This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-449 
entitled 'Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed by NNSA to Clarify 
Dismantlement Performance Goal' which was released on April 30, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee 
on Appropriations, U.S. Senate: 

April 2014: 

Nuclear Weapons: 

Actions Needed by NNSA to Clarify Dismantlement Performance Goal: 

GAO-14-449: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-449, a report to the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons programs. As part 
of this mission, it oversees dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons 
and disposition of their components. Dismantlement occurs at NNSA's 
Pantex Plant, and disassembly of CSAs from dismantled weapons occurs 
at the Y-12 site. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's weapons dismantlement 
and component disposition efforts. 

This report examines, among other things, (1) how NNSA measures 
progress toward its fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, 
as well as any challenges it might face in achieving the goal; (2) the 
schedule for and any challenges in dismantling weapons to be retired 
as a result of the New START treaty; (3) physical capacity available 
at Pantex to meet or accelerate planned dismantlement workload; and 
(4) any challenges in disassembling and disposing of weapon 
components. GAO analyzed NNSA's future dismantlement schedule, 
observed weapons dismantlement and component disposition activities at 
Pantex and Y-12, and interviewed NNSA officials. This report 
summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on nuclear weapons 
dismantlement. 

What GAO Found: 

How the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) measures 
progress toward its performance goal of dismantling all weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 is 
unclear for two reasons. First, NNSA does not track the actual date 
that dismantled weapons were retired and may be counting some 
dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to 
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Second, NNSA will not 
dismantle some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 but will 
reinstate them to the stockpile to save on rebuilding other weapons 
and count the reinstated weapons as equivalent dismantlements. Having 
clear goals and measures is a key element of program management. 
Because the dismantlement performance goal does not make these 
practices clear, NNSA risks providing misleading information about 
progress related to its goal. 

NNSA has a schedule for future weapon dismantlements but has not 
scheduled for dismantlement any weapons to be removed from the 
stockpile resulting from implementation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START). These weapons are not expected to be 
retired until the late 2020s or early 2030s. The deferred retirement 
of these weapons could result in a significant dismantlement workload 
gap during the mid-2020s. Such a gap could result in the loss of 
certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at 
Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon 
type in the past year. By extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement 
performance goal, NNSA could allow the current dismantlement workload 
to be leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain its 
dismantlement workforce. 

The physical capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas should be 
sufficient to meet NNSA's planned dismantlement workload and other 
stockpile commitments through fiscal year 2022. According to NNSA 
officials and Pantex site contractors, the site's ability to 
significantly accelerate its dismantlement rates and complete planned 
workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly, and it is 
unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so. 

GAO identified policy and technical challenges complicating NNSA's 
disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from 
dismantled nuclear weapons. For instance, the Y-12 National Security 
Complex in Tennessee disassembles canned subassemblies (CSA)—-a major 
nuclear component that can contain highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
which is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or 
greater. NNSA is retaining many CSAs, leaving far fewer of them for 
disassembly, and creating challenges for Y-12's ability to plan its 
disassembly workload. However, NNSA bases its retention decisions on 
national security considerations and not Y-12 workload. Moreover, NNSA'
s ability to effectively manage a contingency inventory of millions of 
nonnuclear components at Pantex is complicated by decisions to retain 
many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old parts 
for weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in Pantex's 
previous component inventory management system. GAO is not making a 
recommendation on these matters because of efforts already under way 
at Pantex to address the need to retain older parts and to upgrade its 
component inventory management system. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that NNSA (1) clarify the dismantlement performance 
goal and (2) consider extending the goal to avoid a dismantlement 
workload gap. NNSA generally agreed with these recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-449]. For more 
information, contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841or 
trimbled@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Weapons Inventory to Be Dismantled Shrank Then Increased, While NNSA's 
Annual Dismantlement Rates Generally Declined: 

How NNSA Measures Progress Toward Its Dismantlement Performance Goal 
May Be Misleading, and NNSA Is Unlikely to Achieve This Goal: 

Deferred Retirement of Weapons under New START Will Pose Challenges to 
NNSA's Management of Future Dismantlement Workload and Workforce: 

Pantex Capacity Sufficient to Meet NNSA's Planned Dismantlement 
Workload but Accelerating Dismantlement Could Be Costly: 

Disassembly and Disposition of Some Nuclear and Nonnuclear Components 
from Dismantled Weapons Is Complicated by Policy and Technical 
Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Nuclear Weapon Systems in the U.S. Stockpile, as of September 
2012: 

Table 2: NNSA Estimated Additional Funding to Achieve Fiscal Year 2022 
Dismantlement Performance Goal by Fiscal Year 2018 or Fiscal Year 2020: 

Table 3: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Inventory as of May 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: B61 Nonnuclear Components: 

Figure 2: NNSA Sites Involved in the Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement 
Process: 

Figure 3: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process Workflow: 

Figure 4: SS-21 Improvements--Old and New B83 Bomb Work Stands: 

Figure 5: Pantex Zone 4 Magazines for Pit and Weapon Storage: 

Figure 6: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Warehouse Storage: 

Abbreviations: 

ALCM: air-launched cruise missile: 

CSA: canned subassembly: 

DEQ: dismantlement equivalent unit: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DQ: difficulty quotient: 

HEU: highly enriched uranium: 

ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile: 

KCP: Kansas City Plant: 

LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory: 

LLNL: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 

LRPPM: Long Range Production Planning Model: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NNSS: Nevada National Security Site: 

RTBF: Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities: 

SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile: 

SNL: Sandia National Laboratories: 

SS-21: Seamless Safety for the 21st Century: 

START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: 

WDD: Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2014: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Lamar Alexander: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

Nuclear weapons remain an essential element of U.S. national security. 
However, the number of nuclear weapons needed by the United States to 
maintain deterrence has shifted dramatically since the end of the cold 
war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Since 
the early 1990s, the United States has greatly reduced its nuclear 
forces through arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia--
including the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the 
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.[Footnote 1] 

As a result of these force reductions and other initiatives reducing 
the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile,[Footnote 2] thousands 
of weapons have been retired from service and made available for 
dismantlement.[Footnote 3] By overseeing the dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons, the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) helps ensure that the United States is not 
maintaining more nuclear weapons than necessary and is meeting 
international treaty commitments.[Footnote 4] From fiscal year 1992 
through fiscal year 2012, NNSA and DOE dismantled more than 12,000 
retired nuclear weapons. However, there are several thousand retired 
weapons awaiting dismantlement, and additional weapons will enter the 
dismantlement queue as a result of ongoing weapon retirement 
decisions. Moreover, further stockpile reductions are expected as a 
result of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, 
signed by the United States and Russia in 2010.[Footnote 5] 

The dismantlement of nuclear weapons also supports U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives. NNSA and Department of State officials 
have noted the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons dismantlement in 
demonstrating the nation's commitment to disarmament under the 1970 
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and NNSA officials 
and documents have stated that dismantlement represents a concrete 
step toward the President's long-term goal of a world without nuclear 
weapons.[Footnote 6] Other organizations--including the Secretary of 
Energy Advisory Board--have recommended that NNSA accelerate its 
dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons to further demonstrate the 
United States' commitment to nuclear weapons reductions.[Footnote 7] 
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review--which provides a road map for 
implementing the President's agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the 
United States--also highlights nuclear weapons dismantlement and the 
administration's intention to consider accelerating the pace of 
dismantlement. 

NNSA's Office of Defense Programs oversees the maintenance, 
refurbishment,[Footnote 8] surveillance,[Footnote 9] and dismantlement 
of nuclear weapons. Within this office, the Weapons Dismantlement and 
Disposition (WDD) program oversees, among other things, nuclear 
weapons dismantlement and the further disassembly of major weapon 
components, "characterization" of components to identify hazards and 
security concerns, and disposal of most weapon-system components. The 
WDD program's performance goal is to dismantle all nuclear weapons 
that were retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 
2022. 

The physical work of dismantling weapons and disassembling and 
disposing of weapon components is performed by contractors operating 
facilities in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.[Footnote 10] In 
general, dismantlement of a nuclear weapon involves reducing it to its 
component parts and takes place at the Pantex Plant in Texas. NNSA 
defines a weapon as dismantled when the high explosive surrounding the 
weapon's fissile core, known as the "pit," is removed.[Footnote 11] 
The dismantlement of a weapon results in nuclear components, such as 
the pit, and numerous nonnuclear components of various types and 
sizes, from screws to parachutes. Figure 1 depicts some of the 
components from a B61 bomb. 

Figure 1: B61 Nonnuclear Components: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Pantex. 

[End of figure] 

Some components from the dismantled weapon require further 
disassembly. For instance, after Pantex has dismantled a weapon, a 
major nuclear component called the canned subassembly (CSA), which can 
contain highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other materials, is packaged 
and sent to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee for 
additional disassembly and disposition.[Footnote 12] 

Nuclear components from dismantled weapons may be retained for 
eventual reuse, disposed of, or retained as a "strategic reserve" to 
ensure an adequate supply of material for the weapons program in the 
future. For example, pits from dismantled weapons are stored at Pantex 
pending decisions regarding their potential reuse in refurbished 
weapons or decisions regarding further disassembly and disposition, or 
to compose part of the U.S. strategic reserve of plutonium. In 
addition, some CSAs are retained at Y-12 for potential reuse in 
refurbished weapons, disassembled to recover HEU that may be recycled 
into fuel to supply the U.S. Naval Reactors Program,[Footnote 13] 
among others, or as part of the U.S. strategic reserve of HEU. 

Nonnuclear components may also be disposed of or saved for reuse. 
However, some nonnuclear components may be classified or radioactively 
contaminated and therefore require extra precautions to securely and 
safely dispose of them. Nonnuclear components from types of weapons 
still in the stockpile may be retained at Pantex for potential reuse 
in refurbished weapons. In addition to managing retained components 
for weapons still in the stockpile, Pantex has a backlog of components 
from the dismantlement of types of weapons that are no longer in the 
stockpile--referred to as "legacy" components--which it is working to 
characterize and dispose of. 

The Kansas City Plant (KCP) in Missouri stores some nonnuclear 
components, and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) disposes of 
other classified or radiologically contaminated components. Technical 
support for the dismantlement process--including responding to any 
problems Pantex encounters while dismantling a weapon--is provided by 
the national laboratories involved in nuclear weapons design: the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California, the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, and Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL) in California and New Mexico. Figure 2 shows the 
locations of NNSA facilities involved in the dismantlement process and 
briefly describes their roles. 

Figure 2: NNSA Sites Involved in the Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement 
Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Kansas City Plant: 
* Storage and testing of nonnuclear components. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 
* Technical support for weapons dismantlement process. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory: 
* Technical support for weapons dismantlement process. 

Nevada National Security Site: 
* Disposal and permanent burial of some nonnuclear components. 

Pantex Plant: 
* Dismantlement of nuclear weapons; 
* Storage of pits (fissile cores of weapons; 
* Disposal of high explosives; 
* Characterization and disposition of nonnuclear components. 

Sandia National Laboratories (California and New Mexico): 
* Technical support for weapons dismantlement process; 
* Maintenance of the Stockpile Dismantlement Database. 

Y-12 National Security Complex: 
* Disassembly of canned subassemblies (component that can contain 
highly enriched uranium and other materials; 
* Storage of canned subassemblies, highly enriched uranium, and 
lithium. 

Sources: GAO and National Nuclear Security Administration (text); 
copyright © Corel Corp., all rights reserved (map). 

[End of figure] 

You asked us to report on issues associated with NNSA's nuclear 
weapons dismantlement and component disposition efforts. Our 
objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual 
inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA's annual 
dismantlement rates have changed over time, and, if so, the reasons 
why; (2) how NNSA measures progress toward achieving its performance 
goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by 
the end of fiscal year 2022, and any challenges it might face in 
meeting the goal; (3) NNSA's schedule for dismantlement of weapons 
retired as a result of the New START treaty and the challenges, if 
any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons; (4) the physical 
capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA's planned future 
dismantlement workload and to potentially accelerate dismantlement; 
and (5) the challenges, if any, affecting disassembly and disposition 
of components from dismantled weapons. In February 2014, we reported 
to you on the results of our work in a classified report. This report 
summarizes certain aspects of our classified work. 

In general, we addressed these objectives by reviewing relevant 
nuclear weapons stockpile guidance and planning documents; 
interviewing NNSA officials on issues related to dismantlement and 
component management; interviewing officials from the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the military services on nuclear weapons retirement 
and dismantlement interactions with NNSA; and conducting site visits 
to the two sites that carry out the two major steps of weapons 
dismantlement and disposition, the Pantex and Y-12 sites. On our site 
visits, we observed weapons dismantlement and CSA disassembly 
operations for several weapon systems; viewed component processing and 
storage facilities; and interviewed Pantex and Y-12 site operating 
contractors on issues relating to dismantlement operations and 
component management processes, as well as site weapon engineers on 
issues affecting dismantlement and CSA disassembly of seven different 
weapon systems. 

To assess the extent to which and the reasons why the annual 
inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA's annual 
dismantlement rates have changed over time, we analyzed data from NNSA 
on the annual inventories of retired weapons available for 
dismantlement and on annual numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal 
year 1992 through fiscal year 2012. We selected this period for 
several reasons, including that it allowed us to assess weapon 
retirements and dismantlements since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991 and resulting from stockpile reductions through 
strategic arms control treaties and presidential initiatives. We also 
interviewed NNSA and DOD officials and Pantex site contractors on 
issues affecting retired inventories of weapons and annual 
dismantlement rates. To assess how NNSA is measuring progress toward 
achieving its performance goal, and the challenges it faces in doing 
so, we analyzed a March 2013 draft schedule for the dismantlement or 
other disposition of all retired weapons from fiscal year 2013 through 
fiscal year 2022--including the dismantlement schedule for the 
remaining weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009--and interviewed 
NNSA and DOD officials on issues that could affect this dismantlement 
schedule. To assess NNSA's schedule for dismantlement of weapons 
retired as a result of the New START treaty and the challenges, if 
any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons, we interviewed DOD 
officials on the numbers of weapons expected to be retired and when 
they would be retired as a result of the treaty and interviewed NNSA 
officials on challenges related to management of this future 
dismantlement workload. To assess the physical capacity available at 
Pantex to meet NNSA's planned future dismantlement workload, and to 
potentially accelerate dismantlement, we analyzed data on the physical 
capacity at Pantex available to meet the future dismantlement schedule 
and all other future stockpile production commitments and analyzed 
data and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on the 
site's ability to accelerate dismantlement work. To assess the 
challenges affecting disassembly and disposition of components from 
dismantled weapons, we reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA 
officials and Pantex site contractors on the management of plutonium 
pit inventories, and we reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA 
officials and Y-12 site contractors on CSA inventory management, 
disassembly schedules, and the potential effect on HEU supply 
commitments. We also analyzed data from Pantex and interviewed NNSA 
officials and Pantex site contractors on the nonnuclear component 
inventory and the issues affecting the management, retention, and 
disposition of these components. We assessed the reliability of data 
on the inventories of retired weapons available for dismantlement and 
the annual numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal year 1992 through 
fiscal year 2012, future capacity requirements at Pantex, and 
nonnuclear component inventories. We analyzed the data for accuracy 
by, among other things, manually testing the data for errors and 
missing data, and interviewed knowledgeable officials about the data. 
We determined that the data were of sufficient reliability for our 
purposes. Additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology 
can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

This section discusses the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; the 
stockpile planning and retirement process; nuclear weapons design and 
components; nuclear weapons dismantlement planning, facilities, 
supporting programs, and budget; and the nuclear weapons dismantlement 
process. 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: 

Since 1945, the United States has fielded more than 70 different 
nuclear weapon systems; currently, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile 
consists of 8 such systems. These systems can be strategic or 
nonstrategic, and can include gravity bombs deliverable by long-range 
bombers and dual-capable aircraft, as well as warheads deliverable by 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM), and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). 
[Footnote 14] 

For some systems in the stockpile--such as the B61 bomb--there may be 
multiple versions as a result of modifications, or "mods," that change 
weapon components related to their operational characteristics, 
safety, or control features.[Footnote 15] Life extension programs have 
been initiated for some weapons to address aging and enhance the 
safety, security, and reliability of the weapons in the 
stockpile.[Footnote 16] Table 1 shows the weapon systems in the U.S. 
stockpile, including information on their delivery systems and 
missions, responsible military services, and dates of entry into the 
stockpile. 

Table 1: Nuclear Weapon Systems in the U.S. Stockpile, as of September 
2012: 

Weapon system: W76-0/1; 
Description: Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead; 
Delivery system: D5 missile, Trident submarine; 
Mission: Underwater to surface; 
Military service: Navy; 
Entry into service: 1978 (mod 0); 2009 (mod 1). 

Weapon system: W78-0; 
Description: Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead; 
Delivery system: Minuteman III ICBM; 
Mission: Surface to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1979. 

Weapon system: W87-0; 
Description: ICBM warhead; 
Delivery system: Minuteman III ICBM; 
Mission: Surface to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1986. 

Weapon system: W88-0; 
Description: SLBM warhead; 
Delivery system: D5 missile, Trident submarine; 
Mission: Underwater to surface; 
Military service: Navy; 
Entry into service: 1989. 

Weapon system: B61-3/4/10; 
Description: Nonstrategic bomb; 
Delivery system: F-15, F-16, and certified NATO aircraft; 
Mission: Air to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1979 (mod 3); 1979 (mod 4); 1990 (mod 10). 

Weapon system: B61-7/11; 
Description: Strategic bomb; 
Delivery system: B-52, B-2; 
Mission: Air to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1985 (mod 7); 1997 (mod 11). 

Weapon system: B83-1; 
Description: Strategic bomb; 
Delivery system: B-52, B-2; 
Mission: Air to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1993. 

Weapon system: W80-1; 
Description: Air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) warhead; 
Delivery system: B-52; 
Mission: Air to surface; 
Military service: Air Force; 
Entry into service: 1982. 

Source: National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Note: The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb (e.g., the -0/1 
for the W76) represents the mod associated with the respective weapon. 

[End of table] 

The nuclear weapons stockpile is configured into "active" and 
"inactive" categories, and individual nuclear weapons are identified 
as being in 1 of 10 states of readiness across both categories. 
[Footnote 17] Active weapons maintained at the top readiness state are 
operationally deployed weapons; the numbers of these weapons have been 
limited under strategic arms control treaties, such as New START. 
Inactive weapons are normally maintained at a depot in a 
nonoperational status.[Footnote 18] Some nondeployed weapons are 
"hedge" weapons, maintained in both the active and inactive categories 
and retained both for technical hedge purposes (i.e., to hedge against 
an unforeseen catastrophic failure in a weapon type or family) and for 
geopolitical hedge purposes (i.e., to hedge against a reversal in the 
geopolitical situation that would require more weapons to be available 
for use). 

Retired nuclear weapons have been removed from their delivery 
platforms and are no longer part of the stockpile. Retired weapons 
fall into one of the following two categories: 

* Weapons released for dismantlement. These weapons have been released 
for dismantlement, consistent with the capacity available at NNSA 
facilities and DOD requirements. Some of these weapons may be 
"reinstated" to the stockpile in lieu of being dismantled. 
Specifically, the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a practice that 
allows NNSA to reinstate some retired weapons awaiting dismantlement 
to the stockpile to replace weapons that have been disassembled and 
inspected under the stockpile surveillance program.[Footnote 19] 

* Weapons in managed retirement. These weapons have been removed from 
the stockpile but have not been approved for dismantlement. These 
weapons are maintained in such a way that they could be reactivated 
should there be a catastrophic failure in the stockpile necessitating 
such action. The Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee 
must approve dismantlement of these weapons. 

In addition, NNSA also characterizes retired nuclear weapons as either 
"war reserve" weapons or "quality assurance" weapons. Retired war 
reserve weapons are those withdrawn from the active or inactive 
stockpile categories that are surplus to defense needs and that could 
be reinstated to the stockpile if not dismantled. Retired quality 
assurance weapons are those that have been retired from the active or 
inactive stockpile categories for surveillance purposes--specifically, 
some of their components are destructively tested as part of the 
surveillance process, and these weapons are subsequently dismantled 
rather than being rebuilt. In discussing its future dismantlement 
schedule, NNSA tends to focus on the inventory of war reserve weapons 
because this inventory includes a large number of weapons that have 
been retired and accumulated in inventory over time and are weapons to 
be counted toward NNSA's dismantlement performance goal. The number of 
retired quality assurance weapons is generally small and consistent 
from year to year, and the dismantlement of all quality assurance 
weapons is generally completed within the year they are retired. 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Planning and Retirement Process: 

The decision to retire and subsequently dismantle nuclear weapons is 
tied to a high-level policy-making process establishing the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile's size and composition. This process begins with 
nuclear weapons policy and strategy guidance provided by the President 
in the form of a Presidential Policy Directive. Based on this 
presidential directive and other inputs--including guidance from the 
Secretary of Defense in the form of DOD directives and planning 
guidance--the military services, combatant commanders, and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff develop nuclear weapons requirements. 

These requirements are submitted to the Nuclear Weapons Council staff 
and, combined with other inputs, inform the development of a nuclear 
weapons Requirements and Planning Document, which specifies nuclear 
weapon policies, military requirements, joint DOD and DOE planning 
factors, long-term planning considerations that affect the future of 
the stockpile, and supporting programmatic details. The Requirements 
and Planning Document provides detailed technical information and 
analyses that support the development of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 
Memorandum and a proposed presidential directive containing a proposed 
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 
Memorandum is an annual memorandum from the Secretary of Defense and 
Secretary of Energy that transmits the proposed directive, which, if 
approved, becomes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. The Nuclear 
Weapons Stockpile Plan specifies the size and composition of the 
stockpile for a projected multiyear period. The coordination process 
for these documents serves as the key forum in which DOD and DOE 
resolve issues concerning DOD nuclear weapon requirements and DOE 
capacity and capability to support those requirements. Once the 
President signs the directive, the Nuclear Weapons Council is 
authorized to approve changes in the stockpile within certain 
percentage limits specified by the President. 

Nuclear weapons are retired from the stockpile by the Nuclear Weapons 
Council in accordance with the presidential guidance in the Nuclear 
Weapons Stockpile Plan. Project Officers Groups--which are joint DOD-
DOE committees established for each weapon type to coordinate on 
technical matters relating to the weapon--develop prioritized 
retirement plans for the weapon systems identified for retirement in 
the Requirements and Planning Document.[Footnote 20] 

NNSA uses the information from each Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and 
the Requirements and Planning Document to develop a Nuclear Weapons 
Production and Planning Directive, which includes long-term schedules 
for weapons dismantlement at Pantex and CSA disassembly at Y-12, as 
well as plans for nuclear weapon life extension programs, 
surveillance, and other stockpile-related activities executed by the 
agency.[Footnote 21] Dismantlement scheduling details are elaborated 
by NNSA in specific weapon Program Control Documents used to manage 
the workload outlined in the Production and Planning Directives. NNSA 
coordinates with the Navy and the Air Force to arrange delivery of 
specific weapons to the Pantex Plant for dismantlement, consistent 
with the Production and Planning Directive and the Program Control 
Documents. 

Nuclear Weapons Design and Components: 

All weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are two-stage nuclear 
weapons, sometimes referred to as thermonuclear weapons, involving 
fission and fusion reactions to achieve the explosive yield.[Footnote 
22] The first stage, known as the primary, consists of a hollow pit--
containing a central shell of fissile material typically made of 
plutonium or of plutonium and uranium inside a tamper shell--
surrounded by high explosives. The second stage, or secondary, is 
encased inside a CSA that can contain HEU and other materials. The 
primary and the CSA are referred to as the weapon's nuclear explosive 
package. 

Outside of the nuclear explosive package, a nuclear weapon contains 
other nonnuclear components that control the use, arming, and firing 
of the weapon, including arming, fuzing, and firing systems; 
reservoirs of tritium and deuterium gas that are injected into the pit 
through gas transfer systems to boost the nuclear reaction during 
detonation; neutron generators that produce neutrons for primary 
detonation; and other nonnuclear components such as radars, batteries, 
and parachutes (for gravity bombs dropped from aircraft). 

Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Planning, Facilities, Supporting 
Programs, and Budget: 

Nuclear weapons dismantlement is a multistage process that requires 
extensive planning, utilizes a mix of facilities at Pantex, and relies 
on a number of supporting NNSA programs. For fiscal years 2008 through 
2012, the WDD program budget generally ranged from approximately $50 
million to $60 million per year. 

Planning for Dismantlement: 

Before a weapon system can be dismantled, Pantex must conduct planning 
to identify and analyze potential hazards, locate or create 
appropriate tools, train its workforce, identify disposition pathways 
for nuclear and nonnuclear components, allocate time and facilities 
for dismantlement activities, ensure space is available to receive and 
store, or "stage," the weapons, identify on-site storage for pits, and 
coordinate transport of CSAs recovered from the weapons to Y-12 for 
further disassembly. 

Since 1999, Pantex has managed the planning for dismantlement of 
weapons through an integrated safety management process known as 
Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21). Among other things, this 
process ensures that appropriate safety authorizations have been 
developed, reviewed, and approved for each weapon system before it is 
dismantled. The SS-21 process is unique to Pantex and comprises 
several steps, including: (1) hazard analysis to review all possible 
hazards at each step, such as the risk of electrostatic discharge 
within a dismantlement facility and the number of times a warhead must 
be lifted and moved; and (2) tooling preparation to ensure that 
workers have the necessary specialized tooling designed to mitigate 
the hazards; and (3) reviews, safety analyses, and readiness 
assessments, which must be completed before dismantlement 
authorization is given. 

Pantex Facilities for Dismantlement: 

Dismantlement operations at Pantex occur at a secure area of the site--
referred to as Zone 12--inside specialized bays and cells authorized 
for nuclear explosive operations.[Footnote 23] Intact nuclear weapons 
on-site awaiting dismantlement are stored inside magazines, located in 
a separate secure area of the plant--known as Zone 4. Zone 12 contains 
37 bays where mechanical dismantlement of weapons and dismantlement of 
nuclear explosive packages utilizing insensitive high explosives may 
be conducted, as well as 10 cells that are reserved for nuclear 
explosive operations involving conventional high explosives.[Footnote 
24] Pantex refers to these 47 facilities as nuclear explosive 
production facilities. 

Physical capacity available at any given time at Pantex is influenced 
by several factors, including the physical size of the weapons, 
whether they use conventional or insensitive high explosives, weight 
limitations within facilities, and the time requirements to perform 
dismantlement operations, which vary from weapon system to weapon 
system. Furthermore, physical capacity at the site to dismantle 
weapons is limited, and it must be balanced against other stockpile-
related operations at Pantex that require use of bays and cells. Other 
stockpile-related operations that use the site's bays and cells 
include temporarily staging weapons brought into Zone 12 from Zone 4 
prior to being worked on, life extension program work, and weapon 
surveillance work. In addition, nuclear explosive operations at the 
site halt during thunderstorms that occur nearby--to minimize 
electrostatic detonation risks inside bays and cells during weapons 
assembly and disassembly. According to Pantex site contractors, the 
site plans for a small loss of capacity each year in the form of 
facility downtime due to lightning risks. 

NNSA Programs Supporting Dismantlement: 

The WDD program relies on several other NNSA programs to support the 
dismantlement mission. For instance, funding from NNSA's Readiness in 
Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program provides the facilities, 
infrastructure, and base capabilities that indirectly support the WDD 
program. RTBF funds also provide storage and material recycle and 
recovery support to WDD efforts.[Footnote 25] NNSA's Office of Secure 
Transportation pays for transportation of weapons to Pantex for 
dismantlement and transportation of resulting components to other 
sites for further disassembly or processing, utilizing specialized 
vehicles called Safeguards Transporters. NNSA's Stockpile Services 
Production Support program supports shipping, receiving, equipment 
maintenance and calibration services, and other activities that 
facilitate dismantlement and other weapons-related work. 

Dismantlement Budget: 

In general, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the WDD program budget 
has ranged from approximately $50 million to $60 million per year. 
[Footnote 26] The WDD budget supports weapons dismantlement, 
characterization of components to identify hazards and classification 
issues, disposition of components, and other activities. According to 
an NNSA official, approximately 80 percent of the current and 
anticipated future program budget is allocated to weapons 
dismantlement and disassembly, with the remaining funding allocated to 
component characterization, disposition, and other activities. 

NNSA does not track the indirect dismantlement costs incurred by other 
NNSA supporting programs because these programs do not separately 
account for or apportion their costs between support for WDD and other 
stockpile support activities. For instance, the Office of Secure 
Transportation provides transportation support for programs across the 
NNSA nuclear security enterprise but does not collect or maintain 
accounting data based on weapon type or functional workload for 
weapons. 

Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process: 

The dismantlement process begins when a weapon is transferred from a 
storage magazine in Zone 4 to a dismantlement bay in Zone 12. In the 
bay, the nuclear explosive package containing the primary and CSA; the 
arming, fuzing and firing system; and other nonnuclear components are 
removed from the weapon. Nuclear explosive packages that contain 
conventional high explosives are transferred to a cell for further 
dismantlement, while those with insensitive high explosives may be 
dismantled in a bay. Within the bay or cell, the high explosive is 
separated from the pit, and the weapon is considered officially 
dismantled. 

From this stage forward, nuclear and nonnuclear components are 
accounted for individually, and each component has an established 
disposition path--it may be stored, recycled, or disposed of. The pit 
is packaged and returned to Zone 4 at Pantex and is stored pending 
either reuse in refurbished weapons or eventual disposal as part of 
NNSA's plutonium disposition program. The high explosives are disposed 
of at Pantex through open-air burning. Other components recovered are 
returned to their original manufacturer--such as nonnuclear components 
sent to KCP for further disposition. Some classified or radiologically 
contaminated components may be disposed of through burial at the NNSS. 
Nonnuclear components may be returned to KCP; demilitarized, 
sanitized, and disposed of at Pantex;[Footnote 27] or stored at Pantex 
for reuse. 

The CSAs from dismantled weapons are sent to Y-12 for disassembly to 
recover HEU and other materials they contain. Because Y-12 is the sole 
national supplier of HEU, disassembly of CSAs is critical in supplying 
HEU for refurbished weapons and meeting HEU supply commitments for 
fuel for naval reactors and research reactors. The HEU retrieved from 
the CSAs is stored at Y-12 in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 
Facility, and other recovered materials are stored elsewhere on site. 
Materials that are not suitable for recycling or reuse are sent for 
burial at NNSS. See figure 3 for a general illustration of the nuclear 
weapons dismantlement process workflow. 

Figure 3: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Process Workflow: 

[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration] 

DOD military depot: 
* Weapons arrive via Safeguards Transporters at Pantex Plant. 

Pantex Plant: 
* Weapons are inspected and stored temporarily in magazines; 
* Weapons dismantled in cell or bay; 
* Remove high explosive from primary: 
- Pit is packaged and moved to storage; 
* Remove canned subassembly: 
- Package canned subassembly and transport to Y-12 via Safeguards 
Transporters; 
* Remove nonnuclear components; 
* Component disposition: 
- Pantex storage; 
- Component disposal; 
- Kansas City Plant (nonnuclear components). 

Y-12 National Security Complex: 
* Canned subassembly storage; 
* Disassemble canned subassembly: 
- Material recycle and recovery; 
- Nevada National Security Site (classified/radiologically contaminated
components); 
* Store recovered highly enriched uranium at Canned subassembly 
storage; 
* Highly enriched uranium commitments from Canned subassembly storage. 

Note: Pit refers to a weapon's fissile core. Canned subassembly refers 
to a component that can contain highly enriched uranium and other 
materials. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Nuclear Security Administration 
information. 

[End of figure] 

Weapons Inventory to Be Dismantled Shrank Then Increased, While NNSA's 
Annual Dismantlement Rates Generally Declined: 

After generally declining from fiscal year 1992 through the early 
2000s, the inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement 
increased following nuclear stockpile reductions and significant 
additional weapon retirements in 2004 and 2007. At the same time, the 
number of weapons dismantled annually--NNSA's annual dismantlement 
rate--generally declined over the past 20 years because of a greater 
emphasis on dismantlement safety and increased weapon complexity. 

Inventory of Weapons Awaiting Dismantlement Declined Until the Early 
2000s but Then Increased Following Substantial Additional Weapon 
Retirements: 

In the early 1990s, following the end of the cold war, the United 
States had a large inventory of retired nuclear weapons awaiting 
dismantlement.[Footnote 28] This inventory shrank through the mid-
1990s and early 2000s. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, 
significant stockpile reductions stemming from presidential direction 
in 2004 and 2007 resulted in large numbers of additional weapons being 
declared surplus to defense needs and retired. For instance, in 2004, 
the President directed that the stockpile be reduced by nearly one-
half by fiscal year 2012. In 2007, the President directed substantial 
additional reductions in the stockpile. These decisions resulted in 
substantial growth in the inventory of retired weapons awaiting 
dismantlement. NNSA has reduced this inventory since that time. 
However, at the end of fiscal year 2012, the inventory of retired 
weapons that were awaiting dismantlement was similar in size to the 
inventory of weapons awaiting dismantlement in the mid-1990s. 

NNSA's Annual Dismantlement Rate Has Generally Decreased over the Past 
20 Years as a Result of Increased Safety Emphasis and Weapon 
Complexity: 

According to our analysis of dismantlement data, since the early 
1990s, NNSA's dismantlement rates have generally decreased, with NNSA 
dismantling about 1,000 fewer weapons annually in recent years than it 
was dismantling in the mid-1990s. In addition, in some years, only one 
or two types of retired war reserve weapons were dismantled. 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors attributed the overall 
decline in dismantlement rates in part to an increased emphasis on 
safety in nuclear explosive operations performed at the Pantex site. 
The initiation of the SS-21 process at Pantex in 1999 provided a more 
comprehensive framework for evaluating and mitigating the hazards 
associated with nuclear weapon activities, including dismantlement. 
[Footnote 29] According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, 
the SS-21 process also led to greater efficiency in dismantling 
individual weapons. For example, the SS-21 redesign of the B83 
dismantlement process included development of a new work stand that 
holds the bomb throughout the dismantlement process, allowing Pantex 
to mitigate both the safety risks and time losses previously 
experienced in moving the weapon from one work stand to another. 
Figure 4 shows the old and new B83 work stands. 

Figure 4: SS-21 Improvements--Old and New B83 Bomb Work Stands: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: Pantex. 

[End of figure] 

However, according to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the 
new emphasis on safety stemming from SS-21 led Pantex to suspend the 
practice of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay or cell--a 
practice referred to as multiunit dismantlement. Some weapon systems 
are currently authorized for different types of multiunit 
dismantlement but, as a matter of practice, Pantex is not dismantling 
multiple weapons within individual bays and cells.[Footnote 30] 
According to Pantex site contractors, this move away from multiunit 
processing offset other processing efficiencies, resulting in a 
significant decline in the number of weapons dismantled by the site 
annually. For instance, Pantex site contractors told us that 
throughout the 1990s, the site was processing multiple weapons in a 
bay or cell at a time, which enabled the site to typically dismantle 
1,000 to 2,000 weapons per year. With suspension of multiunit 
dismantlement, Pantex site contractors told us that it was unlikely 
the site could achieve a comparable rate of dismantlement today. 
Pantex site contractors provided us with data showing that, in the 
1990s, some weapon systems were dismantled three-or four-at-a-time 
within a bay or cell, including the following systems: 

* W48 warheads: dismantled two per cell, three per bay; 

* B57 bombs: dismantled two per cell, four per bay; 

* W68 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay; 

* W70 warheads: dismantled three per cell, four per bay; and: 

* W79 warheads: dismantled two per cell, four per bay. 

According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, as a result 
of the reevaluation of safety at Pantex, NNSA concluded that the 
potential additional risk during multiunit dismantlement processing 
outweighed the benefits of dismantling multiple weapons within one bay 
or cell at a time. 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors also told us that 
dismantlement rates have generally decreased over time because weapons 
dismantled recently have tended to be more difficult and time-
consuming to dismantle than weapons dismantled in the 1990s. More 
specifically, an NNSA official told us that many of the weapons 
dismantled in the 1990s were smaller, less complex tactical nuclear 
weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells that were retired as a 
result of the 1991 presidential nuclear initiatives, and that more 
recently dismantled weapons--such as the B53 and B83 strategic bombs--
have tended to be larger, more complex weapon systems. 

Pantex site contractors told us that each weapon system comes apart 
differently and poses different dismantlement challenges. These 
variations affect the length of dismantlement time. Pantex has 
developed data to measure the time requirements in dismantling 
different weapon systems, referred to as dismantlement "difficulty 
quotients" (DQ). According to Pantex officials, dismantlement DQs are 
not measures of technical difficulty per se in dismantling a weapon, 
but they are measures of the amount of time involved in the 
dismantlement operation. These DQs are developed by Pantex planning 
staff who work with individual weapon program engineers to determine 
the number of hours required for each dismantlement activity 
associated with the weapon in question. These hours are rolled up for 
each weapon type and then divided by the number of hours required for 
a "standard" life extension program involving disassembly, inspection, 
refurbishment, and rebuilding of the weapon. NNSA has used the DQ data 
to establish "dismantlement equivalent units" (DEQ) for each weapon 
type, in order to measure the relative dismantlement time requirements 
among different weapon systems. The DEQs are derived by dividing a 
weapon's DQ against the DQ of a dismantlement base case. According to 
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, and based on our review of 
DQ and DEQ data, some weapon systems that have recently been 
dismantled in large numbers were more time-consuming to dismantle than 
other weapons due to their complexity and size, and these have high 
DEQs. 

How NNSA Measures Progress Toward Its Dismantlement Performance Goal 
May Be Misleading, and NNSA Is Unlikely to Achieve This Goal: 

How NNSA measures progress toward its performance goal of dismantling 
all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal 
year 2022 is unclear and may make its reported progress misleading, 
including its practice of not tracking the actual date of retirement 
of individual dismantled weapons and its plans to reinstate to the 
stockpile--rather than dismantle--certain weapons retired prior to 
fiscal year 2009. In addition, NNSA faces challenges in managing 
planned dismantlement workload and is unlikely to achieve its 
dismantlement performance goal because a large number of weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are in managed retirement status, 
and it is uncertain whether these weapons will be released for 
dismantlement in time for NNSA to meet its dismantlement goal. 

How NNSA Measures Dismantlement Progress May Be Misleading: 

In 2006, NNSA established a performance goal for the WDD program to 
dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of 
fiscal year 2022. This goal was established to demonstrate to Congress 
that NNSA had a plan for timely, safe, and secure dismantlement of 
nuclear weapons. In March 2013, we obtained a draft of NNSA's future 
dismantlement schedule for all retired war reserve weapons, which 
included the schedule for the dismantlement, or other disposition, of 
the subset of weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Our analysis 
of NNSA's dismantlement schedule for weapons retired prior to fiscal 
year 2009 and interviews with NNSA officials indicate that how NNSA 
measures progress toward this performance goal is unclear and may be 
misleading for two reasons. 

First, the way in which NNSA measures progress toward its 
dismantlement performance goal is unclear and may be misleading 
because NNSA as a matter of practice does not identify and track the 
actual retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled. 
According to an NNSA official, NNSA knows how many weapons of each 
system type were retired prior to fiscal year 2009. However, NNSA and 
Pantex do not track the date of retirement of individual weapons when 
they are dismantled at the Pantex Plant. Instead, whenever Pantex 
dismantles an individual retired weapon of a system type represented 
in the pre-fiscal year 2009 inventory--regardless of that weapon's 
actual date of retirement--NNSA counts that dismantlement as being 
equivalent to a weapon retired prior to fiscal year 2009 and counts it 
toward the fiscal year 2022 goal. Because of this approach, it is 
possible, according to an NNSA official, that NNSA is counting weapons 
toward the achievement of its performance goal that were retired after 
fiscal year 2009. This official told us that while individual retired 
weapons in storage at military facilities can be tracked by retirement 
date, weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are not marked or 
designated for priority dismantlement. However, this official stated 
that, in general, it is unlikely that a more recently retired weapon 
would be selected for dismantlement if older retired weapons of the 
same type are available. 

An NNSA official also commented that there may be technical reasons 
why an individual weapon retired after fiscal year 2009 may be 
transferred to NNSA for dismantlement before a weapon retired prior to 
fiscal year 2009. For instance, an NNSA official told us that NNSA's 
stockpile surveillance program might identify potential problems with 
a specific component, such as a capacitor, that might apply only to 
individual weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 and not to those 
retired before, making dismantlement of the weapons retired after 
fiscal year 2009 a higher priority. 

Second, how NNSA measures progress toward its dismantlement 
performance goal is also unclear and may be misleading because some 
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are reinstated to the 
stockpile rather than dismantled. Specifically, in our analysis of 
NNSA's dismantlement schedule as of March 2013 for weapons retired 
prior to fiscal year 2009, we found that approximately 9 percent of 
the weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are scheduled to be 
reinstated during fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2022 or later. 

According to NNSA officials, NNSA plans to reinstate these weapons, in 
part, to offset the costs of rebuilding weapons disassembled under the 
stockpile surveillance program. Through this program, in a given year, 
a random sample of weapons from each weapon system is selected and 
withdrawn from the stockpile, disassembled, and inspected, and usually 
one weapon in each weapon system sample is subjected to nonnuclear, 
destructive testing of its nuclear components and cannot be rebuilt. 
The destructively tested units are replaced by weapons kept in 
readiness states in the inactive category of the stockpile, known as 
quality assurance and reliability testing replacement weapons. The 
remaining weapons from the sample set could be rebuilt following 
inspection and returned to the stockpile. However, in lieu of 
rebuilding all of the disassembled weapons, NNSA replaces some of them 
by reinstating retired war reserve weapons to the stockpile. According 
to NNSA officials, this is a cost-effective practice that avoids the 
costly rebuilding of weapons evaluated under the surveillance program 
and also reduces the number of weapons in the dismantlement queue. 

An NNSA official told us that it is technically correct that under 
this practice some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 are not 
expected to be dismantled but reinstated to the stockpile instead. 
However, this official noted that, under the reinstatement practice, 
NNSA is still dismantling a weapon for each weapon that is reinstated 
to the stockpile--that is, the weapon in the stockpile that is 
disassembled and inspected under the surveillance program. Thus, the 
reinstatement practice represents an equivalent dismantlement that has 
a neutral impact on the size of the stockpile.[Footnote 31] 

We have found in our prior work that having clear performance goals 
and measures is a key element of effective program 
management.[Footnote 32] Performance goals or measures that are not 
clearly stated may be confusing or misleading. Neither NNSA's 
dismantlement performance goal as currently written, nor the way that 
progress toward the goal is measured, makes it clear that NNSA is 
counting equivalent numbers of weapons dismantled. Without such 
clarity, Congress and other users of this performance information may 
not understand the age or types of weapons that NNSA is counting 
toward achievement of the performance goal. 

Uncertainties Related to Weapons in Managed Retirement Make It 
Unlikely That NNSA Will Achieve Its Dismantlement Goal: 

The uncertainties surrounding when weapons in managed retirement--
retired weapons that have not been approved by the Nuclear Weapons 
Council for dismantlement--may be released for dismantlement present 
challenges for NNSA in scheduling future dismantlement workload and 
make it unlikely that NNSA will achieve its goal of dismantling all 
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 
2022. During our review, weapons from three different weapon systems 
were in managed retirement. These include some: 

* W84-0s retired in fiscal year 2006, 

* W80-1s retired in fiscal year 2007, and: 

* W76-0s retired from fiscal years 2004 through 2012. 

The W84-0s and W80-1s currently in managed retirement may not be 
available to NNSA for dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2022 because 
both of these systems are being held in managed retirement as 
candidates for potential reuse as the warhead on a future long-range 
standoff missile to replace the Air Force's current ALCM.[Footnote 33] 
NNSA and DOD officials told us that release of the W84-0s and W80-1s 
in managed retirement for dismantlement is contingent on a future 
Nuclear Weapons Council selection of a warhead for potential reuse on 
the future missile. However, the timing of the future Nuclear Weapons 
Council's decision, whether it will select the W84-0 or W80-1 for the 
long-range standoff missile, and when weapons will be released for 
dismantlement remains uncertain, according to NNSA and DOD officials. 

According to an NNSA official, if the W80-1 is selected for reuse on 
the future missile, NNSA could move the W84-0s back into its 
dismantlement schedule in the future. Depending on the timing, such a 
decision could present challenges to NNSA and Pantex in meeting the 
fiscal year 2022 dismantlement goal, as the W84-0 is considered a 
relatively difficult, or time-consuming, weapon to dismantle based on 
our review of DQ and DEQ data. However, this official told us that the 
W84-0 has many modern features. For this reason, there is a 
possibility that, even if this weapon system is not selected for reuse 
as the long-range standoff missile warhead, NNSA and the national labs 
may seek to retain the W84-0s indefinitely for other potential future 
warhead reuse options. Because of these uncertainties, NNSA had not 
scheduled dismantlement of any W84-0s--including those in managed 
retirement--in the dismantlement schedule we reviewed, as of March 
2013, and NNSA officials told us that these weapons will be addressed 
in one way or another after fiscal year 2022. Given this time frame, 
and since all W84-0s in managed retirement were retired in fiscal year 
2006, NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 
unless these weapons are released from managed retirement, and a 
decision is made to dismantle them. 

Alternatively, if the W84-0 is selected for reuse on the future 
missile, the time frame for dismantlement of the W80-1s in managed 
retirement remains uncertain. NNSA has tentatively scheduled the W80-
1s for dismantlement before fiscal year 2020. However, DOD officials 
told us that, given the need to sustain the ALCM through the mid-
2020s, it is unlikely that the W80-1s in managed retirement would be 
released for dismantlement before the first warhead is produced for 
the new missile and before the missile achieves initial operating 
capability, projected for later in the 2020s. 

Uncertainties also surround the W76-0s in managed retirement and when 
they might be released for dismantlement, which could pose challenges 
for NNSA in meeting its dismantlement performance goal. NNSA is 
currently conducting a W76 life extension program under which W76-0 
warheads in the stockpile are replaced with refurbished W76-1 
warheads. NNSA expects to complete this life extension program by 
fiscal year 2019. As a hedge against technical problems in the life 
extension program process and in the refurbished warheads, however, 
the W76-0s are to remain in managed retirement and be unavailable for 
dismantlement until the life extension program processes and W76-1 
unit reliability are "satisfactorily established," according to the 
fiscal year 2011 nuclear weapons Requirements and Planning Document. 
However, the criteria for "satisfactory establishment" of the W76 life 
extension program process and W76-1 unit reliability are unclear, 
creating uncertainty as to whether the W76-0s in managed retirement 
will be released to NNSA in time for dismantlement by the end of 
fiscal year 2022. 

This uncertainty is driven by concerns about the life extension 
program that have been raised by DOE and DOD officials. For instance, 
in 2006 and 2012, the DOE Inspector General reported on delays in the 
W76-1 life extension program that put program startup and production 
goals at risk. In March 2013, DOD officials expressed concerns to us 
about the W76-1 life extension program, including that NNSA has been 
unable to produce consistent quantities of W76-1 warheads, and they 
told us that there are no formal criteria for the Nuclear Weapons 
Council's decision to release the W76-0s in managed retirement. These 
officials stated that it would be difficult to predict the completion 
of the W76-1 life extension program given inconsistent production, and 
that it was impossible to say whether the W76-0s in managed retirement 
could be released for dismantlement prior to fiscal year 2019 without 
additional confidence in NNSA's production capability. 

Deferred Retirement of Weapons under New START Will Pose Challenges to 
NNSA's Management of Future Dismantlement Workload and Workforce: 

According to DOD officials we interviewed, the 2010 New START treaty 
may eventually result in the retirement of additional weapons from the 
U.S. stockpile. However, DOD officials told us it is unlikely that 
entry into force of New START will lead immediately to additional 
warhead retirements and increased dismantlement workload for NNSA. 
Instead, DOD officials said that the United States will meet the New 
START ceiling--1,550 operationally deployed nuclear weapons--to be in 
force by 2018 by transitioning currently deployed nuclear weapons to 
nondeployed "hedge" status without any significant change in the total 
stockpile size. 

DOD officials told us that the retirement of additional weapons from 
the stockpile stemming from New START will be predicated on the 
successful restoration of the NNSA weapons production infrastructure, 
including the construction and operation of new NNSA facilities 
supporting nuclear weapons production--the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at LANL, and the Uranium 
Production Facility at Y-12--which they did not believe could be 
achieved until the late 2020s or early 2030s.[Footnote 34] Because of 
these conditions, it remains unclear when the weapons associated with 
the New START reductions will be retired. Due to the uncertainty on 
the timing of these retirements NNSA has not yet scheduled for 
dismantlement any weapons that may be removed from the stockpile under 
New START. 

The deferred retirement of weapons following entry into force of the 
New START treaty until the late 2020s or early 2030s could present 
challenges to NNSA in managing its future dismantlement schedule and 
workforce. Specifically, there could be a significant gap in 
dismantlement work during the mid-to late-2020s, between the end of 
fiscal year 2022, when NNSA expects to complete most of its planned 
dismantlement workload, and the time when a large number of additional 
weapons would be available for dismantlement resulting from New START. 
This gap could affect NNSA's ability to manage the dismantlement 
workforce, posing challenges for NNSA in dismantling weapons retired 
as a result of the treaty. In particular, an NNSA official expressed 
concern that this gap in dismantlement workload in the mid-2020s could 
result in the loss of certified dismantlement personnel because 
dismantlement technicians at Pantex lose their certifications if they 
have not worked on a weapon type within the past year. As a result, 
Pantex may need to retrain and recertify sufficient numbers of new 
dismantlement personnel in the late 2020s to resume dismantlement 
efforts to address retired weapons stemming from New START. 

According to an NNSA official we interviewed, relaxing the fiscal year 
2022 dismantlement performance goal could allow the dismantlement 
workload to be leveled, and a steady dismantlement workforce to be 
maintained at Pantex through the mid-2020s. Pantex site contractors 
agreed with this view and stated that they were working with the WDD 
program manager to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap. An 
NNSA official also told us that stretching out the dismantlement 
workload beyond fiscal year 2022 could free up program resources--
assuming future WDD program budgets are comparable in size to the 
current budget of approximately $50 million per year--to allow the 
program to focus greater attention on disposing of a large inventory 
of legacy components from weapons dismantled long ago that are no 
longer in the current stockpile. 

Pantex Capacity Sufficient to Meet NNSA's Planned Dismantlement 
Workload but Accelerating Dismantlement Could Be Costly: 

Our analysis of Pantex data indicates that the physical capacity at 
Pantex should be sufficient to allow the site to meet NNSA's planned 
dismantlement workload through fiscal year 2022 and to meet all other 
stockpile commitments, including surveillance and life extension 
program activities. NNSA's ability to significantly accelerate 
dismantlement and complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 
2022 could be costly, and it is unclear whether Pantex would have 
sufficient capacity to do so. 

Physical Capacity at Pantex Should Be Sufficient to Meet NNSA's 
Planned Dismantlement Workload and Other Stockpile Commitments: 

In April 2013, we obtained and analyzed data on the physical capacity 
at Pantex to address NNSA's long-term dismantlement schedule and other 
stockpile plans as of March 2013 and found that sufficient bay and 
cell capacity should be available to meet these commitments. 
Specifically, we analyzed data from a computer-based system, known as 
the Long Range Production Planning Model (LRPPM), that Pantex uses to 
forecast the numbers of bays and cells needed to address future 
planned workload at the site--including dismantlement, surveillance, 
maintenance, staging, and life extension program activities. 

The LRPPM also provides a tool to NNSA to evaluate the capacity 
available at Pantex to support different potential stockpile plans and 
scenarios--such as the effect of a delay in completing or initiating a 
life extension program for a certain weapon system, or the impact of 
accelerating the dismantlement of certain weapons. On the basis of the 
workload schedules at any given time, Pantex site contractors can use 
the LRPPM to calculate the amount of time and the numbers of bays and 
cells needed to complete annual workload from year to year.[Footnote 
35] We used data generated by the LRPPM to assess the future bay and 
cell requirements for dismantlement and other stockpile related 
activities at Pantex on the basis of NNSA's dismantlement schedule and 
other long-term stockpile plans as of March 2013.[Footnote 36] We did 
not validate the LRPPM system itself. 

Based on the LRPPM data, sufficient bay and cell capacity should be 
available to meet NNSA's planned weapon dismantlement, life extension 
program, and surveillance workload from fiscal year 2013 through 
fiscal year 2022.[Footnote 37] In many years, the total number of bays 
and cells needed to complete total planned workload at the site 
exceeds the capacity limit at one work shift but does not require a 
second work shift. Pantex site contractors told us in those cases that 
they could address excess workload through overtime pay or a partial 
second shift, which they believed would be less expensive than 
maintaining a larger workforce to sustain the use of two work shifts. 

Notwithstanding these projections of sufficient capacity, as of April 
2013, NNSA officials cautioned that there are dozens of issues that 
could significantly change stockpile workload schedules and capacity 
requirements at Pantex in the future. These factors include reduced 
long-term funding levels for all NNSA stockpile-related work stemming 
from sequestration; potential new nuclear weapon requirements 
generated by the U.S. Strategic Command;[Footnote 38] potential loss 
of military interest in a future planned common, or interoperable, 
warhead to replace the W78 and W88; new presidential guidance that 
could call for significantly reduced stockpile levels; and delays in 
startup of new NNSA facilities supporting nuclear weapons 
refurbishment. 

NNSA's Ability to Significantly Accelerate Dismantlement and Complete 
Planned Workload Earlier Than Planned Could Be Costly: 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said that they believe that 
significantly accelerating future dismantlement workload--to complete 
total planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022--could be costly 
and that it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity 
to do so. However, NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us 
that Pantex can and has accelerated some planned dismantlement work in 
response to changing military needs and to annual financial 
performance incentives provided by NNSA to the Pantex site operating 
contractor. 

Capacity to Significantly Accelerate Future Dismantlement Workload Is 
Uncertain and Would Likely Entail Significant Costs: 

NNSA has assessed the capacity at the Pantex site and the costs to 
significantly accelerate the dismantlement schedule in order to 
dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier than 
the end of fiscal year 2022. Specifically, in March 2011, the Office 
of the Vice President asked NNSA to assess the possibility of 
accelerating its dismantlement schedule, to dismantle all weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2018, or 4 years 
earlier than the performance goal date. In December 2011, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense also asked NNSA to evaluate this scenario 
and a second scenario for completing dismantlement of all weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2020, or 2 years 
earlier than the performance goal date. In response to these 
inquiries, in fiscal year 2011, NNSA identified the requirements and 
estimated the costs of increasing annual dismantlement rates. 

To achieve the rate of dismantlement associated with either scenario, 
NNSA identified the need for certain technical improvements at Pantex, 
including bringing one bay and one cell that were unavailable for 
dismantlement operations back online, among other things. In addition, 
NNSA estimated at the time that approximately $212 million in 
additional funding on top of the projected baseline budgets for WDD 
and other NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 through 
fiscal year 2018 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 2018 
dismantlement scenario. Alternatively, NNSA estimated that $265 
million in additional funding on top of the projected baseline budgets 
for WDD and other NNSA programs supporting WDD for fiscal year 2012 
through fiscal year 2020 would be needed to achieve the fiscal year 
2020 scenario. We did not verify the accuracy of these funding 
estimates. See table 2 for more information on NNSA's estimated annual 
funding needs associated with these dismantlement acceleration 
scenarios. 

Table 2: NNSA Estimated Additional Funding to Achieve Fiscal Year 2022 
Dismantlement Performance Goal by Fiscal Year 2018 or Fiscal Year 2020: 

Increased funding to achieve fiscal year 2018 dismantlement scenario 
goal: 

Program: WDD program; 
Total: $119.8 million. 

Program: Other NNSA programs supporting WDD; 
Total: $91.6 million. 

Program: Total: $211.5 million. 

Increased funding to achieve fiscal year 2020 dismantlement scenario 
goal: 

Program: WDD program; 
Total: $142.7 million. 

Program: Other NNSA programs supporting WDD; 
Total: $122.4 million. 

Total: $265.0 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: Amounts may not total due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Under NNSA's 2011 estimate, achieving either of these acceleration 
scenarios was predicated on additional funding being made available to 
the WDD program and the other supporting NNSA programs beginning in 
fiscal year 2012. According to an NNSA official, no additional funding 
was provided by Congress to NNSA in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 to 
support either the 2018 or 2020 dismantlement acceleration scenario. 
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since the 
2011 estimate, they have not reassessed the costs of accelerating its 
dismantlement schedule and have not reevaluated the constraints--
including bay and cell capacity, and the numbers of certified workers 
available--or the impact on the site's other scheduled stockpile life 
extension program and surveillance work that would be associated with 
accelerating dismantlement rates to meet the fiscal year 2018 or 2020 
dismantlement scenario. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors 
told us they were reluctant to undertake such a reevaluation without a 
clear signal of new congressional interest in accelerated 
dismantlement. As a result, we could not determine whether it would be 
possible for NNSA to accelerate dismantlement workload to complete 
dismantlement of all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 earlier 
than fiscal year 2022. 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors told us that they believed 
it would not be possible to complete dismantlement of the remaining 
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2018 without 
compromising the site's planned stockpile life extension program and 
surveillance workload. However, an NNSA official told us that 
completing dismantlement work 2 years early, or by the end of fiscal 
year 2020, might be possible if (1) Congress provided additional 
funding to the WDD program and supporting NNSA programs beginning in 
fiscal year 2014 and (2) other conditions were met, including timely 
Nuclear Weapons Council decisions on the release of weapons in managed 
retirement and rehabilitation of the additional bay and cell at 
Pantex. To accelerate dismantlement to meet a fiscal year 2020 goal, 
an NNSA official estimated that additional funding of approximately 
$212 million, as a rough order of magnitude, would likely be required 
on top of current projected baseline budgets for WDD and supporting 
NNSA programs--that is, the amount of additional funding NNSA 
estimated in 2011 that would be needed to achieve the dismantlement 
rates for the fiscal year 2018 acceleration scenario described above. 

Pantex Has Accelerated Dismantlement of Some Weapons in Response to 
Military Needs and Financial Performance Incentives: 

Even though NNSA and Pantex have not formally reassessed the costs and 
capacity constraints of accelerating dismantlement to complete planned 
workload earlier than fiscal year 2022, according to NNSA officials 
and Pantex site contractors, the Pantex site is generally able to 
accelerate dismantlement work. Specifically, Pantex has regularly 
exceeded annual dismantlement targets established in the Production 
and Planning Directives and Program Control Documents by running extra 
dismantlement shifts and allowing overtime pay. Based on our analysis 
of NNSA data for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012, the Pantex 
site exceeded the annual planned dismantlement rates every year by 
approximately 14 percent on average.[Footnote 39] 

Pantex has accelerated some dismantlement work in response to changing 
military needs that have required some weapons to be dismantled more 
quickly. For instance, in 2011, NNSA agreed to a Navy request to 
accelerate dismantlement of retired W76-0 warheads at the rate of 100 
units per year, with the goal of dismantling 500 warheads by the end 
of fiscal year 2016. At the time, NNSA had not planned for significant 
and consistent dismantlement of W76-0 warheads until fiscal year 2015. 
According to Navy officials we interviewed, accelerating dismantlement 
of retired W76-0 warheads allowed the Navy to avoid constructing new 
weapon storage facilities, saving the Navy approximately $190 million 
in estimated construction costs. 

NNSA has also provided financial performance incentives to the Pantex 
site operating contractor to encourage the site to pursue accelerated 
rates of dismantlement. NNSA has included dismantlement-related 
financial incentives in the annual performance evaluation plans that 
set forth the criteria used by NNSA to evaluate the Pantex site 
operating contractor's performance and determine the total fee the 
contractor earned. For example, the fiscal year 2012 performance 
evaluation plan included five dismantlement-related performance 
incentives, as follows: 

* exceed planned dismantlements of B53s, 

* complete scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities, 

* exceed scheduled W76-0 dismantlement quantities, 

* complete dismantlement of at least 14 W31 trainer units from Y-12, 
and: 

* exceed scheduled W80-0 dismantlement quantities. 

NNSA determined, in its fiscal year 2012 performance evaluation 
report, that the Pantex site operating contractor substantially 
exceeded each of these goals. On the basis of this performance, along 
with the site's performance in meeting other objectives not related to 
dismantlement, the site contractor earned over $16.5 million in award 
fees for defense program-related work that year.[Footnote 40] 

In addition to accelerating dismantlement activities at Pantex, NNSA 
officials told us that consideration had been given in the past to 
augmenting dismantlement capacity by using a similar weapons assembly/ 
disassembly facility, known as the Device Assembly Facility, located 
at the NNSS. Using this facility in such a way would be similar to an 
approach to increase dismantlement capacity recommended by the 
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board in 2005.[Footnote 41] However, NNSA 
officials told us that using the Device Assembly Facility for nuclear 
weapons dismantlement operations could carry significant costs. 
According to NNSA officials, the facility currently does not have the 
necessary safety authorizations, sufficient numbers of certified 
technicians and security personnel, and other required tooling and 
resources to perform dismantlement operations there. For example, 
because the SS-21 process is a Pantex-specific plan for dismantlement 
that takes into account the unique features of the site, Pantex site 
contractors told us the SS-21 process would need to be recreated at 
the Device Assembly Facility to adjust for features specific to that 
facility and the weapons to be dismantled there. NNSA officials said 
that they believed meeting these requirements could take a significant 
amount of time, so that the augmented dismantlement capacity at the 
facility might be operational for only a few years before the planned 
dismantlement workload is expected to be completed. 

Disassembly and Disposition of Some Nuclear and Nonnuclear Components 
from Dismantled Weapons Is Complicated by Policy and Technical 
Challenges: 

We identified several policy and technical challenges affecting NNSA's 
disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from 
dismantled nuclear weapons. First, NNSA has not established a 
capability for the disassembly and disposition of pits from dismantled 
nuclear weapons, creating uncertainty about when they will be removed 
from Pantex. Second, NNSA is retaining much of its inventory of CSAs, 
which is not expected to have a near-term effect on NNSA's ability to 
meet its external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors 
Program and others, but poses challenges to Y-12's ability to plan its 
workload. Third, NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components 
from dismantled weapons at Pantex in a contingency inventory that may 
exceed future weapons needs, and the agency's ability to effectively 
manage this inventory is complicated by decisions to retain many 
components for potential reuse in weapons and by limitations in 
Pantex's previous component inventory management system. Finally, 
there is a large backlog of legacy components and unknown legacy 
material that, at current funding levels, could take up to a decade or 
longer to dispose of because of technical and classification security 
challenges associated with the characterization of components. 
However, efforts to address the need to retain older parts and upgrade 
Pantex's component inventory management system are already under way. 

NNSA Has Not Established a Capability for Disassembly and Disposition 
of Pits Stored at Pantex: 

NNSA has not established a capability for the disassembly and 
disposition of pits from dismantled nuclear weapons, creating 
uncertainty about when they will be removed from Pantex and 
potentially posing challenges to site operations. In 1994, the United 
States declared 38.2 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium as surplus 
to national security needs, and in 1997 NNSA announced a plan to 
dispose of this plutonium through conversion into mixed oxide fuel by 
building a dedicated pit disassembly and conversion capability and a 
mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, among other means.[Footnote 42] 
Much of the plutonium slated for disposition is contained in nuclear 
weapon pits, which must be disassembled and converted to plutonium 
oxide before it can be fabricated into mixed oxide fuel. 

However, after 15 years of consideration, NNSA has decided not to 
establish a dedicated plutonium disposition capability and is studying 
other options for disassembly of surplus pits. As a result, the future 
of the overall plutonium disposition program remains unclear.[Footnote 
43] Since 1997, NNSA has proposed a number of planned alternatives for 
establishing a plutonium disposition capability; however, in 2007 and 
2010, we identified persistent problems with cost overruns and 
schedule delays in many of these plans.[Footnote 44] In its fiscal 
year 2014 budget, NNSA stated that it remains committed to plutonium 
disposition but that, in consideration of preliminary cost increases 
and the current budget environment, it is assessing alternative 
strategies for a plutonium disposition capability, which may further 
delay the timelines for pit removal from Pantex.[Footnote 45] 

Because NNSA has not established a capability for pit disassembly and 
conversion, Pantex has accrued a large inventory of pits that are 
surplus to defense needs. These pits are being stored on-site until a 
pit disassembly capability is operational. Many of the surplus pits 
are available for disassembly. The remaining pits on site comprise the 
U.S. strategic reserve of plutonium, or serve as candidates for 
potential reuse in refurbished stockpile weapons. 

Pantex is authorized by federal authorities to store up to 20,000 pits 
on-site. Pantex site contractors told us that the pits from all 
weapons to be dismantled by fiscal year 2022 could be accommodated at 
the site without surpassing the 20,000 pit limit. According to our 
analysis of NNSA's future dismantlement schedule, additional weapons, 
each with one pit, are to be dismantled from fiscal year 2013 through 
fiscal year 2022, but the site will remain within the overall storage 
limit. 

However, as future weapons are retired and dismantled and, in the 
absence of a plutonium disposition capability, storing an increasing 
number of pits will require a reconfiguration of some of the 
nonnuclear bays at Pantex. Pantex site contractors told us that while 
Zone 4 magazine storage is reaching capacity under its current 
configuration, if a dedicated pit disassembly and conversion 
capability is not built, additional nonnuclear bays within Zone 12 
would need to be converted to permit the storage of the remaining pits 
up to the 20,000 pit limit. An NNSA official told us that these bays 
have recently been authorized for nuclear explosive operations and 
could be used for pit storage without any adverse impact on the site's 
ability to perform its anticipated workload. See figure 5 for photos 
of the weapon and pit storage magazines in Pantex Zone 4. 

Figure 5: Pantex Zone 4 Magazines for Pit and Weapon Storage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: National Nuclear Security Administration. 

[End of figure] 

NNSA's Decision to Retain Many CSAs Poses Challenges to Y-12's 
Workload Planning: 

NNSA has made a policy decision to retain many CSAs for potential 
reuse in refurbished weapons and as part of the U.S. strategic 
reserve. Retention of these CSAs is not currently expected to have a 
near-term impact on NNSA's external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. 
Naval Reactors Program and other programs, but retention poses 
challenges to Y-12's ability to plan its future workload. 

NNSA Is Retaining Many CSAs: 

At the end of fiscal year 2012, NNSA identified a large number of CSAs 
from dismantled weapons or in retired weapons awaiting 
dismantlement.[Footnote 46] Some of these CSAs were identified as 
excess by NNSA and were available for disassembly at Y-12. The HEU 
from the excess CSAs may be used to meet NNSA's external HEU supply 
commitments to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program and other programs. 
However, there were many remaining CSAs being retained by NNSA that 
were not available for disassembly. According to NNSA documents and 
officials, as well as Y-12 site contractors, NNSA is retaining many 
CSAs for several reasons, including the following: 

* To provide NNSA with multiple options in selecting which CSAs to 
reuse in refurbished weapons. According to data provided by NNSA 
officials and Y-12 site contractors in March 2013, NNSA is retaining 
two types of CSAs as options for reuse in a potential future W78 
warhead refurbishment.[Footnote 47] An NNSA official told us that NNSA 
anticipated a decision on the CSAs for W78 reuse by 2016, which would 
lead to the release for disassembly of the retained CSAs not selected 
shortly thereafter. In addition, NNSA is also retaining four types of 
CSAs as options for reuse in a warhead on the Air Force's planned long-
range standoff missile. An NNSA official told us that the work to 
select CSAs for a long-range standoff missile warhead was in a very 
preliminary stage and that it was not possible to estimate a date for 
the release of the CSAs currently being held as reuse candidates. 

* To provide a technical hedge for aging CSAs. Additional CSAs are 
being retained because of uncertainty about the effects of aging on 
the retained CSAs. Some of the retained CSA types have not been 
disassembled and inspected in many years, and the national 
laboratories have expressed the concern that the age and degradation 
of components may affect the number of usable CSAs and CSA parts. The 
laboratories recommend that the condition of many of the systems be 
reassessed and that those systems found unacceptable be removed from 
the list, but NNSA officials told us they had no plans to do so. NNSA 
officials told us they could not estimate the number of CSAs that the 
laboratories have requested as a hedge due to concerns about their age. 

* For potential use in planetary defense against earthbound asteroids. 
NNSA officials told us that CSAs associated with a certain warhead 
indicated as excess in the 2012 Production and Planning Directive are 
being retained in an indeterminate state pending a senior-level 
government evaluation of their use in planetary defense against 
earthbound asteroids. While NNSA has declared these CSAs to be excess 
and, until March 2013, had scheduled them for disassembly beginning in 
fiscal year 2015, the national labs' retention letter has also 
characterized the CSA associated with this warhead as an 
"irreplaceable national asset." The WDD program is coordinating NNSA's 
evaluation of their use in planetary defense with the support of LLNL, 
LANL, and Y-12. 

* To provide a strategic reserve of HEU. Because the United States no 
longer produces HEU, since 1994, the United States has retained a 
strategic reserve of HEU--in the form of CSAs and HEU metal--to ensure 
an adequate HEU supply is available for the weapons program in the 
future. Some of the HEU from retained CSAs is expected to remain in 
the strategic reserve even after disassembly. For example, once a 
decision is reached regarding which of the two retained CSA types will 
be used in the refurbished W78, the remaining CSA types not selected 
will be released for disassembly, but their HEU metal will continue to 
make up part of the U.S. strategic reserve. 

CSA Retention Is Not Expected to Have an Impact on NNSA's External 
Supply Commitments but Poses Challenges to Y-12's Ability to Plan Its 
Disassembly Workload: 

NNSA's decision to retain many CSAs is not expected to have a near-
term impact on NNSA's external HEU supply commitments to the U.S. 
Naval Reactors Program, space and research reactors, and nuclear 
nonproliferation programs. Based on our review of a March 2013 Y-12 
analysis of the site's ability to supply HEU over the next 20 years 
and interviews with an NNSA official and an NNSA contractor, CSA 
disassembly through the end of fiscal year 2020 is projected to 
provide Y-12 with enough HEU to meet its external supply commitments 
through 2032. However, the Y-12 analysis noted that, unless additional 
CSAs are made available for disassembly, after fiscal year 2020 Y-12 
will need to draw HEU from its on-hand inventory to meet its 
commitments. Furthermore, an NNSA official confirmed that a 
significant delay in the release of managed retirement weapons would 
impact NNSA's ability to meet external HEU supply commitments to the 
U.S. Naval Reactors Program after 2032. According to the Y-12 
analysis, additional supplies of HEU to support the U.S. Naval 
Reactors Program after 2032 are required, and NNSA is currently 
reviewing weapon life extension program requirements that will ensure 
additional supply. 

However, NNSA's decision to retain many CSAs has reduced the number of 
CSAs available for disassembly at Y-12, which poses significant 
challenges to Y-12's ability to plan its disassembly workload. We 
analyzed Y-12 CSA disassembly data from the 2009 Production and 
Planning Directive--published before the number of CSAs retained was 
increased--and from the March 2013 draft CSA disassembly schedule and 
found that, from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2032, Y-12 is 
projected to disassemble far fewer CSAs than in NNSA's 2009 Production 
and Planning Directive. 

NNSA's decision to retain many CSAs, and uncertain policy decisions 
regarding when some will be released for disassembly, pose challenges 
to Y-12's ability to plan future work. Under NNSA's September 2012 
retention plan, the March 2013 draft disassembly schedule shows a 
significant drop-off in workload in fiscal year 2018 through fiscal 
year 2020, and after fiscal year 2022. Y-12 site contractors told us 
that they need approximately 2 to 3 years to plan for the disassembly 
of CSAs, including training personnel and ensuring that adequate 
equipment is in place. Y-12 site contractors raised serious concerns 
about how this potential drop-off in workload could affect both their 
near-term planning and their long-term workload, resulting in the need 
to lay off workers, and that the effects could be felt at the site 
earlier than the first year of the drop-off. 

An NNSA official also told us that upcoming decisions regarding which 
CSAs would be used for certain refurbished weapons would result in the 
release of additional CSAs for disassembly by late 2016. However, 
based on our discussions with Y-12 site contractors, a decision in 
late 2016 could already affect Y-12's ability to prepare for upcoming 
disassembly work. When we raised these concerns with an NNSA official, 
the official told us that CSA retention decisions are driven by 
national security considerations and not by Y-12 workload 
considerations. 

NNSA Is Retaining a Contingency Inventory of Nonnuclear Components 
That May Exceed Future Weapon Needs: 

NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from dismantled 
weapons at Pantex--including millions of parts for potential reuse in 
repairing, maintaining, or refurbishing weapons in the current and 
future stockpiles--as a contingency inventory that may exceed future 
weapon needs. However, NNSA's ability to effectively manage and 
evaluate the retention of some parts in this inventory is complicated 
by decisions to retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, 
including old parts from weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by 
limitations in Pantex's previous component inventory management system. 

The inventory of nonnuclear components at Pantex includes several 
categories of components that are managed in different ways. 
Nonnuclear components from weapons still active in the stockpile are 
categorized within Pantex's "active" component inventory, and 
nonnuclear components from weapons no longer in the stockpile are 
considered "legacy" components. "Mark quality" components are those 
that have been retained for reuse--Pantex retains those in the active 
category but is authorized to dispose of those in the legacy category. 
The "non-netable" category comprises components that will not be 
retained at Pantex and that will be disposed of. Table 3 illustrates 
Pantex's nonnuclear component inventory as of May 2013. 

Table 3: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Inventory as of May 2013: 

Legacy[C]: 
Mark quality[A]: 7,250; 
Non-netable[B]: 75,425; 
Total: 82,675. 

Active[D]: 
Mark quality[A]: 3,029,300; 
Non-netable[B]: 239,902; 
Total: 3,269,202. 

Total: 
Mark quality[A]: 3,036,550; 
Non-netable[B]: 315,327; 
Total: 3,351,877. 

Source: Pantex. 

[A] Mark quality refers to nonnuclear components retained for possible 
reuse. 

[B] Non-netable refers to nonnuclear components that will not be 
retained. 

[C] Legacy refers to nonnuclear components from weapons no longer in 
the stockpile. 

[D] Active refers to nonnuclear components from weapons still in the 
stockpile. 

[End of table] 

In arranging for the disposition of nonnuclear components from 
dismantled weapons, Pantex's first priority is disposing of components 
from ongoing weapon dismantlement to avoid adding unnecessarily to 
Pantex's preexisting inventory. However, because remanufacturing 
certain nonnuclear components and parts could be time-consuming and 
expensive--or, in some cases, is impossible--NNSA officials and the 
national laboratories ask Pantex to store components for potential 
reuse in current weapons, future modernized weapons, or for other 
weapons-related contingencies. These component retention instructions 
are outlined in a weapon type's Program Control Document, which 
targets the numbers of components to retain, and detailed in each 
weapon type's Retirement Disposition Instruction, developed by the 
national laboratories and weapon program managers, which specifies the 
method of disposition for each component--saved for reuse, disposed 
of, or sent to KCP or NNSS. According to a 2011 Pantex chart, Pantex 
will add an estimated 53,000 components to the mark quality inventory 
per year from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015. Figure 6 
shows nonnuclear component storage within Pantex's warehouses and 
nonnuclear components packaged and ready for shipment from Pantex. 

Figure 6: Pantex Nonnuclear Component Warehouse Storage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: National Nuclear Security Administration. 

[End of figure] 

Our review of nonnuclear component inventory data and Pantex 
documents, as well as our interviews with NNSA officials and Pantex 
site contractors, suggest that Pantex may be retaining more nonnuclear 
components as "mark quality" for potential reuse than necessary and 
that the age and condition of some mark quality components raises 
questions about their suitability for reuse. As of May 2013, Pantex 
was storing 3 million mark quality nonnuclear components as a 
contingency inventory for potential reuse in maintaining active 
stockpile or refurbished weapons. In January 2013, Pantex site 
contractors estimated that 1.4 million of these components were 
commercially available hardware, such as screws, nuts, and bolts. 
According to Pantex documentation, "a large number" of the components 
retained in the mark quality inventory are believed to be excess based 
on the current stockpile. Pantex site contractors also told us that 
some retention requests from the laboratories for nonnuclear 
components may be overly conservative. For instance, Pantex site 
contractors told us that, in 2012, NNSA--at the request of the 
national laboratories--directed Pantex to retain approximately 650 
spin rocket motors, but that after questioning from Pantex, they 
revised the request to 50 motors. In addition, some mark quality 
components in storage are very old. For example, our review found that 
1.7 million components--or more than half of the mark quality 
inventory at Pantex, as of August 2012--were placed in storage in 1989 
or before.[Footnote 48] During our site visit to Pantex, we observed 
several components covered in dust that appeared not to have been 
touched or moved in years, if not decades. 

NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, however, told us that they 
believed that it made sense to retain more components in mark quality 
inventory than may be necessary because of uncertain future stockpile 
maintenance, repair, or refurbishment needs, and because it could be 
costly to remanufacture or replace components that had been disposed 
of. An NNSA official told us that, in the past, NNSA had disposed of 
components that the agency later needed. For instance, an NNSA 
official told us that NNSA had disposed of the center cases--a section 
of the case that contains the CSA--from dismantled B61 bombs through 
burial at NNSS but later found the agency would need them for the B61 
life extension program. NNSA officials told us that the components' 
importance was such that NNSA had decided to dig up the cases because 
doing so cost less than remanufacturing them. In addition, NNSA 
officials and Pantex site contractors told us that, since some parts 
will always need to be retained to sustain the current stockpile, and 
since the cost to sustain the warehouses varies little by the number 
of parts stored, they believed that any marginal costs associated with 
storing excess components were justified by the potential cost of any 
future scenario requiring their remanufacture or reacquisition. 

However, we found that some active mark quality nonnuclear components 
in the Pantex inventory are associated with weapon systems no longer 
in the stockpile, raising questions about whether these components 
will ever be reused. For example, as of August 2012, we found that 
Pantex was storing in its mark quality inventory for reuse 493,305 
components from weapons that were no longer in the active stockpile, 
including approximately 6,135 components from the B43--a weapon 
produced in the early 1960s and retired from the stockpile in 1991--
and 5,092 components from the Mk-11--a weapon produced in the 1950s 
and retired in 1960. Both of these weapons were dismantled before 
1992, but some of their components remain in Pantex's contingency 
inventory. In addition, Pantex continues to store 58,854 components 
from dismantled B57s, a weapon that was last dismantled in 1995. 
Pantex site contractors told us that NNSA retains some components from 
weapons no longer in the stockpile because they can be reused in 
active stockpile weapons, but Pantex site contractors said it was 
unlikely that many of the components from some of these very old 
weapons would be reused. An NNSA official told us that NNSA is working 
with the national laboratories to reassess the need to retain these 
components, but that efforts were hampered under current funding 
levels. 

In recognition of these inventory issues, in September 2012, NNSA 
created a capability to track "slow moving" inventory and reevaluate 
the continuing need to retain it. However, in January 2013, NNSA 
officials told us that the capability was too new to judge its 
usefulness to weapons program managers and the national laboratories. 
NNSA officials told us that they would use this capability to evaluate 
the ongoing necessity to retain some of these slow moving components 
during their next annual review of retained weapons components to be 
held in the fall of 2013. 

Management of the large nonnuclear component inventory at Pantex has 
been further complicated by limitations in the site's previous 
inventory management system. For example, the inventory system, which 
dated to 1989, did not have the fields to collect financial and other 
information to establish storage component costs, the value of the 
components in storage, or forecast future storage capacity needs. In 
January 2013, we requested data on the cost of storage for nonnuclear 
components at Pantex. NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said 
they did not have an estimate of those costs. NNSA officials also did 
not have an estimate of the value of the components in storage that 
could enable NNSA to make economic decisions about retaining or 
disposing of certain components, particularly those weapons no longer 
in the stockpile. 

In addition, according to an NNSA official and Pantex site 
contractors, the system could not be used to forecast future component 
inflows or outflows based on anticipated capacity and workload at 
Pantex. Pantex site contractors estimated that Pantex's inventory was 
at 86 percent of the site's storage capacity, which was a decrease 
from the 1990s, when inventory was at nearly 95 percent capacity. In 
January 2013, the DOE Inspector General found that the warehouses that 
Pantex uses to store weapons components are nearing capacity levels. 
[Footnote 49] Pantex site contractors were able to show us pictures 
demonstrating reductions in stored components that had freed up space, 
but the inventory system could not project if current storage capacity 
will be sufficient to contain the estimated 53,000 components that 
will be added to the mark quality inventory on average through fiscal 
year 2015. Pantex site contractors told us that, if they ran out of 
storage space, they could store components in special containers 
outside in Zone 12, or create additional storage by opening up an 
unused warehouse on-site, but that doing so may add to operating 
costs. Furthermore, when we requested basic information such as how 
long components had been in storage and their associated weapon 
system, Pantex site contractors told us they would have to write 
special queries to extract this information from the system. 

In May 2013, Pantex site contractors informed us that they would be 
addressing some of these limitations through a $38 million upgrade to 
the site's computer systems in July 2013 that would include 
improvements to the component inventory management system. However, 
this system was still being implemented in August 2013, and we were 
not able to assess the extent to which the upgrades may address the 
issues we identified. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site 
contractors, the upgraded system will include fields to collect cost 
information and the physical size of a component. However, it will not 
contain fields to track the age of a part, though a Pantex site 
contractor said that the upgraded system will make it easier to 
research that data. 

Disposing of a Large Nonnuclear Legacy Component Inventory Could Take 
a Decade or Longer: 

In addition, there is a large backlog of legacy components and unknown 
legacy material that could take up to a decade or longer to dispose of 
because of technical and classification security challenges associated 
with the characterization of components. Nonnuclear components must be 
characterized before Pantex can safely and securely dispose of them. 
Characterization is the process of understanding, documenting, 
classifying according to security level, and establishing a waste 
disposal pathway. To characterize a component, Pantex relies heavily 
on engineers at SNL, as well as weapons component information 
contained in a database maintained by SNL called the Stockpile 
Dismantlement Database. 

* Legacy components: As previously mentioned, these are components 
from dismantled weapons that are no longer in the active stockpile and 
that Pantex is authorized to dispose of. These components may be 
partially characterized--in that they have been identified and 
recorded in the inventory system--but do not yet have an appropriate 
disposal pathway established by Pantex. 

* Legacy material: There is an unknown quantity of components in boxes 
left over from previous decades' dismantlement. These components have 
not been characterized, and, once identified and recorded, may or may 
not have an established disposal pathway. 

In 2011, after several years of review, NNSA authorized Pantex to 
dispose of all of the site's legacy components, but approximately 
1,300 components need characterization before they can be disposed of. 
According to an NNSA official, in November 2012, characterization and 
disposal of legacy components and material in legacy boxes is the 
lowest priority for the WDD program and would be the first activity to 
be reduced under program budget cuts. In September 2013, an NNSA 
official told us that the net impact of sequestration had been a delay 
to legacy component disposition work in fiscal year 2013. According to 
Pantex data, by May 2013, Pantex had successfully disposed of more 
than 75 percent of the legacy component inventory it had in September 
2011--from 350,249 to 82,675 components. However, 1,300 of these 
legacy components had not been fully characterized, as of April 2013, 
and could not be disposed of. Pantex site contractors told us that 
they could characterize 730 of these components on-site but that 
information on the remaining 570 had been sent to SNL for additional 
research. In April 2013, Pantex site contractors told us this 
additional research could take over a year to complete. 

Additionally, Pantex currently has an unknown quantity of legacy 
material in boxes left over from previous decades' dismantlement 
operations that it is attempting to eliminate over time. Pantex site 
contractors and an NNSA official told us that, in previous decades, 
less emphasis was placed on properly disposing of nonnuclear weapons 
components. During our site visit, we observed a number of cardboard 
and wooden boxes containing unknown weapons parts from previous 
decades' dismantlements. Pantex site contractors told us that some of 
these boxes may contain parts that are up to 60 years old and that may 
be radiologically contaminated, which makes them difficult to handle 
and identify. 

An NNSA official told us that they have an informal goal of disposing 
of the entire backlog of legacy components and legacy material by 
fiscal year 2022. However, Pantex site contractors told us that their 
efforts are hampered when weapons component information in the 
Stockpile Dismantlement Database does not exist or is incomplete. 
Pantex site contractors told us they rely heavily on information in 
the database to identify these legacy components, but some very old 
weapons information--which may contain highly classified additional 
details about the design of early nuclear weapons--is incomplete or 
has not been added to the database out of "need to know" security 
concerns. NNSA officials told us that because the database can be 
accessed by a variety of individuals across the weapons complex, LLNL 
and LANL site contractors are often reluctant to share drawings with 
SNL for inclusion in the database, hampering SNL and Pantex's efforts 
to identify and dispose of legacy components. Pantex site contractors 
told us that they could request the drawings directly from the weapons 
design laboratories, but a Pantex document states that the time 
required to characterize a component is significantly lengthened when 
it is not in the database. NNSA officials told us that they are 
working to identify a solution, in concert with site contractors at 
Pantex, SNL, LLNL, and LANL. 

Conclusions: 

NNSA's WDD program is instrumental in enabling the United States to 
eliminate nuclear weapons excess to defense needs and to meet 
international treaty commitments. To these ends, DOE and NNSA have 
dismantled more than 12,000 weapons since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and the WDD program will play a critical role in 
dismantling weapons through fiscal year 2022 and beyond as the nuclear 
weapons stockpile continues to shrink, and more weapons are retired. 
While we recognize the progress NNSA has made, we identified concerns 
related to its dismantlement performance goal. 

NNSA is unlikely to achieve its goal of dismantling all weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 
because of uncertainties surrounding when large numbers of retired 
weapons that are currently in managed retirement might be released for 
dismantlement. In addition, because of the possible delay in the 
retirement of additional weapons resulting from New START treaty 
implementation, there could be a significant gap in dismantlement 
workload during the mid-to late-2020s that could affect NNSA's ability 
to sustain sufficient numbers of certified dismantlement personnel. By 
relaxing and extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance 
goal deadline, NNSA could give itself flexibility to account for the 
uncertainties associated with weapons in managed retirement and could 
allow the dismantlement workload to be leveled and extended through 
the mid-2020s to sustain the dismantlement workforce. 

In addition, NNSA's level of progress toward its dismantlement 
performance goal is unclear because it does not track the actual date 
of retirement of individual weapons as they are dismantled. As a 
result, some weapons retired after 2009 may be dismantled and counted 
toward meeting this performance goal. In addition, some weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 will be reinstated to the stockpile, 
but counted as dismantled, because they are replacing weapons 
disassembled and not rebuilt under the stockpile surveillance program. 
As a result, NNSA counts equivalent numbers of weapons as dismantled 
toward its performance goal. Because the dismantlement performance 
goal as written does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks 
providing misleading or confusing information about the age or types 
of weapons being dismantled. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the NNSA Administrator take the following two 
actions: 

* Reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement 
performance goal, to account for the uncertainties about when weapons 
currently in managed retirement will be released for dismantlement, 
and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due to the 
deferred retirement of large numbers of additional weapons following 
entry into force of the New START treaty. 

* Revise the dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA 
intends to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or 
an equivalent number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an 
updated deadline, to reflect that NNSA may be counting some dismantled 
weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009, and is counting some reinstated 
weapons as being equivalent dismantlements. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to NNSA and DOD for comment. NNSA 
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II. DOD 
did not provide written comments. 

In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with our two recommendations 
that it (1) reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022 
dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties when 
weapons currently in managed retirement will be released for 
dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due 
to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional weapons 
following entry into force of the New START treaty and (2) revise the 
dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA intends to 
dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an 
equivalent number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an 
updated deadline. 

Regarding the first recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA 
stated that it is committed to the development of a comprehensive, 
long-term strategy to address not only weapons retired before fiscal 
year 2009, but also weapons retired in fiscal year 2009 and 
thereafter. NNSA stated that such a strategy would allow the agency to 
manage dismantlement and production activities at Pantex and Y-12 in 
order to balance the workload at those facilities and to allow NNSA to 
manage critical skills and technologies to maintain its dismantlement 
commitments. NNSA also stated that it is fully committed to 
dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal 
year 2022. NNSA's proposed action to develop a long-term dismantlement 
strategy to balance workload is responsive to our recommendation and 
our concerns about the impacts of a potential gap in dismantlement 
workload from fiscal year 2022 to the late 2020s or early 2030s. 
However, as discussed in this report, NNSA is likely to face 
challenges in achieving its goal of dismantling all weapons retired 
prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022 due to the uncertainties 
surrounding when weapons in managed retirement--including some weapons 
retired before fiscal year 2009--may be released for dismantlement. 

Regarding the second recommendation, in its written comments, NNSA 
responded that the dismantlement performance goal of dismantling by 
fiscal year 2022 all weapons retired before fiscal year 2009 should 
focus on the equivalent numbers of weapons that are being dismantled. 
NNSA agreed with the recommendation and noted that changing how the 
agency calculates a performance goal requires approval from the Office 
of Management and Budget. NNSA agreed to work with the Office of 
Management and Budget during fiscal year 2014 to identify appropriate 
changes to the dismantlement performance goal in response to our 
recommendation. In addition, NNSA commented that it was incorrect of 
us to characterize the way in which NNSA tracks progress toward its 
dismantlement performance goal as being misleading. Our 
characterization is accurate. As stated in the report, in tracking 
progress under its dismantlement performance goal, NNSA counts weapons 
retired prior to fiscal year 2009 that are reinstated to the stockpile 
rather than being dismantled. We also found that NNSA does not track 
the actual retirement date of individual weapons that are dismantled 
and may be counting weapons toward its dismantlement performance goal 
that were retired from service after fiscal year 2009. NNSA's 
performance goal, as written, does not make these practices clear. As 
we have previously reported, having clear performance goals and 
measures is a key element of effective program management, and 
performance goals and measures that are not clearly stated may be 
confusing or misleading. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the NNSA Administrator, and the Secretary of Defense. In 
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David C. Trimble: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual 
inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and the National Nuclear 
Security Administration's (NNSA) annual dismantlement rates have 
changed over time, and, if so, the reasons why; (2) how NNSA measures 
progress toward achieving its performance goal of dismantling all 
weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 
2022, and any challenges it might face in meeting the goal; (3) NNSA's 
schedule for dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the challenges, if 
any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons; (4) the physical 
capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA's planned future 
dismantlement workload and to potentially accelerate dismantlement; 
and (5) the challenges, if any, affecting disassembly and disposition 
of components from dismantled weapons. 

In general, we addressed these objectives by reviewing relevant 
nuclear weapons stockpile guidance and planning documents and 
interviewing NNSA officials. These documents include Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile Plans, the nuclear weapons stockpile Requirements and 
Planning Documents, and NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Production and Planning 
Directives. We interviewed NNSA officials responsible for overseeing 
the Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) program and obtained 
technical information and data from them on the stockpile, past and 
future dismantlement workload, component management, and on other 
issues pertaining to the program. To understand stockpile planning, 
weapons retirement, and how the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
military services interact with NNSA on dismantlement issues, we 
obtained information and interviewed officials from the Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, U.S. Air 
Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Strategic Command. We also visited the 
Pantex and Y-12 sites where we observed weapon dismantlement and 
canned subassembly (CSA) disassembly operations for several weapon 
systems, viewed component storage facilities, and interviewed 
representatives of the site operating contractors at each location on 
issues relating to dismantlement operations and component management 
processes.[Footnote 50] We identified a nonprobability sample of seven 
weapons systems--B53, B61, W62, W70, W71, W76, and B83--based on 
several factors, including the branch of the military associated with 
the weapons, the weapon delivery platform (i.e. bomber or missile), 
and whether the weapon is strategic or nonstrategic. We used a list of 
standardized questions to conduct interviews with nuclear weapon 
engineers at Pantex on the time, requirements, challenges, and other 
issues associated with the dismantlement of those systems.[Footnote 
51] We also received presentations from Y-12 weapon engineers on 
issues related to the disassembly of the CSAs of these seven weapon 
systems. 

To assess the extent to which and the reasons why the annual 
inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and NNSA's annual 
dismantlement rates have changed over time, we obtained and analyzed 
data from NNSA's Weapons Information System on the annual inventories 
of retired weapons awaiting dismantlement and on annual numbers of 
weapons dismantled for fiscal years 1992 through 2012. We selected 
this time frame for several reasons, including that it allowed us to 
assess weapon retirements and dismantlements since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991 and resulting from stockpile 
reductions through strategic arms control treaties and presidential 
initiatives. The Weapons Information System does not include a 
specific field or category of nuclear weapons that are awaiting 
dismantlement. According to NNSA officials, the annual inventory of 
retired nuclear weapons--which is tracked--approximates, but is not a 
precise figure for, the number of weapons awaiting dismantlement. 
According to NNSA officials, during the time frame of our review, each 
year some number of retired weapons were reinstated, or held for 
future reinstatement, to the stockpile and were not available for 
dismantlement.[Footnote 52] In addition, some retired weapons were not 
immediately available for dismantlement because they were in managed 
retirement status and had not been released by the Nuclear Weapons 
Council. Because NNSA officials told us that it would be difficult and 
time-consuming to locate older stockpile records and reconcile the 
data to develop accurate figures on the actual inventory of weapons 
that were awaiting dismantlement by year over the past 20 years, we 
agreed with NNSA officials to use the annual retired inventory of 
weapons as an approximate measure of the number of weapons awaiting 
dismantlement from year to year, for fiscal year 1992 through fiscal 
year 2012. We also interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on reasons why 
the inventories of retired weapons have changed over time, and 
interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on issues that 
have affected dismantlement processes and rates. We obtained and 
analyzed data that Pantex has developed to measure the difficulty, or 
time requirements, in dismantling different weapon types, referred to 
as dismantlement "difficulty quotients" (DQ). NNSA has used the DQ 
data to establish "dismantlement equivalent units" (DEQ) for each 
weapon type to measure the relative dismantlement time requirements of 
different weapon types. Pantex had DQ data available only for weapons 
dismantled since fiscal year 1998. As a result, we were unable to 
analyze dismantlement DQ and DEQ data for all weapon types dismantled 
since fiscal year 1992 and determine whether weapon systems have 
become more time-consuming to dismantle over the past 20 years based 
on this data. However, we did interview weapon engineers at Pantex 
regarding the challenges in dismantling weapons, including two 
recently dismantled weapon systems that both had relatively large DEQs. 

To assess how NNSA measures progress toward achieving its performance 
goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by 
the end of fiscal year 2022, and any challenges it might face in 
meeting the goal, we obtained and analyzed NNSA data on the inventory 
of retired weapons potentially available for dismantlement over fiscal 
year 2013 through fiscal year 2022. Specifically, we analyzed a March 
2013 draft schedule for the dismantlement or other disposition of all 
retired weapons over this time, which included the schedule for 
dismantling the subset of remaining weapons retired prior to fiscal 
year 2009. We interviewed NNSA and DOD officials on issues related to 
or that could affect the dismantlement schedule, including 
reinstatement of retired weapons and release of retired weapons in 
managed retirement status for dismantlement. 

To assess NNSA's schedule and the challenges, if any, in the 
dismantlement of weapons to be retired as a result of the New START 
treaty, we interviewed NNSA officials to determine whether those 
weapons had been scheduled for dismantlement. We interviewed DOD 
officials to understand how many and when those weapons are expected 
to be retired and other conditions affecting the timing and release of 
those weapons to NNSA for dismantlement. We interviewed NNSA officials 
and Pantex site contractors on issues related to how this additional 
future dismantlement workload will be managed. 

To assess the physical capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA's 
dismantlement goal and to potentially accelerate achievement of this 
goal, we obtained and analyzed data from Pantex's Long Range 
Production Planning Model and interviewed Pantex site contractors on 
the physical capacity at Pantex available to meet the future 
dismantlement schedule and all other future stockpile production 
commitments such as weapon life extension and surveillance efforts. We 
also analyzed data and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site 
contractors on Pantex's ability to accelerate dismantlement work, 
including data on the extent to which Pantex has exceeded annual 
dismantlement goals in response to contract performance incentives and 
information from NNSA on previously developed scenarios for 
accelerating dismantlement workload to meet the fiscal year 2022 
dismantlement goal by fiscal year 2018 or fiscal year 2020. 

To assess the challenges affecting disassembly and disposition of 
components from dismantled weapons, we reviewed NNSA program and 
planning documents and interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex and Y-12 
site contractors on the full scope of the weapons dismantlement and 
disposition process. We reviewed NNSA data and interviewed NNSA 
officials and Pantex site contractors on the number and location of 
pits from dismantled weapons and future plans for reuse or 
disposition, as well as effects of storage on Pantex operations. We 
reviewed NNSA documents, analyzed data, and interviewed NNSA officials 
and Y-12 site contractors on current and future CSA inventories, draft 
CSA disassembly schedules, and related policy issues affecting CSA 
management to assess the effects of CSA disassembly and retention on Y-
12's workload and ability to supply highly enriched uranium to the 
U.S. Naval Reactors Program and other programs. We reviewed data from 
Pantex's nonnuclear weapons component inventory management system and 
interviewed NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors on the size of 
the overall inventory, age and weapon system associated with these 
components, impact of requests from the national labs to retain some 
components, and limitations of the inventory management system. 

We conducted reliability assessments of the data on: (1) the 
inventories of retired weapons available for dismantlement and on 
annual numbers of weapons dismantled for fiscal year 1992 through 
fiscal year 2012 (NNSA's Weapons Information System); (2) future 
capacity requirements at Pantex (Pantex's Long Range Production 
Planning Model); and (3) nonnuclear component inventories (Pantex's 
nonnuclear weapons component inventory management system). We analyzed 
the data from each system for accuracy by, among other things, 
manually testing the data for errors and missing data, and interviewed 
knowledgeable officials on the reliability of the data. We found 
discrepancies in the data provided to us on the retired and dismantled 
weapon inventories and on the Pantex capacity projections, but we were 
able to correct or reconcile the differences through interviews with 
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors. We did not identify any 
material weaknesses in the three data sources that would significantly 
alter our findings. We determined that, overall, the data provided to 
us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Office of The Administrator: 
Washington DC 20585: 

April 23, 2014: 

Mr. David Trimble: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20458: 

Dear Mr. Trimble: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft unclassified report titled, "Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed by 
NNSA to Clarify Dismantlement Performance Goal, GAO)-14-449." GAO 
conducted this audit in response to a request made by the Subcommittee 
on Energy and Water Development of the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's weapons dismantlement 
and component disposition efforts. The GAO provided two 
recommendations for the NNSA to: 1) clarify the dismantlement 
performance goal to account for NNSA's practice of counting equivalent 
numbers of weapons dismantled toward the goal; and 2) consider 
extending the fiscal year (FY) 2022 dismantlement performance goal to 
avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due to deferred weapon 
retirements resulting from New START. 

NNSA's response to GAO's recommendations is enclosed. If you have any 
questions concerning this response, please contact Dean Childs, 
Director, Office of Audit Coordination and Internal Affairs, at (301) 
903-1341. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Frank G. Klotz: 
Administrator: 

Enclosure: 

Response to Report Recommendations: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report: 
Nuclear Weapons Actions Needed by NNSA to clarify Dismantlement 
Performance Goal: 
Unclassified Version: 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that the NNSA
Administrator: 

Recommendation 1: Revise the dismantlement performance goal to clarify 
the weapons NNSA intends to dismantle. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) agrees with the GAO
recommendation that the performance goal of dismantling by FY 2022 all 
weapons retired before FY 2009 should focus on the equivalent number 
of weapons dismantled. A change in how we calculate a performance goal 
requires Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval. NNSA will 
therefore work with OMB in FY 2014 to identify appropriate changes to 
the goal in response to GAO's recommendation. 

To characterize in the summary that NNSA is misleading on progress in 
dismantlements is incorrect. Under current management, some weapons 
retired prior to FY 2009 are reinstated back into the stockpile in 
exchange for weapons that are dismantled and evaluated through the 
stockpile surveillance program. 

Recommendation 2: Reevaluate and consider extending the Agency's 
fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal. 

NNSA is fully committed to dismantling all weapons retired before FY 
2009 by FY 2022. NNSA is also committed to the development of a 
comprehensive, long-term strategy to address not only those weapons 
retired before FY2009, but also weapons retired in FY 2009 and 
thereafter. Such a strategy would allow NNSA to manage dismantlement 
and production activities at Pantex and Y-12 to balance the workload at
these facilities. 

By considering a comprehensive, long-term strategy for the 
dismantlement of weapon systems entering the queue after FY 2009, NNSA 
is able to implement a balanced approach that will allow NNSA to 
manage critical skills and technologies to maintain its dismantlement 
commitments. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant 
Director), Julia Coulter, and William Hoehn made key contributions to 
this report. Other technical assistance was provided by Antoinette 
Capaccio, Penney Harwell Caramia, Karen Keegan, Cynthia Norris, Kevin 
L. O'Neill, Dr. Timothy M. Persons, Dan Royer, Justin Schnare, Rebecca 
Shea, Amie Steele, and Kiki Theodoropoulos. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The formal titles of these treaties are, respectively: The Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. 

[2] For instance, in September 1991, the President announced several 
unilateral initiatives to reduce the U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons 
arsenal. The following month, the Soviet President responded that the 
Soviet Union would reduce its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 
addition, as part of the annual presidential stockpile review process, 
in 2004, the President directed that the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile be reduced by more than 40 percent by 2012 and, in 2007, he 
directed an additional reduction of the stockpile, making it roughly 
one-quarter the size of cold war-era levels. 

[3] The United States had 19,008 nuclear weapons in the stockpile at 
the end of fiscal year 1991 and approximately 5,000 weapons at the end 
of fiscal year 2012. 

[4] NNSA is a semiautonomous agency within DOE created in 1999 with 
responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and 
naval reactors programs. 

[5] The formal title of this treaty is the Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 

[6] Among other things, parties to the treaty, including the United 
States, agree to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and nonnuclear 
weapon state parties agree not to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

[7] The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board provides advice and 
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy on the department's basic 
and applied research and development activities, economic and national 
security policy, educational issues, operational issues, and any other 
activities and operations of DOE as the Secretary may direct. 

[8] Since the end of the cold war, in lieu of designing, testing, and 
producing new nuclear weapons, NNSA has sought to extend the lifetimes 
that existing nuclear weapons can safely and reliably remain in the 
stockpile through a refurbishment process known as a life extension 
program. 

[9] NNSA's stockpile surveillance program includes two elements: the 
stockpile evaluation program, which conducts surveillance evaluations 
of the active and inactive stockpile and new production units, and an 
enhanced surveillance program, which provides diagnostics, 
methodologies, and other tools to enable prediction and detection of 
weapon defects. Surveillance is performed at various levels, including 
testing and evaluation of full weapons, major assemblies and 
components, and the materials that compose the components. Under this 
program, samples of weapons from each system in the stockpile are 
chosen annually and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, 
inspection, reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories. 
The surveillance process can include destructive testing of 
components, resulting in the dismantlement of some weapons. 

[10] NNSA's nuclear security enterprise--formerly known as the nuclear 
weapons complex--consists of the laboratories, production plants, and 
a test site that carry out missions to support NNSA's programs. 

[11] Nuclear weapons dismantlement generally takes place in 
"campaigns," in which a type of weapon is sent to Pantex for 
dismantlement over a period of months. 

[12] HEU is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent 
or greater. Low-enriched uranium contains uranium-235 in a 
concentration of less than 20 percent and greater than 0.7 percent. 

[13] The U.S. Naval Reactors Program, run jointly by the U.S. Navy and 
DOE, ensures an adequate supply of HEU as fuel for U.S. nuclear-
powered naval vessels, among other things. 

[14] DOD identifies strategic weapons as those delivered by ICBMs, 
SLBMs, or heavy bombers. All other weapons are nonstrategic, or 
tactical, nuclear bombs delivered by nonstrategic aircraft--usually 
dual-capable aircraft that can be used for nuclear and conventional 
missions. In the past, nonstrategic U.S. nuclear weapons were 
available for delivery through other means, including as warheads on 
cruise missiles delivered by nonstrategic aircraft; warheads delivered 
on sea- or ground-launched cruise missiles; warheads on ground-
launched ballistic missiles with ranges less than 5,500 kilometers; 
warheads fired from cannon artillery; atomic demolition munitions; and 
antisubmarine nuclear depth bombs. 

[15] In addition to "mods," other alterations, or "alts" to weapons 
may be made that do not affect their military characteristics. For 
example, an alt was completed on B61-3, -4, -7, and -11 bombs to 
replace spin rocket motors, which accelerate the rotation of a weapon 
after it is released from a delivery aircraft and produce thrust to 
arm the weapon. 

[16] For instance, some W76-0 warheads are currently going through a 
life extension program, resulting in refurbished W76-1 units. For more 
information on life extension programs, see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA 
and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the Stockpile Life Extension 
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-385] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009). 

[17] DOD officials told us in June 2013 that the readiness states for 
the stockpile were changing, but that the new categories had not yet 
been released. 

[18] Inactive stockpile weapons are not available to be uploaded on a 
delivery vehicle. They have certain components removed and other 
limited-life components of inactive stockpile weapons are not replaced 
unless the weapons are reactivated and moved to the active stockpile. 

[19] The Nuclear Weapons Council, established by Congress in 1986, is 
a joint DOD/DOE organization that facilitates high-level coordination 
to secure, maintain, and sustain the nuclear stockpile. See Pub. L. 
No. 99-661, § 3137 (1986). The council consists of five members: the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; 
and the NNSA Administrator. The Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and 
Safety Committee is a subordinate body to the Nuclear Weapons Council, 
which advises and assists it, and provides preliminary approval for 
many of the council's activities. It is a joint DOD-DOE senior 
executive or flag-level committee that conducts transactions between 
DOD and DOE on behalf of the council. 

[20] The Nuclear Weapons Council charters a Project Officers Group for 
each weapon system to provide a technical forum for weapon development 
and management activities. Each Project Officers Group is led by a 
project officer from either the Navy or Air Force--the two military 
services that maintain and operate nuclear weapons. 

[21] NNSA issued a 2012 Production and Planning Directive that amended 
or updated certain information in the 2011 directive. According to 
NNSA officials, the 2012 version was not considered a full Production 
and Planning Directive and, among other things, did not include an 
updated dismantlement schedule. The 2013 Production and Planning 
Directive was not available at the time of our review. 

[22] Fission occurs when the nucleus of a heavy unstable atom (such as 
uranium-235 or plutonium-239) is split into two lighter parts, 
releasing neutrons and producing large amounts of energy. Fusion 
occurs when the nuclei of two light atoms (such as deuterium and 
tritium) are joined, or fused, to form a heavier atom, with an 
accompanying release of a neutron and large amounts of energy. 

[23] Nuclear explosive operations are activities involving a nuclear 
explosive, including activities in which the main charge high-
explosive parts and pit are collocated. 

[24] Compared with conventional high explosives, insensitive high 
explosives are highly insensitive to shock, heat, and impact and are 
highly resistant to accidental detonation. Cells have a higher level 
of explosive containment than bays, to reduce the potential for 
release of radioactive material in the event of the accidental 
explosion of conventional high explosives. 

[25] Through a range of subprograms, the RTBF program provides the 
facilities and infrastructure needed to support NNSA's national 
security and operational mission requirements. In its fiscal year 2014 
budget request, NNSA proposed eliminating the RTBF program and 
splitting its activities between an existing Site Stewardship program 
and a new Nuclear Programs unit that will continue to support the 
nuclear material recycle and recovery activities that were supported 
by RTBF. For further information on the RTBF program, see GAO, Nuclear 
Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of Weapons Complex 
Infrastructure and Research and Production Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-582] (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 
2010). 

[26] For weapons going through life extension programs, the process 
involves replacing multiple components and includes dismantling and 
reassembling the weapons. The WDD program does not fund dismantlement 
of weapons associated with life extension programs, but it does fund 
dismantlement of weapons subjected to destructive component testing 
under the stockpile surveillance program. 

[27] Demilitarization refers to the process whereby a component is 
rendered unusable for weapons purposes. Sanitization refers to 
removing or destroying any classified characteristics of a component, 
such as by crushing or shredding. 

[28] We agreed with NNSA officials to use the annual retired inventory 
of weapons as an approximate measure of the number of weapons awaiting 
dismantlement from year to year, from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal 
year 2012. For more information, see appendix I. 

[29] In an October 1993 report on nuclear weapons dismantlement, we 
found that Pantex had completed fewer than half of the required safety 
analysis reports for its facilities and operations; see GAO, Nuclear 
Weapons: Safety, Technical, and Manpower Issues Slow DOE's Disassembly 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-9] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 1993). According to NNSA and Pantex 
officials, the SS-21 process was instituted to correct these 
deficiencies and improve the overall safety of operations at Pantex, 
and Pantex is certified to work on all weapon types in the U.S. 
stockpile under this process. 

[30] For example, the B61 is authorized for dismantlement of two 
weapons simultaneously by two separate work crews within one bay or 
cell, though operations are currently conducted on a single-unit 
basis. Other weapons are authorized for multiunit processing, 
including the W87--which is authorized for one work crew to work on 
two weapons in a bay simultaneously--and the W80--which is authorized 
for dismantlement of one unit while another is staged in a transport 
canister within the bay. 

[31] During our review, DOD and military service officials raised 
concerns about the practice of reinstating retired weapons to the 
stockpile and its potential implications for stockpile reliability. 
NNSA officials provided us with additional information about the 
reinstatement practice and how NNSA addresses potential reliability 
concerns associated with weapons that could be reinstated, and they 
noted that reinstatements are conducted with the full cognizance of 
the joint DOD-DOE Project Officers Group responsible for weapon 
systems that are reinstated. 

[32] For additional information on developing performance goals and 
measures, see GAO, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act 
Implementation Provides Important Opportunities to Address Government 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-617T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2011); Agency Performance Plans: Examples 
of Practices That Can Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69] 
(Washington, D.C.: February 1999); The Results Act: An Evaluator's 
Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20] (Washington, D.C.: April 
1998); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[33] In addition, B61 bombs are also being evaluated for reuse as the 
warhead for the long-range standoff missile, though no B61s are 
currently in managed retirement. 

[34] The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear 
Facility is intended to provide LANL with a modernized capability to 
analyze and store plutonium. However, NNSA has deferred construction 
of this facility until at least fiscal year 2019. The Uranium 
Production Facility is intended to provide Y-12 with a single 
consolidated uranium processing and component production facility. 
This facility was renamed the Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project 
and is scheduled to be completed in three phases through the mid-2030s. 

[35] The LRPPM converts workload by year--i.e., the numbers of weapons 
to be processed under one activity or another in a given fiscal year--
into annual bay and cell requirements through a series of 
calculations. First, the system calculates the total number of hours 
needed to complete a discrete workload activity, such as dismantlement 
of B61-3 bombs, in a given fiscal year by multiplying the number of 
weapons to be processed that year by the estimated amount of time 
needed to complete that activity for a single weapon. The system then 
divides this total time to complete the planned activity by 2,080--the 
number of hours available in a single facility (bay or cell) at one 
work shift, during the course of a year. This results in the total 
numbers of bays or cells needed to complete that activity in that 
year. For example, if 100 weapons of a given type are to be dismantled 
in a given fiscal year, and it takes an estimated 30 hours to complete 
dismantlement of a single unit, the bay requirements for this activity 
over the course of the year would be 1.44 (or 3,000 divided by 2,080). 
The LRPPM adds bay and cell requirements for all planned workload 
activities (e.g., dismantlement, surveillance, and life extension 
programs) to determine the total bay and cell requirements. 

[36] NNSA and Pantex officials told us in April 2013 that the capacity 
projections generated by the LRPPM are subject to change and are often 
updated because stockpile requirements and resources can frequently 
change after a Production and Planning Directive is issued--such as a 
decision to accelerate dismantlement of one system and defer another. 

[37] After fiscal year 2022, the only dismantlement workload that NNSA 
and Pantex had scheduled in the LRPPM data we reviewed were W76-0 
dismantlements. 

[38] The U.S. Strategic Command, part of the Department of Defense, 
has primary responsibility for targeting nuclear weapons, preparing 
the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan, and, if ordered by the President, 
executing the war plan. 

[39] NNSA officials stated that the high annual rates of dismantlement 
would not necessarily lead NNSA to complete planned dismantlement 
workload earlier than fiscal year 2022, as dismantlement workload is 
dynamic and adjusted for increases or decreases in the planned 
quantities of weapons available for dismantlement, and because 
dismantlement workload must be balanced with component disposition 
work. 

[40] According to NNSA officials, because of the way the incentives 
are structured in the performance evaluation plans, it is not possible 
to determine the total earned fee in a fiscal year resulting directly 
from dismantlement performance. Specifically, while there are some 
dismantlement-specific performance incentives, in other cases, the 
dismantlement performance targets can be one component of a composite, 
Pantex-wide performance goal. In those cases, the amount of the fee 
attributable to the dismantlement portion cannot be determined, 
according to NNSA officials, because fee amounts are not generally 
allocated to specific targets in the composite performance goal. 

[41] In 2005, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Infrastructure Task Force recommended that NNSA utilize the 
Device Assembly Facility for assembly of nuclear weapons utilizing 
insensitive high explosives, thereby freeing up capacity at Pantex for 
expedited weapons dismantlement. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force, Recommendations for 
the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 
2005). 

[42] The United States declared an additional 9 tons of plutonium as 
excess in 2007. 

[43] The plutonium disposition program is managed by NNSA's Fissile 
Materials Disposition Program. 

[44] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties 
with and Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium 
Disposition Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-378] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 
2010); and Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a 
Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid 
Cost Increases and Delays, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-336] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2007). 

[45] NNSA is disposing of a small amount of plutonium using a pit 
disassembly development and demonstration project located at LANL. 

[46] CSAs within active stockpile weapons, managed retirement weapons, 
and a small quantity held as test objects and for enhanced 
surveillance activities were not included in this inventory. 

[47] Refurbishment of the W78 is intended to modify the weapon such 
that it may be used on multiple platforms. 

[48] We were limited to using August 2012 data because Pantex 
officials told us this information was not easily extracted directly 
from their records. 

[49] DOE, Audit Report: The National Nuclear Security Administration's 
Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program, OAS-L-13-06 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2013). 

[50] The terms dismantlement and disassembly are sometimes used 
interchangeably. However, in our report, we use the term nuclear 
weapons dismantlement to refer to the process at Pantex of reducing a 
weapon to its component parts and removing the high explosives 
surrounding the pit. We use the term disassembly to refer to weapons 
disassembled and inspected for surveillance purposes at Pantex, and to 
refer to further disassembly of weapon components, such as CSAs 
disassembled at Y-12. 

[51] Because this was a nonprobability sample, information derived 
about these weapon systems cannot be generalized to all weapon 
systems, but it can provide illustrative examples of the time, 
requirements, challenges, and other issues associated with the 
dismantlement of the systems and the disassembly of the associated 
CSAs. 

[52] According to NNSA officials, in general, the number of weapons in 
the annual retired inventory to be reinstated to the stockpile was 
relatively small, perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the total, while weapons 
in managed retirement status generally represented a larger percentage 
of the annual retired inventory. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]