This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-15-155 
entitled 'Information Sharing: DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center 
Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for 
Federal Funding Provided to Centers' which was released on November 6, 
2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

November 2014: 

Information Sharing: 

DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and Results, but Needs to 
More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers: 

GAO-15-155: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-15-155, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Fusion centers play a key role in sharing threat information among all 
levels of government and the private sector. Federal agencies support 
these centers by providing personnel, funding, and other assistance. 
GAO was asked to assess how federal agencies are accounting for 
ongoing support provided. 

This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has helped centers 
assess capabilities and address gaps, (2) the federal government has 
defined its expectations for centers and assessed their contributions 
to homeland security, (3) federal agencies have deployed personnel to 
centers, and (4) DHS grant reforms have improved accountability for 
federal funds that support centers. 

GAO analyzed the results of center assessments, documents on center 
expectations, guidance for deploying personnel, and grant 
requirements. GAO also interviewed DHS and FBI officials who work with 
centers, and directors, staff, and deployed personnel at 10 of 78 
fusion centers. GAO selected centers based on geographic location and 
other factors. Interviews are not generalizable, but provided insights 
on center capabilities and federal support provided. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is helping state and major 
urban area fusion centers assess baseline capabilities—such as the 
ability to receive, analyze, and disseminate threat information—and 
address capability gaps through an annual assessment process, 
resources it provides to centers to mitigate gaps, and an exercise 
program to evaluate capabilities in practice. Results of the 2013 
annual assessment show that centers achieved an average score of about 
92 out of 100, which generally indicates that centers have policies 
and procedures in place to implement key information sharing 
activities. The scores do not reflect if these activities have 
resulted in specific homeland security impacts. All 10 fusion center 
directors GAO contacted said that the annual assessment is a useful 
tool to identify capabilities and monitor progress. 

Since 2004, the federal government has issued guidance and related 
documents that define its expectations and key roles for fusion 
centers and also has taken steps to assess their contributions to 
homeland security. For example, DHS has developed 45 performance 
measures to help assess fusion center contributions, which generally 
align with attributes of successful measures. The measures include 
outputs-—such as the number of intelligence products-—and outcomes, 
such as how products have influenced key partners' security decisions. 

In 2013, federal agencies deployed a total of 288 personnel to fusion 
centers. The two agencies that provide the most support-—DHS's Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)—-have developed nationwide guidance to help these 
agencies make fusion center support decisions and generally identified 
key roles and responsibilities for personnel deployed to centers. 
Other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have not developed such 
guidance and generally defer to field-level management to make 
deployment decisions. However, in September 2014, DHS issued guidance 
that is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking 
resource deployments to fusion centers. 

DHS reforms to the Homeland Security Grant Program are helping to 
ensure that grant funds intended for fusion centers are used to build 
or sustain baseline capabilities, but DHS cannot accurately account 
for federal funds provided to states to support these centers. 
Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA)-—the lead DHS agency responsible for grant 
funding-—began to require that grant requests for fusion centers 
identify specific capabilities that proposed projects are to address. 
FEMA also requires that state grantees biannually report the amount of 
federal funds spent on fusion center projects. However, after further 
review of data provided to GAO, FEMA determined that states 
inaccurately categorized about $60 million in projects as related to 
fusion centers in 2012. Thus, FEMA could not reliably report on the 
amount of federal grants used to support centers, which is needed to 
help inform future investment decisions. FEMA is developing guidance 
to help grantees better categorize fusion center projects and improve 
the reliability of grant reporting, but an additional mechanism to 
verify that states act in accordance with the guidance could help FEMA 
ensure that projects are properly classified and more accurately 
account for grant funding provided to centers. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FEMA develop a mechanism to verify that states act 
in accordance with proposed guidance, when implemented, to help ensure 
that data on fusion center projects are sufficiently accurate to 
provide a reliable accounting of the total amount of federal grant 
funding provided to centers. DHS concurred. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-155]. For more 
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-6510 or 
larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess Capabilities and 
Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further Evaluate Capabilities 
through Exercises: 

Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and Developed 
Measures to Assess Homeland Security Contributions: 

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 
2013 and Generally Defined Roles and Responsibilities: 

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, but DHS 
Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided to Centers: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center Performance Measures: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Excerpts of Fusion Center-Related Laws, Policies, and 
Guidance, 2004 through 2013: 

Table 2: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Outcome 
Category: 

Table 3: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Output 
Categories: 

Table 4: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities for Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Personnel Deployed to Fusion Centers: 

Table 5: Summary of Outcome and Output Measures, Implementation 
Status, and Results for the National Network of Fusion Centers: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Goals and Objectives in the National Strategy of Fusion 
Centers: 

Figure 2: Number of Federal Personnel Agencies Reported Deploying to 
Fusion Centers, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013: 

Abbreviations: 

AOR: area of responsibility: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Administration: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993: 

HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program: 

I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

IRS: Internal Revenue Service: 

ISE: Information Sharing Environment: 

NFCA: National Fusion Center Association: 

NSI: Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative: 

P/CRCL: privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties: 

PM-ISE: Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment: 

SAR: Suspicious Activity Reporting: 

SHSP: State Homeland Security Program: 

SLPO: State and Local Program Office: 

SLTT: state, local, tribal, and territorial: 

UASI: Urban Area Security Initiative: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 4, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Homeland security incidents, such as the bombings at the Boston 
Marathon in April 2013, emphasize the importance of developing a 
national capability to efficiently and expeditiously gather, analyze, 
and disseminate law enforcement, homeland security, and terrorism 
information. Since 2001, 49 states and many major urban areas have 
established fusion centers to help improve the sharing of information 
among state, local, tribal, territorial, federal, and private sector 
entities.[Footnote 1] As of June 2014, the National Network of Fusion 
Centers (National Network) consisted of 78 centers and the 
partnerships and collaborative efforts formed within and among them. 
While state and local governments own and operate these centers, many 
federal partners--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ)--have supported fusion centers by 
providing resources in various forms, such as training, technical 
assistance, funding, and personnel. Within DHS, the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is the lead component with 
responsibilities for sharing terrorism-related information with all 
levels of government and the private sector. I&A's State and Local 
Program Office (SLPO) serves as the focal point for fusion center 
coordination. 

We have designated the sharing of terrorism-related information as 
high risk because of the significant challenges the federal government 
faced in sharing this information in a timely, accurate, and useful 
manner.[Footnote 2] We have since monitored federal efforts to 
implement the Information Sharing Environment (ISE)--an approach that 
is intended to serve as an overarching solution to strengthening the 
sharing of terrorism-related information among federal, state, local, 
tribal, territorial, international, and private sector partners. 
[Footnote 3] The National Network of Fusion Centers is a key part of 
this effort. Since 2007, we have conducted multiple reviews addressing 
fusion center activities and operations. For example, in September 
2010, we reported that federal agencies were helping fusion centers 
build and sustain capabilities and protect privacy--but could better 
measure results--and recommended that DHS take steps to implement 
standard performance measures for centers.[Footnote 4] DHS concurred 
and has taken steps to address this recommendation. DHS has since 
established a Fusion Center Performance Program to assess center 
capabilities, mitigate potential capability gaps, and help justify 
investment requests. Since 2011, DHS has also initiated grant 
management reforms to improve the department's ability to account for 
federal funds that support fusion centers. 

You asked us to assess federal efforts to support fusion centers and 
account for resources provided. This report addresses the extent to 
which (1) DHS has helped centers assess capabilities and mitigate 
potential capability gaps through the Fusion Center Performance 
Program, (2) federal agencies have defined expectations for fusion 
centers and assessed homeland security contributions, (3) federal 
agencies have deployed federal personnel to fusion centers and defined 
their roles and responsibilities, and (4) DHS grant management reforms 
have improved accountability for federal funds that support fusion 
centers. 

To address all four objectives, we visited 10 fusion centers in 7 
states and interviewed center directors; staff, such as analysts and 
grants administrators; and federal personnel supporting the center. 
[Footnote 5] We selected these centers based on a range of factors, 
including geographic location, staffing levels, and extent of federal 
support. The results of our interviews are not generalizable to all 
fusion centers nationwide, but they provided valuable information and 
perspectives on fusion centers activities and operations. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed strategic planning 
documents and other guidance to identify Fusion Center Performance 
Program goals and objectives. We analyzed assessment results--
including the 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment of Fusion Centers 
and the National Network of Fusion Centers: Final Reports for years 
2011, 2012, and 2013--to determine the extent to which the assessments 
identify gaps in baseline capabilities and mitigation actions. We also 
reviewed a sample of individual assessment reports from the fusion 
centers we visited to determine the extent to which the reports 
included recommendations to address potential capability gaps and to 
identify progress made since the previous year's assessment. The 
reports we reviewed are not generalizable to all fusion center 
assessments conducted nationwide, but provided insights on the 
assessment process. Further, we interviewed senior officials and 
program managers from SLPO regarding the criteria and methods used to 
conduct the assessments, validate results, and report progress, and 
determined that data related to the annual assessments were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We also 
interviewed directors of the 10 fusion centers we visited and the 
President of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) to obtain 
perspectives on the value of the assessments and how the results are 
utilized.[Footnote 6] 

To address the second objective, we analyzed relevant laws, strategy 
documents, and federal guidance that address the federal government's 
information-sharing responsibilities to fusion centers and the 
centers' expected results. Documents analyzed include the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), 
[Footnote 7] the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act),[Footnote 8] the National Strategy 
for Information Sharing, Fusion Center Guidelines, Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, and the 
National Prevention Framework. Regarding contributions to homeland 
security, we analyzed fusion center performance measures and assessed 
them against criteria that GAO developed in connection with work 
related to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). 
[Footnote 9] We also interviewed SLPO officials regarding the 
development and definitions of these measures. Further, we interviewed 
other federal stakeholders--including headquarters program officials 
and field personnel from I&A, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--to determine the extent to which these 
agencies have developed expectations for fusion centers and assessed 
how centers help support the agencies' homeland security missions. We 
selected these agencies because they had the most personnel deployed 
to fusion centers during fiscal year 2013. 

To address the third objective, we analyzed I&A, CBP, ICE, and FBI 
strategies, policies, and plans to identify criteria and guidance 
associated with making deployments. We also reviewed provisions of the 
9/11 Commission Act that call for federal agencies to help support and 
provide staff to fusion centers. Further, we analyzed the results of 
the Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory to determine the number of 
personnel deployed from each federal agency.[Footnote 10] To assess 
the reliability of data on federal deployments and funding to fusion 
centers, we reviewed standard operating procedures related to 
collecting these data and interviewed DHS officials who maintain the 
data to determine how they ensure the accuracy and completeness of the 
data. We determined that the federal deployment and funding data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We also 
interviewed headquarters officials from I&A, CBP, ICE, and the FBI, as 
well as federal personnel deployed to the 10 fusion centers we visited 
to (1) identify the range of activities personnel performed; (2) 
assess the extent to which agencies defined personnel's roles, 
responsibilities, and expectations; and (3) determine what, if any, 
performance criteria existed to hold deployed personnel accountable 
for expected results. We also interviewed directors and other fusion 
center officials at the 10 locations to obtain their views on federal 
support to the centers. 

To address the fourth objective, we analyzed Federal Emergency 
Management Administration (FEMA) guidance related to the Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) to identify reforms that are intended to 
improve accountability for federal funds that support fusion 
centers.[Footnote 11] We also reviewed grant requests for fiscal years 
2012 and 2013 from the 10 centers we visited, and data provided by 
FEMA on the amount of DHS grant funding provided to support fusion 
centers in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. We determined that FEMA data on 
the amount of federal funding provided to fusion centers was 
unreliable, a conclusion we discuss later in this report. We 
interviewed fusion center directors and FEMA grant management 
officials to discuss the HSGP and related processes--including FEMA's 
recent changes to grant requirements--and determine how fusion centers 
utilized annual center assessments to identify and prioritize grant 
projects. We also interviewed FEMA officials to determine the steps 
they take to monitor the reliability of data reported by grantees and 
compared these steps with related controls outlined in Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 12] 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 through October 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Fusion Centers: 

The federal government recognizes fusion centers as assets that are 
critical to enhancing homeland security because they coordinate the 
gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland 
security, public safety, and terrorism information.[Footnote 13] 
Centers also serve as focal points for the two-way exchange of 
information between federal agencies and state and local governments. 
As of June 2014, there were 78 fusion centers across the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories that 
collectively make up the National Network. These include centers that 
are statewide or broad in jurisdiction--such as those operated by 
state police--and regional centers that usually cover large cities 
with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure 
sites, which may be operated by a city or county law enforcement or 
emergency management agency.[Footnote 14] 

Recognition as a fusion center within the National Network generally 
requires that the governor of the state make this formal designation; 
a state or local governmental agency oversees and manages the center; 
the center has plans and procedures to function as a focal point for 
sharing law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and 
terrorism information; and the center has achieved requisite baseline 
capabilities as DHS--on behalf of federal interagency partners--
determines through an annual assessment of each fusion center's 
capabilities. A state or local law enforcement official generally 
serves as the center director, but non-law enforcement contract 
personnel can also serve in this capacity as determined by the 
applicable agency that owns and operates the center. Analyst positions 
within these centers often make up a substantial portion of the 
staffing and typically include a combination of state, local, and 
federal personnel. 

While each center engages in core information-sharing functions--
namely, the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threat-
related information--some centers focus more broadly on "all-crimes" 
or "all-hazards," in addition to terrorism and homeland security 
information. Fusion centers can issue a combination of situational 
awareness and analytical products--such as daily or weekly bulletins 
on criminal or intelligence information and intelligence assessments--
which, in general, provide reporting on an emerging threat, group, or 
crime. Centers primarily create these products for law enforcement 
entities and other partners within their jurisdiction, such as owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure. Fusion centers also collect 
and process tips and leads as part of the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), and provide outreach and training 
to the private sector and other governmental partners.[Footnote 15] 

Federal Support to Fusion Centers: 

The 9/11 Commission Act required that the DHS Secretary establish a 
DHS State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative and that--in 
coordination with representatives from fusion centers and the states--
the department take certain actions to support the 
initiative.[Footnote 16] For example, the act requires the Secretary 
to support federal efforts to integrate fusion centers into the ISE, 
assign personnel to centers, incorporate fusion center intelligence 
information into DHS information, provide training, and facilitate 
close communication and coordination between the centers and DHS. The 
law also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, to establish guidelines for fusion centers that include 
standards that fusion centers must address.[Footnote 17] These 
include, for example, that centers collaboratively develop a mission 
statement, identify expectations and goals, measure performance, and 
determine center effectiveness; create a collaborative environment for 
the sharing of intelligence and information among federal, state, 
local, and tribal government agencies, the private sector, and the 
public, consistent with guidance from the President and the Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); and offer a 
variety of intelligence and information services and products. 
[Footnote 18] 

Within DHS, I&A's SLPO is responsible for providing a link among the 
fusion center; the intelligence community; and state, local, and 
private sector partners.[Footnote 19] Other DHS and DOJ components can 
also deploy either part-time or full-time personnel to fusion centers 
to support center operations and serve as liaisons between the fusion 
center and federal components. 

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities and Assessment Process: 

In September 2008, DHS and DOJ jointly published the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which the 
agencies developed in collaboration with the PM-ISE and other federal, 
state, and local officials. This document identified the capabilities 
determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated network of 
fusion centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion 
center to be considered capable of performing basic functions by the 
fusion center community. In 2010, fusion center directors, in 
partnership with the federal government, distilled the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers into 
priorities, including four Critical Operational Capabilities: 

* receive: ability to receive classified and unclassified information 
from federal partners. 

* analyze: ability to assess local implications of that threat 
information through the use of a formal risk assessment process. 

* disseminate: ability to further disseminate that threat information 
to other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector 
entities within their jurisdiction; and: 

* gather: ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate 
it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate. 

In September 2010, federal, state, and local officials completed the 
first nationwide assessment of fusion centers to evaluate center 
capabilities and to establish priorities for federal government 
support. The assessment process focuses on measuring fusion center 
implementation of the four Critical Operational Capabilities, as well 
as four additional Enabling Capabilities (privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties protections; sustainment strategy; communications and 
outreach; and security). Since 2011, DHS has taken the lead to manage 
and implement the annual assessment process as a core component of its 
broader Fusion Center Performance Program. The other two components of 
the performance program are DHS activities to further develop 
capabilities and mitigate gaps, as well as an exercise program to 
evaluate fusion center capabilities in practice, called the Fusion 
Center Readiness Initiative. 

Federal Grants to Fusion Centers: 

While fusion centers are state and locally owned, the federal 
government has continued to provide federal grant funding to support 
center operations, in part because the government expects the National 
Network of Fusion Centers to be a key player in sharing information. 
The fiscal year 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance also 
identified the maturation and enhancement of fusion centers as one of 
five priority areas for HSGP funding. The HSGP consists of three 
separate programs, two of which states and local jurisdictions have 
primarily used to help fund fusion centers--the State Homeland 
Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). 
[Footnote 20] These grant programs are not specifically focused on, or 
limited to, fusion centers and the fusion centers do not receive 
direct, dedicated funding from DHS. Rather, a state administrative 
agency--the state-level agency responsible for managing all homeland 
security grants and associated program requirements--or an urban 
area's working group, which has similar responsibilities, determines 
the amount of grant funding a fusion center receives. A fusion center 
typically contributes to the development of a state's federal grant 
application by providing information on how the center will use the 
proposed funding it requests, called an investment justification. 

DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess Capabilities and 
Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further Evaluate Capabilities 
through Exercises: 

Fusion Center Assessment Process Is Systematically Assessing 
Capabilities and Monitoring Progress; Most Centers Are Achieving 
Baseline Capabilities: 

As the cornerstone of DHS's efforts to evaluate how fusion centers are 
meeting designated standards for the four critical capabilities and 
four enabling capabilities, the fusion center annual assessment 
process is serving to assess and monitor capability development for 
both individual fusion centers and the National Network.[Footnote 21] 
To determine capability scores, each fusion center completes an online 
questionnaire that addresses multiple attributes for each of the eight 
capabilities, for a collective total of 50 individual attributes. 
[Footnote 22] For example, the "gather" capability is composed of 8 
total attributes, which include questions to determine if the center 
has a documented process to manage tips and leads and has identified 
standing information needs from DHS entities, among other partners. 
These attributes form the basis by which DHS assesses each fusion 
center's progress from year to year. The highest possible score that 
each fusion center can receive is 100 points. 

SLPO completed its third iteration of the annual assessment process in 
2013, and released its annual report of the aggregate findings from 
this assessment in July 2014. Results of the 2013 assessment indicate 
that fusion centers are continuing to increase overall capability 
scores, and many are nearing full achievement of the 50 individual 
attributes that the assessment uses as evaluation criteria. 
Specifically, the average overall capability score reported for the 
National Network was 91.7 out of 100 in 2013.[Footnote 23] This score 
represents an improvement of about 3 points from the 2012 average 
score of 88.4 and continues an upward trend from the average national 
score of 76.8 identified in 2011. These increases reflect that fusion 
centers are continuing to take steps to achieve designated 
capabilities and mitigate gaps identified in prior years. However, 
scores also decreased for 1 or more of the capability attributes for 
15 centers in 2013, a fact that, according to SLPO officials, 
highlights the importance of continued monitoring through the annual 
assessment. 

The overall assessment scores represent fusion centers' progress in 
establishing designated baseline capabilities--such as implementing 
specified policies and procedures--but the scores may not reflect 
improvements in overall performance or homeland security 
contributions. That is, the assessment questions are intended to 
capture the extent to which each fusion center--regardless of size or 
staffing level--has met baseline capabilities to receive, analyze, 
gather, and disseminate information. However, the actual output of 
products and services can vary considerably by center based on risk 
environment, resource levels, or other factors. For example, 11 
individual attributes constitute the "analyze" capability, and 
represent a broad range of activities, such as having developed an 
analytical production plan, the ability to access subject matter 
experts, and being able to contribute to local and national threat 
assessments. A center may report the successful completion of such 
activities and improve its overall assessment scores, but the scores 
do not reflect if the center effectively administered these activities 
or if they resulted in any considerable impact. For example, 
developing an analytical production plan may not equate to effectively 
meeting the plan's targets or producing the types of reports 
identified therein. This highlights the importance of further 
validating these capabilities through other mechanisms, such as the 
Fusion Center Readiness Initiative and targeted performance metrics, 
which we discuss later in the report. Nevertheless, the annual 
assessment process reflects a mechanism for systematically assessing 
existing baseline capabilities and gaps, and provides fusion centers 
an indicator of their progress in achieving baseline capabilities. 
SLPO program management officials noted that they intend for other 
efforts, including the recent development of additional performance 
measures, to help capture the extent to which centers are achieving 
intended results and supporting the federal government's homeland 
security mission. 

All 10 directors of the fusion centers we visited stated that the 
annual assessment program is an effective process to evaluate their 
capabilities against a uniform standard, and serves to identify 
potential opportunities for improvement. For example, directors 
identified specific actions that their fusion center took to address 
an individual attribute and improve the center's capability score, 
such as developing a plan, policy, or developing additional mechanisms 
to disseminate alerts. In general, the directors we spoke with stated 
that the administrative requirements for completing the assessment 
were reasonable and that center staff could generally complete these 
steps in a few days. In addition to assessing capabilities and related 
gaps, 2 directors noted that the assessment can serve as an effective 
mechanism to familiarize a new director with the center, given the 
relatively frequent turnover in directors across the National 
Network.[Footnote 24] Two directors also said that they use the 
assessment results to brief center management, such as state homeland 
security directors, on center operations, and that these results 
provide information on progress the center made toward achieving 
baseline capabilities. Further, 5 of the 10 directors we interviewed 
specifically noted the DHS requirement to utilize the assessment 
results to inform annual federal grant funding requests. Generally, 
the directors reported that while the grant requests are routinely 
focused on maintaining existing capabilities through analytical staff 
positions and technology platforms, the requests may also target the 
development of plans or other actions necessary to address attribute 
gaps, as applicable.[Footnote 25] 

With the average assessment score now at almost 92 percent--and many 
centers achieving the highest possible score of 100--SLPO officials 
stated that the assessment process is unlikely to drive significant 
new capability development. The majority of the fusion centers that we 
visited had achieved scores of over 95 percent, and in 2 cases, center 
directors did not plan to address the 1 or 2 remaining attributes 
required for a perfect score because they said the cost and 
administrative burden outweighed the benefit. One example cited was 
requiring fusion centers to verify that recipients received all 
products as intended.[Footnote 26] These directors continued to 
support the overall assessment process, but they acknowledged that 
their focus would likely shift to maintaining existing capabilities 
rather than trying to achieve new capabilities to close any remaining 
gaps. 

Although fusion centers are continuing to mature and are beginning to 
maintain high scores, SLPO officials said that they do not plan to 
change the current assessment process or any of the individual 
attributes to potentially capture additional capabilities. The 
officials noted that the current process and attributes remain 
important to help monitor and sustain existing capabilities and 
protect against possible backsliding as fusion center directors turn 
over and fusion center funding becomes more constrained. These 
officials also noted the importance of maintaining a common standard 
that all fusion centers can achieve, regardless of size, staffing, or 
location. Moreover, the officials said that they plan to maintain the 
existing assessment questions to ensure direct comparability of 
results from year to year. Finally, as discussed later, DHS uses the 
assessment to collect data to measure progress according to certain 
performance measures. 

Fusion Center Directors We Contacted Found DHS Technical Assistance 
and Other Resources to Mitigate Gaps Helpful: 

As the second key component of the Fusion Center Performance Program, 
SLPO conducts activities to identify common capability gaps across the 
National Network and provides resources for fusion centers--such as 
technical assistance and document templates--to help centers address 
and mitigate these gaps. Within the annual assessment report, SLPO 
provides a summary of findings regarding National Network capability 
scores and progress made, and includes data-informed recommendations 
that are intended to address commonly identified gaps. SLPO also 
includes specific recommendations for each of the eight capabilities, 
as well as several overall areas identified as needing improvement. 
For example, the 2012 report highlighted the need to identify 
analytical products that meet specific information needs, as well as 
expanded involvement in local government bodies to promote improved 
collaboration. As part of information collection efforts during the 
annual assessment process, SLPO officials noted that they also solicit 
feedback regarding the quality and effectiveness of federal support 
activities, such as training and technical assistance, received over 
the previous 12 months. According to officials, SLPO uses this 
information to help develop the suite of mitigation resources to be 
provided in the following year. 

According to program documentation, the gap mitigation resources are 
intended to help fusion centers address gaps in capabilities and 
enhance the knowledge and skills of fusion center personnel. These 
resources include a combination of guidance and reference materials, 
as well as targeted training and technical assistance programs. Two 
key documents comprise the gap mitigation resources--the Gap 
Mitigation Guidebook and an annual publication of Gap Mitigation 
Activities. The guidebook notes that this resource is intended to 
assist fusion centers in developing and implementing plans, policies, 
or standard operating procedures for each of the critical operating 
capabilities. It includes plan templates and reference materials that 
DHS intends to help fusion centers define and document key business 
processes, such as the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The 
Gap Mitigation Activities is a dynamic document informed by both the 
annual assessment results and feedback DHS receives from fusion 
centers. For example, the 2013 Gap Mitigation Activities "menu" 
included a total of over 60 activities identified to enhance or 
sustain fusion center capabilities across each of the core 
capabilities. Specific resources identified include a combination of 
new and existing activities intended to enhance and support capability 
development, including staff exchange programs, risk analysis and 
product feedback templates, and training and technical assistance 
designed to educate fusion center personnel on specific subjects, such 
as basic intelligence analysis. 

All 10 fusion center directors we visited said that they were aware of 
DHS's annual Gap Mitigation Activities--such as its listing of 
analytical training courses and exchange programs--and the 6 directors 
that discussed participation in these activities said they were 
effective. Three directors also specifically referenced the Gap 
Mitigation Guidebook and said that they utilized a template or other 
written reference materials contained within the document. In 
addition, several fusion center directors said that they routinely 
interact with directors from other centers and one noted they were 
most likely to address any identified capability gaps by obtaining an 
example of a plan or policy from another center, or inquiring about 
their approach to addressing a capability. In general, our interviews 
with fusion center directors and SLPO headquarters officials indicate 
that SLPO routinely provided outreach and communications to these 
fusion centers regarding the mitigation support resources that are 
available. 

DHS Has Not Yet Fully Implemented an Exercise Program to Further 
Evaluate Fusion Center Capabilities, but Is Planning Additional 
Actions: 

The Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is a core component of the 
Fusion Center Performance Program, but it remains in the early stages 
of development largely because of staffing challenges. According to 
DHS program documents, this initiative includes the establishment of 
an annual exercise program that is intended to provide fusion centers 
an opportunity to apply and evaluate capabilities in an operational 
context. According to DHS officials, the exercise program is intended 
to help define capability improvement priorities and identify 
investment focus areas, as well as provide support and functional 
consistency across the National Network. The officials noted that 
limited progress has been made in developing an exercise program since 
2012 because of challenges in hiring a candidate to fill a key program 
management position. However, the officials said that this position 
was successfully staffed in June 2014. 

Although the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is not fully 
implemented, DHS has taken steps to conduct several drills and 
exercises involving fusion centers in recent years. For example, in 
August 2012, SLPO facilitated an exercise incorporating 7 fusion 
centers and other partners, including representatives from FBI, CBP, 
and the Transportation Security Administration. This day-long exercise 
included four objectives that collectively targeted each of the fusion 
centers' critical and enabling capabilities. The after-action report 
identifies 18 individual corrective actions and includes 
implementation details, such as the entity responsible for taking the 
action and the expected time frame for completion. 

According to SLPO officials, efforts are underway to schedule and 
coordinate additional fusion center exercises. Specifically, the 
officials noted that they plan to conduct exercises under the 
readiness initiative every 2 years with participation from a group of 
7 to 10 fusion centers. The officials said that the longer-term vision 
is to conduct up to three exercises per year--as well as drills 
addressing specific analytical capabilities and communications. SLPO 
officials also noted the importance of aligning these activities with 
DHS's National Exercise Program.[Footnote 27] 

Officials from the 10 fusion centers we visited also reported that 
centers often participate in exercises and drills sponsored by a 
combination of other federal, state, and local partners. The scope and 
purpose of these exercises varied and ranged from full-scale exercises 
simulating a real-world threat scenario to routine drills validating 
communication and alert notification procedures. Fusion centers also 
reported on their participation in such exercises as part of 
publications the centers develop to identify key products and services 
provided to centers' partners over the year. 

Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and Developed 
Measures to Assess Homeland Security Contributions: 

Federal Agencies Have Developed a Combination of High-Level Strategic 
Guidance and Specific Capability Expectations for Fusion Centers: 

Over the past decade, Congress has enacted laws and federal agencies 
have issued guidance and related documents that help to define 
expectations for fusion centers, which have evolved from high-level 
guidance focused on terrorism-related information sharing to more 
specific guidance that defines expectations for fusion center 
capabilities, operations, and functions. For example, provisions of 
the Intelligence Reform Act, as amended, recognize that state and 
local partners have a role in the sharing of terrorism-related 
information. In 2005, as states and localities began to create 
centers, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE issued more specific guidance to 
fusion centers through Fusion Center Guidelines that recommended 
procedures for establishing and maintaining centers, training 
personnel, and producing privacy and civil liberties policies. In 
conjunction with the guidelines, in 2008, DOJ's Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative issued Baseline Capabilities for State 
and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which further clarified 
expectations for fusion center capabilities and management and 
administrative functions, such as those related to the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information.[Footnote 28] Based on our 
analysis of the collective laws and federal agency guidance issued to 
date, federal agencies have defined expectations for fusion centers 
related to their role in information-sharing activities.[Footnote 29] 
Table 1 highlights excerpts from selected laws and policies. 

Table 1: Excerpts of Fusion Center-Related Laws, Policies, and 
Guidance, 2004 through 2013: 

Year: 2004; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004[A]; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The act requires the President to ensure that an 
Information Sharing Environment provides and facilitates the means for 
sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, 
local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector, through the 
use of policy guidelines and technologies. 

Year: 2005; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: Fusion Center Guidelines[B]; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The guidelines provide direction on establishing and 
operating fusion centers at the federal, state, and local levels, and 
specifically outline18 recommended elements for fusion centers, such 
as creating a collaborative environment for information and 
intelligence sharing across law enforcement, public safety agencies, 
and the private sector, as well as the development of a mission 
statement and goals for the centers. The guidelines also are intended 
to improve consistency among the many different state and local fusion 
centers, enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national 
partnerships, and improve fusion center capabilities. 

Year: 2007; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007[C]; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security--in 
consultation with the Program Manager for the Information Sharing 
Environment and the Attorney General, among others--to establish a 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) State, Local, and Regional 
Fusion Center Initiative that will, among other things, provide 
operational and intelligence advice and assistance as well as 
management assistance to fusion centers, and facilitate close 
communication and coordination between the centers and DHS. The act 
also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, to establish guidelines for fusion centers to, among other 
things, develop mission statements, identify expectations and goals, 
measure performance, and determine effectiveness. 

Year: 2007; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: National Strategy for Information 
Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 
Information Sharing; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: As part of the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing, the federal government recommended that fusion centers 
achieve a baseline capability level and become interconnected with the 
federal government and one another. The strategy also designated 
fusion centers as vital assets critical to information sharing and 
antiterrorism efforts, and as the primary state and local focal points 
for the receiving and sharing of terrorism-related information. 

Year: 2008; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: Baseline Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The baseline capabilities, a supplement to the Fusion 
Center Guidelines, identifies the abilities needed to achieve a 
national, integrated network of fusion centers and details the 
standards necessary for a center to be capable of performing basic 
functions. The baseline capabilities also defines standards for fusion 
centers, including management and administrative functions, 
information gathering, recognition of indicators and warnings, and 
processing of information, intelligence analysis and production, and 
intelligence and information dissemination. 

Year: 2012; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and Safeguarding; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The National Strategy for Information Sharing and 
Safeguarding highlights priorities for fusion centers that include the 
implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative (NSI)--a decentralized, distributed system for sharing 
terrorism-related information--and expanding training and outreach for 
the initiative to other public safety entities. The strategy also 
specifically notes that the National Network of Fusion Centers is to 
achieve the critical operational capabilities and enabling 
capabilities to serve as focal points for the receipt, analysis, 
gathering, and sharing of threat-related information. 

Year: 2013; 
Federal law, policy, or guidance: National Prevention Framework; 
Information sharing and fusion center-related provisions and 
requirements: The National Prevention Framework outlines the 
capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or 
actual act of terrorism. The document identifies the National Network 
as a coordinating structure to assist in achieving those capabilities. 

Source: GAO analysis of fusion center-related guidance and policies. 
GAO-15-155. 

[A] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. at 3665 (codified 
as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2). See also 6 U.S.C. § 485(a)(5) 
(defining "terrorism information"). 

[B] The Department of Justice (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative and DHS's Homeland Security Advisory Council collaborated 
to develop the Fusion Center Guidelines and first issued the 
guidelines in 2005 to help resolve interoperability and communication 
issues with centers at the state, regional, and federal levels and 
provide guidance in relation to the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence. 

[C] See 6 U.S.C. § 124h. 

[End of table] 

Stakeholders Have Developed a National Strategy That Also Addresses 
Fusion Center Expectations: 

The NFCA--in collaboration with other state, local, and federal 
entities--developed a national strategy that builds upon federal 
guidance to further outline key roles and priorities of the National 
Network from the fusion center perspective.[Footnote 30] Among the 
elements included in the strategy is an overview of the current status 
of the network; the network's roles in supporting information-sharing 
activities; and future goals, objectives, and initiatives that the 
network is to carry out to support national security over the period 
defined by the strategy, 2014 to 2017. The NFCA strategy was issued in 
July 2014. The NFCA President noted that the strategy is intended to 
help standardize how fusion centers function across the network and 
further clarify the standards established in the baseline capabilities 
guidance related to the analysis and dissemination of intelligence 
information, among other things. The strategy also provides specific 
examples that outline the network's contributions to national security 
and the types of services fusion centers provide to state, local, and 
federal partners, among others. For example, the strategy discusses 
the centers' role in vetting information in support of the NSI and 
also providing analysis that increases the value of analytic products 
centers produce. 

The NFCA strategy notes that the development of a national strategy 
has been a long-standing priority for state and local partners and the 
July 2013 Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion 
Centers also called for this strategy.[Footnote 31] The majority staff 
report recommended that federal agencies develop a national strategy 
to help enable the fusion center national network to reach its 
potential and sustain the network over time. The strategy contains 
four goals and associated objectives that outline a broader set of 
activities the National Network expects to accomplish over the next 3 
years, as figure 1 illustrates. 

Figure 1: Goals and Objectives in the National Strategy of Fusion 
Centers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: list] 

Goal 1: 
Uphold public confidence through the safeguarding of information and 
the protection of the person and the privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties of individuals. 

Objective 1: Continue the consistent and comprehensive application of 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections across the 
National Network. 

Objective 2: Enhance and sustain a trusted network through which 
information can be collected, maintained, and shared, in a manner that 
protects our communities and the privacy and legal rights of the 
public. 

Objective 3: Promote fusion center accountability and transparency 
among all fusion center partners and with the public. 

Goal 2: 
Support fusion center engagement with state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) partners; private sector partners; field-based 
information-sharing programs; and federal partners to enhance decision 
making and resource allocation, improving the information-sharing 
environment within fusion centers' areas of responsibility. 

Objective 1: Identify opportunities for continued outreach and 
engagement with SLTT, private sector (including field-based 
information-sharing programs), and federal partners to enhance the 
fusion process.[A] 

Objective 2: Increase the capability and expertise among the cadre of 
fusion center SLTT and private sector partners to improve their 
ability to analyze and prioritize raw intelligence. 

Objective 3: Provide access to technology solutions to fusion center 
partners with limited funding and expertise, such as the use of shared 
services. 

Objective 4: Advocate for visibility of local homeland security 
priorities within the standing information needs and priority 
intelligence requirements for fusion centers' area of responsibility 
(AOR). 

Objective 5: Improve the information-sharing enterprise within fusion 
centers' AORs, including increasing the relevance of information 
shared and facilitating the identification of state and local partner 
priorities through the implementation of the Criminal Intelligence 
Enterprise and similar initiatives. 

Goal 3: 
Strengthen the integration and interconnectedness of fusion centers to 
share and leverage information, analysis, and expertise. 

Objective 1: Develop National Network-wide Fusion Center Doctrine to 
capture fusion center lessons learned, best practices, example 
processes, and product templates to support the institutionalization 
of critical fusion center operations. 

Objective 2: Develop centers of analytic excellence to better share 
tradecraft, areas of unique expertise, and analytic processes 
horizontally and vertically with members of the National Network. 

Objective 3: Promote the development and interoperability of fusion 
center information-sharing and intelligence management systems and 
common technology services while ensuring local control of information 
through processes such as shared services, standards-based 
acquisition, and strong identity, access and discovery capabilities. 

Objective 4: Develop a rapid response or augmentation capability to 
physically and virtually support fusion centers during large-scale 
events, critical incidents, or long-term crisis situations that exceed 
the primary responding center's organic ability to support. 

Objective 5: Support institutionalization of information-sharing 
objectives within each fusion center to ensure sustainability through 
leadership and personnel turnover throughout the National Network. 

Goal 4: 
Increase the overall connectivity between fusion centers and the 
federal government to strengthen analytic and information-sharing 
capabilities and enhance situational awareness through collaborative 
efforts to protect the homeland. 

Objective 1: Contribute to federal partners as a national security 
asset, improving smart practices in crime prevention, with a priority 
on counterterrorism, providing a return on investment for federal 
partners. 

Objective 2: Encourage the development and implementation of 
information-sharing agreements aimed at sustainability. 

Objective 3: Promote interoperability among national information-
sharing systems. 

Objective 4: Enhance situational awareness efforts by fusion center 
partners through collaboration and formalized production of joint 
products. 

Objective 5: Increase analytic efforts to strengthen the understanding 
and augment awareness of the current threat environment. 

Objective 6: Collaborate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
identify and improve smart practices regarding joint terrorism task 
forces. 

Source: GAO analysis of the 2014-2017 National Strategy for the 
National Network of Fusion Centers goals and objectives. GAO-15-155. 

[A] The Fusion Center Guidelines defines the fusion process as the 
management of the flow of information and intelligence across levels 
and sectors of government and private industry. 

[End of figure] 

The strategy also identifies 37 specific initiatives that support the 
goals and objectives that further highlight efforts that the National 
Network expects to complete over the 3 years. For example, 1 
initiative related to goal 4 is to work with federal partners to 
establish a minimum level of engagement and expectations that are 
uniform and consistent across all regions and field offices related to 
access to data systems. 

In addition to the recommendation that centers themselves articulate a 
national strategy, the majority staff report also called for federal 
agencies to develop a federal strategy that explains how and why the 
federal government engages with fusion centers. The NFCA President 
also noted that a federal strategy could, among other things, provide 
fusion centers with a better understanding of the methodology federal 
agencies use to deploy personnel to centers and standardize centers' 
access to federal data systems. SLPO officials said that DHS does not 
plan to develop a federal strategy, since they believe this 
information currently exists in the various strategy and guideline 
documents already issued. However, DHS is currently working in 
coordination with DOJ to develop a Federal Framework for Supporting 
the National Network of Fusion Centers that a senior I&A official said 
is intended to help summarize the collective federal efforts guiding 
support to fusion centers. The official also noted that the framework 
will include efforts related to assessment and performance programs, 
resource allocations, governance processes, and analytic standards, 
among others. In technical comments provided on a draft of this 
report, DHS noted that the federal framework document will also 
include strategic objectives and priorities, in addition to 
identifying current efforts. DHS added that a draft of this updated 
approach was presented to the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 
Council and the Fusion Center and Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Subcommittee of the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy 
Committee for feedback in September 2014.[Footnote 32] 

DHS Has Developed New Performance Measures to Assess Fusion Center 
Contributions to Homeland Security: 

In coordination with fusion centers and federal partners, DHS has 
developed 45 performance measures designed to capture standardized 
data to assess the impact and contribution of fusion centers on 
information sharing and homeland security. DHS initially reported on 
five measures in the 2012 fusion center assessment report. For 
example, one measure included the number of suspicious activity 
reports that fusion centers submit to the FBI that result in the 
initiation or an enhancement of an FBI investigation. 

To build upon these five initial measures, in 2013, DHS began an 
effort to develop a "logic model" that graphically depicts how fusion 
center inputs (e.g., funding and personnel), processes (e.g., 
activities and initiatives), outputs (e.g., products and services), 
and outcomes (e.g., effect or results) relate to one another. 
According to DHS's performance measures definition guide, the logic 
model was used to develop an additional 40 performance measures, and 
collectively, the 45 measures are intended to determine the impact of 
fusion centers and homeland security contributions.[Footnote 33] The 
guide notes that, using the logic model, 24 of the measures are 
defined as outcome measures, which are grouped into six outcome 
categories, examples of which are illustrated in table 2. 

Table 2: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Outcome 
Category: 

Outcome category: Enriched Partnerships and Decision-Making; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services influenced their decision 
making related to threat response activities within their area of 
responsibility. 

Outcome category: Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services resulted in increased 
situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility. 

Outcome category: Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis, and 
Dissemination; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of fusion center analytic 
products tagged to Homeland Security Standing Information Needs[A]. 

Outcome category: More Effective Law Enforcement Activities; 
Performance measure examples: Number of suspicious activity reports 
vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in a Terrorist 
Screening Center watchlist encounter[B]. 

Outcome category: Improved Systemic Intelligence Capability; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of state, local, tribal, and 
territorial fusion center analysts with Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at least once a 
month[C]. 

Outcome category: Improved Support to Operational Response; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of federally designated 
special events in which fusion centers played a direct role[D]. 

Source: DHS Performance Measure Data. GAO-15-155. 

[A] Homeland Security Standing Information Needs refers to the all-
threats and all-hazards information needs of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), federal, state, local, and private sector 
stakeholders and homeland security partners. 

[B] The Terrorist Screening Center, a multi-agency organization 
administered by the FBI, was established to organize and consolidate 
the government's approach to terrorism screening and to provide for 
the appropriate and lawful use of information related to terrorist in 
the screening process. 

[C] HSIN Intel is one of the primary information systems DHS supports 
to post and share sensitive but unclassified intelligence information 
between fusion centers and federal partners. 

[D] The events can include activities of national significance such as 
the presidential inauguration, national political conventions, or 
planned events at the state and local levels that may require federal 
support. Fusion centers can supply operational support and monitoring 
for special events within their area of responsibility. 

[End of table] 

According to the guide, 21 of the 45 measures, also based on the logic 
model, are intended to capture the outputs of key fusion center 
functions and quantify the number of products or services delivered as 
a result of a process, such as situational awareness reporting. 
Examples of such measures are shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Examples of Fusion Center Performance Measures by Output 
Categories: 

Output category: Intelligence and Information Products and Services; 
Performance measure examples: Number of situational awareness products 
that fusion centers develop and disseminate. 

Output category: Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 
Protections; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties audit findings for which fusion centers took 
corrective actions. 

Output category: Strategic Plans and Budgets; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of fusion centers that 
develop an annual report providing updates on progress in achieving 
strategic goals and objectives. 

Output category: Communications Policies and Systems; 
Performance measure examples: Number of programmatic briefings, tours, 
and other engagements. 

Output category: Security Policies and Systems; 
Performance measure examples: Percentage of state, local, tribal, and 
territorial fusion center personnel requiring secret clearances who 
have them, or have submitted requests for them to the appropriate 
granting authority. 

Source: DHS Performance Measure Data. GAO-15-155. 

[End of table] 

We assessed SLPO's 45 performance measures against criteria for 
successful measures that GAO developed in connection with work 
conducted on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 
[Footnote 34] Specifically, the criteria include key attributes 
developed to assess performance goals and measures based on a 
combination of previously established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, as well as related performance 
management literature.[Footnote 35] Our analysis showed that, 
collectively, the fusion center performance measures are generally 
aligned with the successful attributes. For example, among other 
attributes, the measures are aligned with DHS's goals and missions, 
are clearly stated, appear objective, and cover the core activities of 
the program. While the new measures do not currently incorporate 
performance targets, as our prior work suggests, SLPO officials stated 
that they plan to analyze data collected for the measures in 2013 to 
establish baseline targets for future years. 

According to the Performance Measures Definition Guide, data obtained 
from responses to DHS's annual assessments of fusion centers will 
provide information to implement some of the 45 measures. Data for 
other measures will come from internal DHS offices, other federal 
agencies--such as the FBI--and other fusion center partners, including 
the National Governors Association and state homeland security 
advisors. SLPO implemented 34 of the 45 performance measures as part 
of the 2013 fusion center annual assessment and plans to implement the 
remaining 11 measures in future assessment cycles as additional data 
collection mechanisms are established. 

Since all of the new performance measures have not yet been fully 
implemented, it is too early to determine how these measures 
collectively will help assess fusion center contributions to homeland 
security. For example, 10 of the 11 performance measures that were not 
implemented as part of the 2013 annual assessment are intended to 
assess outcomes of fusion center activities related to enhancing 
homeland security, and SLPO has not yet developed methodologies for 
collecting the data. An example of an outcome measure not yet 
implemented is the percentage of key customers--including state 
homeland security advisors--reporting that fusion center products and 
services resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within 
their area of responsibility. According to SLPO officials, these 
measures are still in development since limitations currently exist to 
collect data to implement them, but they are taking steps to overcome 
these limitations. For example, some measures require DHS to put 
additional data collection requirements into place or develop new 
systems. Appendix I contains a summary of fusion center performance 
measures and their implementation status. 

The 2013 annual report on fusion centers contained results for the 34 
measures that SLPO had implemented and noted that over 98 percent of 
fusion centers provided data related to all 34 measures.[Footnote 36] 
The report also highlighted specific measures that show the National 
Network's contributions to federal homeland security efforts. For 
example, the report noted that fusion centers developed about 6,000 
products in 2013 and linked 2,250 (37.5 percent) to Homeland Security 
Standing Information Needs. The report also noted that fusion centers 
issued 275 collaborative products with federal partners in 2013, a 7.4 
percent increase from 256 in 2012. 

The 2013 annual assessment's focus on performance measures reflects 
that DHS and the National Network are taking steps to better capture 
key results and outcomes of fusion center activities and their overall 
contributions in support of the homeland security mission. 

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 
2013 and Generally Defined Roles and Responsibilities: 

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 
2013: 

SLPO produces an annual Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report 
that shows the number of federal personnel agencies report that they 
deployed to fusion centers--either full-or part-time--as well as the 
non-personnel support agencies provided. Figure 2 shows the number of 
personnel federal agencies reported deploying to fusion centers from 
fiscal years 2011 through 2013. 

Figure 2: Number of Federal Personnel Agencies Reported Deploying to 
Fusion Centers, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Agency: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 95; 
Fiscal year 2012: 98; 
Fiscal year 2013: 96. 

Agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 96; 
Fiscal year 2012: 96; 
Fiscal year 2013: 96. 

Agency: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 24; 
Fiscal year 2012: 24; 
Fiscal year 2013: 17. 

Agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 24; 
Fiscal year 2012: 23; 
Fiscal year 2013: 27. 

Agency: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 18; 
Fiscal year 2012: 17; 
Fiscal year 2013: 15. 

Agency: Transportation Security Administration; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 11; 
Fiscal year 2012: 13; 
Fiscal year 2013: 20. 

Agency: Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Protective Service, 
U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service (combined)[A]; 
Deployments: 
Fiscal year 2011: 9; 
Fiscal year 2012: 8; 
Fiscal year 2013: 17. 

Total deployed personnel: 
Fiscal year 2011: 277; 
Fiscal year 2012: 279; 
Fiscal year 2013: 288. 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security; 
DOJ: Department of Justice. 

Source: GAO analysis of fusion center federal cost inventory data 
(2011, 2012 and 2013). GAO-15-155. 

[A] The 2011, 2012, and 2013 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory 
reports state that, in each year, these agencies deployed the 
following number of personnel to fusion centers: Drug Enforcement 
Administration (3) in each year; Federal Protective Service (1), (1) 
and (5); U.S. Coast Guard (1), (1) and (5); and U.S. Secret Service 
(4), (3) and (4); respectively. All personnel reported were deployed 
in full-or part-time positions to support fusion center activities. 

[End of figure] 

The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria--issued by the PM-ISE--
defines the general criteria that federal departments and agencies are 
to use when making deployments and other resource allocations to 
fusion centers.[Footnote 37] For example, the criteria note that the 
governor of the state must designate the fusion center as an official 
state center and the center must participate in the baseline 
capabilities annual assessment process. While the criteria provide 
high-level guidance to federal agencies, they can develop additional 
criteria to inform deployment decisions, such as how closely the 
missions of the fusion center and agency align. For fusion centers 
where agencies have not deployed federal personnel, agencies can 
provide support through off-site personnel or liaison representatives, 
who can provide access to federal data systems, among other things. 
Federal agencies can also provide non-personnel resources to fusion 
centers, such as training, technical assistance, participation in 
exercises, security clearance administration, and travel. According to 
federal cost inventory reports, federal agencies provided fusion 
centers with non-personnel support totaling about $32.8 million in 
fiscal year 2011 and about $18 million in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 
The 2012 report lists several factors that contributed to the 
reduction in federal funding between the fiscal years, including 
continuing federal agencies' budget reductions and agencies 
transitioning from the initial costs of developing data systems to 
maintaining the systems. 

I&A Has Developed Guidance for Deploying Personnel to Fusion Centers, 
although Specific Roles and Responsibilities Depend on Center Needs 
and Capabilities: 

As of June 2014, I&A had deployed a total of 74 intelligence officers 
to fusion centers across the National Network, as well as 9 regional 
directors to manage officer activities. As of this date, I&A had also 
deployed a total of 6 intelligence analysts to centers, as well as 
reports officers that collectively cover every fusion center in the 
network.[Footnote 38] I&A has developed general guidance that defines 
the roles and responsibilities for each of these deployed positions, 
as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities for Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Personnel Deployed to Fusion Centers: 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Manage relationships 
with state, local, and federal partners within the officer's area of 
responsibility; 
Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Work with fusion 
centers, state and local partners, and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) components to develop tailored intelligence products that 
support operational missions and senior management; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: Work with state and local 
partners to identify and report information that meets DHS requirements 
for reporting unevaluated or raw intelligence information to the 
intelligence community. 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Provide a national 
intelligence perspective to support state, local, and other center 
partners at the fusion centers; 
Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Develop production 
goals and write finished intelligence products that meet fusion center 
partners' and DHS's mission requirements, including analytic support 
to special event threat assessments, among other products; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: [Empty]. 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Support fusion center 
efforts to develop and implement the capabilities necessary to execute 
the intelligence cycle[A]; 
Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Lead collaboration 
efforts on joint analytic production with DHS and intelligence 
community partners in support of fusion center mission requirements; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: [Empty]. 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Facilitate DHS efforts 
to manage, track, and monitor the execution of fusion center 
capabilities via the annual fusion center assessment process; 

Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Provide training and 
other support to help ensure that fusion center analysis adheres to 
intelligence community tradecraft standards[B]; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: [Empty]. 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Represent DHS in 
intelligence and information sharing activities with state and local 
officials--such as governors, mayors, and state homeland security 
advisers--as well as with federal entities, including the FBI and DHS 
component field offices, among others; 
Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Facilitate the 
incorporation of state and local intelligence needs into DHS's Program 
of Analysis and analytic production planning[C]; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: [Empty]. 

Intelligence officer roles and responsibilities: Serve as the lead DHS 
I&A representative and team leader at the center for other I&A 
personnel assigned to the area of responsibility, which can include 
intelligence analysts; 
Intelligence analyst roles and responsibilities: Use domestic and DHS-
wide databases, such as the Homeland Security Information Network, to 
provide analytical support to the intelligence community, state and 
local partners, and DHS; 
Reports officer roles and responsibilities: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of I&A documents. GAO-15-155. 

[A] The intelligence cycle, as defined by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), is the process of developing unrefined data into 
polished intelligence for policymakers to use. Six steps constitute 
the intelligence cycle: requirements, planning and direction, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and 
dissemination. 

[B] I&A is to follow the same tradecraft standards as the rest of the 
intelligence community, which are detailed in Intelligence Community 
Directive Number 203--Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007). The Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence uses these standards to 
evaluate DHS intelligence analysis products, as well as those from 
other members of the intelligence community. 

[C] DHS's Program of Analysis is a tool used to plan, manage, and 
evaluate analytic production; increase understanding of homeland 
security issues; and address customer needs. 

[End of table] 

Intelligence Officers: 

Intelligence officers perform a range of activities at fusion centers 
depending on the center's size, maturity, capabilities, and needs. For 
example, at a smaller center we visited, the intelligence officer's 
activities included training local intelligence analysts on basic 
analytic techniques and helping to develop and produce intelligence 
products. At two large fusion centers we visited that had their own 
experienced intelligence analysts, the intelligence officers focused 
on performing more extensive outreach with government and private 
sector partners and reviewing local analysts' finished intelligence 
products prior to dissemination. According to intelligence officers at 
2 of the 10 centers we visited, regional directors that supervise 
intelligence officers allow them flexibility to support the fusion 
center in the capacity that best benefits center operations.[Footnote 
39] 

In addition, intelligence officers also stated that regional directors 
and I&A management communicate expectations to intelligence officers 
through oral discussion and employee performance plans. These plans 
describe expectations across a broad set of competencies that include 
accountability for results, communications, critical thinking, 
engagement, and collaboration, among others. According to intelligence 
officers and regional directors we interviewed, these plans also 
provide a mechanism to identify specific performance goals for the 
intelligence officer based upon the needs and objectives of the fusion 
center. For example, according to a performance plan template that we 
reviewed, an intelligence officer's goal is to facilitate the fusion 
centers' execution of the intelligence cycle. To address this goal, 
the officer can perform research and identify analytical training 
opportunities for the fusion center and advocate and facilitate the 
production of joint analytic products with other centers, among other 
things. 

According to 7 of the 10 of the fusion center directors we 
interviewed, intelligence officers have helped the center develop 
analytic capabilities. For example, 3 directors noted that officers 
participate in and arrange intelligence training for the local 
intelligence analysts at the fusion center. At 1 fusion center, the 
director emphasized the importance of having the intelligence officer 
on-site to bring DHS and broader nationwide perspectives on 
intelligence to the fusion center. One other director noted that the 
intelligence officer provided the center with a connection to other 
DHS components in the area of responsibility. Officers also served as 
a conduit to DHS headquarters personnel and subject matter experts to 
respond to inquiries on issues such as the annual fusion center 
assessment process. According to 1 fusion center director, 
intelligence officers also benefit the center by maintaining effective 
relationships with external stakeholders such as InfraGard members and 
the area Protective Security Advisor program.[Footnote 40] 

Intelligence Analysts and Reports Officers: 

I&A has deployed intelligence analysts to fusion centers on a limited 
basis. Until February 2014, I&A had deployed one analyst to both the 
Los Angeles and San Diego fusion centers. The local intelligence 
officer supervises the analysts but officials within I&A's Analysis 
Directorate also manage these analysts. According to senior I&A 
officials at headquarters, these embedded analysts work with fusion 
centers to provide training and detailed analytic work in accordance 
with tradecraft standards. For example, one standard requires analysts 
to explicitly identify the critical assumptions on which analytic work 
is based.[Footnote 41] In February 2014, I&A initiated a multi-phased 
pilot project to expand the number of analysts deployed to fusion 
centers and, as of June 2014, had deployed an additional five analysts 
to centers for 90-day rotations. In October 2014, I&A officials said 
that they were reviewing the results of the pilot in order to inform 
future resource and deployment planning decisions. Senior officials 
within I&A's Analysis Directorate noted that they considered several 
factors in selecting fusion centers to participate, including the 
center's 2013 fusion center assessment results, access to information-
sharing systems and databases, partnerships with local DHS components 
and other federal agencies, and the sharing of common threat 
priorities between the center and I&A. Officials said that they are 
also considering deploying analysts to additional fusion centers and 
expanding the deployments to 2-year rotations.[Footnote 42] 

DHS has also deployed reports officers to fusion centers to primarily 
collect raw intelligence and develop intelligence information reports--
formerly known as homeland intelligence reports--which are intended to 
address the intelligence community's information requirements. In a 
2012 report, congressional staff raised concerns about fusion center 
intelligence reporting not being timely or of sufficient quality. 
[Footnote 43] According to senior I&A officials, in response to these 
concerns, I&A modified procedures for reporting intelligence and 
training reports officers. For example, according to one regional 
director, to enhance the quality of reporting, DHS restricted the 
development and reporting of intelligence information reports to 
reports officers. Before this change, I&A intelligence officers, among 
others, were involved in producing homeland intelligence reports for 
DHS and the intelligence community, which the congressional report 
notes were, in some instances, unrelated to terrorism and outdated, 
among other things. One supervisory reports officer we interviewed 
said that the goal is to standardize the reporting and approval of 
intelligence reports before releasing them to I&A for further review 
and then on to the intelligence community. One other reports officer 
said that I&A also enhanced training for reports officers by 
increasing the training itinerary from 2 to 3 weeks, in part to spend 
more time on certain issues--such as cyber security analysis--and 
place additional emphasis on the quality of reporting over the 
quantity of reports generated. I&A expanded the reports officer 
training as part of an officer certification program, which includes 
supervised on-the-job training as well as an assessment of an 
officer's reporting for compliance with standards. 

FBI Headquarters Has Developed Guidance to Help Its Field Offices 
Determine the Level of Engagement They Should Have with Fusion Centers: 

As of June 2014, the FBI had deployed 94 intelligence analysts, 
special agents, and others to 58 fusion centers, and had installed its 
secure data system (FBINet) at 51 centers.[Footnote 44] While local 
field office management makes deployment decisions, FBI headquarters 
developed guidance in August 2011 that contains several factors local 
management is to consider when deciding the type of engagement the 
office will have in supporting a fusion center. These factors include 
the extent to which: 

* the fusion center mission aligns with the FBI's mission, 
particularly related to counterterrorism--for example, both 
organizations share information on terrorism-related activities; 

* FBI management participates in the fusion center governance 
structure; 

* the fusion center operates in an accredited secure work environment 
and has a process to receive, handle, store, and disseminate 
classified information; 

* the fusion center is capable of receiving, analyzing, disseminating, 
and gathering information that contributes to the understanding of the 
current threat environment; and: 

* the fusion center immediately shares all emerging, terrorism-related 
information with the FBI, such as suspicious activity reports. 
[Footnote 45] 

In addition to this overarching guidance, in February 2013, the FBI 
developed guidance identifying the key roles and responsibilities of 
FBI personnel assigned to work with fusion centers.[Footnote 46] As 
noted in the document, this guidance is intended to provide additional 
policy and governance to the field and facilitate uniformity across 
the FBI while recognizing that individual roles and responsibilities 
may vary based on fusion center maturity, operational capability, and 
other factors. The FBI has identified three types of engagement levels 
it uses to support fusion centers: enhanced (interaction with centers 
on a regular and reoccurring basis), basic (interaction with centers 
on a liaison to part-time basis), and liaison (no dedicated resources 
but FBI maintains an information sharing relationship with the 
centers).[Footnote 47] As of July 2014, of the 78 total fusion centers 
in the National Network, FBI data showed that 38 centers received 
enhanced support, 20 centers received basic support, and 19 centers 
received liaison support.[Footnote 48] 

At all 8 of the fusion centers we visited that had FBI personnel 
deployed, FBI field office management--generally an assistant special 
agent-in-charge--were involved in the decision to support fusion 
center activities with personnel and non-personnel resources. Managers 
at 2 fusion centers said that they also provide guidance and oversight 
to deployed intelligence analysts and agents regarding their roles and 
responsibilities, and define general expectations in analysts' and 
agents' performance work plans. The FBI tasks personnel deployed to 
fusion centers with various duties, which can include performing 
liaison services with federal, state, local, and private sector 
partners; reviewing suspicious activity reports for dissemination to 
fusion center partners; briefing DHS and fusion center personnel on 
threats; and collaborating with DHS and fusion center staff to develop 
joint products. FBI officials noted that specific roles and 
responsibilities for deployed staff also depend on factors such as the 
size and maturity of the fusion center. For example, at 1 larger 
center with an established history of FBI engagement we visited, an 
FBI supervisory intelligence analyst managed the fusion center's 
intelligence unit, which consisted of about 35 intelligence analysts. 
At a smaller center, the FBI intelligence analyst was primarily 
involved in vetting suspicious activity reports. Among the 
responsibilities identified by other FBI analysts we spoke with 
included providing center personnel with intelligence information to 
enhance situational awareness, intelligence briefings to fusion center 
leadership, and analysis for the fusion center's tactical efforts. 

Fusion center directors at all 10 of the locations we visited 
generally viewed engagement with the FBI as beneficial to the center. 
For example, officials at 1 center noted that access to FBINet was 
particularly helpful to determine if persons of interest had been the 
subject of any prior investigations. Officials at another center noted 
that their relationship with the FBI is working well since issues 
related to how the center vetted tips and leads before submitting them 
to the FBI for processing have been resolved. Specifically, this 
center now embeds personnel on a rotational basis with the FBI unit 
that reviews these tips and leads. At another fusion center, where the 
FBI's engagement included a management role in the center's 
intelligence unit, center officials said that the bureau recognizes 
the overall value that the center provides in supporting intelligence 
activities. 

CBP and ICE Headquarters Rely on Field Office Management to Make 
Deployment Decisions; CBP Headquarters Is Developing Additional 
Guidance: 

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that local field office 
management independently makes staff deployment decisions. The 
officials noted that management generally bases decisions on existing 
relationships with fusion center personnel and management 
interpretation of shared mission goals with the center, rather than 
headquarters-level guidance.[Footnote 49] For example, one CBP field 
office determined that because it shared information with the fusion 
center on issues of mutual interest in the southwest region of the 
country--such as border security--and both the field office and center 
provided investigative leads to state, local, and federal law 
enforcement partners, among other things, the field office would 
deploy an officer to the center. 

According to our interviews with headquarters and field office 
representatives, roles and responsibilities for deployed CBP and ICE 
personnel can include activities similar to those performed by I&A and 
FBI personnel--such as providing liaison support for fusion center 
operations, access to component data systems, and investigative case 
support--while also supporting the components' own missions. For 
example, a CBP supervisory official we interviewed said that the 
primary responsibilities of one such deployment included an individual 
supporting the activities of a task force consisting of fusion center 
partners, as well as engaging with the DHS intelligence analyst that 
was deployed to the center to develop intelligence products. An ICE 
intelligence analyst we interviewed said that, in addition to 
performing ICE-related work priorities, the analyst's key roles within 
the center included coordinating investigative activities and 
providing data in support of the center's investigative unit. 

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that they have not created 
guidance to date for field office management to consider when making 
deployment decisions primarily because field offices are decentralized 
units with the authority to make such decisions independent of 
headquarters management. However, in June 2014, CBP headquarters 
officials said that they are developing a strategy to assist the 
agency in determining the most appropriate locations and mechanisms to 
provide personnel support to fusion centers and other CBP partners. 
The officials noted that CBP expects to complete the strategy in 
fiscal year 2015. According to the officials, the strategy will 
include several elements, including (1) a listing of all existing CBP 
partnerships with fusion centers and other agencies, (2) a matrix to 
evaluate current and potential future partnerships against CBP mission 
needs and operational requirements, and (3) training and equipment 
requirements to ensure consistency across all partnerships. 

ICE headquarters officials did not plan to develop additional guidance 
to help govern field office personnel deployments. However, DHS is 
taking additional actions to provide departmental components with 
information on the support priorities and personnel requirements of 
individual fusion centers. For example, I&A conducted a survey of 
fusion centers in 2010--and a follow-up data call in 2012--to help 
identify fusion center needs for DHS component personnel to meet the 
centers' operational mission and requirements. Further, according to a 
senior I&A official, the forthcoming Federal Framework for Supporting 
the National Network of Fusion Centers is to include information 
related to federal resource allocations to fusion centers and is 
intended to respond, in part, to the efforts called for by the NFCA. 
DHS also issued the Implementation Guidance for the Federal Resource 
Allocation Criteria Policy in September 2014. According to the 
document, this guidance is designed to assist federal agencies in 
planning and tracking resource deployments. Among the elements 
included in the guidance are recommended best practices for collecting 
data on support resources provided to fusion centers. These suggested 
practices are intended to promote additional consistency across 
federal agencies and help provide more comprehensive information on 
the overall federal investment in fusion centers. 

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, but DHS 
Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided to Centers: 

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Ensure That Requests for Federal Funding 
to Support Fusion Centers Are Aligned with Expected Capabilities: 

In fiscal year 2011, FEMA initiated a requirement that each fusion 
center complete DHS's annual baseline capabilities assessment to be 
eligible for HSGP funding, and federal officials began reviewing the 
grant requests to ensure that proposed projects target the achievement 
or sustainment of identified capabilities. Since that time, FEMA and 
SLPO officials have collaborated to help ensure that each fusion 
center grant request incorporates the results of the annual assessment 
as part of the investment justification. Specifically, HSGP grant 
guidance calls for each fusion center investment justification to 
describe the investment; identify how the investment supports state or 
urban area homeland security goals and objectives; explain capability 
gaps that the investment is intended to address; and describe the 
outcomes the investment is to achieve, among other things. 

Since fiscal year 2012, the grant guidance also requires the 
investment justification to further identify the specific capabilities 
and assessment attributes that the proposed projects are intended to 
address. According to SLPO officials who are responsible for reviewing 
these investment justifications, the guidance requires narrative 
statements that support the justifications to include explicit 
references to the capabilities covered within the annual fusion center 
assessment. The officials stated that they review each justification 
to ensure that these narratives adequately address any identified 
capability gaps. SLPO officials also noted that the narratives have 
improved from year-to-year based upon feedback provided to grantees, 
including that FEMA rejected some requests until it received 
additional information. 

Our review of the fiscal year 2013 investment justifications for the 
10 fusion centers we visited showed that the narratives routinely 
referenced targeted capabilities, with most of the narratives focusing 
on sustaining existing capabilities rather than initiating new ones. 
[Footnote 50] For example, the most common areas targeted for funding 
were maintenance and upgrades of existing technology platforms and 
sustainment of current staff positions. DHS officials stated that 
sustainment of existing capabilities would likely be the area of 
emphasis going forward but noted that these narratives would remain 
helpful to identify network trends and needs, particularly as funding 
becomes further constrained. While our review indicated that many of 
the supporting narratives within the investment justifications lacked 
explicit details--potentially, in part, because of the focus on 
sustainment of existing staff positions and technology systems rather 
than new capabilities--these grant requirements and corresponding 
review procedures provide a mechanism to help ensure that requested 
fusion center projects are addressing the achievement of identified 
baseline capabilities.[Footnote 51] 

FEMA Has Improved Tracking of Federal Grants for Fusion Centers, but 
Data on Total Levels of Federal Funding Remain Unreliable: 

In September 2010, we reported on Congress' interest in knowing the 
amount of federal funding going to support fusion center 
operations.[Footnote 52] However, in the past, DHS generally, and FEMA 
more specifically, have had challenges in tracking this amount because 
of the way FEMA captured funding data in its systems. Moreover, a 2012 
congressional committee report cited concerns regarding DHS's ability 
to provide adequate oversight of its financial support for fusion 
centers.[Footnote 53] According to FEMA grant management officials, 
FEMA initiated a new grant requirement for the 2012 grant cycle in 
part to address these concerns and help ensure more reliable reporting 
on fusion center grant funding in the future. 

Historically, FEMA relied upon a keyword search of its grant 
management system to identify likely fusion center projects and 
related funding. However, according to the 2012 committee report, 
depending on the keywords searched, FEMA estimated that grant funding 
provided to fusion centers from 2003 through 2010 ranged from $289 
million to as much as $1.4 billion.[Footnote 54] Subsequently, FEMA 
initiated a new requirement for the fiscal year 2012 grant cycle that 
called for states to submit a separate investment justification for 
all fusion center projects requested to be funded through the HSGP. As 
part of this justification, FEMA requires grant applicants to 
categorize individual fusion center projects among six designated 
spending categories--equipment, exercises, management and 
administration, organization, planning, and training. FEMA is to 
capture this information in its grant management system, which is to 
allow FEMA to account for aggregate spending in these individual areas 
across the National Network. FEMA also requires states to specifically 
identify fusion center projects--via a check mark--on all subsequent 
reports that these entities submit to FEMA every 6 months, providing 
the status of project implementation.[Footnote 55] 

FEMA's 2012 grant requirements represent an improvement over keyword 
searches in identifying fusion center projects and funding, but the 
data are unreliable, as grantees have incorrectly categorized many 
projects. Specifically, in response to our request, FEMA provided data 
indicating that states obligated approximately $124 million of DHS 
grant funding to support fusion centers across the network in fiscal 
year 2012. However, upon further review of the individual project 
descriptions that states reported, FEMA and SLPO officials determined 
that states incorrectly categorized many fusion center projects. These 
include cases in which projects supported broader capabilities not 
directly related to fusion centers--such as emergency management 
positions--as well as those that were not specifically supporting 
center operations. For example, one urban area reported obligating $14 
million to a fusion center for automated license plate readers and 
video surveillance equipment, although the center will be one of a 
number of system users. Given that FEMA identified that the $124 
million estimate contained non-fusion-center-related projects, the 
figure is unreliable for quantifying total federal grant funding 
provided to support fusion center operations in 2012. As an 
alternative estimate of fusion center grant funding, SLPO officials 
provided us with data on annual fusion center budgets that they 
collected via the annual assessment process. According to these data 
that fusion center directors reported, centers received approximately 
$60 million in DHS grant funding to support their operations in fiscal 
year 2012.[Footnote 56] We did not independently evaluate the 
reliability of this estimate; however, an SLPO official stated that 
the $60 million estimate was generally consistent with the amount 
remaining from the $124 million figure provided once non-fusion-center-
related projects were subtracted. 

To address this issue, FEMA is planning additional efforts to help 
states better categorize fusion center projects and improve the 
reliability of grant reporting. Specifically, for grant awards issued 
prior to fiscal year 2014, FEMA plans to provide supplemental guidance 
to grantees in advance of the next reporting period, which ends on 
December 31, 2014. According to FEMA officials, this guidance will 
direct grantees to reassess specified projects to determine if they 
are properly identified as supporting fusion centers. Additionally, 
the FEMA officials plan to introduce a series of questions within the 
FEMA grant reporting system by the end of calendar year 2014 to help 
grantees assess if designated projects should remain categorized as 
support to fusion centers. These combined efforts, if implemented as 
proposed, could provide grantees with information they need to make 
revisions to incorrect categorizations and help address data 
reliability issues. 

As proposed, the efforts discussed above could also serve to support 
the overall enhancement of project-level reporting that FEMA is 
currently implementing, in part, to address our prior recommendations. 
Although these efforts are not specific to fusion centers, we reported 
in February 2012 that FEMA lacked visibility over project-level 
details--particularly within the SHSP and UASI grant programs--and we 
recommended that DHS collect project information with sufficient 
detail to identify potential duplication.[Footnote 57] DHS concurred 
with this recommendation and, beginning with the 2014 grant cycle, 
FEMA started implementing a project-based application and reporting 
process that is intended to help improve oversight for individual 
projects. FEMA plans for this initiative to be fully implemented for 
fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 58] FEMA officials reported that this 
process is intended to help ensure that FEMA receives more 
comprehensive information from state grantees about project objectives 
and overall implementation progress. 

The combined efforts of additional guidance and implementation of 
project-level reporting may help states better categorize fusion 
center projects, improve the reliability of grant reporting, and 
enhance oversight of the projects. However, FEMA does not have plans 
to specifically review state reporting to ensure that grantees act in 
accordance with the proposed guidance--such as using the drop-down 
menus as intended--and take steps to revise any misclassified fusion 
center projects. It is important that projects be accurately 
categorized, as FEMA uses these data to determine the overall level of 
federal investment in fusion centers. FEMA officials stated that 
overall grant monitoring efforts are expected to help improve the 
reliability of fusion center funding data, but they noted that only a 
sample of fusion centers will be targeted through these processes. 
[Footnote 59] While sampling remains a reasonable approach for FEMA to 
conduct monitoring across the large number of HSGP projects 
implemented annually, this approach is not likely to provide FEMA with 
sufficient visibility over fusion center projects because each state 
reports information independently and any actions taken by one state 
to recategorize projects are not generalizable to others. Given the 
past problems related to data reliability and FEMA not knowing why 
states may have initially miscategorized fusion center projects, 
additional actions beyond the monitoring efforts currently planned are 
important. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, monitoring is important not only to assess the quality of 
performance over time but also to ensure that audit findings are 
promptly resolved.[Footnote 60] Development of a specific mechanism to 
ensure that states act in accordance with the forthcoming guidance 
could provide FEMA reasonable assurance that fusion center projects 
are properly classified and accurately account for total grant funding 
provided to centers. Such a mechanism could include, for example, 
having SPLO officials review those projects that states identify as 
supporting fusion centers to verify that states have accurately done 
so in accordance with the guidance. SPLO officials are in a position 
to conduct this review based on their knowledge of the results of the 
annual center assessments, input from DHS representatives at fusion 
centers, and other means. Developing a mechanism to ensure that states 
act in accordance with the proposed guidance could provide DHS, 
congressional, and other decision makers with more accurate 
information on the level of federal investment in centers to help 
decision makers determine future levels of investment. 

Conclusions: 

As focal points within states and urban areas for the receipt, 
analysis, gathering, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland 
security, and terrorism information, fusion centers are uniquely 
situated to help enhance the national threat picture and help protect 
the country. As these centers continue to mature, it remains important 
for DHS to identify the results that centers are achieving and how 
federal agencies can help support and leverage these centers. The 
recent expansion of performance measures is a positive step in this 
process, as are plans to move forward with additional exercises to 
further evaluate fusion center capabilities. DHS grant funding also 
remains an important component of federal support to fusion centers, 
but to date, FEMA has not been able to accurately account for and 
report on the amount of funds it has provided to centers. FEMA's 
proposed efforts to help ensure that grantees provide more accurate 
information on fusion center projects remain critical to improving 
reporting, but implementation of a specific mechanism to verify that 
states have acted in accordance with the forthcoming guidance would 
further help ensure that these efforts are achieving their intended 
purpose and fusion center grant reporting is reliable. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To help provide reasonable assurance that data states report on the 
amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is 
reliable, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator implement a 
mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with the proposed 
grant reporting guidance, when implemented. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and 
comment. In its written comments, summarized below and reprinted in 
appendix II, DHS concurred with the recommendation and described 
actions planned to address it. In addition, DHS provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. On 
October 27, 2014, DOJ's Audit Liaison Group informed us via email that 
the department did not have any comments on our draft report. 

DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA develop a mechanism to 
verify that states act in accordance with proposed guidance to help 
ensure that data reporting on the amount of federal grant funding used 
to support fusion centers is reliable. Specifically, DHS said that 
beginning in January 2015, FEMA--in coordination with I&A as 
appropriate--will review all fusion center projects to determine 
whether state reported expenditures are actually in support of a 
designated fusion center. In the event that the review identifies 
discrepancies, DHS said that FEMA will work with grantees to obtain 
additional clarification. In addition, DHS noted that any grantees 
currently scheduled for monitoring in fiscal year 2015 will receive an 
in-depth review of all fusion center projects, to include an 
examination of project progress, impediments to timely completion, and 
verification of funding data provided by the state. If fully 
implemented, DHS's planned efforts will address the intent of the 
recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs and Border 
Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
appropriate congressional committees. The report is also available at 
no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center Performance Measures: 

This appendix provides a summary of performance measures that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--in consultation with other 
partners--has established for the National Network of Fusion Centers. 
DHS grouped the performance measures by six outcome and five output 
categories. Table 6 shows a description of measures, their 
implementation status, and aggregated performance results across the 
National Network, as reported in the 2013 National Network of Fusion 
Centers, Final Report. 

Table 5: Summary of Outcome and Output Measures, Implementation 
Status, and Results for the National Network of Fusion Centers: 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-defined outcome measures: 

Enriched partnerships and decision making: 

Performance measures description: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services are timely for mission needs; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 87.8%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services are relevant; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 83.5%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of key customers who 
indicate they are satisfied with fusion center support; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 87.7%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services influenced their decision 
making related to threat response activities within their area of 
responsibility; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Number of law enforcement, fire 
service, and emergency medical services entities with Fusion Liaison 
Officers; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 11,572. 

Enhanced threat and domain awareness; 

Performance measures description: Percentage of states whose fusion 
centers report involvement in Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 92.5%. 

Performance measures description: Number of DHS Intelligence 
Information Reports originating from information received and validated 
by a fusion center; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]:[Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Number of Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) intelligence information reports originating from 
information received and validated by a fusion center; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of key customers reporting 
that fusion center products and services resulted in increased 
situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Better targeted information gathering, analysis, and dissemination: 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion center analytic 
products tagged to Homeland Security Standing Information Needs; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 19.3%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion center analytic 
products tagged to fusion center Standing Information Needs; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 34.1%. 

More effective law enforcement activities: 

Performance measures description: Number of suspicious activity reports 
vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in the initiation or 
enhancement of an investigation by the FBI; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 193[B]. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of requests for 
information from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for which fusion 
centers provided information for a TSC case file; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 63.6%. 

Performance measures description: Number of suspicious activity reports 
vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in a TSC Watchlist 
encounter; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 134[B]. 

Improved systemic intelligence capability: 

Performance measures description: Number of analytic products co-
authored by at least one fusion center and at least one federal agency; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 211. 

Performance measures description: Number of analytic products co-
authored by two or more fusion centers; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 115. 

Performance measures description: Number of DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis analytic products that cite information originating from 
fusion centers; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Number of fusion center analytic 
products that cite source information originating from Intelligence 
Community (IC) products or reports; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Number of fusion center analytic 
products that cite source information originating from at least one 
other fusion center's products or reports; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of state, local, tribal, 
and territorial fusion center analysts with Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at 
least once a month; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Improved support to operational response: 

Performance measures description: Percentage of federally designated 
special events in which fusion centers played a direct role; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 48.6%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of federally declared 
disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 42.9%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of state declared 
disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of recommendations 
identified through Fusion Center Readiness Initiative exercises acted 
upon and addressed by the specified fusion center(s); 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

DHS-defined output measures: 

Intelligence and information products and services: 

Performance measures description: Number of situational awareness 
products developed and disseminated by fusion centers[C]; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 27,592. 

Performance measures description: Number of analytic products developed 
and disseminated by fusion centers[C]; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 5,994. 

Performance measures description: Number of threat tips and leads 
processed by fusion centers; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 77,378. 

Performance measures description: Number of fusion center searches 
conducted on suspicious activity reporting (SAR) within the Nationwide 
SAR Initiative--SAR Data Repository[C]; 
Implementation status: 
Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 69,212. 

Performance measures description: Number of suspicious activity reports 
submitted by fusion centers; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 5,883. 

Performance measures description: Number of responses to fusion center-
to-fusion center requests for information; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 18,714. 

Performance measures description: Number of responses to federal 
requests for information; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 

Performance results[A]: 47,069.
Performance measures description: Number of responses to requests for 
information from agencies within fusion center area of responsibility; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 228,892. 

Privacy, civil Rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) protections: 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion centers that 
conduct a P/CRCL compliance review based upon the compliance 
verification tool; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 92.3%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion centers that 
conduct P/CRCL audits; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 80.8%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of P/CRCL audit findings 
for which fusion centers took corrective actions; 
Implementation status: Not implemented; 
Performance results[A]: [Empty]. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion center P/CRCL 
officers who received P/CRCL training for their position; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 94.7%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion centers that 
provide annual P/CRCL training to all fusion center staff; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 97.4%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion center analytic 
products reviewed by P/CRCL officers for P/CRCL issues; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 57.0%. 

Strategic plans and budgets: 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion centers that 
develop an annual report providing updates on progress in achieving 
strategic goals and objectives; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 56.4%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of fusion centers 
providing all performance data for the Fusion Center Performance 
Program; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 98.7%. 

Communications policies and systems: 

Performance measures description: Number of programmatic briefings, 
tours, and other engagements; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 5,117. 

Performance measures description: Number of open records inquiries 
(e.g. Freedom of Information Act requests) responded to by fusion 
centers; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 222. 

Security policies and systems: 

Performance measures description: Of the fusion centers that fall under 
DHS's purview, percentage of fusion centers that undergo an annual 
security compliance review based on DHS standards; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 100%. 

Performance measures description: Of the fusion centers that 
participated in the DHS's, Security Compliance Review during the 
assessment period, percentage of findings identified in the review 
report for which fusion centers took corrective actions within the 
timeframe identified; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 96.4%. 

Performance measures description: Percentage of state, local, tribal, 
and territorial fusion center personnel requiring secret clearances who 
have them or have submitted requests to the appropriate granting 
authority for them; 
Implementation status: Implemented; 
Performance results[A]: 92.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS's 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers 
Final Report and the Performance Measures Definitions Guide. 
GAO-15-155. 

[A] DHS did not report data on individual fusion center's performance 
results in the 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. 
Instead the data collected on performance measures were aggregated to 
report the performance of the National Network in total. 

[B] DHS states that results for these performance measure are based on 
preliminary data. 

[C] For these performance measures, DHS counted products that were 
written by fusion centers. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

October 17, 2014: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-782, "Information Sharing: DHS Is Assessing 
Fusion Center Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately 
Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers" 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's acknowledgment that the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is developing guidance to 
help grantees better categorize fusion center projects and improve the 
reliability of grant reporting. DHS also appreciates GAO's recognition 
of the continued progress and maturity of the Fusion Center 
Performance Program in evaluating the value and impact of the National 
Network of Fusion Centers in supporting national information sharing 
and homeland security outcomes. 

The draft report contained one recommendation with which DHS concurs. 
Specifically, GAO recommended that the FEMA Administrator: 

Recommendation: Implement a mechanism to verify that states acted in 
accordance with proposed grant reporting guidance. 

Response: Concur. In December 2014, grantees will provide the first 
Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) for the Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2014 Homeland Security Grant Program awards. When the reporting 
period is complete, FEMA Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) program 
analysts, in coordination with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A) as appropriate, will review all of the fusion center projects to 
determine whether the reported expenditures are actually in support of 
a designated fusion center. GPD will work with I&A to develop 
evaluation criteria and training tools that align to fusion center 
assessment process and reporting categories for the program analysts 
to use in this process. Where discrepancies appear, the program 
analysts will release the report back to the states for clarification. 

During FY 2015, for grantees scheduled for monitoring, as part of the 
programmatic monitoring program, GPD will implement an additional in-
depth desk review of all projects that states have categorized as 
fusion center projects. This level of additional review will be 
similar to the project-level review process currently in place for our 
risk-based monitoring protocol for our grant programs. Each fusion 
center project review will include an examination of project progress, 
impediments to timely completion, and verification of funding data 
provided by the state. Information verified will be compared to what 
was submitted by the state as part of the application and reporting 
processes. Development of specific tools to be used for this review
will be coordinated with I&A. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 
2015. 

During FY 2016, GPD plans to move the reporting functionality 
currently supported by the Grants Reporting Tool to the Non-Disaster 
Grants System, which will provide more advanced tools for Program 
analysts to review project progress in accordance with fusion center
assessment process and reporting categories. This system also has the 
ability to capture project-based reporting. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant 
Director), Eric Hauswirth, Ryan Lambert, Thomas Lombardi, Linda 
Miller, Marvin McGill, and Jessica Orr made significant contributions 
to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In general, fusion centers provide a mechanism for multiple 
federal, state, and local entities to collaborate and share resources, 
expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing the ability to 
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to all hazards, including 
criminal or terrorist threats. See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1). 

[2] Terrorism-related information sharing remained a high-risk area 
for our February 2013 update. See, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 2013), for the most recent update. Every 2 years, at the start of 
a new Congress, we call attention to agencies and program areas that, 
according to our audits and evaluations, are of high risk of fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. 

[3] See 6 U.S.C. § 485. 

[4] See, GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion 
Centers Build and Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could 
Better Measure Results, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-972] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 
2010). 

[5] We visited state fusion centers in New Jersey, Wisconsin, 
Delaware, and Washington, and major urban area centers in 
Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange 
County, California. 

[6] The National Fusion Center Association is an organization that 
represents and provides an independent consolidated voice for state 
and local fusion centers. 

[7] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004) 
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 485). 

[8] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317-324 (2007) (codified 
at 6 U.S.C. § 124h). 

[9] GAO, Tax Administration, IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax 
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C. Nov. 22, 
2002). As part of this work, GAO developed nine key attributes to use 
as criteria for assessing performance goals and measures. GAO 
developed these attributes based on a combination of previously 
established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS Restructuring and Reform 
Act of 1998, as well as related performance management literature. 
Among other reasons, GPRA was enacted to hold federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results. Among the elements 
identified by the act as a leading practice is the development of 
applicable performance measures. 

[10] The Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory provides the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Program Manager of the ISE with an 
inventory of all federal funding that agencies report was expended and 
the personnel deployed that are dedicated to support the National 
Network of Fusion Centers. 

[11] FEMA manages the HSGP, which awards funds to states, territories, 
and urban areas to enhance their ability to prepare for, prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and 
other major disasters. The HSGP is the primary DHS grant program that 
allocates federal funds to help support fusion centers. 

[12] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[13] See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 482(f) (defining "homeland security 
information") and 485(a)(5) (defining "terrorism information"). For 
purposes of this report, homeland security information and terrorism 
information are referred to collectively as terrorism-related 
information. 

[14] As of June 2014, 49 states (all except Wyoming) and the District 
of Columbia had established fusion centers. 

[15] The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative is 
a joint collaborative effort by DHS; the FBI; and state, local, 
tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. This initiative 
provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism 
and other related criminal activity by establishing a national 
capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and 
sharing SAR information. 

[16] See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(a)-(b). Specifically, the DHS Secretary was 
to establish the DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center 
Initiative in consultation with the Program Manager for the 
Information Sharing Environment and the Attorney General, as well as 
DHS's Privacy Officer, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
and Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. 

[17] See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(i). 

[18] In April 2005, and in accordance with the Intelligence Reform 
Act, the President designated a Program Manager--within the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence--to, among other things, plan 
for, oversee implementation of, and manage the ISE. 

[19] The intelligence community is comprised of 17 member agencies 
that carry out the federal government's intelligence collection and 
dissemination efforts. See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4). 

[20] Under the SHSP, each state receives a level of funding determined 
through a formula grant allocation based on three factors: minimum 
amounts established by statutory mandate; DHS's risk methodology, and 
anticipated effectiveness of proposed projects. The UASI program 
addresses the planning, organization, equipment, training, and 
exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. FEMA 
allocates these funds on the basis of risk and anticipated 
effectiveness. The third grant program, Operation Stonegarden, 
provides approximately $50 million each year to facilitate cooperation 
and coordination among stakeholders to secure U.S. international 
borders. Fusion centers have received only a small proportion of grant 
funding through Operation Stonegarden. 

[21] In addition to assessing fusion center capabilities, the annual 
assessment process is used to assess fusion center performance. 
Additional information on DHS's efforts to measure fusion center 
performance and homeland security contributions is provided later in 
this report. 

[22] In some cases, a single question is asked to determine whether a 
fusion center has achieved an attribute and, in other cases, two or 
more questions are required to make this determination. DHS also 
conducts a validation process that includes data review and a 
structured interview with fusion center directors to help ensure 
consistency and minimize data discrepancies. 

[23] The 2013 assessment data cover the time period from August 2012 
through July 2013. 

[24] The 2013 assessment report noted that director turnover averaged 
34 percent in 2012 and 2013, but this figure is expected to be reduced 
to about 14 percent in 2014. 

[25] Additional information on how fusion centers use assessment 
results to inform grant requests is provided later in this report. 

[26] According to SLPO officials, this attribute remains important to 
help ensure effective product dissemination methods and help determine 
if products are meeting the needs of the customers. 

[27] The DHS National Exercise Program includes criteria that call for 
exercises to generally serve to support at least one of the following 
key objectives: (1) exchange intelligence, information, data, or 
knowledge to enable timely and informed decision making prior to and 
during an incident that threatens the security of the nation; (2) 
identify threats and hazards and share prompt, reliable, and 
actionable risk information with the public; (3) establish and 
maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process, 
capable of identifying, prioritizing, and delivering resources across 
all hazards and lead federal agency authorities; and (4) establish and 
maintain plans, authorities, responsibilities, and coordination 
capabilities. 

[28] The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative serves as a 
federal advisory committee to the U.S. Attorney General on justice 
information-sharing issues. 

[29] In addition to federal guidance, the performance measures and 
targets discussed later in this report also help define expectations 
and the results fusion centers are to achieve. 

[30] NFCA, 2014-2017 National Strategy for the National Network of 
Fusion Centers (July 2014). 

[31] Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 
Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers 
(Washington, D.C.: July 2013). 

[32] Established in 2004, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 
Council is made up of members representing law enforcement and 
homeland security agencies from all levels of government and is an 
advocate for state, local, and tribal law enforcement and their 
efforts to develop and share criminal intelligence for the purpose of 
promoting public safety and securing the nation. The Information 
Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee is responsible for 
advising the President on, among other things, developing policies and 
standards necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE and 
includes representatives from DOJ and DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(g) 
(establishing an Information Sharing Council, the responsibilities of 
which were subsequently subsumed by the Information Sharing and Access 
Interagency Policy Committee). 

[33] DHS, Performance Measure Definitions Guide, Measuring the 
Performance of the National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington 
D.C.: April 2014). 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143]. 

[35] The nine key attributes identified include (1) linkage, (2) 
clarity, (3) measurable targets, (4) objectivity, (5) reliability, (6) 
coverage of core program activities, (7) limited overlap, (8) balance, 
and (9) government-wide priorities. 

[36] DHS, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report 
(Washington D.C.: June 2014). 

[37] PM-ISE, Information Sharing Environment: Federal Resource 
Allocation Criteria, ISE Guidance ISE-G-112 (Washington D.C.: June 3, 
2011). 

[38] DHS considers the number of reports officers that are deployed to 
fusion centers to be sensitive information, and therefore we did not 
include this information in this report. 

[39] DHS has deployed nine regional directors across the country to 
supervise intelligence officers deployed at fusion centers. These 
directors are also responsible for supporting fusion centers and 
facilitating execution of the intelligence cycle. 

[40] InfraGard is an FBI-sponsored initiative designed to bring 
together representatives from the private and public sectors to help 
protect our nation's critical infrastructure from attacks by 
terrorists and criminals. The protective security advisor is a 
critical infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation 
subject matter expert who provides DHS with perspectives on risks to 
critical infrastructure within the regional and local levels. Critical 
infrastructure comprises vital assets, systems, and networks that if 
incapacitated or destroyed could have an adverse impact on the 
nation's security, economy, public health, or safety. 

[41] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence 
Community Directive Number 203--Analytic Standards (Washington D.C.: 
June 21, 2007). 

[42] For additional information on DHS intelligence analysis 
activities, see GAO, DHS Intelligence Analysis, Additional Actions 
Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce Challenges, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-397] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 4, 2014). 

[43] United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal 
Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers 
(Washington D.C.: Oct. 3, 2012). 

[44] The FBI Network (FBINet) is the FBI's primary system for 
communicating secret information, including intelligence pertaining to 
national security. 

[45] FBI, FBI Electronic Communication, FBI Engagement with State and 
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Aug. 1, 2011). 

[46] FBI, FBI Electronic Communication, Fusion Center Initiative; 
Roles and Responsibilities for Personnel Assigned to Fusion Centers 
(Feb. 28, 2013). 

[47] In general, the FBI defines the enhanced engagement level as 
having a regular and ongoing presence in the fusion center, mission 
overlap, FBINet connectivity, and FBI field office and fusion center 
personnel working together on joint activities and products. Basic 
engagement can range from liaison support to part-time attendance in 
the fusion center and may include sharing classified assessments and 
intelligence information reports, in addition to joint analytic 
activities. At the liaison level, there is an established channel for 
sharing information, but FBI resources are not dedicated to the fusion 
center and joint activities are limited. 

[48] The FBI documents we reviewed did not assign an engagement level 
for 1 fusion center. 

[49] The 2011 Fusion Center Cost Inventory shows that CBP and ICE had 
each deployed 24 personnel to fusion centers, which was the third most 
personnel deployed, behind I&A and the FBI. 

[50] Each investment justification can include up to 10 individual 
projects. 

[51] FEMA is in the early stages of implementing a new grant reporting 
tool that is designed to capture additional project-level information 
in the investment justifications, which we discuss in greater detail 
later in this report. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-972]. 

[53] Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Federal Support for 
and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: 
Oct. 3, 2012). 

[54] We did not assess the reliability of these reported data but 
evaluated the most recent FEMA data available for the purposes of this 
report. 

[55] Following the award of a grant, state grantees must provide FEMA 
with updated information on project obligation amounts every 6 months 
in order to show implementation progress. States submit this 
information to FEMA through biannual strategy implementation reports. 
This reporting requirement is for all DHS grants and not unique to 
fusion center grant funding. 

[56] Since we reported on federal support to fusion centers in 2010, 
the proportion of federal funding to support operations has decreased. 
For example, self-reported state data collected as part of DHS's 
annual assessment of fusion centers show that, in 2010, fusion centers 
covered about 60 percent of their operational budgets with federal 
funding and the remaining with state or local funding. However, data 
show that in 2012, centers covered about 38 percent with federal 
funding. 

[57] See GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information 
and Coordination among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-303] (Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 
2012). 

[58] This electronic tool requires applicants to complete narrative 
statements and make selections from a series of menus to capture the 
key characteristics and status of individual projects. With respect to 
fusion centers, FEMA officials noted that these project-level 
enhancements are expected to allow DHS to track expenditures against 
investment justification requests and identified capability gaps, per 
the annual assessment process. 

[59] FEMA is currently in its second year of conducting a risk-based 
monitoring approach to evaluate the information states provide through 
biannual reports. According to FEMA, this approach includes a baseline 
review of each project to identify potential challenges to grant 
success such as grantee organizational weaknesses, complexity of 
projects, and concerns related to timeliness or accuracy of reporting. 
A small subset of these projects are then to be selected for a 
detailed review based on several factors, including the dollar amount 
of the project and known issues with, or visibility of, the project. 

[60] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]