferometer (LRI), which performs the same 
ranging measurements as the mission's microwave instrument but with 20 
times greater precision. 

[Figure: Refer to PDF: illustration] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The project is tracking technical risks which include those related to 
the LRI, such as the availability of the interface specifications. In 
order to provide early warning for potential problems, the project is 
also tracking a risk that the LRI could exceed available cost and 
schedule resources if additional technical risks are realized. 
Officials stated that the LRI could be de-scoped from the project in 
the event that its development exceeded available budget, schedule, or 
technical margins because the LRI is not necessary to meet the 
mission's science requirements. The planned development and addition 
of the LRI have been accommodated in the overall system design. 
Project officials stated that if the instrument is descoped, the 
project will replace it with dummy masses, and no further impact to 
system design are anticipated. 

Project Update: 

The project entered Phase C—-the final design and fabrication phase of 
implementation-—in February 2014. The project plans to utilize existing 
technologies-—upgraded as needed to address obsolescence issues—0from 
the GRACE mission to complete its mission, with the addition of the LRI 
technology demonstration effort. GRACE-FO includes a similar 
partnership with Germany as the original GRACE mission. Specifically, 
GFZ will be contributing the launch vehicle and launch services, 
flight operations, and ground stations, as well as the optics 
components of the LRI. NASA is contributing program and project 
management services, satellites, the microwave instrument, and the 
electronic components of the LRI. 

Development Partner Issues: 

The project is tracking a risk that the development of the LRI could 
exceed available cost and schedule resources, which could impact the 
baseline mission. The project is also tracking technical risks with the 
instrument's development, such as the availability of interface 
specifications which describe how the LRI will be integrated with the 
spacecraft. Officials stated that the LRI could be de-scoped from the 
project in the event that its development exceeds available cost, 
schedule, or technical margins because it is not essential to meet the 
project's science requirements. The project plans to resolve any 
conflicts related to LRI accommodation and functional requirements in 
favor of the primary science instruments and mission objectives. The 
planned development and addition of the instrument, which has multiple 
components distributed throughout the spacecraft and in some cases, 
more stringent requirements than that of the spacecraft, has been 
incorporated into the overall system design. Project officials stated 
that if the instrument is descoped, the project will replace it with 
dummy masses with no further impact to system design, or project cost 
and schedule. Project officials report that they maintain close 
contact with GFZ in order to ensure that the project's schedule 
proceeds as planned. This communication includes involvement in 
manufacturing readiness reviews, design reviews, and regularly 
scheduled status meetings. According to project officials, the 
decision to descope the LRI would be a joint decision between NASA and 
GFZ. 

Project Office Comments: 

The GRACE FO project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
reported that it continues to have excellent coordination among 
participants with focus on risk mitigation and has continued the close 
partnership with GFZ on the selection of the provided launch service, 
Mission and Ground Operations planning activities, and the development 
of the German elements of the LRI. The project further stated that the 
spacecraft and science instruments developments and accommodations are 
proceeding well with minimal risk and have all successfully passed 
their respective preliminary design reviews. In addition, the LRI went 
through a technology maturity assessment in December 2013 to verify 
status prior to the project preliminary design review. 

[End of GRACE-FO assessment] 

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2: 

Common Name: ICESat-2. 

Formulation: 
12/09: Formulation start; 
05/11: Mission/System definition review. 

Implementation: 
12/12: Project confirmation; 
12/13: GAO review; 
02/14: Critical design review; 
05/15: System integration review; 
05/17: Committed launch readiness date (under review). 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Design (new); 
* Schedule (new); 
* Funding. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Launch; 
* Workforce. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partner: None. 

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, CA; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 3 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2007 Earth Science Decadal Survey. 

Contract Information: 

Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Orbital Sciences Corp. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development. 

Type of Contract: Fixed Price; 
Date of Award: September 2011; 
Initial Value of Contract: $135.1 million; 
Current Value: $146.9 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions: 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2013: $860.3; 
Latest: Feb 2013: $860.3; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2013: $248.8; 
Latest: Feb 2013: $248.8; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2013: $558.9; 
Latest: Feb 2013: $558.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost[A]: 
Baseline Established FY 2013: $52.9;
Latest: Feb 2013: $52.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Established FY 2013: May 2017; 
Latest: Feb 2013: May 2017[A]; 
Change: 0 months. 

[A] The project is undergoing a replan, and final cost and 
schedule information is not available. 

NASA's Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2) is a 
follow-on mission to ICESat, tasked with using space-borne altimetry 
measurements to measure changes in polar ice-sheet mass, in order to 
better understand mechanisms that drive change and the associated 
impact of change on global sea level. ICESat-2 will utilize a micro-
pulse multi-beam laser instrument with a photon counting approach to 
measurement. This process will allow for dense cross-track sampling 
with a high repetition rate, allowing ICESat-2 to provide better 
elevation estimates than ICESat over high slope and rough areas. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Orbital Sciences Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

Due to ongoing design and development issues with the Advanced 
Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument – the project's 
single instrument that is being developed at Goddard Space Flight 
Center – the ICESat-2 project is undergoing a replan of its cost and 
schedule. As a result, preliminary estimates indicate that the project 
will exceed the agency baseline cost commitment by at least 15 percent 
and the committed launch readiness date of May 2017 will not be 
achieved. According to project officials, progress was slower than 
expected because, although the ATLAS subsystems were well understood 
individually, the project's overall systems engineering analysis was 
not mature enough to ensure that they would work together as a fully 
integrated instrument. To address these issues, Goddard Space Flight 
Center has replaced the instrument management team and added new 
technical expertise and resources. 

Project Update: 

Design Issues: 

As a result of ongoing design and development issues with the ATLAS 
instrument-—the project's single instrument-—the ICESat-2 project is 
undergoing a replan of its cost and schedule. The project noted that 
the instrument's performance began to degrade in January 2013, one 
month after its plan was baselined at confirmation. The project is 
currently monitoring multiple risks related to the ATLAS instrument 
including delivery delays of some of ATLAS's 20 subsystems and 
development problems. For example, according to project officials, the 
instrument's most challenging subsystem is the optics subsystem, due 
to its very strict requirements. The project recently reported 
identifying several areas where requirements could be relaxed, which 
benefited multiple subsystems. 

Schedule Issues: 

Because of the ongoing cost and schedule replan of the ATLAS 
instrument, preliminary estimates indicated that the project's 
committed launch readiness date of May 2017 will not be achieved. The 
project critical design review was delayed in order to accommodate 
ATLAS delays, and the eventual integration and testing activities for 
the observatory will also be affected by the ATLAS delay. Recent 
estimates indicate that ATLAS has used all of its schedule reserve and 
is now planned for delivery in March 2016—nine months later than 
originally needed for integration onto the spacecraft. 

The project's contractor has also developed a plan to revise the 
integration and test schedule for the observatory to conduct as many 
activities as possible ahead of ATLAS delivery, such as vibration 
testing utilizing an ATLAS mock-up. Although some tests, such as the 
thermal vacuum testing, would have to be repeated when ATLAS becomes 
available, project officials indicated that this plan could shorten 
the length of time required for integration and testing between the 
delivery of ATLAS and launch by as much as three months. According to 
agency officials, the evaluation of these proposals is on hold pending 
the ATLAS replan, and no contractual changes have been initiated. 

Funding Issues: 

Based on the preliminary estimates, the project office reported that 
the ICESat-2's estimate at completion for development is expected to 
exceed its agency baseline cost commitment by more than 15 percent – 
$84 million at minimum. NASA's Science Mission Directorate has been 
notified by letter of the pending cost growth based on the preliminary 
estimates from the ATLAS instrument team that will be evaluated by 
center and agency management. 

Project Office Comments: 

The ICESAT-2 project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of ICESAT-2 assessment] 

Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat 
Transport: 

Common Name: InSight. 

Formulation: 
07/12: Formulation start; 
10/13: Preliminary design review; 
12/13: GAO review; 

Implementation: 
03/14: Project confirmation; 
06/14: Critical design review; 
10/14: System Integration review; 
03/16: Committed launch date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Funding (new). 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

International Partner: Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (France), 
Canadian Space Agency. 

Launch Location: Vandenburg AFB, CA; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V. 

Mission Duration: 2.5 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
NASA Strategic Plan. 

Contract Information: 

Current highest value contract: 

Contractor: Lockheed Martin. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development. 

Type of Contract: Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee; 
Date of Award: October 2012; 
Initial Value of Contract: $208.8 million; 
Current Value: $220.2 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions: 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline FY 2014: $675.1; 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $675.1; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline FY 2014: $98.9; 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $98.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline FY 2014: $541.8; 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $541.8; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline FY 2014: $34.4; 
Latest Est. FY 2014: $34.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline FY 2014: 03/2016; 
Latest Est. FY 2014: 03/2016; 
Change: 0 months. 

The Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and 
Heat Transport (InSight) is a Mars lander based on the Phoenix 
lander's design. The first objective is to understand the formation 
and evolution of terrestrial planets through investigation of the 
interior structure and processes of Mars by determining the size, 
composition, and physical state of the core; the thickness of the 
crust; and the composition and structure of the mantle, as well as the 
thermal state of the interior. The second objective is to determine 
the present level of tectonic activity-—the magnitude, rate, and 
geographical distribution of internal seismic activity-—and the 
meteorite impact rate on Mars. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

Project officials report that they are closely monitoring issues that 
could result in delays because missing the current launch window would 
delay the project by 26 months and increase project costs. According 
to the project office, cost increases are not a viable option for the 
project because it is planned as a low cost mission under NASA's 
Discovery Program and its costs have been capped. The project recently 
requested to rephase funds from later fiscal years to fiscal year 2014 
in order to cover long lead item procurements identified by the 
contractor and other activities. However, according to project 
officials, as a result of price increases in subcontract and materials 
cost, overall planned project costs have increased. Project officials 
stated they addressed the cost increases by reducing procurement of 
selected hardware components and eliminating one redundant element. 

Project Update: 

The project held a confirmation review meeting in December 2013, and 
received formal approval to enter the implementation phase in March 
2014. 

Funding Issues: 

Project officials report that they closely monitor schedule issues 
because missing the current launch window would delay the project by 
26 months and increase project costs. According to the project office, 
cost increases are not a viable option for the project because it is 
planned as a low cost mission under NASA's Discovery Program and its 
costs have been capped. 

The project requested to rephase funds from fiscal years 2015 and 2016 
into fiscal year 2014 to cover risk reduction activities, such as long 
lead procurements, early design work, and build of additional 
development hardware in order to maintain desired schedule margin. 
Overall planned project costs have increased due to increases in 
subcontract components and materials procurements. Project officials 
stated that they addressed the cost increases by reducing the 
procurement of selected high cost hardware components and eliminating 
one redundant element. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

The project is currently tracking risks related to its mass and energy 
margins. For example, as a result of design changes to the existing 
spacecraft from the Phoenix project, as well as design changes to 
InSight payload elements, the project is concerned about mass growth. 
Specifically, the project is particularly concerned about the 
projected mass of the spacecraft upon entry, descent, and landing on 
Mars. The project is also concerned with the amount of energy the 
spacecraft will have to conduct science experiments on Mars due to 
dust storms which could reduce power and impact scientific 
capabilities. 

The anticipated path on which the spacecraft will travel does not 
allow for tracking via only the Deep Space Network-—NASA's world-wide 
network of large antennas and communication facilities that supports 
interplanetary missions. Without supplemental measurements from the 
European Space Agency (ESA) or Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
tracking stations, the spacecraft might not meet the required target 
location on Mars. Therefore, NASA is in discussions with ESA and the 
Japanese Space Agency regarding the feasibility and approach for 
utilizing their tracking stations. 

Project Office Comments: 

The InSight project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of InSight assessment] 

James Webb Space Telescope: 

Common Name: JWST. 

Formulation: 
3/99: Formulation start; 
01/06: Mission/System definition review; 
03/08: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
07/08: Project confirmation; 
03/10: Critical design review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
09/17: System integration review; 
10/18: Committed launch readiness date. 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Design/Technology; 
* Funding; 
* Test and Integration. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Contractor. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partners: 
European Space Agency, Canadian Space Agency. 

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana;
Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied). 

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal). 

Requirement derived from: 
2001 Astrophysics Decadal Survey. 

Contract Information: 

Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Company. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development and other components. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: 2002; 
Initial Value of Contract: $824.8 million; 
Current Value: $3.54 billion. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2009: $4,963.6; 
Latest, February 2013: $8,827.5; 
Change: 77.88%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2009: $1,800.1; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,800.1; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2009: $2,581.1; 
Latest, February 2013: $6,190.4; 
Change: 139.8%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Established FY 2009: $582.4; 
Latest, February 2013: $837.0; 
Change: 43.7%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Established FY 2009: June 2014; 
Latest, February 2013: October 2018; 
Change: 52 months. 

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large, infrared-optimized 
space telescope that is designed to help understand the origin and 
destiny of the universe, the creation and evolution of the first stars 
and galaxies, the formation of stars and planetary systems, and 
characteristics of planetary systems. JWST's instruments will be 
designed to work primarily in the infrared range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability in the visible range. 
JWST will have a large primary mirror composed of 18 smaller mirrors 
and a sunshield that is the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror 
and sunshield will unfold and open once JWST is in outer space. JWST 
will reside in an orbit about 1 million miles from the Earth. 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: NASA JWST Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

JWST is generally executing to its September 2011 revised cost and 
schedule baseline and maintaining 13.25 months of funded schedule 
reserve. However, monthly performance has declined more recently in 
fiscal year 2013. The project has made progress addressing some 
technical challenges reported last year but, several challenges-—such 
as cryocooler development-—remain that could affect continued 
progress. In addition, while overall the project is maintaining a 
significant amount of cost reserves, low levels of near-term cost 
reserves could limit its ability to meet future cost and schedule 
commitments. Additionally, GAO's analysis of three subsystem schedules 
determined that the reliability of the project's integrated master 
schedule-—which is dependent on the reliability of JWST's subsystem 
schedules-—is questionable. 

Project Update: 

In January 2014, GAO issued a report on JWST and made two 
recommendations on the project's cost reserves and lack of schedule 
risk analyses. GAO also advised that Congress require NASA to conduct 
an updated joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis based on 
a reliable schedule and current risks. Overall performance data from 
the prime contractor indicate that generally work is being 
accomplished on schedule and at the cost expected. Below is a summary 
of key issues identified in that report.[A] 

Design/Technology Issues: 

The project has made progress addressing some technical challenges 
such as inadequate spacecraft mass margin, but others have persisted, 
causing subsystem development delays and cost increases. For example, 
the development and delivery schedule of the cryocooler-—which cools 
one JWST instrument-—was delayed due to technical issues. Its contract 
was modified in August 2013 for the second time in less than 2 years 
with a cumulative 120 percent increase in contract costs. While 
contractor officials state that they believe they understand the 
causes of the technical issues, execution of the cryocooler remains a 
concern given that performance and schedule issues persist. 

Funding Issues: 

More recent monthly performance data by the prime contractor has 
declined in fiscal year 2013 as the project approached the last 
critical design review in January 2014 on the spacecraft bus. Overall 
the project is maintaining a significant amount of cost reserves; 
however, low levels of near-term cost reserves could limit its ability 
to meet future cost and schedule commitments. Development challenges 
have required the project to allocate a significant portion of cost 
reserves in fiscal year 2014. Adequate cost reserves for the prime 
contractor are also a concern in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Limited 
reserves could require work to be extended or deferred—-a contributing 
factor to the project's prior performance issues that led to the 
project being rebaselined in 2011 with a 78 percent increase to the 
life-cycle cost estimate-—now $8.8 billion—-and a launch delay of 52 
months—-now October 2018. 

Test and Integration Issues: 

The project is maintaining 13.25 months of funded schedule reserve as 
it conducts the first of five integration and test efforts. According 
to the project, an Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM) 
cryovacuum risk reduction test had to be truncated due to the 
government shutdown in October 2013 and not all planned work was 
completed. While the project reported many of the test objectives were 
completed before the shutdown, this increases the risk of the second 
ISIM cryo-vacuum test, planned for later in 2014, not finishing on 
schedule and delaying other critical activities that occur after the 
test. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

GAO's analysis of three subsystem schedules determined that the 
reliability of the project's integrated master schedule—-which is 
dependent on the reliability of JWST's subsystem schedules-—is 
questionable. GAO's analysis in 2012 came to the same conclusion on 
the integrated master schedule. In addition, reliable schedule risk 
analyses of the Optical Telescope Element, the cryocooler, and the 
Integrated Science Instrument Module schedules were not performed. A 
schedule risk analysis is a best practice that gives confidence that 
estimates are credible based on known risks so the schedule can be 
relied upon to track progress. 

[A] GAO, James Webb Space Telescope: Project Meeting Commitments but 
Current Technical, Cost, and Schedule Challenges Could Affect 
Continued Progress, GAO-14-72 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 4, 2014). 

Project Office Comments: 

The JWST project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that NASA has concluded that its monthly cost/risk 
assessments and schedules risk analysis on existing schedules of 
critical JWST elements are credible and sufficient enough to not 
warrant conducting a new joint cost and schedule confidence level 
analysis. 

[End of JWST assessment] 

Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer: 

Common Name: LADEE. 

Formulation: 
02/09: Formulation start; 
07/09: Mission/System design review; 
07/10: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
08/10: Project confirmation; 
05/11: Critical design review; 
08/12: System integration review; 
09/03/13: Launch date; 
12/13: GAO review. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Test and Integration; 
* Launch; 
* Technology; 
* Design. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Ames Research Center. 

Partners: 
U.S. Air Force (Launch Vehicle) and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
(Science Payloads). 

Launch Location: Wallops Flight Facility, VA; 
Launch Vehicle: Minotaur V. 

Mission Duration: 180 days. 

Requirement derived from: 
Scientific Context for the Exploration of the Moon. 

Contract Information: 

Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Space Systems Loral. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft Propulsion. 

Type of Contract: Firm Fixed Price; 
Date of Award: January 2010; 
Initial Value of Contract: $9.3 million; 
Current Value: $12.5 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Established: $262.9; 
Latest, February 2013: $281.5; 
Change: 7.1%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Established: $79.5; 
Latest, February 2013: $79.5; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost[A]: 
Baseline Established: $168.2; 
Latest, February 2013: $1914; 
Change: 13.8%. 

Operations Cost[A]: 
Baseline Established: $15.2; 
Latest, February 2013: $10.6; 
Change: -30.3%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Established: November 2013; 
Latest, February 2013: September 2013; 
Change: -2 months. 

The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission is 
planned to assess the global density, composition, and time 
variability of the lunar atmosphere. LADEE's measurements should 
determine the size, charge, and spatial distribution of 
electrostatically transported dust grains. Additionally, LADEE is 
designed to carry an optical laser communications demonstrator that 
will test high-bandwidth communication from lunar orbit. 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: LADEE Project. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The LADEE project successfully launched on September 6, 2013 as 
planned. The project office reported that on August 2, 2013 LADEE 
completed Key Decision Point E review, when an additional $18.6 
million was added to the project's budget total. The additional funds 
included $4.2 million for increased mission operations costs and 
$783,000 to ensure that data returned from the mission conforms to 
NASA standards, which will put the science data into context for 
future use and analysis. Project officials reported that the new life 
cycle cost estimate approved at KDP E also would have allowed LADEE to 
launch as late as October 14, 2013. In January 2014, NASA announced 
that LADEE was approved for a 28 day mission extension. The spacecraft 
is now expected to impact the lunar surface on or around April 21, 
2014 depending on the final trajectory. 

Project Office Comments: 

The LADEE project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of LADEE assessment] 

Magnetospheric Multiscale: 

Common Name: MMS. 

Formulation: 
05/02: Formulation start; 
09/07: Mission/System definition review; 
05/09: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
06/09: Project confirmation; 
08/10: Critical design review; 
08/12: System integration review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
03/15: Committed launch readiness date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Funding (new); 
* Parts. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Test and Intefration; 
* Contractor; 
* Design; 
* Development Partner; 
* Technology. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partners: 
Austria, France, Japan, Sweden. 

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V. 

Mission Duration: 2 years. 

Requirement derived from: NASA Strategic Plan. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Southwest Research Institute. 

Major Contractor: Instrument development. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Fixed Fee; 
Date of Award: April 2004; 
Initial Value of Contract: $229.4 million; 
Current Value: $224.9 million. 

Project Performance: 

Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2009: $1,082.7; 
Latest FY 2013: $1,081.1; 
Change: -1.5%. 

Formulation Cost 
Baseline Estimate FY 2009: $173.0; 
Latest FY 2013: $172.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost 
Baseline Estimate FY 2009: $857.3; 
Latest FY 2013: $856.7; 
Change: -0.1%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2009: $52.3; 
Latest FY 2013: $51.5; 
Change: -1.5%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2009: March 2015; 
Latest FY 2013: March 2015; 
Change: 0 months. 

The Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) is comprised of four identical 
spacecraft-—each containing 27 instrument components. The mission is 
planned to use the Earth's magnetosphere as a laboratory to study the 
microphysics of magnetic reconnection. Magnetic reconnection is the 
primary process by which energy is transferred from solar wind to 
Earth's magnetosphere and is the physical process determining the size 
of a space weather storm. 

The four spacecraft will fly in a tetrahedron formation, adjustable 
over a range of approximately 6 to 250 miles. The data from MMS is 
intended to be used to help predict space weather in support of 
terrestrial and space exploration activities. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: MMS Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The project is tracking risks that cost reserves may be inadequate 
unless the project accepts additional risk and that the project may 
overrun its cost baseline. In addition to other challenges encountered 
during implementation, the project discovered optocoupler failures in 
some of its four Fast Plasma Instrument (FPI) suites. The project 
completed the first half of a test program to determine the cause and 
extent of the failures and resumed the second half in January 2014. As 
a result of the government shutdown, the project's planned launch date 
of October 2014 was rescheduled to March 2015, the agency's baseline 
commitment date for launch. However, the project's committed level of 
funding is insufficient to cover this slip, and, as a result, project 
costs are expected to exceed the agency baseline commitment by at 
least $28.9 million. 

Project Update: 

The project reported completing integration of the first of four 
identical mission observatories in June 2013, as planned in the 
project's rebaselined schedule. Dates for completing integration of 
the remaining three observatories have each slipped against the 
project schedule at least four times. Further, as a result of the 
government shutdown, schedule reserves have fallen below plan, and the 
project's planned launch date of October 2014 will need to be 
rescheduled. Due to a crowded launch manifest, the next available 
launch slot available to the project is in March 2015. 

Funding Issues: 

Project officials are tracking a risk that available funding for MMS 
may prove inadequate without accepting additional levels of risk. 
According to project officials, the project has used cost reserve as 
planned for integration and test activities. However, the project has 
consumed nearly its entire available budget but has not yet completed 
its integration and test phase, where projects typically realize cost 
and schedule growth. The delay of the project's planned launch from 
October 2014 to March 2015 would require an additional $41 million in 
funding. As a result of this delay, the project will exceed its 
currently available reserves and committed level of funding by about 
$28.9 million, in addition to any further reserves needed to complete 
remaining integration and test activities or mitigate other issues 
that arise. 

In 2012, NASA requested a new budget from the Southwest Research 
Institute (SwRI) following cost overruns during previous instrument 
development efforts. Until August 2013, the project tracked the risk 
of a cost overrun on the contract with SwRI. 

Parts Issues: 

The MMS project reports that flight-unit testing of the project's Fast 
Plasma Instrument (FPI) suites resulted in failures in high-voltage 
electronic parts known as optocouplers. Each observatory's FPI suite 
includes eight instruments, for a total of 32. Among these 
instruments, a total of 288 optocouplers are required. As we reported 
in 2011, optocouplers have caused problems in several other space and 
missile defense programs. The project office has implemented a program 
of X-ray and thermal testing of flight-model and spare optocouplers to 
determine the cause and extent of the failures. The project completed 
the first half of a test program to determine the cause and extent of 
the failures, resumed the second half of the planned tests in January 
2014, and plans to complete them in May 2014. Based on the results of 
the first set of tests, the project stated that a rework and 
replacement of the majority of optocouplers is unlikely. However, 
should such an effort become necessary, it could further exceed the 
project's available funding. Given that the root cause of the failures 
is unknown, the project is tracking a risk that the part may fail on 
orbit, leading to instrument degradation or failure. On-orbit failures 
of these parts would reduce science returns from the MMS mission. The 
project office has committed $2.15 million in reserve funds to resolve 
the FPI optocoupler issue, based on modestly optimistic estimates of 
the work required to mitigate the risk of lost science returns. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MMS project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also 
reported that significant progress has recently been made with respect 
to the optocoupler issues discussed. 

[A] GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment 
Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GAO-11404 
(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011). 

[End of MMS assessment] 

Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN: 

Common Name: MAVEN. 

Formulation: 
09/08: Formulation start; 
07/10: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
10/10: Project confirmation; 
07/11: Critical design review; 
06/12: System integration review; 
11/13: Launch date; 
12/13: GAO review. 

Project Challenges: 
* Parts. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Launch; 
* Design. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partner: Institute of Research for Astrophysics and 
Planetology, Toulouse, France. 

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V. 

Mission Duration: 10-month cruise to Mars and 1-year science mission. 

Requirement derived from: 
Response to the Mars Scout 2006 and Missions of Opportunity 
Announcement of Opportunity. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Lockheed Martin. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: April 2009; 
Initial Value of Contract: $237 million; 
Current Value: $250.6 million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate: $671.2; 
Latest, February 2013: $636.5; 
Change: -5.2%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate: $63.9; 
Latest, February 2013: $63.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost[A]: 
Baseline Estimate: $567.2; 
Latest, February 2013: $489.4;
Change: -13.7%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate: $40.1;
Latest, February 2013: $83.2;
Change: 107.5%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate: November 2013; 
Latest, February 2013: November 2013; 
Change: 0 months. 

The Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission, a robotic 
orbiter mission, is to provide a comprehensive picture of the Mars 
upper atmosphere, ionosphere, solar energetic drivers, and atmospheric 
losses. MAVEN is to deliver comprehensive answers to long-standing 
questions regarding the loss of Mars' atmosphere, climate history, 
liquid water, and habitability and provide the first direct 
measurements ever taken to address key scientific questions about Mars'
evolution. 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: ©2013 Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

MAVEN launched on November 18, 2013, at the project's first launch 
opportunity. The project's launching on schedule was important because 
the next available launch opportunity would have occurred 26 months 
later and a delay would have impacted potential science returns. MAVEN 
is expected to arrive at Mars on September 22, 2014. The MAVEN project 
maintained a cumulative cost underrun of about $35 million through 
launch, as a result of work efficiencies and lower labor costs. 
Following a cost-to-complete review in February 2013, NASA decided to 
reallocate $27.5 million initially budgeted for mission development to 
the mission's operations phase in order to address concerns about the 
adequacy of planned staffing levels' ability to achieve the project's 
science objectives. 

Project Update: 

The MAVEN spacecraft launched successfully at the opening of the project
's 20-day launch window on November 18, 2013. Maintaining schedule was 
important because the next available launch opportunity would have 
occurred 26 months later and a delay would have impacted potential 
science returns. MAVEN is expected to arrive at Mars on September 22, 
2014. 

The MAVEN project maintained a cumulative cost underrun of about $35 
million through launch as a result of work efficiencies and lower labor 
costs. MAVEN indicated that following a cost-to-complete review in 
February 2013, NASA decided to reallocate $27.5 million initially 
budgeted for mission development to the mission's operations phase. The 
project office described this shift as a response to the results of 
MAVEN's Mission Operations Review, which highlighted concerns about 
the adequacy of planned staffing to achieve the project's science 
objectives. 

Parts Issues: 

The project reported that thermal--vacuum testing led to the discovery 
of unevacuated air in two of the reaction-wheel assemblies-—used to 
control the spacecraft's orientation—which may have restricted the 
spacecraft's range of motion in case of a failure after launch. The 
project shipped two of four flight models and a spare to their 
manufacturer for testing and subsequent rework. Project officials 
stated that the reworked flight assemblies were reintegrated and 
regression testing was completed at Kennedy Space Center without 
affecting the project's cost or schedule margins. 

In two of its instruments, MAVEN uses the same optocouplers-—high 
voltage electronic parts-—that have recently experienced failures 
during testing on the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) project. After 
hundreds of hours of environmental testing on the MAVEN instrument 
suites, the project office reported no performance by the MAVEN 
optocouplers that resemble the performance of MMS optocouplers 
before they failed. 

The Neutral Gas and Ion Mass Spectrometer (NGIMS) instrument was 
removed from the spacecraft at Kennedy Space Center due to a 
recurrence of a current spike in the radio frequency module that had 
been observed on only two prior occasions and that the project was 
unable to duplicate. The radio frequency module was swapped out with 
the flight spare at Goddard Space Flight Center. NGIMS was 
reassembled, tested, and returned to Kennedy Space Center for 
reinstallation. A full regression test and comprehensive performance 
test were successfully completed at the spacecraft level. Current 
spikes have not occurred again since the flight spare radio frequency 
module was installed. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MAVEN project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
reported that MAVEN is currently in the operations and sustainment 
phase, having successfully launched at the opening of the launch 
window on November 18, 2013 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. All 
spacecraft systems continue to perform well. According to project 
officials, the first trajectory correction maneuver, instrument 
activations and checkouts, and observations of the comet ISON occurred 
in December 2013. The project plans to conduct the post launch 
assessment review in January and the Electra telecommunications relay 
package in February 2014. The project further commented that MAVEN 
continues to meet its cost and schedule commitments with adequate 
reserves. 

[End of MAVEN assessment] 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2: 

Common Name: OCO-2. 

Formulation: 
03/10: Formulation start. 

Implementation: 
09/10: Project confirmation; 
05/12: System integration review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
07/14: Manifested launch date; 
02/15: Committed launch readiness date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Funding; 
* Parts; 
* Design; 
* Launch. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

International Partner: None. 

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, CA; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II. 

Mission Duration: 2 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2000-2010 NASA Earth Science Research Strategy. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Orbital Science Corporation. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Fixed Fee/Incentive Fee; 
Date of Award: May 2010; 
Initial Value of Contract: $48 Million; 
Current Value: $69.6 Million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $349.9; 
Latest, February 2013: $467.5; 
Change: 33.6%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $60.9; 
Latest, February 2013: $60.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $249.0; 
Latest, February 2013: $371.6; 
Change: 49.2%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $40.0; 
Latest, February 2013: $35.0; 
Change: -12.5%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: February 2013; 
Latest, February 2013: February 2015; 
Change: 24 months. 

NASA's Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2 (OCO-2) is being designed to 
enable more reliable predictions of climate change and is based on the 
original OCO mission that failed to reach orbit in 2009. It is planned 
to make precise, time-dependent global measurements of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. These measurements will be combined with data from a 
ground-based network to provide scientists with information needed to 
better understand the processes that regulate atmospheric carbon 
dioxide and its role in the carbon cycle. NASA expects enhanced 
understanding of the carbon cycle will improve predictions of future 
atmospheric carbon dioxide increases and the potential impact on the 
climate. 

Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The OCO-2 life cycle cost estimate remained stable following last 
year's cost growth and schedule delay stemming from the late selection 
of the Delta II as the project's launch vehicle. According to project 
officials, the spacecraft is currently scheduled to arrive at its 
launch site, Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, on April 24, 
2014 for a planned launch in July 2014. Project officials report that 
they resolved the risk that launch-related hardware such as the 
payload attach fitting will be delivered later than initially expected 
and that all necessary hardware has now been delivered. 

Project Update: 

Issue Update: 

The project reported that the launch vehicle provider has delivered 
all necessary hardware, such as the payload attach fitting, which 
includes the payload separation system and allows the spacecraft to 
interface with the launch vehicle. A launch date of July 1, 2014 has 
been coordinated with the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. 

Project officials reported that the project is operating within the 
new funding profile established last year as a result of a change in 
launch vehicle plans. However, according to project officials, the 
project's Phase D was replanned due to the lateness of the change, and 
as a result, the contract value increased by about $15 million. 

Last year, the project identified a risk of potential failure with its 
reaction wheel assemblies—-rotating wheels used to control the 
spacecraft's orientation—-that led to the project selecting new 
wheels. Project officials reported that the wheels have been 
successfully replaced and integrated onto the spacecraft at a cost of 
roughly $3 million-—$2.9 million for the wheels plus an additional 
$158 thousand for expediting the procurement-—which was fully covered 
by project reserves. The observatory is currently undergoing final 
assembly test and launch operations testing, which is expected to be 
complete in early 2014. 

Project Office Comments: 

The OCO-2 project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of OCO-2 assessment] 

Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-
Regolith Explorer: 

Common Name: OSIRIS-REx. 

Formulation: 
05/11: Formulation start; 
05/12: Mission/System design review; 
03/13: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
05/13: Project confirmation; 
12/13: GAO review; 
04/14: Critical design review; 
02/15: System integration review; 
10/16: Committed launch readiness date. 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Development Partner. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

International Partner: Canadian Space Agency. 

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: TBD; 
Mission Duration: 7 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
NASA Strategic Plan Goal 2.3; 2013 Agency Performance Goal 2.3.1.2. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft Development; 
Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: January 2012; 
Initial Value of Contract: $315.9 million; 
Current Value: $321.8 million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $1,121.4; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,064.2; 
Change: -5.1%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $144.3; 
Latest, February 2013: $144.3; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $778.6; 
Latest, February 2013: $721.6; 
Change: -7.3%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: $198.5; 
Latest, February 2013: $198.3; 
Change: -0.1%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2010: October 2016; 
Latest, February 2013: October 2016; 
Change: 0 months. 

The Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-
Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) spacecraft will travel to a near-Earth 
asteroid and use a robotic arm to retrieve samples that could better 
explain our solar system's formation and how life began. The OSIRIS-
REx mission has five planned science objectives: (1) return and 
analyze a sample, (2) document the sample site, (3) create maps of the 
asteroid, (4) measure forces on the asteroid's orbit that makes it an 
impact threat to the Earth, and (5) compare the asteroid's 
characteristics with ground-based telescopic data of the entire 
asteroid population. If successful, OSIRIS-REx will be the first U.S. 
mission to return samples from an asteroid to Earth. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: OSIRIS-Rex Project Office, NASA/GSFC. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The project was approved to enter its final design and fabrication 
phase in May 2013 with a life-cycle cost estimate of $1.121 billion. 
The project is tracking several issues related to the delivery of 
instruments and key flight hardware components. For example, the laser 
altimeter being developed by the Canadian Space Agency will likely be 
delivered past its need date for integration onto the spacecraft, and 
the guidance, navigation, and control light detection and ranging (GNC 
LIDAR) instrument may not complete development in time for spacecraft 
integration and testing. Due to its criticality to the mission, the 
project is pursuing a back up approach for the GNC LIDAR that would 
prevent a launch delay if delivery of the LIDAR is late. The mission's 
destination requires a launch during its 39 day window between 
September and October 2016 because the project's available budget 
could not accommodate the backup launch windows in 2017 or 2022. 

Project Update: 

The project successfully passed its key decision point C review and 
entered the final design and fabrication phase of implementation in 
May 2013 with a life-cycle cost estimate of $1.121 billion. According 
to project officials, at the project's confirmation review, adequate 
funding was identified to retain all five planned science instruments 
and all associated science requirements were finalized. 

Development Partner Issues: 

Project officials reported that the Canadian Space Agency's (CSA) 
laser altimeter instrument—-one of the five planned mission 
instruments which will be used to create a 3-dimensional model of the 
asteroid-—will likely be delivered past its need date for integration 
onto the spacecraft due to the CSA receiving the funds later than 
expected from the Canadian government. As a result, integration and 
test activities will be adjusted to accommodate the late delivery. 
Project officials stated they are working with CSA to recover schedule 
margin where possible. For example, the project is providing excess 
parts to CSA from other project elements. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

The project is currently tracking a risk regarding the potential 
impact of a late delivery of the guidance, navigation, and control 
Light Detection and Ranging (GNC LIDAR) instrument, which uses a light 
sensing technology to guide the spacecraft toward the asteroid. The 
project is concerned that the GNC LIDAR units may either miss delivery 
to the spacecraft for integration or fail on orbit as a result of the 
small company building these units for a long duration of flight for 
the first time. Currently, the project is reporting 20 working days of 
schedule reserve to the date the LIDAR is required for integration and 
test in February 2015. If the GNC LIDAR is not ready to be integrated 
on the spacecraft on time, then costs could increase in order to 
accommodate a late delivery or launch readiness could be missed. 
However, the project is pursuing a back up approach that will use 
camera-based natural feature tracking of the asteroid to provide the 
same type of range data as the GNC LIDAR. The project has allocated 
$6.9 million of its reserve funding to cover the cost of the cameras 
and development of the natural feature tracking algorithms and 
software and system testing. 

Project Office Comments: 

The OSIRIS-REx project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also 
noted that the project assessment accurately reflects the current 
status of the project. 

[End of OSIRIS-REx assessment] 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: 

Common Name: Orion. 

07/06: Orion Project formulation start; 
08/09: Orion preliminary design review; 
02/10: Orion canceled under Constellation Program; 

Formulation: 
02/12: Orion formulation start; 
12/13: GAO review; 
08/14: Preliminary design review; 
09/14: First exploration flight. 

Implementation: 
12/14: Project confirmation; 
04/15: Critical design review; 
12/17: First non-crewed launch date; 
08/21: First crewed launch date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Funding; 
* Design. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: Johnson Space Center. 

International Partner: European Space Agency. 

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: Space Launch System. 

Mission Duration: 
Varied based on destination. 

Requirement derived from: 
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 Public L. No. 111-267, §§ 303, 304. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Lockheed Martin. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft Development; 
Type of Contract: TBD; 
Date of Award: TBD; 
Initial Value of Contract: TBD; 
Current Value: $6.66 billion to date: final value TBD. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Preliminary estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost:[A] 

Latest: Feb 2013: $8.5 - $10.3 billion. 

[A] This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design 
options being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning 
purposes. 

Orion is being developed to conduct in-space operations beyond low 
Earth orbit and to service the International Space Station if 
necessary. Under the Orion program, NASA is continuing to advance 
development of the human safety features, designs, and systems of the 
former Orion project under the Constellation program which was 
canceled in February 2010. Orion is planned to launch atop NASA's 
Space Launch System. The current design of Orion consists of a crew 
module, service module, and launch abort system. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Space City Films. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The Orion program is developing and building hardware for its first 
exploration flight test (EFT-1) in September 2014, but development 
challenges continue to threaten the program. The mass of the 
spacecraft remains a top program risk. Despite mass reduction efforts, 
the spacecraft could be up to 2,800 pounds over the maximum lift-off 
mass requirement for the un-crewed first exploration mission flight 
(EM-1) of the Space Launch System in 2017. The program has made 
changes to the heat shield's design in order to address the 
possibility of cracks between its ablative material and the underlying 
shield structure due to thermal expansion during its initial test 
flight in 2014; however, the spacecraft is expected to undergo more 
stressful temperatures during later launches. 

Project Update: 

Funding issues: 

According to NASA, constrained funding has forced the program to adopt 
an incremental development approach. For example, to stay within 
budget, the program deferred a second round of testing for the launch 
abort system, which carries the crew away from the launch vehicle in 
case of a failed launch. NASA originally scheduled this test for 2014, 
about 7 years before the first crewed flight (EM-2) in 2021. Now, the 
test is scheduled for 2018, or 3 years prior to the crewed flight. By 
delaying this test some 4 years, NASA will have only about half the 
amount of time to address any issues discovered during the 2018 test. 
The program is willing to accept this risk based on prior testing and 
intends for EFT-1 to help mitigate technical issues. However, the 
program also indicated that, should unexpected technical issues arise, 
there is increased risk of cost increases and schedule delays for the 
crewed EM-2 flight in 2021. 

Design Issues: 

Program documents indicate that, even with mass reduction efforts 
ongoing through 2013, the spacecraft could be up to 2,800 pounds over 
the maximum lift-off mass requirement of 73,500 pounds for the Space 
Launch System's EM-1 in December 2017. According to program officials, 
no additional dedicated mass reduction efforts will occur prior to EM-
1 because the Orion can perform assigned EM-1 and EM-2 exploration 
missions within the currently-predicted mass of the Orion and expected 
performance of the Space Launch System. Instead, the program plans to 
relieve mass issues by utilizing performance margins they anticipate 
to be available on the Space Launch System and by adjusting mission 
parameters, such as load, crew size, and mission duration. Officials 
stated that, if NASA or the Administration defined a yet-unspecified 
mission requiring the Orion to meet allocated lift-off mass, design 
changes to the spacecraft could be required. 

The program expects to downgrade a risk associated with the Orion heat 
shield, but design challenges with this technology remain. Program 
officials continue to track a risk that the thermal protection system 
could develop cracks between its ablative material and the underlying 
shield structure due to thermal expansion prior to the Orion's reentry 
into the Earth's atmosphere. According to the officials, additional 
coating has been added to the shield and delivery is on schedule. They 
noted, however, that the spacecraft will encounter hotter, more 
stressful temperatures during reentry, when the crew module returns 
from lunar destinations. As a result, some risk remains beyond EFT-1. 
Officials stated that the program will continue to monitor and 
mitigate any issues with the heat shield and thermal protection system. 

Additionally, the Orion service module, which supplies propulsion, 
life support, and power and is being provided by ESA, is experiencing 
design issues. The preliminary design review for the module slipped 
some 10 months to allow more time to complete design trade-offs, 
increase design maturity, and identify potential mass reduction 
opportunities. Program officials stated that the ESA module will be 
used in EM-1, but a second module not yet on contract will be required 
for EM-2. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

Development of Orion continues under a contract awarded in 2006 for 
development of the Orion vehicle under the Constellation program. This 
contract is currently valued at $6.66 billion. Program officials are 
in the process of negotiating an approximately $4.55 billion 
modification to the contract that will extend the period of 
performance to December 2020. They expect to definitize the contract 
modification in February 2014. 

Project Office Comments: 

The program provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. Additionally, officials noted 
that Orion achieved a major milestone in 2013 by reaching the 
preliminary design phase, and that they anticipate completion of 
preliminary design and integration activities in 2014. 

End of Orion assessment] 

Soil Moisture Active and Passive: 

Common Name: SMAP. 

Formulation: 
09/08: Formulation start; 
02/09: Mission/System design review; 
10/11: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
06/12: Project confirmation; 
07/12: Critical design review; 
04/13: System integration review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
10/14: Manifested launch date; 
03/15: Committed launch readiness date. 

Project Challenges: 
* Parts/Test and Integration (new). 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Launch; 
* Design; 
* Funding; 
* Technology. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

Partner: None. 

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, CA; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II. 

Mission Duration: 3 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2007 Earth Science Decadal Survey. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems. 

Contractor Activity: Reflector Boom Assembly development. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Fixed Fee; 
Date of Award: June 2009; 
Initial Value of Contract: $20.0 million; 
Current Value: $47.0 million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $916.5; 
Latest, February 2013: $914.6; 
Change: -0.2%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $388.2;
Latest, February 2013: $388.2; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $485.7; 
Latest, February 2013: $490.0; 
Change: 0.9%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $42.6; 
Latest, February 2013: $36.4; 
Change: -15.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: March 2015; 
Latest, February 2013: March 2015; 
Change: 0 months. 

NASA's Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP) mission leverages 
previous Earth Science missions and is based on the soil moisture and 
freeze/thaw mission concept developed by an earlier mission known as 
Hydros. SMAP is designed to provide new information on global soil 
moisture and its freeze/thaw state enabling new advances in 
hydrospheric science and applications. These measurements will improve 
understanding of regional and global water cycles and climate changes, 
and improve the accuracy of weather, flood, and drought forecasts. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: 2011 California Institute of Technology/Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The spacecraft's subsystems are being completed on or ahead of 
schedule, which enabled integration and testing to begin 7 weeks 
earlier than planned-—however, there have been several delayed 
instrument sub-system deliveries due to manufacturing and testing 
challenges. For example, the reflector boom assembly was delivered in 
December 2013, one month later than initially planned due to design 
issues encountered last year with the assembly's deployment mechanism 
and slow technical progress. Following the late delivery, technical 
issues with the reflector boom assembly and other components have 
occurred during testing, and as a result, mitigation activities are 
expected to severely impact cost and schedule resources. According to 
the project, the current completion plan is realistic, but there will 
be little margin to accommodate any further slippage. 

Project Update: 

Parts/Test and Integration Issues: 

Subsystems for the spacecraft were completed on schedule or earlier 
which enabled the spacecraft integration and testing to begin 7 weeks 
early. However, several instrument-related subsystem deliveries were 
delayed because of manufacturing and testing challenges. For example, 
the reflector boom assembly was delivered to the project in December, 
one month later than planned due to design issues encountered last 
year with the assembly's deployment mechanism and slow technical 
progress. The project used engineering models to mitigate testing 
risk, and replanned the integration and test schedule since the 
reflector boom assembly was not needed at the beginning of integration 
and testing on the observatory. Following the late delivery of the 
reflector boom assembly, technical issues with it and other components 
have occurred during testing, and as a result, mitigation activities 
are expected to severely impact cost and schedule resources. The 
planned integration and test activities for the observatory have been 
further adjusted to accommodate these delays, and the project 
continues to look for additional opportunities to recover schedule 
margin. According to the project, the current completion plan is 
realistic, but there will be little margin to accommodate any further 
slippage. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SMAP project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
reported that all spacecraft and instrument subsystems are now 
delivered. The reflector boom assembly was shipped to the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory in December to complete acceptance testing 
(consistent with contingency plans.) The project also stated that 
observatory integration and test began in January as scheduled and the 
project remains on track for its October 31, 2014 launch date. 

[End of SMAP assessment] 

Solar Probe Plus: 

Common Name: SPP. 

Formulation: 
12/09: Formulation start; 
11/11: Mission/System design review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
01/14: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
03/14: Project confirmation; 
03/15: Critical design review; 
06/16: System integration review; 
07/18: Committed launch date. 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Funding (new); 
* Parts/Test and Integration (new). 

Previously Reported Challenges
* Launch; 
* Technology; 
* Design. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

Partner: None. 

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: TBD. 

Mission Duration: 7 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
2003 Solar and Space Physics Decadal Survey. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. 

Contractor Activity: Aerospace Research Development and Engineering 
Support. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: May 2010; 
Initial Value of Contract: $218.6 million; 
Current Value: $237.7 million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $1,553.4; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,553.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $247.1;
Latest, February 2013: $247.1; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $1,055.7; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,055.7; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: $250.6; 
Latest, February 2013: $250.6; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2012: August 2018; 
Latest, February 2013: August 2018; 
Change: 0 months. 

Solar Probe Plus (SPP) is designed to explore the Sun's outer 
atmosphere, or corona, as it extends into space. The spacecraft will 
orbit the Sun 24 times and its instruments will observe the generation 
and flow of solar winds from very close range. By observing the 
corona, where solar energetic particles are energized, there is 
potential to further the science of heliophysics by shedding light on 
the origin and evolution of solar wind and why the Sun's outer 
atmosphere is so much hotter than the visible surface. In order to 
achieve its mission, parts of the spacecraft must be able to withstand 
temperatures exceeding 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit, as well as endure 
blasts of extreme radiation. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: 2012 Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab (artist 
depiction). 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The project entered Phase C-—the final design and fabrication phase of 
implementation-—in March 2014. Prior to the confirmation review, the 
project reported concerns with the phasing of project funds; however, 
these issues were resolved as part of the confirmation review process. 
The project also reported recently closing several technological risks 
related to the Thermal Protection System including the potential 
inability to meet launch load requirements. However, several risks 
continue to be tracked, such as the potential inability to remove a 
sufficient amount of heat to keep the system cool enough to function 
properly. Additionally, the project validated the performance of the 
solar cell and array in advance of the project's preliminary design 
review in January 2014. 

Project Update: 

The project entered Phase C—the final design and fabrication phase of 
implementation—in March 2014. Prior to the confirmation review, the 
project reported concerns with the phasing of project funds being 
heavily weighted in later years and lacking sufficient funding for the 
near term. These issues were resolved as part of the confirmation 
review process. 

Funding Issues: 

Project officials stated that while adequate funding for the project 
exists in later years, the agency's budget plan for the project is not 
currently aligned with the project's near term needs. Project 
officials stated that they have a significant amount of funds presently 
designated for fiscal year 2018 that could be rephased to earlier 
years without impacting the project's overall budget. This issue will 
be addressed by NASA as the project prepares for its confirmation 
review, scheduled for March 2014. The agency is currently assessing 
various options, including one to delay the launch from 2018 to 2019, 
with a back up launch opportunity in 2020. 

Parts/Test and Integration Issues: 

The SPP project includes several critical technologies, such as its 
Thermal Protection System, which allows the instruments on the 
spacecraft to operate at near room temperature despite their proximity 
to the Sun. The project reported recently closing a risk related to 
the Thermal Protection System's potential inability to meet launch 
load requirements. However, several risks continue to be tracked, such 
as the potential inability to remove a sufficient amount of heat to 
keep the system cool enough to function properly. The project 
conducted numerous tests to determine mitigation steps necessary to 
address these risks and mature the technology sufficiently prior to the 
project's preliminary design review. The project also reported 
validating the performance of another critical technology-—the solar 
cell and array, which is linked to SPP's power and cooling systems. 
Underperformance of the technology could compromise the performance 
and temperature of other systems on the spacecraft. To mitigate this 
risk, the contractor conducted a series of tests on a secondary array 
to make sure that the array will be able to support the power and 
cooling systems on the spacecraft. Officials reported that the 
performance of the solar array was demonstrated at greater than 
maximum expected intensities for the planned mission. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SPP project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Officials stated 
that all of the new technologies necessary to execute the project have 
been successfully matured to a technology readiness level 6, and that 
this accomplishment has been independently validated. 

[End of SPP assessment] 

Space Launch System: 

Common Name: SLS. 

Formulation: 
11/11: Formulation start; 
07/12: Mission/System design review; 
07/13-09/13: Preliminary design review; 
12/13: GAO review. 

Implementation: 
4/14: Project confirmation; 
01/15-03/15: Critical design review; 
12/17: First non-crewed launch date; 
2021: First crewed launch date. 

Recent/Continuing Project Challenges: 
* Funding; 
* Schedule (new); 
* Integration of Existing Hardware (new). 

Previously Reported Challenges
* Design; 
* Funding. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Marshall Space Flight Center. 

Partner: None. 

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, FL. 

Mission Duration: 
Varied based on destination. 

Requirement derived from: 
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the NASA 2011 Strategic Plan. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Boeing; 
Contractor Activity: Stages Development; 
Type of Contract: TBD; 
Date of Award: TBD; 
Initial Value of Contract: TBD; 
Current Value: TBD. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Preliminary estimate of Project Cost through first non-crewed 
launch:[A] 

Latest: February 2014: $7.65 – $8.59 billion. 

[A] This estimate is preliminary through the first non-crewed launch 
in December 2017, as the project is in formulation and there is 
uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options 
being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. 

The Space Launch System (SLS) is intended to be the nation's first 
human heavy-lift launch vehicle since the Saturn V was developed for 
the Apollo program. SLS is planned to launch NASA's Orion vehicle and 
service the International Space Station if necessary. The vehicle is 
being designed to provide an initial lift capacity of 70 metric tons 
to low-Earth orbit and be evolvable to 130 metric tons. The initial 70 
metric ton capability will include a core stage, powered by 4 RS-25 
engines and two five-segment boosters. The 130 metric ton capability 
will include a core stage, an upper stage powered by a J-2X engine, and 
advanced boosters. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: SLS Project Office (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

The SLS program completed preliminary design reviews at the system and 
element level in late summer 2013 and is expected to enter the program 
implementation phase in April 2014. Based on current budget estimates, 
program officials have expressed concern that the first launch in 2017 
could be delayed. Additionally, the integration of existing hardware 
with new hardware could pose technical and schedule challenges during 
system engineering and integration efforts. According to officials, 
though the program is addressing affordability concerns by utilizing 
existing hardware, NASA must make adjustments to ensure existing and 
new hardware integrate properly and meet requirements. 

Project Update: 

The program plans to reach Key Decision Point (KDP)-C in April 2014 
and enter the implementation phase of the NASA acquisition life cycle. 
At that point, NASA will establish cost, schedule, and performance 
baselines for the initial version of the SLS, the 70-metric ton launch 
vehicle, through its first test flight, EM-1, in December 2017, plus 3 
months for data analysis. 

Funding Issues: 

Funding remains a top program risk. Although the agency plans to spend 
about $6.8 billion to develop the SLS in fiscal years 2014 through 
2018, the budget requested is flat across all years and, as a result, 
some sub-system managers have expressed concern about adequacy of 
funding in some years to support planned development work. Because the 
SLS is an evolvable development effort, the flat budget profile NASA 
is proposing may not fully reflect the funding level required at 
various stages in the development cycle. 

Schedule Issues: 

NASA's schedule for the core stage is aggressive. The core stage is 
the SLS program's only new development effort and it represents the 
critical path—-the set of developmental activities that must be 
completed for the program to stay on schedule—-for the SLS program as 
a whole. Unlike the existing booster and engine subsystems, designs 
and hardware for the core stage as well as the production facility are 
not yet complete. According to program officials, NASA has compressed 
the core stage development schedule, including making early decisions 
about long lead items such as manufacturing materials and tooling, in 
order to meet the December 2017 EM-1 flight test date. While 
compressing development creates schedule margin, it places NASA at 
increased risk of late cycle rework if problems are encountered during 
development. 

Integration of Existing Hardware: 

The SLS program faces challenges integrating existing hardware into a 
new system with different operational environments and requirements. 
In the case of the RS-25 engines from the Space Shuttle, the engines 
were designed to start using fuel slightly warmer than the fuel they 
will receive from the new SLS core stage fuel tank. NASA's plans for 
integration include adding heaters to the fuel lines because that is a 
less expensive and time-consuming effort than recertifying the engine 
to start with cooler fuel. Similarly, according to program officials, 
some portions of the Shuttle-era solid rocket boosters may require 
redesign due to the increased loads anticipated in the SLS operating 
environment. For example, NASA is concerned that the forward skirt of 
the solid rocket boosters is not qualified to withstand the loads it 
will encounter during SLS flight. So NASA plans to conduct structural 
tests of the forward skirt to determine if it needs to be redesigned. 
Additionally, NASA plans to use a propulsion subsystem, called the 
Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), originally developed for 
the Delta IV launch vehicle. However, according to agency officials, 
this subsystem is not certified to meet NASA's requirements for human 
spaceflight. For example, the ICPS currently cannot be steered by 
launch vehicle crew, which is a human spaceflight requirement. As a 
result, NASA tailored the ICPS requirement to allow for the crew to 
manually shutdown ICPS. The full extent of challenges associated with 
integrating existing hardware into new operating environments and 
their associated impacts on cost, schedule, and performance, including 
mass, is likely to remain uncertain until the program's critical 
design review, currently planned for 2015. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

Over 2 years after being established as a program, many of the SLS 
program contracts remain undefinitized, placing the program at risk of 
unanticipated costs. Additionally, SLS cost baselines do not include 
the likely full costs of the SLS program. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SLS project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of SLS assessment] 

Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment: 

Common Name: SGSS. 

Formulation: 
11/11: Formulation start; 
12/11: Mission/system design review; 
09/12: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
04/13: Project confirmation; 
06/13: Critical design review; 
12/13: GAO review; 
TBD: Project confirmation; 
06/2017: Final acceptance review (under review). 

Project Challenges: 
* Contractor; 
* Funding. 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Technology. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

Mission Duration: 9 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
March 2008 Space Network modernization concept study. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc. 

Contractor Activity: Modernizing the Ground System and Network. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Award Fee; 
Date of Award: June 2010; 
Initial Value of Contract: $626.2 million; 
Current Value: $663.0 million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions: 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline FY 2013: $493.9; 
Latest Est. Feb 2014[A]: $493.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Formulation Cost:
Baseline FY 2013: $125.8; 
Latest Est. Feb 2014[A]: $125.8; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost:
Baseline FY 2013: $368.1; 
Latest Est. Feb 2014[A]: $368.1; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Operations Cost:
Baseline FY 2013: $0; 
Latest Est. Feb 2014[A]: $0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule:
Baseline FY 2013: June 2017; 
Latest Est. Feb 2014[A]: June 2017[A]; 
Change: 0 months. 

[A] The project is undergoing a replan, and final cost and 
schedule information is not available. 

The Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) project plans to 
develop and deliver a new ground system that will enable the Space 
Network—-which provides essential communications and tracking 
services to NASA and non-NASA missions-—to continue safe, reliable, 
and cost efficient operations for the next several decades. Existing 
ground systems are based on 1980s technology and software and are 
becoming obsolete and unsustainable. Updated systems and equipment 
will allow the Space Network to maintain critical communications 
services to customer missions while reducing operations and 
maintenance costs. 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

Due in part to recent performance issues, the project held a cost and 
management review in November 2013 at which the contractor's 
performance and updated estimates at completion were evaluated. The 
estimates indicated the project's cost and schedule would likely 
exceed the agency baseline commitment. As a result, agency officials 
directed the project to develop replan options to be presented to 
agency leadership in Spring 2014. Project officials reported that the 
project consumed all fiscal year 2013 reserves to address contractor 
performance issues, and as a result, could not absorb a $2.3 million 
sequestration cut in fiscal year 2013. The Space Communication and 
Navigation program—-of which SGSS is a component—-added $20 million in 
funding for fiscal year 2013. However, planned funding for fiscal year 
2014 and beyond is expected to be insufficient, based on the updated 
contractor estimates. As a result, the project may have to delay or 
descope planned capability or capacity. 

Project Update: 

Contractor Issues: 

Project officials reported that contractor performance sharply 
declined following the preliminary design review. For example, 
additional detailed design activities led to a three-month slip in sub-
system critical design reviews. According to project officials, as a 
result of this delay and an unrealistic staffing plan, the contractor 
delayed delivery of several project elements to testing by an 
additional three months. The contractor absorbed the delay in its 
schedule by eliminating the final planned test increment which was 
intended to serve as a placeholder in the event that additional 
unanticipated testing needed to be completed. However, this approach 
increases risk because as noted by project officials, upcoming test 
increments will be the most challenging and the project will not have 
the placeholder test increment to use if unanticipated testing needs 
arise. Furthermore, the project office reported that the contractor 
significantly underestimated costs associated with infrastructure 
technologies such as routers, processors, and servers. The project 
assembled a team of experts to work with the contractor to develop 
more realistic cost estimates which were examined at a cost and 
management review in November 2013. The preliminary estimates 
developed by the contractor indicated the project's cost and schedule 
would likely exceed the agency baseline commitment. As a result, 
agency officials directed the project to develop replan options to be 
presented to agency leadership in Spring 2014. The technical portion of 
the critical design review was completed in June 2013; however the 
cost and schedule portion of the review has been postponed, pending 
decisions on the project's replan. 

Funding Issues: 

Prior to the confirmation review in April 2013, project officials 
noted concerns with the contractor's optimistic assumptions in the 
remaining phases of the project. Since the confirmation review, the 
risks previously identified have been realized, and there have been 
significant performance issues. Project officials have been working 
with the contractor since prior to the confirmation review to mitigate 
these risks; however, according to project officials, based on the 
results of the November cost and management review, the project may 
have to consider delaying or descoping the project's planned 
capability or capacity. The project is also implementing mechanisms to 
limit contractor costs in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, such as 
reductions in staffing levels and materials purchases, while also 
minimizing the overall cost and schedule impact of such changes. 

According to project officials, due to the performance issues, the 
project had no remaining cost reserves in fiscal year 2013 and could 
not absorb a $2.3 million sequestration impact. To ensure completion 
of planned activities for 2013, the Space Communications and 
Navigation program-—of which SGSS is a component—-added $20 million in 
funding. However, according to project officials, planned funding for 
fiscal year 2014 and beyond is insufficient to execute the project 
based on the most recent estimates at completion. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SGSS project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. According to 
project officials, the contractor's updated plan includes more 
realistic projections of productivity and materials costs than the 
previous plan. The project is currently assessing optimization of 
the processes, staffing approaches, and organizational structure for 
the remaining phases of SGSS and is working with the contractor to 
improve cost and schedule performance before considering descopes to 
content. 

[End of SGSS assessment] 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy: 

Common Name: SOFIA. 

Formulation: 
10/91: Formulation start. 

Implementation: 
11/95: Project confirmation; 
08/00: Critical design review; 
12/10: Initial operational capability; 
12/13: GAO review; 
04/14: Full operational capability (projected); 
12/14: Full operational capability (committed). 

Previously Reported Challenges: 
* Design; 
* Funding. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Dryden Flight Research Center. 

International Partner: 
German Aerospace Center (DLR). 

Aircraft: Boeing 747SP. 

Sortie Location: 
Dryden Aircraft Operations Center, CA. 

Mission Duration: 20 years of science flights. 

Requirement derived from: 
1991 Decadal Survey for Astronomy and Astrophysics, National Research 
Council. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Universities Space Research Association. 

Contractor Activity: Provide the SOFIA Science Center and the science 
missions operations. 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Fixed Fee; 
Date of Award: December 1996; 
Initial Value of Contract: $484 Million; 
Current Value: $589 Million. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2007: $2,954.5; 
Latest, February 2013: $2,999.9; 
Change: 1.5%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2007: $35.0; 
Latest, February 2013: $35.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2007: $919.5; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,119.8; 
Change: 21.8%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2007: $2,000.0; 
Latest, February 2013: $1,844.4; 
Change: -7.8%; 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Estimate FY 2007: December 2013; 
Latest, February 2013: December 2014; 
Change: 12 months. 

SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the German Aerospace Center 
to install a 2.5 meter telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP 
aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to provide routine 
access to the visual, infrared, far-infrared, and sub-millimeter parts 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. Its mission objectives include 
studying many different kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, 
including star birth and death; the formation of new solar systems; 
planets, comets, and asteroids in our solar system; and black holes at 
the center of galaxies. Interchangeable instruments of the observatory 
are being developed to allow a range of scientific measurement to be 
taken by SOFIA. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

SOFIA has projected reaching full operating capability, defined by the 
project as the commissioning of four of seven total planned science 
instruments by April 2014. According to project officials, the final 
technical objective for full operating capability was achieved in 
February, and this achievement will be certified though the project's 
next key decision point process. However, continuing challenges such 
as uncertain financial support and the loss of expertise from the 
German space agency could impact project costs. Further, the need to 
fund infrastructure and procurements for continued maintenance and 
operation is a concern. Due to its high operating costs and budget 
constraints, NASA's fiscal year 2015 budget request proposes placing 
SOFIA in storage; however, according to the project, the planned 
fiscal year 2015 budget is insufficient to prepare the observatory for 
storage. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SOFIA project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment which were incorporated as appropriate. The project 
stated that SOFIA completed the procurement of four spare engines in 
fiscal year 2013, and funding for fuel and staff to support all planned 
flights is covered in the current budget. They also reported that DLR, 
the German space agency, has signed a contract to ensure continued 
support and adequate staffing levels. 

[End of SOFIA assessment] 

Surface Water and Ocean Topography: 

Common Name: SWOT. 

Formulation: 
11/12: Formulation start; 
12/13: GAO review; 
03/14: Mission design review; 
01/16: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
03/16: Project confirmation; 
06/17: Critical design review
02/19: System Integration review
10/20: Projected launch date. 

Project Challenges 
* Development Partner (new). 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

International Partner: Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (France), 
Canadian Space Agency. 

Launch Location: Vandenburg AFB, CA; 
Launch Vehicle: TBD. 

Mission Duration: 3 years. 

Requirement derived from: 2007 National Research Council Decadal 
Survey. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: TBD. 

Contractor Activity: TBD. 

Type of Contract: TBD; 
Date of Award: TBD; 
Initial Value of Contract: TBD; 
Current Value: TBD. 

The Surface Water and Ocean Topography Mission (SWOT) is a joint 
project between NASA and the French Space Agency—-the Centre National 
d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)—-with additional components provided by the 
Canadian Space Agency. SWOT will use its wide-swath altimetry 
technology to take repeated high-resolution measurements of the 
world's oceans and freshwater bodies to develop a global survey. This 
survey will make it possible to estimate water discharge into rivers 
more accurately, and help improve flood prediction. It will also 
provide global measurements of ocean surface topography which will 
improve prediction of weather and climate as well as variations in 
ocean currents. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

Project Summary: 

SWOT officials are working toward the project's scheduled preliminary 
design review in January 2016 and maturing instruments to fulfill the 
mission's science requirements. The project is monitoring a risk that 
the French-provided nadir altimeter may have to be de-scoped in the 
event of cost overruns. The project is assessing options to address 
this issue, such as enhancing the design of the NASA-developed Ka 
band Radar Interferometer (KaRIn) to function as a replacement. The 
KaRIn instrument will require significant development work in order 
for it to reach maturity by the preliminary design review. Development 
of this instrument is also a risk due to the complexities involved in 
managing multiple international partners. 

Project Update: 

The SWOT mission entered Phase A—-the concept and technology 
development phase of formulation—-in November 2012 with a preliminary 
life cycle cost estimate of $642 to $752 million. SWOT is being 
jointly developed with the French space agency, CNES, with additional 
components provided by the Canadian Space Agency. The combined cost 
of the project, including partner contributions, is approximately $1 
billion. 

The project will include six instruments that fulfill the project's 
planned science requirements, including three that perform orbit 
determination. CNES is providing the spacecraft bus and nadir altimeter 
instrument, as well as one of three instruments utilized by the 
spacecraft to determine its orbit. The Canadian Space Agency is 
contributing a radar transmitter subsystem. NASA is providing the 
payload module, microwave radiometer instrument as well as the primary 
science instrument – the Ka band Radar Inteferometer (KaRIn), with 
participation from both CNES and CSA. This instrument will enable the 
spacecraft to provide high resolution oceanography and hydrology by 
taking wide-swath measurements. 

Development Partner Issues: 

Project officials are monitoring the development of the French-
provided nadir altimeter due to limited available funding from the 
French. Project officials reported that the altimeter could be 
descoped in the event of cost overruns. However, the altimeter is not 
essential to meeting threshold requirements. As an alternative, the 
project is assessing the cost and schedule impact of enhancing the 
KaRIn instrument to function as a nadir altimeter replacement. 

Other Issues to be Monitored: 

The project expects its critical technologies to be mature by the 
preliminary design review in January 2016. However, the project is 
closely monitoring several risks related to the development of the 
KaRIn. For example, the project is concerned about the complexity of 
managing KaRIn's schedule due to having multiple contributing 
partners. To mitigate this risk the project plans to define interfaces 
and test plans early in development and maintain parallel development 
schedules. The project is also concerned about the lack of redundancy 
in the instrument. Project officials told us that the project is 
mitigating this risk by using redundancy in select areas, as well as 
focusing on obtaining high reliability parts and instituting a robust 
test program. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SWOT project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of SWOT assessment] 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment: 

Common Name: TDRS. 

Formulation: 
02/07: Formulation start; 
07/08: Mission/System design review; 
03/09: Preliminary design review. 

Implementation: 
07/09: Project confirmation; 
02/10: Critical design review; 
08/11: System integration review (TDRS K); 
06/12: System integration review (TDRS L); 
01/30/13: Launch date (TDRS K); 
12/13: GAO review; 
01/23/14: Launch date (TDRS L). 

Previously Reported Challenges 
* Test and Integration; 
* Contractor;
* Launch; 
* Technology; 
* Parts. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 

Partner: Non-NASA Agencies. 

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, FL; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V. 

Mission Duration: 15 years. 

Requirement derived from: 
Support and expand existing TDRS System fleet. 

Contract Information: 
Current highest value contract. 

Contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems. 

Contractor Activity: Spacecraft development. 

Type of Contract: Fixed Price Incentive Fee; 
Date of Award: December 2007; 
Initial Value of Contract: $1.38 billion[A]; 
Current Value: $1.151 billion[A]. 

[A] This represents the full cost of the Boeing contract that NASA is 
managing; however, the cost is shared with NASA's partners and includes 
options for future versions of the spacecraft. 

Project Performance: 
Then year dollars in millions. 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline estimate FY 2010: $451.3; 
Latest, February 2013: $426.5; 
Change: -5.5%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline estimate FY 2010: $241.9; 
Latest, February 2013: $241.9; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost[A]: 
Baseline estimate FY 2010: $209.4;
Latest, February 2013: $184.6; 
Change: -11.8%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline estimate FY 2010: $0.0; 
Latest, February 2013: $0.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Launch Schedule: L: 
Baseline estimate FY 2010: December 2012; 
Latest, February 2013: January 20134; 
Change: 1 month. 

Note: NASA's contract with Boeing covers development of both TDRS K 
and TDRS L. 

The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) System consists of in-
orbit communication satellites stationed at geosynchronous altitude 
coupled with two ground stations located in New Mexico and Guam. The 
satellite network and ground stations provide mission services for near-
Earth user satellites and orbiting vehicles. TDRS K and L are the 11th 
and 12th satellites, respectively, to be built for the TDRS system. 
They are planned to contribute to the existing network by providing 
continuous high-bandwidth digital voice, video, and mission payload 
data, as well as health and safety data relay services to Earth-
orbiting spacecraft such as the International Space Station and the 
Hubble Space Telescope. 

Project Summary: 

TDRS K launched in January 2013 and NASA accepted it for deployment as 
part of the agency's space communications network on August 16, 2013. 
The project office completed final integrated systems testing on TDRS 
L in February 2013, and following a 6-month storage period, launched 
as planned on January 23, 2014. TDRS L will undergo a 3-month on-orbit 
check out period and additional tests will be conducted before the 
satellite is put into service. The project office reported progress 
toward resolving technical challenges noted during TDRS K's on-orbit 
acceptance period, including issues related to the spacecraft's 
gyroscope, single-access antenna, satellite coordination and 
communication with ground stations, and battery. NASA officials told 
GAO that resolution of these TDRS K issues will provide valuable 
insights to address potential issues with TDRS L. 

Project Office Comments: 

The TDRS project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of TDRS assessment] 

Commercial Crew Program: 

Common Name: CCP. 

2010–2012: Development phase; 
2012–2014: Integrated capabilities phase; 
2013: Certification products contract; 
2014–2017: Transportation capabilities phase 
2017: Transportation missions. 

Project Challenges: 
* Funding; 
* Schedule. 

Project Essentials: 

NASA Center Lead: 
Kennedy Space Center. 

Partners: Boeing, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX Requirement derived from: 
NASA Strategic Plan. 

Partner Essentials: 

Integrated Capabilities Phase: 

Then year dollars in millions: 

Boeing: 
Milestones Completed: 15/20 (75%) 
Total agreement value: $480.0; 
Total awards to date: $620.9. 

Sierra Nevada: 
Milestones Completed: 8/13 (62%) 
Total agreement value: $227.5; 
Total awards to date: $363.1. 

Space X: 
Milestones Completed: 12/17 (71%) 
Total agreement value: $460.0; 
Total awards to date: $544.6. 

Sum: 
Milestones Completed: 35/50 (70%) 
Total agreement value: $1.1675. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: NASA. 

[End of section] 

The purpose of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is to facilitate the 
development of a safe transportation system, which will enable at 
least one partner to transport NASA astronauts and cargo to and from 
the International Space Station. NASA is currently working with three 
funded industry partners through Space Act Agreements. The National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 authorized NASA to enter into 
agreements with public and private entities outside of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. Agreements entered into under the Act's “other 
transactions” authority are commonly referred to as Space Act 
Agreements. The partners – Boeing, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX – are each 
responsible for all aspects of design and development of a crew 
transportation system. 

CCP is a multi-phase effort that started in 2010 to stimulate private-
sector interest in providing commercial space transportation 
capabilities. The first phases of the program included the Commercial 
Crew Development (CCDev) and Commercial Crew Development Round 2 
(CCDev 2) which were intended to allow partners to develop 
transportation system concepts and system elements. This phase was 
followed by the Commercial Crew Integrated Capabilities (CCiCap) 
phase-—the current phase of the program—-with the objective of 
developing an integrated crew transportation system. Concurrently, 
partners are working on the Certification Products Contract, the 
purpose of which is to ensure their space systems meet NASA safety and 
operational requirements. Finally, the Commercial Crew Transportation 
Capabilities phase (CCtCap) is a phased acquisition approach that will 
result in each applicable transportation system's final certification 
and will include two to six missions to the International Space 
Station to transfer NASA crew members and provide emergency crew 
return capability. 

Program Challenges: 

According to program officials, the biggest challenges that the 
program faces include funding and technical problems that could impact 
schedule. Program officials stated that if adequate funding is not 
received, then competition will be limited moving toward International 
Space Station (ISS) crew transportation missions. This could result in 
increased cost of commercially available transportation capabilities. 
Additionally, program officials state that complications such as 
development of the system to allow the commercial vehicles to dock 
with ISS may affect the program's schedule. The program also continues 
to work toward closing a risk related to Federal Aviation 
Administration licensing issues. Program delays could increase costs 
as NASA would need to prolong its reliance on foreign capabilities for 
transportation services to the ISS. 

In March 2013, an independent cost assessment was conducted and found 
that the program showed evidence of adopting best practices in 
resource and budget planning. According to the independent assessment, 
if funding continues as planned, the program should be able to meet 
the goal of commercial crew capability for one or two partners. After 
this assessment, NASA exercised optional milestones worth $55 million 
for the Integrated Capabilities phase, in order to reduce technical 
risks. 

Boeing: 

Boeing has completed 15 out of 20 milestones for the Commercial Crew 
Integrated Capabilities (CCiCap) phase of the program while 
simultaneously working to complete deliverables for the Certification 
Products Contract for its CST-100 spacecraft. Of the 12 completed 
milestones, 2 were delayed from the initially planned dates – the 
launch vehicle adapter PDR and the engine development test. The design 
of this spacecraft is going to include a crew as well as a cargo 
configuration. Additionally, the spacecraft is being designed to be 
reusable for up to 10 missions. Boeing is making progress on the 
spacecraft and conducted a critical design review in February 2014 on 
the primary structures of the capsule. Boeing has chosen the Atlas-V 
as the initial launch vehicle, but plans to make the CST-100 
compatible with multiple launch vehicles. Boeing completed its 
certification plan review in November 2013. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Boeing. 

[End of figure] 

Milestone timeline: 
11/13: Certification plan review; 
12/13: Avionics demo test; 
02/14: Primary structures CDR; 
4/14: Software CDR. 

Sierra Nevada: 

Sierra Nevada has completed 8 out of 13 milestones for the integrated 
capabilities phase of the program while simultaneously working to 
complete deliverables for the certification products contract for its 
Dream Chaser spacecraft. Of the 8 completed milestones, 2 were delayed 
from the initially planned dates—-the integrated system review and the 
system safety analysis review-—and one was accelerated. The program 
reported that a free flight aerodynamics test conducted in October 
2013 met the success criteria per the Commercial Crew Development 
Phase 2 Space Act Agreement, despite an anomaly that caused the 
spacecraft's left side landing gear to not deploy. Sierra Nevada plans 
for the spacecraft to launch on an Atlas-V launch vehicle, but upon re-
entry it will operate similar to an airplane in that it will glide in 
and will be able to land at any airport that is capable of handling 
commercial traffic. The Dream Chaser will be able to transport five 
crew to and from low earth orbit and will be capable of autonomous 
flight if needed. The certification plan review was completed in 
November 2013. Sierra Nevada is working towards risk reduction and 
technology readiness level advancement testing that is scheduled for 
May 2014. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2013 Sierra Nevada Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

Milestone timeline: 
10/13: System safety review; 
11/13: Certification plan review; 
02/14: Wind tunnel testing; 
05/14: Risk Reduction and TRL Advancement Testing. 

Spacex: 

SpaceX has completed 12 out of 17 milestones and is proceeding through 
the integrated capabilities phase of the program while simultaneously 
working to complete deliverables for the certification products 
contract for its modified DragonRider spacecraft. Of the 12 completed 
milestones, 1 was completed after the initially planned date – the 
delta ground systems preliminary design review. The cargo version of 
the Dragon capsule has already carried cargo to the International 
Space Station. SpaceX completed its on-orbit and entry preliminary 
design review in July 2013 and demonstrated that it was capable of 
docking with the International Space Station and that its flight 
characteristics meet risk and schedule constraints that establish the 
basis for moving forward with more detailed design work. In November 
2013, SpaceX conducted a flight review of the upgraded Falcon 9 launch 
vehicle that will utilize a more powerful engine and a triple-
redundant avionics system. SpaceX completed its human certification 
plan review in May 2013 and is making progress towards its critical 
design review that is scheduled for April 2014. 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2013 Space Exploration Technologies Corp. 

[End of figure] 

Milestone timeline: 
10/13: System safety review; 
11/13: Flight review; 
12/13: Delta Ground Systems PDR; 
04/14: Integrated CDR; 
05/14: Dragon Primary Structure Qualification. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Commercial Crew program provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The program 
stated that it is building on the success of NASA's commercial cargo 
partnerships to achieve a certified crew transportation capability by 
2017 and investing in three companies to promote competition and 
innovation. In parallel, the program stated that early certification 
products including verification plans and hazard reports are being 
developed and matured. The program also noted that the request for 
proposal for the Commercial Crew Transportation Capabilities contract 
has been released. Officials stated that funding at the requested 
level will ensure that the next phase of the program will be awarded 
before the end of 2014 which will keep the program on track to deliver 
a certified system by 2017 and re-establish a United States capability 
to transport crew to and from the International Space Station. 

[End of CPP assessment] 

[End of section] 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for its review and comment. 
In its written response, NASA generally agreed with our findings and 
stated that it remains dedicated to continuous improvement of its 
acquisition management processes and performance, and will continue to 
identify and address the challenges that lead to cost and schedule 
growth on its major projects. 

In commenting on how current information is incorporated to track the 
cost and schedule progress of its major projects, the agency indicated 
that when a project is rebaselined there are often significant changes 
to its scope. As a result, the agency asserts that it is important and 
more accurate to track metrics that reflect progress against the new 
baseline and current scope. However, GAO also uses these metrics to 
support our assessment of whether sufficient progress has been made in 
the area of acquisition management to warrant removal from GAO's High 
Risk List. While we agree that holding projects accountable on an 
ongoing basis to new baselines that reflect the current scope of work 
is appropriate, GAO's assessment of NASA's progress in improving its 
acquisition management practices over time would be rendered useless 
if every time a project is rebaselined the metrics were reset to 
reflect new project baselines. We will continue to work with NASA to 
ensure a shared understanding of how NASA measures progress in 
relation to its high risk metrics. 

NASA's written comments are reprinted in appendix VI. NASA also 
provided technical comments. We carefully considered and incorporated 
those changes that were supported by evidence consistent with GAO 
standards and our role as an independent auditor of executive agencies. 

We are sending copies of the report to NASA's administrator and 
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bill Nelson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Cruz: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Science and Space: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Chaka Fattah: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Steven Palazzo: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Donna F. Edwards: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Space: 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to discuss broader trends and challenges faced by 
the agency in its management of acquisitions and to report on the 
status and challenges faced by 18 National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) major projects and the Commercial Crew program 
with life-cycle costs of $250 million or more. Specifically, we 
assessed (1) the current status of NASA's portfolio of major projects, 
(2) NASA's progress in developing and maturing critical technologies 
(3) efforts NASA has taken to improve the design stability of its 
projects, and (4) any remaining challenges to NASA's management of the 
portfolio. 

To respond to these objectives, we collected and analyzed data from 
May 2013 to April 2014 as well as data from prior reviews. We 
developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was 
completed by each project office. Through the DCI, we gathered and 
assessed data on each project's technology and design maturity, parts 
issues, and development partners. We developed other DCIs that were 
completed by NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) and 
Office of Procurement that gathered data on each project's cost 
performance, current and projected development activities (including 
the project's schedule and manifested/committed launch readiness 
dates), and contracts information.[Footnote 33] NASA updated these 
data collection instruments in February 2014. NASA's Office of the 
Chief Engineer provided data on software-related metrics for selected 
projects. We evaluated projects' monthly or quarterly status reports 
and other project documentation. We also conducted interviews with 
officials from 14 of the 18 projects in our sample, officials from the 
Commercial Crew program, as well as with NASA headquarters and 
contractor officials to identify and understand projects' progress to 
date and any risks. For the Commercial Crew program, we reviewed Space 
Act Agreement values for each of the three funded partners, as well as 
both partner and NASA generated information and partner milestone 
performance and schedules and NASA information on program risks and 
partner performance.[Footnote 34] The Commercial Crew program differs 
from other NASA's other major projects in that NASA's approach to the 
program included having contractors provide significant financial 
investment in the development of their transportation systems. NASA's 
intent is to encourage private sector innovation by having commercial 
partners maintain ownership of the space vehicles and systems they 
develop, while NASA would receive the ancillary benefits of being able 
to eventually use the emerging commercial products to procure safe, 
reliable transportation services to the space station at a reasonable 
price. We reviewed the data and performed various checks to determine 
that the data were reliable for the purposes of this report. Where we 
discovered discrepancies, we clarified the data accordingly with 
agency and project officials. 

The information collected from each project office, Mission 
Directorate, and OCFO was summarized in a project assessment providing 
a project overview; key cost, contract, and schedule data; and a 
discussion of the challenges associated with the deviation from 
relevant indicators from best practice standards. The aggregate 
measures and averages calculated were analyzed for meaningful 
relationships, for example, relationship between cost growth and 
schedule slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at critical 
milestones and through the various stages of the project life cycle. 

To assess the current status of NASA's portfolio of major projects, we 
reviewed current cost and schedule data, technology maturity, design 
stability, and other challenges affecting each of the projects. To 
determine the extent to which each project exceeded its cost and 
schedule baselines, we compared the current cost and schedule data 
reported by NASA in February 2014 to previously established project 
cost and schedule baselines to determine the extent to which each 
project exceeded its baselines. We identified cost and/or schedule 
growth as significant where, in either case, a project's cost and/or 
its schedule exceeded the thresholds that trigger reporting to certain 
Senate and House committees.[Footnote 35] We also compared the average 
development cost growth and average schedule delay since our initial 
assessment in 2009 to this year's average development cost growth and 
average schedule delay to determine whether NASA major projects had 
improved in adhering to cost and schedule baselines. All cost 
information is presented in nominal then-year dollars for consistency 
with budget data.[Footnote 36] Current baseline costs are adjusted to 
reflect the cost accounting structure in NASA's fiscal year 2009 
budget estimates. For the fiscal year 2009 budget request, NASA 
changed its accounting practices from full-cost accounting to 
reporting only direct costs at the project level. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked project officials to provide 
the technology readiness levels of each of the project's critical and 
heritage technologies at various stages of project development--
including the preliminary design review--and compared those levels 
against our technology maturity best practice to determine the extent 
to which the portfolio was meeting the criteria. Our work has shown 
that a technology readiness level of 6--demonstrating a technology as 
a fully integrated prototype in a relevant environment--by the 
preliminary design review is the level of maturity needed to minimize 
risks for space systems entering product development. Originally 
developed by NASA, technology readiness levels are measured on a scale 
of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a technology's 
feasibility and culminating with a technology fully integrated into a 
completed product. See appendix IV for the definitions of technology 
readiness levels. We also compared this year's results against those 
in prior years to assess whether NASA was improving in this area. We 
did not assess technology maturity for those projects that had not yet 
reached the preliminary design review at the time of this assessment. 
We also collected information on the use of heritage technologies in 
the projects, including what heritage technologies were being used; 
what effort was needed to modify the form, fit, and function of the 
technology for use in the new system; whether the project encountered 
any problems in modifying the technology; and whether the project 
considered the heritage technology as a risk to the project. 

To assess design stability, we asked project officials to provide the 
number of engineering drawings completed or projected for release by 
the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our current 
assessment.[Footnote 37] In most cases, we did not verify or validate 
the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the project office. 
However, we collected the project offices' rationale for cases where 
it appeared that only a small number of drawings were completed by the 
time of the design reviews or where the project office reported 
significant growth in the number of drawings released after the 
critical design review. In accordance with best practices, projects 
were assessed as having achieved design stability if at least 90 
percent of projected drawings were releasable by the critical design 
review. We compared this year's results against those in prior years 
to assess whether NASA was improving in this area. We did not assess 
design stability for those projects that had not yet reached the 
critical design review at the time of this assessment. We also 
reviewed NASA's implementation of its technical performance metrics 
and how the projects were meeting those metrics in response to our 
prior recommendation that the agency develop a consistent set of 
proven metrics to assess design stability.[Footnote 38] On February 
14, 2013, we convened a meeting of experts, to discuss additional 
approaches for measuring design stability across a range of unique 
space acquisition projects. We contracted with the National Academy of 
Sciences to select and recruit a panel of experts with a range of in-
depth experience in engineering and managing unique space acquisition 
projects. We analyzed the input provided by the experts and following 
the meeting distributed a questionnaire to each of the experts asking 
them to comment on the utility for measuring design stability of 12 
metrics that were identified by the experts during the meeting. Based 
on their responses, we reviewed selected documentation from NASA's 
projects to identify whether projects were currently tracking and 
reporting the most useful metrics as identified by the experts. 

To identify any remaining challenges to continued improvement, we 
reviewed outstanding issues identified in our prior work on NASA, such 
as cost and schedule growth on one of NASA's most technologically 
advanced and costly projects and assessed NASA's efforts to make 
progress on these issues. To understand how NASA is managing large and 
complex missions within the current budget environment, we examined 
NASA's budget documentation. To understand budget uncertainty at NASA 
we obtained and analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency 
officials to understand the impact of the government shutdown and 
fiscal year 2013 sequestration and the ability of NASA and projects to 
execute their current plans under such funding constraints. To assess 
NASA's approach for continuing to improve its acquisition management 
practices and project oversight, we reviewed NASA's metrics for 
measuring acquisition management and supporting data. We also reviewed 
project documentation and held interviews with projects that had moved 
into implementation but were still experiencing issues with resources 
and known risks. To assess NASA implementation of the joint cost and 
schedule confidence level (JCL) process, we analyzed a number of 
projects in our review that had developed JCLs, spoke with projects 
about the development of their JCL, and interviewed project officials 
on the guidance they had provided to projects on formulating their 
JCLs. We also reviewed JCLs for projects that had established them at 
the key decision point C (KDP-C). To assess NASA's efforts to create 
reliable cost estimates, we reviewed eight project's life cycle cost 
estimates provided by NASA and compared them to the project's 
committed baselines to determine whether the baseline cost fell within 
the estimate, or by what percentage it fell above or below the 
estimate. 

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 
D.C. In addition, we visited Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 
Maryland; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California; 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida; Marshall Space Flight Center in 
Huntsville, Alabama; and contractor facilities in Canoga Park, 
California and Promontory, Utah to discuss individual projects. 

Project Profile Information on Each Individual Project Assessment: 

This year, we developed project assessments for the 18 projects in the 
portfolio with an estimated life cycle cost greater than $250 million. 
We also assessed the Commercial Crew program which has a life cycle 
cost greater than $250 million and recently entered a phase which 
include development activities. For each project assessment we 
included a description of each project's objectives, information 
concerning the NASA center, major contractor, or other partner 
involved in the project, the project's cost and schedule performance, 
a schedule timeline identifying key project dates, and a brief 
narrative describing the current status of the project. As applicable, 
we included a detailed discussion of project challenges for selected 
projects. For LADEE, SOFIA, and TDRS we produced one-page assessments. 
For LADEE and SOFIA, both projects were nearing the end of development 
work and preparing for their launch or full operation capability, 
respectively, and did not warrant a more detailed discussion. For 
TDRS, the project was in storage from April 2013 through October 2013 
prior to its launch and did not warrant a more detailed discussion. 
For the three page assessment of the Commercial Crew program, we 
additionally included discussions of each of the three funded 
partners' current status and milestone timelines. 

Project cost and schedule performance is outlined according to cost 
and schedule changes in the various stages of the project life cycle. 
To assess the cost and schedule changes of each project, we obtained 
data directly from NASA's OCFO through our data collection instrument. 

The project's timeline is based on acquisition cycle time, which is 
defined as the number of months between the project's start, or 
formulation start, and projected or actual launch date.[Footnote 39] 
Formulation start generally refers to the initiation of a project; 
NASA refers to a project's start as KDP-A, or the beginning of the 
formulation phase. The preliminary design review typically occurs 
toward the end of the formulation phase, followed by a review at KDP-
C, known as project confirmation, which allows the project to move 
into the implementation phase. The critical design review is generally 
held during the latter half of the final design and fabrication phase 
of implementation and demonstrates that the maturity of the design is 
appropriate to support continuing with the final design and 
fabrication phase. The manifested launch date is the launch date which 
the project is working toward, and when a launch vehicle is available 
to launch the project. This date is only a goal launch date for the 
project, not a commitment that they will launch on this date. The 
committed launch readiness date is determined through a launch 
readiness review that verifies that the launch system and 
spacecraft/payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase 
includes the operations of the mission and concludes with project 
disposal. 

Project Challenges Discussion on Each Individual Project Assessment: 

To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a DCI 
to each project office. In the DCI, we requested information on the 
maturity of critical and heritage technologies, number of releasable 
design drawings at project milestones, software development 
information, project contractors with related contract values and 
award fees, and project partnerships. We also held interviews with 
representatives from 14 of the projects and the Commercial Crew 
program to discuss the information on the DCI. Four projects--SOFIA, 
LADEE, TDRS, and MAVEN--provided written responses. These discussions 
led to identification of further challenges faced by NASA projects. We 
then reviewed project documentation--such as the project plans, 
schedules, risk assessments, and major project review documentation--
to corroborate any testimonial evidence we received in the interviews. 
A challenge was identified for a project if project performance had 
been or could be affected by the issue. For this year's report, we 
identified the following challenges across the projects we reviewed: 
launch, contractor management, integration of existing hardware, 
parts, development partners, funding, workforce, design, technology, 
and test and integration. These challenges do not represent an 
exhaustive or exclusive list. They are subject to change and evolve as 
we continue this annual assessment in future years. The challenges, 
indicated as "issues" in each project assessment, are based on our 
definitions and assessments, not that of NASA. 

To supplement our analysis, we relied on our work over past years 
examining acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These reports 
cover such issues as contracting, program management, acquisition 
policy, and cost estimating. We also have an extensive body of work 
related to challenges NASA has faced with specific system 
acquisitions, financial management, and cost estimating. This work 
provided the context and basis for large parts of the general 
observations we made about the projects we reviewed. 

Data Limitations: 

NASA provided updated cost and schedule data in February 2014 for 
projects in implementation, or 14 of the 18 projects in our review. In 
March 2014, one project - SPP - was confirmed and entered into 
implementation at which time NASA provided cost and schedule data to 
us. NASA provided preliminary estimated life-cycle cost ranges and 
associated schedules for four of the projects that had not yet entered 
implementation, which are generally established at KDP-B.[Footnote 40] 
For the Commercial Crew program, NASA provided Space Act Agreement 
values for each of the partners. NASA formally establishes cost and 
schedule baselines, committing itself to cost and schedule targets for 
a project with a specific and aligned set of planned mission 
objectives, at key decision point C, which follows a preliminary 
design review. KDP-C reflects the life-cycle point where NASA approves 
a project to leave the formulation phase and enter into the 
implementation phase. NASA explained that preliminary estimates are 
generated for internal planning and fiscal year budgeting purposes at 
KDP-B, which occurs midstream in the formulation phase, and hence, are 
not considered a formal commitment by the agency on cost and schedule 
for the mission deliverables. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to April 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's Annual 
Assessments: 

We have reviewed 38 major National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) projects or programs since our initial review in 
2009. See table 2 below for a list of projects included in our 
assessments from 2009 to 2014 and whether each project was in 
formulation or implementation at the time of our review. 

Table 2: Selected Major NASA Projects and Programs Reviewed in GAO's 
Annual Assessments: 

Projects in formulation: 

2009: 
Ares I; 
GPM; 
JWST; 
LDCM; 
Orion. 

2010:
Ares I; 
GPM; 
LDCM; 
Orion. 

2011: 
Ares I[C]; 
ICESat-2; 
Orion[C]; 
SMAP; 
SPP, 

2012: 
EMTGO; 
ICESat-2; 
Orion MPCV[D]; 
SLS; 
SMAP; 
SPP. 

2013: 
EMTGO[C]; 
Orion MPCV[D]; 
OSIRIS-REx; 
SPP; 
SLS; 
SGSS. 

2014: 
Orion[D]; 
SLS; 
SWOT. 

Projects in implementation: 

2009: 
Aquarius; 
Dawn[A]; 
GLAST[A]; 
Glory; 
Herschel; 
Kepler; 
LRO; 
MSL; 
NPP; 
OCO[B]; 
SDO; 
SOFIA; 
WISE. 

2010: 
Aquarius; 
Glory; 
GRAIL; 
Herschel[A]; 
Juno; 
JWST; 
Kepler[A]; 
LRO[A]; 
MMS; 
MSL; 
NPP; 
RBSP; 
SDO[A]; 
SOFIA; 
WISE[A]. 

2011: 
Aquarius; 
Glory[B]; 
GPM; 
GRAIL; 
Juno; 
JWST; 
LADEE; 
LDCM; 
MAVEN; 
MMS; 
MSL; 
NPP; 
OCO-2; 
RBSP; 
SOFIA; 
TDRS Replenishment. 

2012: 
Aquarius[A]; 
GPM; 
GRAIL[A]; 
Juno[A]; 
JWST; 
LADEE; 
LDCM; 
MAVEN; 
MMS; 
MSL[A]; 
NPP[A]; 
OCO-2; 
RBSP; 
SOFIA; 
TDRS Replenishment. 

2013: 
GPM; 
ICESat-2; 
JWST; 
LADEE; 
LDCM[A]; 
MAVEN; 
MMS; 
OCO-2; 
RBSP[A]; 
SMAP; 
SOFIA; 
TDRS Replenishment[A]. 

2014: 
GPMa; 
GRACE-FO ICESAT-2;
InSight;
JWST;
LADEE[A];
MMS;
MAVEN[A];
OCO-2;
OSIRIS-REx;
SMAP;
SPP;
SGSS;
SOFIA;
TDRS Replenishment[A]. 

Commercial Crew: 

2014: 
CST-100 (Boeing); 
DreamChaser (SierraNevada); 
DragonRider (Space-X). 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[A] NASA projects that have launched. 

[B] NASA projects that have launched but failed to reach orbit. 

[C] NASA projects that were canceled before entering implementation. 

[D] In 2014, NASA adopted Orion has the common name for Orion MPCV; the 
project did not change. This Orion project stems from the original 
Orion project that was canceled in June 2011 when the Constellation 
program was canceled after facing significant technical and funding 
issues. During the closeout process for the Constellation program, NASA 
identified elements of the Ares I and Orion projects that would be 
transitioned for use on the new Space Launch System and Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle programs. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Selected Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO's 2014 
Annual Assessment: 

The content of figure 2 is presented below in a noninteractive format. 

Projects In Formulation: 

Project: Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion): 
Launch Readiness Date: August 2021: 
Project Summary: Orion is being developed to enable astronauts to 
explore deep space and to transport crew to the International Space 
Station as a backup capability if necessary.
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life-Cycle Cost: $8.53 - 10.29 billion: 

Project: Space Launch System (SLS): 
Launch Readiness Date: December 2017: 
Project Summary: SLS, a human heavy-lift launch vehicle, is being 
developed to launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and enable 
deep-space exploration by humans.
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life-Cycle Cost: $7.65 - $8.59 billion: 

Project: Surface Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT): 
Launch Readiness Date: October 2020: 
Project Summary: SWOT is a joint project between NASA and the French 
Space Agency that will collect measurements of the world's oceans and 
freshwater bodies to develop a global survey which will make it 
possible to estimate water discharge into rivers more accurately, and 
help improve flood and weather prediction.
Preliminary Estimate of Project Life-Cycle Cost: $642-$752 million: 

Projects In Implementation: 

Project: Global Precipitation Measurement Mission (GPM): 
Launch Date: February 27, 2014: 
Project Summary: The GPM mission is a joint project between NASA and 
the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency that seeks to improve the 
scientific understanding of the global water cycle and the accuracy of 
precipitation forecasts.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $928.1 million: 

Project: Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow On (GRACE-FO): 
Launch Readiness Date: February 2018: 
Project Summary: GRACE-FO is a joint effort with the German Research 
Center for Geosciences (GFZ) that will provide global high-resolution 
models of Earth's gravity field, which will provide increased insight 
into water movement on and beneath the Earth's surface over a 5-year 
mission period.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $431.9 million: 

Project: Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2): 
Launch Readiness Date: May 2017 (under review): 
Project Summary: ICESat-2, a follow-on mission to ICESat, will measure 
changes in polar ice-sheet mass in order to better understand 
mechanisms that drive changes in ice thickness and the impact of 
change on global sea level.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $860.3 million (under review): 

Project: Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, 
and Heat Transport (InSight): 
Launch Readiness Date: March 2016: 
Project Summary: InSight is a Mars lander intended to help NASA 
understand the formation and evolution of terrestrial planets, and 
determine the present level of tectonic activity and meteorite impact 
rate on Mars.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $675.1 million: 

Project: James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 
Launch Readiness Date: October 2018: 
Project Summary: JWST is designed to help understand the origin and 
destiny of the universe, the creation and evolution of the first stars 
and galaxies, the formation of stars and planetary systems, and 
characteristics of planetary systems.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $8.83 billion: 

Project: Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE): 
Launch Date: September 6, 2013: 
Project Summary: The LADEE mission will assess the global density, 
composition, and time variability of the lunar atmosphere.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $281.5 million: 

Project: Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS): 
Launch Readiness Date: March 2015: 
Project Summary: MMS is planned to use the Earth's magnetosphere as a 
laboratory to study the microphysics of magnetic reconnection. The 
data will help predict space weather in support of terrestrial and 
space exploration activities.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $1.08 billion: 

Project: Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN): 
Launch Date: November 18, 2013: 
Project Summary: MAVEN is a robotic orbiter intended to deliver 
comprehensive answers to long-standing questions regarding the loss of 
Mars' atmosphere, climate history, liquid water, and habitability.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $636.5 million: 

Project: Orbiting Carbon Observatory 2 (OCO-2): 
Launch Readiness Date: February 2015: 
Project Summary: OCO-2 is planned to make precise, time-dependent 
global measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide and is expected to 
enhance understanding of the carbon cycle which should improve 
predictions of future atmospheric carbon dioxide increases and their 
potential impact on the climate.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $467.5 million: 

Project: Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-
Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx): 
Launch Readiness Date: October 2016: 
Project Summary: OSIRIS-REx will travel to a near-Earth asteroid and 
use a robotic arm to retrieve samples to help further understanding of 
our solar system's formation and how life began. If successful, OSIRIS-
REx will be the first U.S. mission to return samples from an asteroid 
to Earth.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $1.06 billion: 

Project: Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP): 
Launch Readiness Date: March 2015: 
Project Summary: The SMAP mission is designed to provide soil moisture 
measurements and its freeze/thaw state that will improve understanding 
of regional and global water cycles and climate changes, and improve 
the accuracy of weather, flood, and drought forecasts.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $914.6 million: 

Project: Solar Probe Plus (SPP): 
Launch Readiness Date: August 2018: 
Project Summary: SPP is designed to explore the Sun's outer atmosphere 
to further the science of heliophysics by shedding light on the origin 
and evolution of solar wind and why the Sun's outer atmosphere is so 
much hotter than the visible surface.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $1.55 billion: 

Project: Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS): 
Completion Date: June 2017 (under review): 
Project Summary: SGSS plans to develop and deliver a new ground system 
that will enable the Space Network--which provides essential 
communications and tracking services to NASA and non-NASA missions--to 
continue safe, reliable, and cost efficient operations for the next 
several decades.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $493.9 million (under review): 

Project: Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA): 
Full Operational Capability: April 2014: 
Project Summary: SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the German 
Aerospace Center to install a 2.5 meter telescope in a specially 
modified Boeing 747SP aircraft to study many different kinds of 
astronomical objects and phenomena, for example planets, comets, and 
asteroids in our solar system.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $2.99 billion: 

Project: Tracking and Data Relay Satellite K/L (TDRS): 
Launch Date: January 23, 2014 (TDRS L): 
Project Summary: The TDRS System provides mission services for near-
Earth user satellites and orbiting vehicles. TDRS L will contribute to 
the existing satellite network by providing continuous high-bandwidth 
digital voice, video, and mission payload data relay services to Earth-
orbiting spacecraft.
Latest Estimate of Total Project Cost: $426.5 million: 

Commercial Crew Program: 

Project: CST-100 (Boeing): 
Project Summary: CCP is a multi-phase effort to stimulate private-
sector interest in providing commercial space transportation 
capabilities. Boeing's CST-100 spacecraft is being designed to include 
a crew as well as a cargo configuration and to be reusable for up to 
10 missions.
Space Act Agreement Total: $480.0 million: 

Project: Dream Chaser (Sierra Nevada): 
Project Summary: CCP is a multi-phase effort to stimulate private-
sector interest in providing commercial space transportation 
capabilities. Sierra Nevada plans that its Dream Chaser spacecraft 
should be able to transport five crew to and from low earth orbit and 
will be capable of autonomous flight if needed.
Space Act Agreement Total: $227.5 million: 

Project: DragonRider (SpaceX): 
Project Summary: CCP is a multi-phase effort to stimulate private-
sector interest in providing commercial space transportation 
capabilities. The cargo version of the Dragon capsule has already 
carried cargo to the International Space Station and is being modified 
to launch crew aboard a Falcon 9 rocket.
Space Act Agreement Total: $460.0 million: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale individual 
components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard; Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of ad-hoc hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware: Low fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale components 
to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or form or fit 
but representative of technically feasible approach suitable for 
flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include high-fidelity 
laboratory integration of components; 
Hardware: High-fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent but not 
necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight, materials, etc). Should be 
approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of several 
components with reasonably realistic support elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not 
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit, and function. 
Probably includes the integration of many new components and realistic 
supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function integrated with 
other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate full 
functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications; 
Hardware: Flight qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight-proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form 
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last 
"bug-fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include 
using the system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Elements of a Sound Business Case: 

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) projects 
can provide early recognition of challenges, allow managers to take 
corrective action, and place needed and justifiable projects in a 
better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice organizations 
show the risks inherent in NASA's work can be mitigated by developing 
a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new 
product's development.[Footnote 41] In its simplest form, a knowledge-
based business case is evidence that (1) the customer's needs are 
valid and can best be met with the chosen concept and that (2) the 
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing 
resources--that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate 
funding, adequate time, and adequate workforce to deliver the product 
when needed. A program should not be approved to go forward into 
product development unless a sound business case can be made. If the 
business case measures up, the organization commits to the development 
of the product, including making the financial investment. The 
building of knowledge consists of information that should be gathered 
at these three critical points over the course of a program: 

* When a project begins development, the customer's needs should match 
the developer's available resources--mature technologies, time, and 
funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of 
the technologies required to meet customer needs--referred to as 
critical technologies. If the project is relying on heritage--or pre-
existing--technology, that technology must be in the appropriate form, 
fit, and function to address the customer's needs within available 
resources. The project will generally enter development after 
completing the preliminary design review, at which time a business 
case should be in hand. 

* Then, about midway through the project's development, its design 
should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance 
requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point in 
time because it generally signifies when the program is ready to start 
building production-representative prototypes. If project development 
continues without design stability, costly re-designs to address 
changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges can occur. 

* Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 
shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 
have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate 
that it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. 
Lack of testing increases the possibility that project managers will 
not have information that could help avoid costly system failures in 
late stages of development or during system operations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Office of the Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

April 8, 2014: 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
draft report entitled "Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects" 
(GAO-14-338SP). NASA remains dedicated to continuous improvement of 
its acquisition management processes and performance and will continue 
to work with GAO to identify and address any challenges that may lead 
to cost and schedule growth of our projects. 

The GAO's Congressionally-mandated annual assessment is a good 
opportunity for NASA to receive an independent perspective on its 
performance in acquisition of major programs and projects. While we 
are not always fully in agreement, we appreciate the GAO's insights 
and the opportunity for open dialogue. NASA values the continued 
constructive communications between NASA and the GAO on this effort 
and appreciates the ongoing work by the GAO assessment team. We would 
also like to thank the GAO for considering and incorporating many 
technical corrections provided by the projects' subject matter experts 
as part of the audit. Inclusion of these comments is important to 
present an accurate and balanced view of the projects' technical 
status. 

NASA is pleased that the GAO has recognized NASA's achievements over 
the past year, including the successful launch of four projects in 
2013 and early 2014. Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Explorer (LADEE) was 
launched from Wallops Flight Facility, VA on September 6, 2013. After 
being successfully inserted into lunar orbit, LADEE conducted science 
operations to gather detailed information about the structure and 
composition of the thin lunar atmosphere and determine whether dust is 
being lofted into the lunar sky, as well as demonstrated very high-
rate laser communications. LADEE is expected to impact the Moon by 
April 24, 2014, taking science data through its decent. Mars 
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) was launched on November 18, 
2013, and the initial checkouts of all payloads on the spacecraft were 
completed in February 2014, with everything performing as expected. 
The spacecraft will enter orbit around Mars in September 2014. The 
second of NASA's three next-generation Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellites (TDRS), TDRS-L, launched on January 23, 2014, and is 
currently undergoing on-orbit checkout activities. TDRS-L bolsters our 
network of satellites that provides essential communications to 
support space exploration and improves the overall health and longevity
of this system. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM), a joint Earth-
observing mission between NASA and the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA), was launched February 27, 2014, and is undergoing 
checkout activities and internal calibrations in preparation for full 
operations. As the GAO noted, both MAVEN and GPM were launched on 
schedule and within budget. TDRS-L was completed within budget and 
delivered early; however, the launch was delayed one month due to 
launch site availability. LADEE experienced cost growth but was 
launched on schedule. 

The draft report identifies three challenges that could affect NASA's 
continued progress including: (I) managing competing priorities within 
the context of constrained budgets; (2) budget uncertainty; and (3) 
NASA's acquisition management. The first two are closely related, and 
the GAO's report rightly observes that any large cost overruns that 
might occur in NASA's three largest missions--James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST), Space Launch System (SLS), and Orion--would make it 
challenging for NASA to manage its portfolio of projects. We further 
agree with the GAO's assessment that budget uncertainty complicates 
NASA's planning efforts given the complex multiyear planning that is 
required to successfully execute spaceflight projects. To the extent 
possible, NASA's budget planning process tries to account for these 
external factors and look for flexibilities to minimize impact to our 
programs and projects. As described by the GAO, NASA has implemented 
numerous changes to policy and practice. These changes are part of 
NASA's continuous improvement effort to improve acquisition management 
and are targeted at reducing cost and schedule growth within NASA's 
spaceflight projects. 

NASA agrees that we cannot sustain large cost growth or schedule 
overruns on Orion and SLS, and the Agency has learned from the issues 
associated with JWST. Since the rebaseline of JWST in 2011, the 
project has consistently remained within its cost and schedule 2011 
baseline. The project continues to make excellent progress meeting 
critical milestones, including successfully completing the spacecraft 
critical design review (CDR) in January 2014. Orion and SLS are also 
making excellent progress as both proceed toward confirmation this 
year. 

NASA has a long-standing designation as a GAO High Risk area, and the 
GAO has previously identified weaknesses in NASA's cost and schedule 
estimating practices. In response to the High Risk designation, NASA 
created a High Risk Corrective Action Plan in 2007 and in 2008, 
established Success and Supporting Measures in support of the Corrective
Action Plan. To date, six of the seven initiatives NASA identified are 
complete and operational, with additional work remaining in the area 
of cost performance. The current methodology employed to assess 
whether the major development projects are achieving the anticipated 
cost and schedule performance is detailed in the GAO's draft report. 
These metrics were established to help assess whether projects are on 
track to meet their Major Program Annual Report (MPAR) baselines, as 
approved by NASA and Congress. 

NASA missions are technically challenging and typically achieve new 
capabilities for the first time, and the development of those missions 
is high risk by their nature with inherent uncertainties. Through the 
planning and review processes that have been put in place, NASA seeks 
to identify and characterize those risks and uncertainties to inform 
our decision making process, but there remains room for improvement. 
NASA acknowledges that Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite 
(ICESat-2) and Space Network Ground Sustainment (SGSS) experienced 
performance issues shortly after confirmation. The review process 
identified the risks that led to these issues, but underestimated the 
likelihood and impact of those risks as part of the analysis. NASA is 
committed to continuous improvement and evolving our management 
practices to better forecast and address items early and to ensure 
that when there are issues we take appropriate action. Given the 
complexity and uniqueness of our major projects, we are continually 
challenged and faced with issues that we have not encountered before, 
which makes it even more important to NASA to ensure we get the basics 
right in our standard business practices like risk management and our 
acquisition approach. We understand that there is still work to be 
done and look forward to continuing a dialog with the GAO to achieve 
this end. 

As part of NASA's continuous improvement in cost estimating policies and
processes, NASA instituted a Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level 
(JCL) Policy in 2009 (NASA Procedural Directive 1000.5) to increase 
the likelihood of project success at the specified funding level. In 
2010, this policy was further expanded and clarified to require 
projects arriving at Key Decision Point (KDP)-B to produce 
probabilistic estimates of project life-cycle cost and schedule, 
consistent with GAO's 2011 recommendation. In order to manage 
resources, the policy directed projects to develop high and low cost 
and schedule estimates as the basis for their budgets until the Agency 
Baseline Commitment is established at KDP-C. As the GAO observes, 
projects are not always confirmed at a cost and schedule within the 
early estimates. Given the unique characteristics of all NASA 
projects, the Formulation Phase is the time for projects to understand 
and evolve the different technical elements and requirements so that 
the Agency can make a realistic cost and schedule commitment at the 
time of confirmation. Cost and schedule estimates may change as a result
of this iterative process as more is known about the project. 

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E currently stipulates specific
circumstances under which a project will need to be rebaselined and a 
new JCL developed to support a new cost and schedule commitment. These 
requirements have evolved over time, so not all of the projects in 
this year's report were rebaselined at a time when this policy was
in place, including the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared 
Astronomy (SOFIA) and JWST. When a project is rebaselined, there are 
often significant changes to the scope of the mission. It is therefore 
important to track performance against the new baseline since it is a
more accurate reflection of the project. An internal assessment is 
also done to show how the new baseline relates to the original 
baseline and to track any changes. 

NASA is committed to working with the GAO to address any questions. We
appreciate the ongoing opportunity to comment on the assessments and 
will continue to work with the GAO to ensure that comments are 
submitted and appropriately reflected in final reports. If you have 
any questions or require additional information, please contact
Ellen Gertsen at (202) 358-0812. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Robert Lightfoot: 
Associate Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant 
Director; Jessica M. Berkholtz; Laura Greifner; Ramzi N. Nemo; Kenneth 
E. Patton; Carrie Rogers; Sylvia Schatz; Daniel Singleton; Roxanna T. 
Sun; Kristin Van Wychen; and Holly Williams made key contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-276SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr 17, 2013). 

[2] See Explanatory Statement, 155 Cong. Rec. H1653, 1824-25 (daily 
ed., Feb. 23, 2009), to the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-8. In this report, we refer to these projects as major 
projects rather than large-scale projects as this is the term used by 
NASA. 

[3] GAO, Earned Value Management Implementation Across Major 
Spaceflight Projects is Uneven, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-22] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 
2012); Additional Transparency and Design Criteria Needed for National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Projects, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-364R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 
2011); and NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 21, 2005). 

[4] The Commercial Crew program is NASA's effort to facilitate the 
private demonstration of safe, reliable, and cost effective 
transportation services to low-Earth orbit by providing a fixed 
investment in each partner's development of their systems. 

[5] NASA provided updated cost and schedule data for 14 projects in 
implementation in February 2014 and one project in March 2014. 

[6] NASA is required to report to certain committees in the House and 
Senate if the development cost of a program is likely to exceed the 
baseline estimate by 15 percent or more, or if a milestone is likely 
to be delayed by 6 months or more. 51 U.S.C. § 30104(e). 

[7] GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve 
Weapon Acquisition. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 
2004). NASA Procedural Requirements 7123.1B, NASA Systems Engineering 
Processes and Requirements Appendix E (Apr. 18, 2013). 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP]. GAO, Best 
Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves 
Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002). NASA, NASA Space Flight Program and Policy Management Handbook. 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2014). GAO awarded a contract to the 
National Academy of Sciences to convene a meeting of experts. For more 
information about this meeting, please see appendix I. 

[9] NASA defines the formulation phase as the identification of how 
the program or project supports the agency's strategic goals; the 
assessment of feasibility, technology, concepts, and performance of 
trade studies; risk assessment and possible risk mitigations and 
continuous risk management processes; team building, development of 
operations concepts and acquisition strategies; establishment of high-
level requirements, requirements flow down, and success criteria; 
assessing the relevant industrial base/supply chain to ensure program 
or project success, the preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules 
essential to the success of a program or project; and the 
establishment of control systems to ensure performance of those plans 
and alignment with current agency strategies. NASA Procedural 
Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E, paragraph 1.3.1.a (Aug. 14, 2012). The 
implementation phase is defined as the execution of approved plans for 
the development and operation of the program or project, and the use 
of control systems to ensure performance to approved plans and 
requirements and continued alignment with the agency's strategic 
goals. NPR 7120.5E, paragraph 1.3.1.c (Aug. 14, 2012). 

[10] According to NPR 7120.5E, Table 2-5 (Aug. 14, 2012), the 
preliminary design review evaluates the completeness/consistency of 
the planning, technical, and cost/schedule baselines developed during 
formulation. It assesses compliance of the preliminary design with 
applicable requirements, and determines if the project is sufficiently 
mature to begin the final design and fabrication phase. 

[11] The agency baseline commitment establishes and documents an 
integrated set of requirements, cost, schedule, technical content, and 
an agreed-to joint cost and schedule confidence level that forms the 
basis for NASA's commitment with OMB and Congress. NPR 7120.5E, 
Appendix A (Aug. 14, 2012). 

[12] We excluded JWST cost and schedule growth from the portfolio cost 
and schedule growth calculations because including it masks any 
changes in the rest of the portfolio's projects, since the magnitude 
of JWST, both its overall budget and its cost growth, are 
significantly larger than the other projects in the portfolio that are 
in implementation. 

[13] As of the GPM project's February 2014 KDP E review, the project 
office's projections indicated that the mission would launch without 
consuming its entire budget. They expect to update these projections 
in April 2014. The project office descoped one of GPM's two planned 
science instruments in an October 2011 rebaseline effort. 

[14] NASA has defined a payload as an assembled group of subsystems 
designed to perform a specified mission in space. 

[15] Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess 
technology maturity and appendix V contains detailed information about 
the project attributes highlighted by knowledge-based metrics at each 
stage of systems development. 

[16] NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage 
technologies. NASA officials do not believe that heritage technologies 
are the same as critical technologies because they believe critical 
technology does not rely on existing technology. GAO best practices 
describe critical technologies as those that are required for the 
project to successfully meet customer requirements, regardless of 
whether or not they are based on existing or heritage technology. For 
the purposes of this review, we distinguish between the two types 
because NASA did not report heritage technologies as critical 
technologies in our data collection instrument. 

[17] The Science Mission Directorate (SMD) engages the science 
community, sponsors scientific research, and develops and deploys 
satellites and probes in collaboration with NASA's partners around the 
world to answer fundamental questions requiring the view from and into 
space. Excluding the Commercial Crew program, SMD houses 14 of the 18 
projects in our review in its four divisions: Earth Science, Planetary 
Science, Astrophysics and Heliophysics. 

[18] Appendix V contains detailed information about the project 
attributes highlighted by knowledge-based metrics at each stage of 
systems development. Engineering drawings are considered to be a good 
measure of the demonstrated stability of a product's design because 
the drawings represent the language used by engineers to communicate 
to the manufacturers the details of a new product design--what it 
looks like, how its components interface, how it functions, how to 
build it, and what critical materials and processes are required to 
fabricate and test it. Once the design of a product is finalized, the 
drawing is "releasable." Because the critical design review is the 
time in the project's life cycle when the integrity of the project 
design and its ability to meet mission requirements is assessed, it is 
important that a project's design is stable enough to warrant 
continuing with the final design and fabrication phase. A stable 
design allows projects to "freeze" the design and minimize changes 
prior to beginning the fabrication of hardware, after which time re-
engineering and re-work efforts due to design changes can be costly to 
the project in terms of time and funding. 

[19] Mass is a measurement of how much matter is in an object. It is 
related to an object's weight, which is mathematically equal to mass 
multiplied by acceleration due to gravity. Margin is the spare amount 
of mass or power allowed or given for contingencies or special 
situations. A request for action is a formal written request sponsored 
by the review panel asking for additional information or action by the 
project team. It is generally developed as a result of insufficient 
safety, technical, or programmatic information being available at the 
time of the review. 

[20] JWST, one of NASA's most costly science missions, had to secure a 
waiver to the recommended margins because the project did not comply 
with the new Goddard Space Flight Center standards for mass margin at 
the time of the critical design review. 

[21] In February 2013, we convened a meeting of experts to enhance our 
best practice criteria. Details on the panel are explained in appendix 
I. 

[22] GAO, James Webb Space Telescope: Project Meeting Commitments but 
Current Technical, Cost, and Schedule Challenges Could Affect 
Progress, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-72] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2014). 

[23] NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for 2013 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2014). 

[24] Reprogramming involves the movement of funds within the same 
appropriation account, while transfer is the movement of funds from 
one appropriation account to another. 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-276SP]. 

[26] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283] (Washington, D.C.: Feb 2013). 

[27] Earned value measures the value of work accomplished in a given 
period and compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for 
that period and with the actual cost of work accomplished. Differences 
in these values are measured in both cost and schedule variances. 
Positive variances indicate that activities are costing less or are 
completed ahead of schedule. Negative variances indicate activities 
are costing more or are falling behind schedule. Cost and schedule 
variances can also be used in estimating the cost and time needed to 
complete the project. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-22]. 

[29] GAO, James Webb Space Telescope: Actions Needed to Improve Cost 
Estimate and Oversight of Test and Integration, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-4] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2012) 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-72]. 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-364R]. 

[32] The manifested launch date is the launch date which the project 
is working toward, and when a launch vehicle is available to launch 
the project. This date is only a goal launch date for the project, not 
a commitment that they will launch on this date. The committed launch 
readiness date is determined through a launch readiness review that 
verifies that the launch system and spacecraft/payloads are ready for 
launch. 

[33] The manifested launch date is the launch date which the project 
is working toward, and when a launch vehicle is available to launch 
the project. This date is only a goal launch date for the project, not 
a commitment that they will launch on this date. The committed launch 
readiness date is determined through a launch readiness review that 
verifies that the launch system and spacecraft/payload s are ready for 
launch. For the fixed-price contracts discussed in this report, the 
initial contract values plus contract modifications issued to 
equitably adjust the contract costs equal the current contract values. 
For the cost-reimbursement contracts, the current contract value can 
be greater than the initial contract value when the government is 
required to reimburse the contractor for increased costs associated 
with performance. 

[34] Space Act agreements are transactions other than contracts, 
leases, and cooperative agreements. Congress granted NASA the 
authority to enter into these types of transactions in the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 to give the agency greater 
flexibility in achieving its mission. Under a funded Space Act 
agreement, appropriated funds are transferred to a domestic partner, 
such as a private company or a university, to accomplish an agency 
mission. These agreements differ from FAR contracts in that they do 
not include requirements that generally apply to government contracts 
entered into under the authority of the FAR. Unfunded agreements 
accomplish the same goals but no appropriated funds are transferred. 
Under such agreements, the company can benefit from NASA's experience, 
guidance, and advice and NASA can gain insight into the company's 
system. 

[35] NASA is required to report to certain committees in the House and 
Senate if the development cost of a program is likely to exceed the 
baseline estimate by 15 percent or more, or if a milestone is likely 
to be delayed by 6 months or more. 51 U.S.C. § 30104(e). 

[36] Because of changes in NASA's accounting structure, its historical 
cost data are relatively inconsistent. As such, we used then-year 
dollars to report data consistent with the data NASA reported to us. 
Then year dollars include the effects of inflation and escalation. 

[37] In our calculation for the percentage of total number of drawings 
projected for release, we used the number of drawings released at the 
critical design review as a fraction of the total number of drawings 
projected, including where a growth in drawings occurred. So, the 
denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was 
projected at the critical design review. We believe that this more 
accurately reflected the design stability of the project. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-364R]. 

[39] Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for 
launch sooner than the date that the launch authority could provide 
actual launch services. In these cases, we used the actual launch date 
for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported 
readiness. 

[40] These missions include Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment 
Follow On (GRACE-FO), Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Solar 
Probe Plus (SPP) and Surface Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT). 

[41] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future 
Combat System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-376] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved 
Business Case Key for Future Combat System's Success, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-564T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 
2006); NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 21, 2005); and NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 
1 Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2005). 

[End of section] 

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