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Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity' 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2011: 

Afghanistan Governance: 

Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts to 
Build Financial Management Capacity: 

GAO-11-907: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-907, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The United States has allocated over $72 billion to Afghanistan since 
2002. With other international donors, it is focused on transitioning 
leadership to the Afghan government and has pledged to provide at 
least 50 percent of its development aid through the Afghan government 
budget. Improving Afghanistan’s public financial management capacity 
is critical to this transition. In 2010, the Afghan government, 
consulting with donors, issued a Public Financial Management Roadmap 
(Roadmap), which outlines goals to improve Afghanistan’s capacity to 
develop a national budget and expend funds. 

GAO reviewed (1) U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan government’s 
public financial management capacity, including the extent to which 
they support Roadmap goals, and (2) the extent to which U.S. efforts 
have improved the government’s capacity. GAO reviewed documents and 
interviewed officials from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID); Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and the 
Treasury (Treasury); World Bank; and Afghan government in Washington, 
D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan. 

What GAO Found: 

USAID, Treasury, and DOD support the Public Financial Management 
Roadmap (Roadmap) goals through various activities such as (1) USAID 
projects that provide technical assistance and training to Afghan 
civil servants, (2) Treasury advisers’ assistance to the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), and (3) DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command–
Afghanistan (CSTC A) that provides support to the Ministries of 
Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI). GAO found that these efforts are 
aligned with the Roadmap goals. USAID provides training and technical 
assistance mainly through two contractor-implemented projects. One 
USAID project provides technical assistance to 37 civilian ministries 
to develop their annual budgets, while another USAID project provides 
training in areas such as financial management and procurement to 
Afghan civil servants. Treasury provides technical assistance through 
6 advisers in MOF, who work with senior officials on issues such as 
budget execution. Through CSTC-A, DOD has 22 advisers at MOD and MOI, 
who advise officials on developing their budgets and strengthening the 
payroll system to improve accuracy. 

The overall extent to which U.S. efforts have improved the public 
financial management capacity of the Afghan government cannot be fully 
determined because (1) U.S. agencies have reported mixed results, and 
(2) weaknesses in USAID’s performance management frameworks, such as 
lack of performance targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of 
its results. USAID’s evaluations of its two public financial 
management projects indicate that some activities were successfully 
completed, while others were terminated because these activities were 
not deemed useful. Treasury advisers assessed that although their 
assistance at MOF had a positive effect, some results had limitations. 
For example, advisers assessed that their efforts to design reports 
for improved communication of financial information were not as 
successful as they had expected. Additionally, CSTC-A assessed that 
while MOD has made progress since 2008 and can perform critical 
financial management functions with minimal international support, MOI 
still needs significant international support for such operations. In 
early 2010, CSTC-A projected that MOD would transition to needing no 
coalition support for finance and budget functions by January 2012, 
and MOI would reach a similar goal by March 2012. However, in early 
2011, CSTC-A extended time frames for meeting its benchmarks for MOD 
and MOI to March 2012 and November 2012, respectively. Regarding 
deficiencies in USAID’s performance management framework, both the 
USAID Mission performance management plan and project-specific plans 
lack performance targets as required for each indicator related to 
public financial management. Additionally, implementing partners, such 
as contractors, have not consistently reported performance data for 
all indicators. Moreover, baselines for public financial management 
capacity of civilian ministries have not yet been established. In the 
absence of baselines, performance targets, and data, it is difficult 
to assess the extent to which USAID efforts have increased the public 
financial management capacity of Afghan ministries. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator take steps to (1) 
establish performance targets in its Mission Performance Management 
Plan (PMP); (2) ensure implementing partners’ PMPs include baselines 
and approved targets; and (3) ensure implementing partners routinely 
report performance data. USAID concurred with GAO recommendations and 
is taking steps to address them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-907]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 
or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Various U.S. Agency Efforts Support Afghanistan's PFM Capacity-
Building Goals: 

Results of U.S. Efforts to Improve Afghanistan's PFM Capacity Cannot 
Be Fully Determined: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Allocations of Funds to Afghanistan from Fiscal Year 
2002 to Fiscal Year 2011: 

Appendix III: Afghan Government Budget Formulation, Budget Execution, 
and Audit Process: 

Appendix IV: CSTC-A Process to Assess Ministry Capacity: 

Appendix V: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Requirements for Performance Management and Evaluation: 

Appendix VI: Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Data for USAID PFM Projects: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Afghan Government PFM Roadmap Components and Their Key Areas: 

Table 2: Examples of USAID PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to Afghan 
Government Entities since 2009: 

Table 3: Examples of U.S. Treasury PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to 
MOF: 

Table 4: MOD and MOI 2011 Development Plan Goals for Finance and 
Budget: 

Table 5: Examples of CSTC-A PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to Afghan 
Security Ministries: 

Table 6: U.S. Allocations of Funds to Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2002- 
2011: 

Table 7: CSTC-A Areas of Focus for Capacity Building at MOD and MOI: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Donors Providing PFM Assistance to Afghan Government 
Entities: 

Figure 2: Total Estimated Budget for Afghanistan ($10.2 billion) 
(Solar Year March 21, 2010, to March 20, 2011): 

Figure 3: Actual and Projected Capability Milestone Ratings for MOD 
and MOI as of April 2011: 

Figure 4: PFM Objectives and Indicators in the USAID Performance 
Management Plan for Afghanistan (2011-2015): 

Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2010 Performance Data for USAID Projects That 
Focus Significantly on PFM Capacity at the National and Provincial 
Levels: 

Figure 6: Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Data for USAID Projects That 
Focus Significantly on PFM Capacity at the National and Provincial 
Levels: 

Figure 7: Key Afghan Government Entities Involved in Budget 
Formulation, Budget Execution, and Audits at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

Figure 8: CSTC-A Process to Assess MOD's Capacity in Areas Including 
Finance and Budget: 

Figure 9: Fiscal Year 2010 Performance Data for USAID Projects with a 
Significant Focus on PFM Capacity Building at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

Figure 10: Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Data for USAID Projects with a 
Significant Focus on PFM Capacity Building at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

Abbreviations: 

ACSS: Afghanistan Civil Service Support: 

ADS: Automated Directives System: 

CM: Capability Milestone: 

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan: 

DFID: Department for International Development: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EGGI: Economic Growth and Governance Initiative: 

GS: General Staff: 

IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Governance: 

MOD: Ministry of Defense: 

MOF: Ministry of Finance: 

MOI: Ministry of Interior: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NTM-A: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan: 

PFM: Public Financial Management: 

PMP: Performance Management Plan: 

Roadmap: Public Financial Management Roadmap: 

SIGAR: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: 

State: Department of State: 

Treasury: The Department of the Treasury: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 20, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

The United States has allocated more than $72 billion to stabilize and 
build Afghanistan since 2002 and, along with the international 
community, has begun focusing on transitioning leadership for 
security, governance, and economic growth to the government of 
Afghanistan. In January 2010, the United States joined other donors by 
pledging that within the next 2 years it would provide 50 percent or 
more of its Afghan development aid through the Afghan government's 
national budget. Such direct assistance is intended to help develop 
the capacity of Afghan government ministries. However, increase in 
direct assistance from donors is conditioned on the Afghan 
government's progress in areas such as reducing corruption and 
strengthening its public financial-management (PFM) systems.[Footnote 
1] In July 2010, the Afghan government, in consultation with donors, 
issued a plan called the Public Financial Management Roadmap (Roadmap) 
to improve its capacity to develop a national budget, expend funds, 
and increase accountability and transparency. 

Due to broad congressional interest in U.S. efforts to improve the 
Afghan government's governance capacity, we performed this review 
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct work on his own 
initiative. We examined (1) U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan 
government's PFM capacity, including the extent to which these efforts 
support and are aligned with the PFM goals identified by the Afghan 
government and the international community; and (2) the extent to 
which U.S. efforts have helped to improve the Afghan government's PFM 
capacity.[Footnote 2] 

To address these objectives, we focused on U.S. agencies' PFM capacity-
building activities since 2009, after President Obama announced the 
U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. We reviewed documents and 
records from the U.S. Departments of State (State), the Treasury 
(Treasury), and Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Additionally, we reviewed documents from the 
Afghan government and other donors, such as the World Bank. We 
interviewed officials from DOD, State, Treasury, and USAID in 
Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, Afghanistan. Additionally, in Kabul, 
we interviewed other international donors, such as the World Bank and 
the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), 
as well as Afghan government officials from organizations including 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the 
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission. 

To identify U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan government's PFM 
capacity, we obtained documentation on relevant plans, projects, and 
activities, and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies including 
USAID, Treasury, and DOD. To identify the extent to which U.S. efforts 
address the Roadmap goals, we identified the U.S. PFM capacity-
building efforts and compared these efforts with the Roadmap. We also 
obtained a description of PFM-related activities funded by other 
donors, including the World Bank and the United Kingdom. To assess the 
results of U.S. PFM efforts, we reviewed U.S. agencies' assessments of 
their efforts and analyzed performance plans and reported results from 
USAID, Treasury, and DOD. Additionally, we obtained documentation and 
attempted to corroborate the effectiveness of U.S. efforts during 
meetings with Afghan officials from relevant ministries, such as MOF 
and MOD. We assessed data obtained for our analysis to be sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes for which they were used in this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through 
September 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are 
contained in appendix I. 

Background: 

Since 2002, the United States has allocated more than $72 billion for 
development, governance, and security in Afghanistan. See appendix II 
for a breakdown by year of U.S. allocation of funds for Afghanistan 
from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2011. After almost a decade of 
donor-led efforts in Afghanistan, the United States and international 
donors have increased their focus on transitioning leadership to the 
Afghan government. The government of Afghanistan and the United 
Nations sponsored international conferences in London (January 2010) 
and Kabul (July 2010), which were attended by senior officials 
representing about 70 major donors, including the United States. 
Participants committed to supporting Afghan government leadership and 
ownership and agreed to increase the percentage of development aid 
delivered through the Afghan government to 50 percent by 2012, if the 
Afghan government showed progress in areas such as strengthening its 
public financial-management systems and reducing corruption. In 
November 2010, representatives from 48 countries contributing to the 
United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force agreed 
to a plan to begin transitioning security responsibilities to the 
Afghan government in 2011 and to complete this transition by 2014. In 
June 2011, the U.S. President reiterated that the process of security 
transition in Afghanistan will be complete by 2014. According to 
donors and the Afghan government, ensuring that public funds are used 
in a transparent and responsible manner is necessary for effective 
governance. Key elements of Afghanistan's PFM include developing a 
national budget that represents the country's priorities (budget 
formulation), spending the approved budget in the intended time frame 
(budget execution), and ensuring that funds are used as intended 
(through audits). 

Public Financial Management Roadmap to Improve Afghan Government 
Capacity: 

In July 2010, the Afghan government published a plan, called the 
Public Financial Management Roadmap, to strengthen the Afghan 
government's performance in three key areas at the national and 
provincial level: budget formulation, budget execution, and 
accountability and transparency of financial management. Additionally, 
a cross-cutting area is to increase the capacity of Afghan ministries. 
MOF led the development of the Roadmap, with input from the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund, as well as partner governments such 
as the United States and United Kingdom.[Footnote 3] Table 1 provides 
an overview of the Roadmap's components and their key areas. 
Additionally, appendix III provides information on the Afghan 
government's budget process. 

Table 1: Afghan Government PFM Roadmap Components and Their Key Areas: 

1. Strengthening budget formulation: 
* Develop comprehensive information regarding on-and off-budget 
programs; 
* Improve budget projections, such as by incorporating recurrent costs 
of development projects and security sector expenses, to improve 
analysis of achieving fiscal sustainability; 
* Present budget on a program basis, including performance targets. 

2. Improving budget execution: 
* Involve local entities in provinces to identify, plan, budget, 
implement, and execute programs; 
* Initiate medium-term procurement reforms and ensure ministries' 
adherence to regulations; 
* Monitor financial and nonfinancial performance. 

3. Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management: 
* Improve guidance on budget and financial-management procedures from 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF); 
* Conduct internal audits of ministries to improve efficiency and 
reduce corruption; 
* Improve the capacity of the Control and Audit Office to conduct 
external audits. 

4. Improving capacity of ministries: 
* Conduct standardized capacity assessments of ministries to inform 
capacity-development initiatives; 
* Assess requirements for technical assistance to ensure capacity is 
developed, not substituted. 

Source: GAO summary of Afghan government data. 

Note: The information comes from the Public Financial Management 
Roadmap. 

[End of table] 

U.S. embassy guidance issued since the release of the Roadmap states 
that U.S. governance activities are to increase focus on developing 
the capacity of Afghan civilian agencies in budget prioritization and 
execution to achieve progress towards Afghan self-governance in 
anticipation of the security transition. 

Multiple Donors Provide PFM Capacity-Building Assistance: 

Several international donors are helping the Afghan government improve 
its PFM capacity. The World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States are key donors providing assistance to build PFM capacity of 
Afghan civilian agencies. Figure 1 shows donor PFM assistance to 
Afghan government entities at the national and provincial levels. 

Figure 1: Donors Providing PFM Assistance to Afghan Government 
Entities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

National level: 

Ministry of Finance[A]: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States; 
United Kingdom; 
World Bank; 
Other. 

Central Ministries[B]: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States; 
World Bank; 
Other. 

Control and Audit Office: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States; 
World Bank. 

Parliament: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States. 

Provincial level: 

Mustofiats: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States; 
World Bank. 

Provincial Directorates: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States. 

Provincial Council: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States. 

Provincial Governors: 
International donors providing PFM capacity-building assistance in 
pictured government entities: 
United States. 

Source: GAO analysis of documents from USAID, United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, World Bank and the Afghan 
government. 

[A] Other donors include the Asian Development Bank, Italy, the United 
Nations Development Program, Norway, Germany, and Japan. 

[B] Other donors include the United Nations Development Program and 
European Union. 

[End of figure] 

Through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 
DOD helps build the PFM capacity of Afghanistan's security ministries, 
the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI).[Footnote 4] CSTC-A 
is primarily U.S.-funded and staffed. In April 2009, the United States 
and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies agreed to 
establish NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee 
institutional training and development of the Afghan National Security 
Forces. NTM-A/CSTC-A now operates as an integrated NATO and U.S. 
command. 

International donors provide a significant share of the total funding 
for Afghanistan in the form of funds channeled through the Afghan 
government budget as well as "off-budget" assistance that does not use 
the Afghan government's budget system.[Footnote 5] According to our 
preliminary analysis, the total estimated budget for Afghanistan for 
March 21, 2010-March 20, 2011 was $10.2 billion; donors were expected 
to fund about two-thirds of the Afghan government budget of $4.4 
billion and the entire reported off-budget assistance of $5.8 billion. 
[Footnote 6] Figure 2 shows the total funding to Afghanistan through 
the Afghan government budget and off-budget donor assistance for March 
2010 to March 2011.[Footnote 7] 

Figure 2: Total Estimated Budget for Afghanistan ($10.2 billion) 
(Solar Year March 21, 2010, to March 20, 2011): 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Afghan government budget: 44%: $4.4 billion; 
Off-budget donor assistance: 57%: $5.8 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of Afghan government data. 

Note: The percentages do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Various U.S. Agency Efforts Support Afghanistan's PFM Capacity-
Building Goals: 

USAID, Treasury, and DOD support the Roadmap goals through various 
activities such as (1) USAID projects that provide technical 
assistance and training to Afghan civil servants, (2) Treasury 
advisers' assistance to MOF, and (3) DOD's mentoring and coaching 
assistance through CSTC-A to MOD and MOI. USAID provides training and 
technical assistance mainly through two contractor-implemented 
projects. Treasury provides technical assistance through 6 advisers in 
MOF, who work with senior officials on issues such as budget 
execution. Through CSTC-A, DOD has 22 advisers at MOD and MOI, who 
advise officials on developing their budgets and strengthening the 
payroll system to improve accuracy. 

USAID Provides Technical Assistance and Training to Afghan Civilian 
Ministries: 

USAID is funding several projects that provide training, mentoring and 
coaching, and technical assistance that address Roadmap goals. 
[Footnote 8] USAID has two primary PFM capacity-building projects--the 
Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI) project that has a 
contract value of approximately $92 million over 5 years, and the 
Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS) project that has a contract 
value of approximately $84 million over 1 year.[Footnote 9] Both these 
projects are implemented by Deloitte Consulting, which has hired 
international contractors and local Afghans. EGGI supports all four 
PFM goals of strengthening budget formulation, improving budget 
execution, increasing accountability and transparency, and improving 
ministry capacity. For example, according to USAID, EGGI contractors 
provided program-budget technical assistance to 37 Afghan central 
ministries and agencies so that these entities can formulate annual 
budgets that conform to MOF guidance. Examples of EGGI's technical 
assistance include contractors helping MOF's fiscal policy unit 
develop a fiscal forecasting model and providing policy assistance to 
the Ministers of Finance and Economy. ACSS similarly supports most 
Roadmap goals through training it provides in financial management and 
procurement to Afghan civil servants in Kabul and in the provinces. 
Table 2 provides information on EGGI and ACSS, as well as other USAID 
projects that, while not exclusively focused on PFM capacity building, 
provide some PFM capacity-building assistance. 

Table 2: Examples of USAID PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to Afghan 
Government Entities since 2009: 

Projects that focus significantly on building PFM capacity at the 
national and provincial levels: 

Project name: Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI); 
USAID implementing partner: Deloitte Consulting, LLP; 
Afghan government partner: Ministry of Finance is the primary 
counterpart; secondary counterparts are Control and Audit Office and 
Ministry of Economy. Training provided to all government ministries 
and budget units; 
Contract duration: Aug. 2009-Sept. 2014; 
Description of PFM assistance: Advisers provide technical assistance, 
training, coaching, and mentoring to Afghan ministries and 
administrative budget units in the areas of program and provincial 
budget reform and external audit; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management; 
* Improving Capacity at Ministries. 

Project name: Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS); 
USAID implementing partner: Deloitte Consulting, LLP; 
Afghan government partner: Independent Administrative Reform and Civil 
Service Commission; 
Contract duration: Feb. 2010-May 2011 (extension requested); 
Description of PFM assistance: National and subnational training on 
procurement and financial management (including program budgeting and 
accounting); 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Improving Capacity at Ministries. 

Other projects that provide some PFM capacity building: 

Project name: Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project; 
USAID implementing partner: State University of New York; 
Afghan government partner: Afghan Parliamentary Institute; 
Contract duration: Sept. 2004-Mar. 2011 (extension requested); 
Description of PFM assistance: Budget team helps parliamentary staff 
analyze budgets; conducts seminars; helps provincial councils improve 
communication between councils and national ministries; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Project name: Support to Sub-National Governance Structure/RC East and 
RC South; 
USAID implementing partner: Consortium for Elections and Political 
Process Strengthening; 
Afghan government partner: Independent Directorate of Local Governance 
(IDLG); 
Contract duration: June 2008-Jan. 2011; 
Description of PFM assistance: Provides training and support to 20 
provincial councils and 20 governors' offices. Includes technical 
assistance on fiscal and budgeting responsibilities; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Project name: Performance Based Governors Fund; 
USAID implementing partner: The Asia Foundation; 
Afghan government partner: IDLG; 
Contract duration: Nov. 2009-May 2011; 
Description of PFM assistance: Provides provincial governors with 
budget formulation guidance; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Project name: Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban 
Population; 
USAID implementing partner: Chemonics International (South); 
Development Alternatives Inc. (East, West, North); 
Afghan government partner: IDLG; 
Contract duration: June 2010-June 2013; 
Description of PFM assistance: Provides city officials core skills and 
on-the-job training related to financial management and revenue 
generation. Provides technical assistance and material support to help 
cities establish and manage accounting and budgeting systems; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[End of table] 

Treasury Advises and Assists MOF: 

A July 2009 Treasury assessment, which was part of a proposal for 
enhanced civilian assistance to Afghanistan, identified the need for 
advisers to assist with public expenditure management in MOF's offices 
of treasury, budget, and internal audit. Treasury assigned six 
advisers from its Office of Technical Assistance to assist various MOF 
offices.[Footnote 10] These advisers are embedded in MOF offices and 
provide assistance that supports Roadmap goals by advising senior 
Afghan MOF officials, analyzing and monitoring budget expenditures and 
controls, and developing accounting and administrative manuals. Table 
3 indicates location of Treasury advisers within MOF, type of 
assistance provided, and the PFM goals support by this assistance. 

Table 3: Examples of U.S. Treasury PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to 
MOF: 

Adviser title/MOF office: Budget and Financial Accountability Adviser 
#1/Treasury department; 
Examples of activities: 
* Advise and mentor the Director General of the Treasury department in 
MOF; 
* Oversee the rollout of the financial-management information system 
and the payroll systems to improve the efficiency of spending in the 
provinces and reduce opportunities for corruption; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management. 

Adviser title/MOF office: Budget and Financial Accountability Adviser 
#2/Budget department; 
Examples of activities: 
* Advise and assist with policy guidance and analysis of budget 
planning and formulation, monitor budget execution and controls, and 
provide timely and effective financial management and reporting; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Adviser title/MOF office: Budget and Financial Accountability Adviser 
#3/Budget department's Provincial Budget Unit; 
Examples of activities: 
* Strengthen the ability of Provincial Reconstruction Team staff to 
support provincial financial management; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Adviser title/MOF office: Budget and Financial Accountability Adviser 
#4/Treasury department; 
Examples of activities: 
* Develop a usable accounting and administrative manual; 
* Draft a business case for purchase and implementation of a 
procurement system; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Adviser title/MOF office: Adviser #5 and Adviser #6/Internal Audit 
department; 
Examples of activities: 
* Establish the internal audit program; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management. 

Source: GAO summary of Treasury data. 

[End of table] 

DOD Provides Mentoring and Coaching to MOD and MOI: 

As of April 2011, DOD, through CSTC-A, and other coalition partners 
had 587 advisers and mentors working with their Afghan counterparts to 
build the capacity of MOD and MOI in about 30 functional areas, such 
as intelligence, personnel management, logistics, and finance and 
budget.[Footnote 11] Of the 587 advisers and mentors, CSTC-A had 7 
advisers at MOD and 15 at MOI who provided advice in the finance and 
budget area. CSTC-A is working to ensure that MOD and MOI are capable 
of operating without coalition assistance by 2014. 

DOD employees or military personnel under CSTC-A provide leadership 
for capacity building in the finance and budget area; they are 
partnered with specific Afghan officials in MOI and MOD units and 
oversee the work of U.S. contractors. CSTC-A has developed 
comprehensive Ministerial Development Plans to guide its capacity-
building efforts at MOI and MOD, including plans for finance and 
budget (see appendix IV for a listing of all focus areas). Table 4 
shows the specific goals in the finance and budget plans for MOD and 
MOI for 2011. 

Table 4: MOD and MOI 2011 Development Plan Goals for Finance and 
Budget: 

MOD: 
* Achieve 98 percent budget-execution rate; 
* Develop a program budget based on annual requirements; 
Implement a pay system that utilizes direct deposit of funds to 
soldier accounts; 
* Establish a formal training program that provides basic financial-
management knowledge and skills to managers across the ministry; 

MOI: 
* Sustain accurate and timely financial services to the Afghan police 
and provide budget decision support to MOI leadership; 
* Continue development and integration of financial systems; 
* Achieve 100 percent electronic funds transfer; 
* Centralize electronic payroll systems. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

According to CSTC-A officials, advisers at MOD focus on building 
Afghan capacity and generally do not carry out the work of MOD 
officials. At MOI, advisers meet with finance and budget partners 
daily to help formulate budget and develop pay procedures, such as the 
electronic payroll system. As shown in table 5, the advisers provide 
advice that supports the Roadmap goals of improving budget formulation 
and execution, and increasing accountability and transparency. 
According to DOD officials, the goal of their capacity-building 
efforts is to ensure that MOD and MOI are fully capable of carrying 
out key functions such as finance and budget without coalition 
assistance. 

Table 5: Examples of CSTC-A PFM Capacity Assistance Provided to Afghan 
Security Ministries: 

Ministry: MOD; 
Areas of advice: Advising and coaching senior Afghan officials on 
annual budget development, budget execution, and policy and guidance 
formulation related to budget and finance; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Strengthening Budget Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Improving Capacity at Ministries. 

Ministry: MOD; 
Areas of advice: Develop and professionalize the Afghan National 
Army's internal control team through training, and conducting audits 
and internal controls assessments of pay process; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management. 

Ministry: MOD; 
Areas of advice:Advocating and overseeing professional development of 
finance officers, including refining the curriculum of MOD's Finance 
School; 
developing doctrine and policy directives, such as pay and budget 
policy; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Improving Capacity at Ministries. 

Ministry: MOI; 
Areas of advice: Developing a program budget; 
preparing project funding requests; 
monitoring budget execution; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: * Strengthening Budget 
Formulation; 
* Improving Budget Execution. 

Ministry: MOI; 
Areas of advice: Improving pay accuracy and timeliness; increasing 
enrollment of Afghan police in electronic payroll system; 
PFM Roadmap goals supported by assistance: 
* Improving Budget Execution; 
* Increasing Accountability and Transparency of Financial Management. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

According to the official terms of reference for CSTC-A advisers, they 
advise, facilitate, and collaborate with their MOI and MOD 
counterparts. The guidance states that on rare occasions, a crisis 
will occur and the adviser will have to perform the relevant 
functions. According to the CSTC-A officer directing finance capacity 
building at MOD, the advisers should allow their Afghan counterparts 
to make mistakes and learn from them, unless the mistake is critical. 

Results of U.S. Efforts to Improve Afghanistan's PFM Capacity Cannot 
Be Fully Determined: 

The overall results of U.S. efforts cannot be fully determined because 
(1) U.S. agencies providing PFM capacity assistance to the Afghan 
government have reported mixed results of their efforts, and (2) 
weaknesses in USAID's performance management plans and frameworks, 
such as lack of performance targets and data, prevent reliable 
assessments of USAID's results. USAID's evaluations of its two primary 
PFM projects indicate that some activities were successfully 
completed, while others were terminated because their usefulness was 
questionable. Treasury advisers assessed that although their 
assistance at MOF had a positive effect, the results fell short of 
what they were trying to accomplish. Additionally, CSTC-A reported 
that while MOD has progressed to being able to perform critical 
financial-management functions with minimal coalition support, MOI 
continues to rely on coalition support for these functions. Moreover, 
CSTC-A has extended transition milestones for security ministries. 
Regarding USAID's performance management, target and performance data 
have not been approved for PFM efforts at the USAID Mission level as 
well as for PFM-focused projects. 

U.S. Agencies Report Mixed Results of PFM Capacity-Building Activities: 

USAID, Treasury, and DOD reported mixed results related to U.S. 
efforts to build Afghan PFM capacity. 

USAID Reviews Indicate Positive and Negative Results of Its PFM 
Projects: 

USAID has reported output and some outcome information for its EGGI 
and ACSS projects, and conducted project evaluations that indicate 
positive and negative results. In 2010, the EGGI project trained 
approximately 800 government employees on how to develop a program 
budget, which allows budget units to request funding based on expected 
outputs and outcomes of specific programs.[Footnote 12] In addition, 
EGGI provided technical assistance to 37 budget units to help them 
prepare annual budgets for Afghan fiscal year March 2011 to March 
2012. According to USAID, this training was effective because all 
budget units prepared program budgets and submitted them in a timely 
manner. USAID also reported that 10 ministries "graduated" from budget 
training as these units can prepare their own budgets with little or 
no assistance from the EGGI team. According to USAID evaluators, 
program budgeting represented a major programmatic accomplishment for 
the EGGI project.[Footnote 13] 

However, other EGGI activities were not as successful, in part because 
USAID and the project's implementing partner did not adequately 
consult with relevant stakeholders, such as other international donors 
conducting related activities. For example, EGGI developed a Revenue 
Reconciliation Database to report revenue collections to the 
Afghanistan Revenue Department in real time. According to USAID 
evaluators, the EGGI revenue database does not directly connect with 
the Afghan government's accounting system, as it was intended to do, 
or the revenue-collection system being developed by DFID; therefore, 
the database does not provide information that is useful for planning 
or analysis. USAID has since terminated this activity. However, USAID 
officials noted that because of delays in the installation of the DFID 
system, the USAID database is the only functional system in use by 
MOF's Afghanistan Revenue Department to collect and report revenue 
data. Additionally, USAID's evaluators noted that USAID and DFID did 
not adequately coordinate efforts related to creating a medium 
taxpayer office in Herat.[Footnote 14] 

According to USAID, ACSS trained approximately 16,000 civil servants 
in Kabul (5,759 participants) and in 26 provinces (10,121 
participants) from February 2010 to March 2011. It provided training 
in five core subjects, including financial management and procurement. 
According to evaluations by USAID and the Afghan government's 
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, ACSS 
training contributed to improvements in civil servants' performance. 
[Footnote 15] However, USAID evaluators noted that a lack of baseline 
data makes it impossible to measure the extent of these improvements. 

In addition, USAID's evaluation of ACSS cites several challenges 
resulting from the project's Afghan-led approach, which involved 
Afghan officials in making decisions related to project 
implementation. Some Afghan officials viewed the Afghan-led approach 
to mean that they did not need to ensure accountability for some 
inventory. As a result, in some cases, USAID inventory stickers were 
reportedly removed from assets before the items were transferred to 
Afghan control, causing accountability issues, according to USAID's 
evaluation. In addition, some Afghan managers interpreted the concept 
of Afghan-led to mean that they could prevent the project's monitoring 
and evaluation team from obtaining data needed to assess project 
results, according to USAID's evaluation. For example, when ACSS staff 
requested monitoring and evaluation data, some Afghan managers 
responded that they were not required to provide data and that such 
requests represented an inappropriate desire to exert control over 
their operations. As a result, the quality of monitoring and 
evaluation of the project suffered. 

Treasury Advisers Report Limited Progress at MOF: 

To assess the effect of Treasury advisers' technical assistance to 
MOF, Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance requires each adviser 
to submit monthly reports and an annual evaluation.[Footnote 16] For 
the period October 2009 to September 2010, Treasury advisers assessed 
that although their assistance related to budget and financial 
management at MOF had a positive effect, the results were less than 
what they were trying to accomplish.[Footnote 17] For instance, the 
advisers gave a low score for results related to their efforts to 
design management reports to improve communication of financial 
information and enhanced budget control.[Footnote 18] However, the 
advisers assigned a high rating for results related to developing 
training materials to support capacity building. The advisers also 
assessed the level of commitment and involvement of their Afghan 
counterparts as being above average, with room for improvement. 

DOD Assessments Report Mixed Results in Improving Security Ministries' 
Capacity: 

CSTC-A has established a process to assess progress on key objectives 
and rate the capacity of MOD and MOI, in areas including finance and 
budget functions, on a quarterly basis.[Footnote 19] According to CSTC-
A's assessments, MOD has progressed from significant reliance on 
coalition support in 2008 to being capable of executing core functions 
related to finance and budget with minimal coalition support by 2011. 
MOI has progressed from not being able to accomplish finance and 
budget functions on its own in 2008 to being able to carry out core 
functions with significant coalition assistance by 2011. Figure 3 
shows actual and projected ratings for MOD and MOI's capability in 
finance and budget operations. Progress at MOI has been slow, in part 
because CSTC-A's capacity-building efforts at MOI started in 2006, 
several years after its efforts began at MOD in 2002. CSTC-A has 
extended the time frames to meet interim and final capacity-building 
goals at MOD and MOI due to various challenges. See appendix IV for a 
description of CSTC-A's capacity assessment process. 

Figure 3: Actual and Projected Capability Milestone Ratings for MOD 
and MOI as of April 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

MOD Finance: 
2008, Actual: CM-4; CM-3
2009, Actual: CM-2B; 
2010, Actual: CM-2A; 
2011, Actual: CM-2A; 
2001, Projected: CM-2A, CM-1B; 
2012, Projected: CM1B, CM-1A; 
2013, Projected: CM-1A; 
2014, Projected: CM-1A. 

MOI Finance: 
2008, Actual: CM-4; 
2009, Actual: CM-4; CM-3; 
2010, Actual: CM-3; 
2011, Actual: CM-3; 
2001, Projected: CM-3; 
2012, Projected: CM-3; CM-2A, CM-1A; 
2013, Projected: CM-1A; 
2014, Projected: CM-1A. 

MOD and MOI Capability Milestone (CM) Ratings: 
CM-4: The department exists but cannot accomplish its mission; 
CM-3: The department cannot accomplish its mission without significant 
coalition assistance; 
Transition Planning: 
CM-2B: The department can accomplish its mission but requires some 
coalition assistance; 
CM-2A: The department is capable of executing functions with minimal 
coalition assistance; 
Transition Decision Point[A]: 
CM-1B: The department is capable of executing functions with coalition 
oversight only; 
CM-1A: The department is capable of autonomous operations. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[A] CSTC-A reserves the right to modify ratings at this stage because 
of the significance of this change. 

[End of figure] 

CSTC-A Assesses MOD as Capable With Minimal Coalition Assistance: 

According to CSTC-A assessments, MOD transitioned from needing 
significant coalition support to accomplish finance and budget 
functions to requiring some coalition assistance in December 2008. 
Although CSTC-A's rating of MOD has not changed since then, CSTC-A 
officials documented progress at MOD.[Footnote 20] For example, CSTC- 
A's quarterly assessment of MOD for January through March 2011 
reported that MOD: 

* executed critical functions, such as paying of salaries to soldiers, 
with minimum coalition support; 

* implemented a policy to transition pay operations from U.S. embedded 
teams to Afghan army finance officers; 

* streamlined pay systems and expanded electronic funds transfer 
capability so that salaries of 97 percent of Afghan soldiers are 
deposited directly into their bank accounts; 

* executed its budget for salaries and other operational expenditures 
at over 99 percent for Afghan fiscal year 2010-2011; and: 

* implemented an integrated program budget-formulation process for 
this fiscal year, such that the budget request was tied to the 
ministry's strategic goals and performance measures. 

However, MOD has not progressed to needing only coalition oversight in 
carrying out finance and budget functions because of a lack of 
sufficient delegation of budget authority from MOD's central finance 
office to subordinate units and commands of the Afghan army.[Footnote 
21] Although CSTC-A officials worked with MOD to clarify roles and 
responsibilities of various offices, highly centralized budget 
authority prevented MOD from developing and executing the budget with 
input from the commands of the Afghan National Army. Therefore, CSTC-A 
advisers are still involved to ensure that MOD develops integrated 
program budgets. 

CSTC-A Assesses That MOI Needs Significant Coalition Support: 

Although MOI progressed from an inability to accomplish its finance 
and budget functions in March 2008 to being able to accomplish these 
functions with significant coalition support by March 2009, MOI's 
capacity is far behind MOD's. CSTC-A officials stated that their 
capacity-building efforts at MOI started in 2006, several years after 
CSTC-A's capacity-building efforts began at MOD in 2002.[Footnote 22] 
CSTC-A's quarterly assessment of MOI for January through March 2011 
rates MOI at the same level as in 2009, citing factors such as lack of 
consolidation of MOI's personnel databases due to delays in contracts 
and lack of telecommunications network expansion. As a result, CSTC-A 
or Afghan officials are not certain that all salary payments are being 
made to legitimate Afghan National Police personnel rather than 
"ghost" employees.[Footnote 23] Additionally, current MOI finance 
office employees do not have formal training in properly executing the 
budget and salary functions. Moreover, according to CSTC-A assessment, 
MOI has a top-down organizational culture in which officials tend to 
delegate key decisions to the minister. For example, MOI's Program 
Budget Advisory Committee, which is responsible for reviewing 
expenditures, is reluctant to make decisions affecting budget 
execution and pushes these up to the Minister of Interior. This 
reportedly resulted in necessary actions not being taken in a timely 
fashion. 

CSTC-A Has Extended Time Frames for Goals: 

CSTC-A's goal is for MOD and MOI to achieve self-sustainability prior 
to 2014, when coalition forces are scheduled to transition security 
responsibilities to the Afghan government. However, CSTC-A has 
extended the time frame for MOD and MOI finance offices to meet 
interim and final goals due to various challenges. For example, in 
early 2010, MOD's finance office was expected to reach the interim 
goals of operating autonomously with only coalition oversight by March 
2011 and the final goal of autonomous operations by January 2012. 
However, in March 2011 the projected date for meeting the interim goal 
was extended by 3 months to June 2011 and for meeting the final goal 
was extended by 6 months to June 2012. Similarly, we have previously 
reported that in several instances DOD pushed out completion dates 
related to training of Afghan army and police forces.[Footnote 24] 

The time frames for MOI to reach interim and final goals have also 
been revised. For example, in early 2010, CSTC-A expected MOI's 
finance office to operate with some coalition assistance by March 2011 
and become fully autonomous by March 2012. However, in March 2011, the 
time frames were revised so that the interim and final goals were 
expected to take 8 additional months each, and projected to be 
accomplished by November 2011 and November 2012, respectively. The 
delay was attributed to problems in implementing the electronic 
payroll system. Despite these delays, CSTC-A officials noted that they 
expect MOI to become fully autonomous by identifying and addressing 
high-risk areas, such as electronic payroll. 

USAID's Performance Management Frameworks Lack Performance Targets and 
Data: 

USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) establishes performance 
management and evaluation procedures USAID is expected to follow with 
respect to planning, monitoring, and evaluating its programs.[Footnote 
25] While USAID has noted that Afghanistan is an insecure environment 
in which to implement its programs, the agency has generally 
maintained the same performance management and evaluation procedures 
as it does in other countries in which it operates. For PFM capacity 
building in Afghanistan, we found a lack of compliance with USAID 
guidance at the mission level and at the implementing-partner level. 
Additionally, USAID evaluations also note weaknesses in the 
performance management of PFM projects. Appendix V presents a summary 
of the planning, monitoring, and evaluating requirements that make up 
USAID's performance management and evaluation procedures. 

USAID Mission Performance Management Plan for Afghanistan Lacks 
Targets: 

At the mission level, ADS requires USAID officials to complete a 
Mission performance management plan for each of its high-level 
objectives as a tool to manage its performance management and 
evaluation procedures. The guidance also requires that USAID establish 
performance targets for each of the indicators. We previously reported 
in July 2010 that USAID has operated without a required Mission 
performance management plan for Afghanistan since the end of 2008. 
Subsequently, USAID issued a new performance management plan that 
realigned objectives based on U.S. strategies adopted in 2009 as well 
as agreements made at the London Conference in January 2010 and the 
Kabul Conference in July 2010.[Footnote 26] This plan represents the 
U.S. Mission's tool to plan and manage the process of assessing and 
reporting progress towards assistance and foreign policy objectives in 
Afghanistan. As figure 4 shows, the plan contains a results framework 
that includes two PFM-related objectives and several related 
indicators, but lacks performance targets for each indicator as 
required. 

Figure 4: PFM Objectives and Indicators in the USAID Performance 
Management Plan for Afghanistan (2011-2015): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Objective #4: A developed business climate that enables private 
investment, job creation and financial independence. 
Sub-Intermediate result: Afghan government has increased capacity to 
conduct public financial management in accordance with international 
standards: 

Indicator: (1) External audits conducted by the Control and Audit 
Office; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (2) Person-days of training for key personnel in fiscal 
policy and financial administration trained with U.S. government 
assistance; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (3) Program budget units that graduate from program 
budgeting training; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Objective #8: Increased management effectiveness of Afghan government 
institutions. 
Intermediate result: Increased capacity in public financial management: 

Indicator: (1) Ratio of revenue to operating expenditure; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (2) Budget execution ratio: Operating budget; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (3) Budget execution ratio: Development budget; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (4) Percent increase in standardized Public Financial 
Management assessment scores; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Indicator: (5) Number of Ministries with effective financial 
management/budget units; 
FY 2011 target: Required but target not established. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID information. 

[End of figure] 

The plan noted that baselines and targets for each indicator would be 
established in the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2011. 
Additionally, according to the plan, many indicators do not have 
baseline data or targets because some indicators are either new or 
were in the previous plan but data were never collected for them. This 
is contrary to ADS, which requires that targets be established for 
each performance indicator. In addition, some indicators are for 
proposed activities and need to be finalized. For example, one of the 
indicators, "Percent increase in standardized Public Financial 
Management assessment scores," relies on baseline data for Afghan 
civilian ministries that is not yet available. In April 2011, donors 
initiated joint assessments of 14 Afghan civilian ministries, which 
account for 90 percent of the development budget, to establish 
baselines of their PFM capacity. These assessments are due by 2012, 
with preliminary information only available for MOF. 

Implementing Partner Performance Frameworks Lack Targets and Data: 

ADS documents USAID's performance management and monitoring 
procedures. Project implementers must follow these requirements 
outlined in USAID award documents. For example, project implementers 
are required to identify performance indicators, define their 
project's "starting point" by establishing baselines, and define 
changes that signal success by establishing performance targets for 
each project year.[Footnote 27] In addition, project implementers are 
required to regularly collect, analyze, and interpret performance data 
in order to improve their ability to make project adjustments in a 
timely manner. The performance management frameworks for PFM capacity-
building projects did not meet USAID guidance because of deficiencies 
such as a lack of baselines, targets, and performance data. 

The performance indicators for EGGI and ACSS related to PFM capacity- 
building activities do not consistently provide baselines, performance 
targets, or actual performance data for each indicator, as required. 
For example, as shown in figure 5, for fiscal year 2010, EGGI's 
implementing partner did not establish performance targets or provide 
actual data on a quarterly or annual basis for training activities 
conducted by EGGI. Additionally, EGGI's implementing partner did not 
report target or actual data for the indicator called "Annual Tax 
Revenues Collected in Priority Revenue Mustofiats"[Footnote 28] 
because MOF did not release revenue data during the project's 
performance year. Subsequently, USAID provided fiscal year 2010 
quarterly and annual data for this indicator to GAO in the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2011. While these data may provide information 
that is useful for project evaluation, since they were provided 
retroactively, they were unavailable for USAID to monitor the progress 
of the activity during the performance year. Similarly, ACSS's 
implementing partner did not provide evidence of baseline, quarterly 
performance targets, or actual quarterly data for any of the project's 
PFM training indicators. This lack of targets and actual performance 
data rendered associated indicators ineffective for either tracking 
the progress of associated activities or assessing the extent to which 
USAID's implementing partners met interim goals. Appendix VI provides 
the available data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for EGGI and ACSS. 

Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2010 Performance Data for USAID Projects That 
Focus Significantly on PFM Capacity at the National and Provincial 
Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Economic Growth And Governance Initiative (EGGI): 

Indicator: Domestic revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Tax revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Nontax revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Tax revenues collected in priority revenue mustofiats; 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Indicator: Provinces with revenue database operational (cumulative 
number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Provided; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Q4 target: Provided; 
Q4 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Ministries where program budgeting commenced (cumulative 
number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Training activities conducted by EGGI (number of 
participants); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS): 

Indicator: Civil servants trained (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving capacity-building training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving subject-matter training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID information. 

[End of figure] 

For fiscal year 2011, although USAID-funded evaluations note that EGGI 
improved its performance measures and data collection, our analysis 
indicates that both EGGI and ACSS did not establish performance 
targets for each indicator, or report actual data for completed 
quarters, as required. As shown in figure 6, EGGI did not establish 
quarterly or annual targets for its training activities that include 
key areas, such as program budgeting and tax administration, noted in 
EGGI's workplan. Similarly, ACSS did not establish baselines for any 
of its PFM indicators, which would make it difficult to assess the 
project's training accomplishments. 

Figure 6: Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Data for USAID Projects That 
Focus Significantly on PFM Capacity at the National and Provincial 
Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI): 

Indicator: Provinces in which Revenue Reconciliation Database 
installed (cumulative number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Provided; 
Q1 actual: Provided; 
Q2 target: Provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Provided; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Ministries in which Revenue Reconciliation Database 
installed (cumulative number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Provided; 
Q1 actual: Provided; 
Q2 target: Provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Provided; 
Q3 actual: Provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Program Budget Implementation Teams established in budget 
units with EGGI support (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Budget units submitting budgets on time (number)[A]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Not required; 
Q1 actual: Not required; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: Not required; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Number of budget units “graduated” by Ministry of Finance
(MOF) from EGGI program[B]: 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Provided; 
Q1 actual: Provided; 
Q2 target: Provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: EGGI supported external audits conducted by Control and 
Audit Office (number)[C]: 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Provided; 
Q1 actual: Provided; 
Q2 target: Provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Provided; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Provided. 

Indicator: Training activities conducted by EGGI (number of 
participants); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS): 

Indicator: Civil servants trained (number)[D]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving capacity-building training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving subject-matter training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID information. 

[A] Target and actual data not required for first, second, and third 
quarters because budget units submit draft and final budgets in fourth 
quarter. 

[B] Target and actual data not required for third quarter because 
graduation occurs in first quarter. 

[C] Third-quarter data not required because in March 2011 this 
activity was downsized to concentrate solely on production of an audit 
manual for the Control and Audit Office. 

[D] Third-quarter data for ACSS not required because training 
activities ceased during this quarter. 

[End of figure] 

USAID Evaluations Noted Weaknesses in Performance Management 
Frameworks: 

In addition to the lack of compliance with USAID guidance noted above, 
USAID-funded evaluations of EGGI and ACSS have noted other weaknesses 
in the projects' performance management frameworks. For example, the 
evaluator of the EGGI project was critical of the large number of 
performance indicators for the project's first year that do not 
demonstrate a direct link between project efforts and improved 
capacity of the Afghan government. More specifically, the evaluator 
noted that only 4 of 7 indicators related to EGGI's PFM capacity-
building component are directly affected by the project's work. The 
other indicators--national domestic revenues, national tax revenues, 
and national nontax revenues--are indirectly affected by the project's 
work. Another EGGI evaluation noted that since MOF was not publishing 
data for the indicator related to annual taxes in priority provinces, 
the implementer should replace it with a different indicator that can 
be used to monitor activities. 

The evaluator of the ACSS project noted that the project's work plan, 
performance management plan, and operations manual were not 
sufficiently rigorous or comprehensive and, given the scope and scale 
of the project, the evaluator expected higher-quality project 
documentation. The evaluator also noted that the project's performance 
monitoring framework lacks results-based information about the 
effectiveness of the project's technical advisers. 

In addition to weaknesses in the performance management frameworks of 
USAID's PFM capacity projects, we have previously noted similar 
deficiencies in other USAID projects in Afghanistan. For example: 

* In July 2008, we reported that, among other things, limitations in 
USAID's data collection and performance evaluation frameworks impeded 
the agency's ability to evaluate the effects of its roads projects. 
[Footnote 29] 

* In July 2010, we reported that USAID did not assure that all 
indicators had targets for the eight GAO-reviewed agriculture 
projects.[Footnote 30] 

* In November 2010, we reported that four of the six implementers of 
GAO-reviewed water projects did not always establish targets for 
performance indicators.[Footnote 31] 

We are following up on USAID's progress on these recommendations. 
Additionally, the USAID Administrator committed to tracking resources 
against outcomes as effectively as possible at a congressional hearing 
in July 2010. 

Conclusions: 

The United States and other international donors have begun to focus 
on building the Afghan government's capacity for a successful 
transition of leadership for security and governance to Afghanistan. 
Improving the Afghan government's ability to manage its public 
finances is an important part of this transition effort. USAID, 
Treasury, and DOD, along with other international donors, have 
undertaken various efforts to address the Afghan government's PFM 
capacity. While DOD and Treasury have assessed and reported mixed 
results based on their efforts, the overall effect of U.S. efforts is 
not known because USAID, which has a key role in building Afghan 
civilian ministries' PFM capacity, has not consistently established 
baselines and targets, or reported actual performance data. We have 
previously reported on deficiencies in USAID's performance management 
efforts in Afghanistan and made recommendations to improve the 
assessment of USAID program performance and the efforts of USAID's 
implementing partners. During a congressional hearing in July 2010, 
USAID's Administrator identified defining, tracking, observing, and 
reporting on results of USAID projects as a priority, noting that it 
is important to determine how USAID efforts contribute to the U.S. 
strategy for Afghanistan. He also committed to tracking resources 
against outcomes as effectively as possible. The lack of approved 
mission-level and implementing partner-level performance targets calls 
into question USAID's efforts to live up to the Administrator's 
commitment. Given the importance of USAID efforts to improving 
Afghanistan's PFM capacity and the need for reliable performance 
results data to base future development assistance and funding 
decisions on, it is vital that USAID take steps to ensure its 
performance management efforts are consistently implemented. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that for public financial management (PFM) efforts, the 
USAID Administrator take the following three actions: (1) establish 
targets, as required, for each PFM-related performance indicator in 
its Mission Performance Management Plan for Afghanistan, (2) take 
steps to ensure that the USAID-approved performance management plan 
for each implementing partner includes baseline data and targets for 
each indicator, and (3) ensure that implementing partners report 
performance data at the frequency established in the performance 
management plan. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, Treasury, USAID, and 
the World Bank for comment and review. USAID provided written 
comments, which are reprinted in appendix VII, as well as technical 
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. DOD, State, 
Treasury, and the World Bank had no comments. 

USAID concurred with all three recommendations and noted that it has 
started taking steps to address these. Specifically, USAID stated that 
it had started a review of the Mission performance management plan to 
determine if adequate PFM-related performance indicators, including 
baseline data and targets, are included. Additionally, USAID noted 
that it has commenced a comprehensive review of all awards to USAID 
implementing partners working on projects and activities in the PFM 
sector to ensure USAID-approved PMPs are in place for each award and 
each implementing partner's performance management plan includes 
sufficient baseline data and targets for each indicator. As part of 
this review, USAID noted that it is also examining the reporting 
requirements set forth in relevant awards, including performance 
requirements, and would take corrective action, as needed. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, as well 
as the Administrator of USAID, and other interested parties. The 
report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Kerry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Buck McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report examines (1) U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan 
government's public financial management (PFM) capacity, including the 
extent to which these efforts aligned with the PFM goals identified by 
the Afghan government and the international community; and (2) the 
extent to which U.S. efforts have helped to improve the Afghan 
government's PFM capacity. 

To address these objectives, we focused on U.S. agencies' PFM capacity-
building activities since 2009, when President Obama concluded the 
administration's review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and announced a 
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. We reviewed documents and 
records from the U.S. Departments of Defense (DOD), State (State), and 
the Treasury (Treasury), and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). We selected these agencies because they provide 
guidance or assistance related to U.S. PFM capacity building for the 
Afghan government. We also reviewed documents from the Afghan 
government and other donors, such as the World Bank. We interviewed 
officials from DOD, State, Treasury, and USAID in Washington, D.C., 
and in Kabul, Afghanistan. Additionally, in Kabul, we interviewed 
officials from other international donors providing PFM assistance, 
such as the World Bank and the United Kingdom, as well as Afghan 
government officials from organizations including the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Public Health, 
and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission. 

To inventory and describe U.S. government efforts to build the Afghan 
government's PFM capacity, we interviewed officials from U.S. 
agencies, including USAID, Treasury, and DOD, and reviewed relevant 
documents. We also compared U.S. agency efforts with the key 
components of the Public Financial Management Roadmap (Roadmap), which 
represents goals agreed upon by donors and the Afghan government to 
improve the Afghan government's PFM capacity. 

* For USAID PFM capacity-building work we reviewed documents--
including base contracts, contract modifications and scope of work--
that describe USAID-funded PFM capacity building work in Afghanistan. 
To identify USAID PFM capacity-building projects since 2009, we 
interviewed officials from USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance, 
and Office of Economic Growth. Some USAID projects are divided into 
major areas of focus called components. Two USAID projects--Economic 
Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI) and Afghanistan Civil Service 
Support (ACSS)--have at least one component related to building the 
PFM capacity of Afghan government entities at the national and 
provincial levels. We selected these projects for a more detailed 
review. Some projects did not have a component focused on building the 
Afghan government's capacity in budget formulation, budget execution, 
or transparency and accountability. However, we included them in our 
inventory because USAID officials noted that these projects contribute 
to increasing the Afghan government's PFM capacity. We decided to 
focus on projects that primarily build PFM capacity at the national 
and provincial levels because the Roadmap prioritizes capacity 
building at these levels. 

* To describe the PFM efforts of Treasury officials, we reviewed 
documents including Treasury's 2009 assessment of the need for 
advisers to assist the Afghan government with public-expenditure 
management and a summary of the roles of advisers currently at MOF. In 
Kabul, we also interviewed the Treasury advisers and met with them at 
MOF. 

* To describe DOD's PFM capacity-building work, we reviewed documents 
including organizational charts and staffing levels, policy guidance 
and operating procedures, and various implementation, development, and 
evaluation plans for both MOD and Ministry of Interior (MOI). For 
information on the role of mentors and advisers in building capacity 
at MOD and MOI, we interviewed senior DOD officials at the Combined 
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), who were providing 
the services to both MOI and MOD, as well as MOD Finance officials who 
were receiving these services. In addition, we reviewed MOD and MOI 
training manuals, course materials, and adviser guides developed 
specifically for mentoring and capacity building in these ministries. 
We also reviewed the contracts providing mentoring and training 
services to MOD and MOI. 

* To assess alignment of U.S. efforts and goals with the PFM goals of 
international donors and the Afghan government, we compared efforts 
undertaken by USAID, Treasury, and DOD with the key components of the 
Roadmap. We also reviewed U.S. plans and guidance issued since 2009, 
including the U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance 
Management Plan (2011-2015) and U.S. Mission guidance to U.S. agencies 
on PFM issues in Afghanistan. For U.S. military efforts we reviewed 
goals stated in CSTC-A Ministerial Development Plans for finance and 
budget functions for MOD and MOI. We also interviewed U.S. officials 
from USAID, Treasury, and CSTC-A to corroborate the extent to which 
the Roadmap guided their efforts in working with Afghan ministries. 
Additionally, we obtained relevant documentation from MOF officials, 
including the implementation plan and a 6-month progress report 
related to the Roadmap. 

* To assess U.S. efforts within the broader context of other donor 
efforts, we interviewed donors including the World Bank and United 
Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) in Kabul. We 
also obtained documents, such as the Roadmap Implementation Plan and 
Technical Assistance Summary Reports, and interviewed officials from 
the World Bank and MOF. 

To assess the results of U.S. PFM efforts, we analyzed relevant 
documentation from U.S. agencies. 

* For USAID, we analyzed the performance plans for the Mission as well 
as for PFM-specific projects. Additionally we analyzed the results 
reported in project evaluations as well as monthly, quarterly, and 
annual reports for the two main PFM-focused projects. USAID 
evaluations were based on document reviews as well as interviews with 
contractors, USAID officials, and Afghan government officials. 
Additionally, the evaluation for EGGI included surveys of and 
interviews with program beneficiaries (e.g., Afghan officials in 
budget units). We found these evaluations to be generally reliable to 
provide information on the results of specific activities conducted 
under EGGI and ACSS for the period for which the evaluations were 
conducted. 

* From the Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP), we identified 
objectives and associated indicators that pertain to PFM. We then 
reviewed the associated data provided by USAID that complemented the 
results framework noted in the Mission PMP. We identified whether 
USAID data included fiscal year 2011 targets for the PFM indicators we 
had identified in the PMP. 

* In analyzing USAID project-performance indicators, we reviewed the 
most current performance data from USAID and its implementing 
partners. Target and performance data were not available for the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2010 for ACSS and EGGI because ACSS began 
operations in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010; although EGGI 
started in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, USAID officials 
reported that they did not expect performance targets and data for 
this quarter because the project was being set up. As of the date of 
this report's publication, no data were available for the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2011, so our analysis does not include data 
from that quarter. As part of our analysis of USAID project-
performance indicators, we reviewed the most current performance data 
provided by USAID and its implementing partners. We also interviewed 
USAID officials and the contractor to obtain clarifying information 
about performance data. Due to unexplained changes and gaps in some 
target and performance data, we could not verify the reliability of 
all performance data reported by USAID. Additionally, we obtained 
documentation and corroborated the effectiveness of U.S. efforts 
during meetings with Afghan officials from relevant governmental 
organizations, such as the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil 
Service Commission. At the commission's training institute, we met 
with contractors who provide training to Afghan civil servants as part 
of the ACSS project. 

* To assess the results of the efforts of Treasury advisers, we 
reviewed a sample of adviser monthly reports as well as advisers' 
assessment for October 2009 to September 2010, the latest available 
report for a complete fiscal year. We also interviewed officials from 
Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance to obtain information on the 
adviser assessment and reporting process. Moreover, in Afghanistan we 
met with MOF officials and contractors in MOF's budget, treasury, and 
internal audit offices, and we obtained their input regarding USAID's 
and Treasury's efforts and results. We assessed data obtained for our 
analysis to be sufficiently reliable to provide an overall assessment 
of the extent to which Treasury advisers' assistance has contributed 
to MOF's PFM capacity. 

* We did not independently assess the capability of MOD and MOI 
finance offices; rather, we relied on CSTC-A's capability milestone 
ratings, which are used to measure the capability level of a specific 
area or department. We spoke with cognizant CSTC-A officials about the 
reliability of these ratings and also reviewed documentation about the 
ratings formulation process. In addition, CSTC-A officials provided 
documentation that showed modifications in their rating process to 
make it more rigorous. For example, in 2010, CSTC-A introduced interim 
ratings, which it believed provided greater detail and a more gradual 
transition from requiring significant coalition assistance to being 
capable of fully autonomous operations. We believe that the capability 
milestone ratings are sufficiently reliable to measure the extent of 
progress in finance and budget functions at MOD and MOI. Additionally, 
we analyzed finance-and budget-related development and evaluation 
plans for MOD and MOI, quarterly assessment briefings, Ministerial 
Development Board presentations, internal control finance reports, and 
other adviser reports. We compared quarterly assessments and projected 
capability milestone ratings over time to identify the extent to which 
DOD was meeting its targets. We also visited MOD's Finance office in 
Kabul and interviewed Afghan officials to obtain their input into U.S. 
efforts to build their ministry's capacity in finance and budget. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Allocations of Funds to Afghanistan from Fiscal Year 
2002 to Fiscal Year 2011: 

Since 2002, the United States has allocated more than $72 billion for 
security, governance, and development to Afghanistan (see table 6). 

Table 6: U.S. Allocations of Funds to Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2002- 
2011: 

Dollars in millions. 

International affairs programs[A]: 
2002: $890.4; 
2003: $764.3; 
2004: $1,969.0; 
2005: $2,749.0; 
2006: $1,061.2; 
2007: $1,909.6; 
2008: $2,211.5; 
2009: $2,770.9; 
2010: $4,177.9; 
2011: $2,588.7; 
Total: $21,092.5. 

International affairs operations[B]: 
2002: $31.7; 
2003: $35.3; 
2004: $119.8; 
2005: $136.1; 
2006: $131.9; 
2007: $210.2; 
2008: $448.8; 
2009: $1,073.5; 
2010: $1,728.2; 
2011: $945.4; 
Total: $4,860.9. 

Department of Defense and other[C]: 
2002: $0.6; 
2003: $167.9; 
2004: $401.7; 
2005: $1,946.1; 
2006: $2,311.1; 
2007: $8,008.2; 
2008: $3,476.4; 
2009: $6,453.1; 
2010: $10,755.9; 
2011: $12,942.6; 
Total: $46,463.6. 

Total: 
2002: $922.7; 
2003: $967.5; 
2004: $2,490.5; 
2005: $4,831.2; 
2006: $3,504.2; 
2007: $10,128.0; 
2008: $6,136.7; 
2009: $10,297.5; 
2010: $16,662.0; 
2011: $16,476.7; 
Total: $72,417.0. 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Management and Budget data. 

[A] The category "international affairs programs" includes funds for 
economic support; foreign military financing; law enforcement; global 
health/child survival; antiterrorism activities; and development, 
migration, and disaster assistance. 

[B] The category "international affairs operations" includes funds for 
diplomatic and consulate operations, building operations, and 
inspectors-general operations. 

[C] "Other" includes funding for training and equipping Afghan 
security forces and counternarcotics activities. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Afghan Government Budget Formulation, Budget Execution, 
and Audit Process: 

According to U.S. agency officials and documents, the budget process 
in Afghanistan is highly centralized, with the Afghan national 
government responsible for developing and executing the country's 
budget. According to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), none 
of the 34 Afghan provinces has the authority to raise revenues or 
spend public funds.[Footnote 32] Budgets are developed and executed 
through central ministries and their provincial offices, called 
provincial directorates. The provincial governor, appointed by the 
Afghan President, and the Provincial Council, whose members are 
elected, can influence the national budget and indicate priorities 
through the Provincial Development Committee, which also includes 
representatives from provincial directorates, according to Treasury 
officials. The ministries then formulate specific budgets and convey 
them to Ministry of Finance (MOF), which develops the overall national 
budget. The Afghan parliament, called the National Assembly, has the 
authority to approve or reject the national budget in its entirety, 
but cannot make changes to it during the final review process, 
according to documentation from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Figure 7 provides an illustration of Afghan 
budget formulation, execution, and audits at the national and 
provincial levels. 

According to Treasury officials, once the National Assembly approves 
the budget, ministries prepare and submit allotment requests for the 
operating budget. MOF establishes quarterly allotments for the 
operating budget for each ministry. For the development budget, each 
ministry can submit a budget allotment request only if there is an 
approved contract (or legal binding agreement) for the project, 
according to the Treasury adviser. MOF must approve the allotment 
request before the budget allotment is established. The external 
budget is not subjected to the budget allotment process. The central 
ministries and their provincial offices implement programs and execute 
funds. However, MOF and its provincial offices, called mustofiats, 
issue payments in response to requests from ministries. Audit of 
expenditures to ensure proper use of public funds is the 
responsibility of the Control and Audit Office--Afghanistan's supreme 
audit institution--and the audit offices of central ministries, 
according to Treasury officials. 

Figure 7: Key Afghan Government Entities Involved in Budget 
Formulation, Budget Execution, and Audits at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Budget Formulation: 

National: 
Budget Formulation: Parliament: May approve or reject the budget in 
its entirety; 
Cabinet[A]: Approves the budget before it is sent to the Parliament; 
Budget Committee[B]: Approves the budget before submission to the 
cabinet; 
Ministry of Finance: Budget Department: Leads development of the 
national budget; 
Central Ministry; Central Ministry[C]: Develop budget for their 
respective organization and submit it to MOF. 

Provincial: 
Provincial Directorate (Linked organizationally to Central Ministry): 
Provide input into the relevant ministry’s budget; 
Provincial Development Committee (Not linked organizationally; can 
influence the process but lacks formal authority): 
* Governor; 
* Provincial Council; 
* Provincial Directorate representatives. 

Budget Execution: 

National: 
Parliament: May review government expenditures; 
Ministry of Finance Linked organizationally to and provides payment to 
Contractors/other service providers): Treasury Department: Establishes 
quarterly allotments to ministries and issues payments; 
Central Ministry (Linked organizationally to Provincial Directorate): 
Request and manage budget allocation to provinces for their 
organization; Payments to and from Ministry of Finance. 

Provincial: 
Provincial Directorate: Approve expenditures and submit payment 
requests to Mustofiat; 
Mustofiat: Payment to Contractors/other service providers. 

Audits: 

National: 
Control and Audit Office (Supreme audit institution): Audits donor-
funded projects; 
Ministry of Finance: Internal Audit Office: Establishes standards and 
trains internal audit offices of other ministries; 
Central Ministry (Linked organizationally to Provincial Directorate): 
Conduct audits of their organizations. 

Provincial: 
Provincial Directorate. 

Source: GAO analysis of information from U.S. agencies and other 
donors. 

[A] The cabinet consists of Afghan government central ministries. 

[B] The Budget Committee consists of MOF, the Ministries of Economy 
and Foreign Affairs, and a presidential appointee. 

[C] The term Central Ministry is used broadly for ministries (such as 
Ministry of Interior) and other government agencies (such as the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: CSTC-A Process to Assess Ministry Capacity: 

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has 
established a process to regularly assess and rate the capability of 
Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) in various areas 
including finance and budget. The CSTC-A assessment process uses the 
objectives in the Ministerial Development Plan as criteria to assess 
progress in capacity building at the ministries. For example, CSTC-A 
advisers at MOD provide quarterly assessments, through Narrative 
Assessment Worksheets, in which they assign a rating and provide a 
description of progress and challenges associated with each objective. 
Additionally, MOD advisers complete an online survey to provide 
information about the scope and quality of their interaction with 
their Afghan counterparts on a quarterly basis. According to CSTC-A 
officials, the MOI assessment and rating is based on interviews with 
advisers and Afghan officials, internal quarterly assessments, and 
other officials' reporting on a quarterly basis. Figure 8 shows CSTC- 
A's assessment process for MOD. 

Figure 8: CSTC-A Process to Assess MOD's Capacity in Areas Including 
Finance and Budget: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Develop Plan: 
Ministerial Development Plan: Contains objectives that are used as 
criteria to assess progress[A]. 
Action or process directly affects assessment and rating. 

Implement: 
Advise and Mentor Ministry Officials: Advisors work with Afghan 
counterparts to accomplish quarterly objectives[A] (90 days long). 
Action or process directly affects assessment and rating. 

Assess: 

Narrative Assessment Worksheets: Advisors provide rating and a 
narrative assessment for each objective; 
Action or process indirectly affects assessment and rating. 

Online Advisor Survey: Each advisor provides information on the amount 
of time and level of interaction with Afghan counterparts. 
Action or process indirectly affects assessment and rating. 

Validate: 
Senior CSTC-A officials and advisors responsible for capacity building 
assess and rate the ministry’s capacity in each functional area. 

Quarterly Assessment and Rating: Includes a rating and also outlines 
key areas of focus for the next quarter[A]; 
Areas of Assessment: 
Current Rating: Overall Strategic Assessment; 
Current Rating: Transition Objectives; 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats Requiring Command 
Attention; 
Next Quarter Objectives. 
Action or process directly affects assessment and rating. 

Brief: 
Ministerial Development Board: Senior CSTC-A and Afghan officials 
discuss ministry rating and address impediments to progress[A]. 
Action or process directly affects assessment and rating. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

Senior CSTC-A officials review input from the advisers and agree on an 
overall rating. This rating and associated details are presented in a 
quarterly assessment that includes highlights of progress towards the 
objectives, key objectives to focus on in the next quarter, and an 
analysis of the ministry's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats. These assessments, which are available in English and Dari, 
are presented to senior coalition forces and Afghan government 
officials as part of the Ministerial Development Board process. This 
review process has three key goals: (1) to institutionalize the formal 
review and oversight of the separate Ministerial Development Plans for 
various critical ministry functions (see table 7 for areas of focus 
for MOD and MOI capacity building), (2) to assess progress toward 
achieving fully autonomous operations including addressing key 
impediments, and (3) to reinforce and set the current and following 
quarter's objectives and initiatives. Although CSTC-A does not 
currently use adviser surveys for MOI, it is in the process of 
developing and implementing these, according to CSTC-A officials. 

Table 7: CSTC-A Areas of Focus for Capacity Building at MOD and MOI: 

MOD: 
1. Intelligence Policy; 
2. Office of the Surgeon General; 
3. Reserve Affairs; 
4. Disaster Response; 
5. Construction and Property Management Division; 
6. Personnel; 
7. Education; 
8. Gender Integration; 
9. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
10. Acquisition Agency; 
11. Minister of Defense; 
12. First Deputy Minister of Defense; 
13. Accountability and Transparency; 
14. Strategy and Policy; 
15. Legal; 
16. Public Affairs; 
17. Inspector General; 
18. Finance; 
19. Parliamentary Affairs; 
20. Strategic Communications; 
21. General Staff (GS) Intelligence; 
22. GS Operations; 
23. GS Force Management; 
24. GS Communications; 
25. Communication Support Unit; 
26. Ground Force Command; 
27. Afghan Air Force; 
28. Afghan Special Operations Command; 
29. GS Personnel; MOI: [Empty]; [Empty].
30. Afghan National Army Recruiting Command; 
31. Religious and Cultural Affairs; 
32. GS Logistics; 
33. Logistics Command; 
34. Chief of the General Staff; 
35. Vice Chief of the General Staff; 
36. GS Legal; 
37. GS Inspector General; 
38. GS Finance. 

MOI: 
1. Public Affairs.
2. Inspector General.
3. Anti-Corruption.
4. Legal Affairs.
5. Intelligence.
6. Counter Narcotics.
7. Strategic Planning.
8. Policy Development.
9. Force Management.
10. Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police.
11. Afghan Border Police.
12. General Directorate of Police Special Units.
13. Anti-Crime.
14. Afghan National Civil Order Police.
15. Afghan Public Protection Force.
16. Afghan Local Police.
17. Operations Planning.
18. Force Readiness.
19. Personnel Management.
20. Logistics.
21. Finance and Budget.
22. Facilities and Installation Management.
23. Surgeon Medical.
24. Information Communication and Technology.
25. Training Management.
26. Acquisition and Procurement. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD data. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Requirements for Performance Management and Evaluation: 

Planning: 
* Define goals and objectives; 
* Identify performance indicators to meet goals and objectives; 
* Establish baselines and targets for performance indicators; 
* Define the frequency of data collection and reporting; 
* Describe the means to be used to verify and validate information 
collected; 
* Plan for data quality assessments; 
* Determine how data will be used for decision making on improving 
performance, on allocating resources, and on communicating USAID's 
story; 
* Plan for evaluations and special studies. 

Monitoring: 
* Collect performance data; 
* Assess data quality, identify limitations, make efforts to mitigate 
limitations; 
* Analyze data; 
* Interpret data and make necessary program or project adjustments; 
* Use data to guide higher-level decision making and resource 
allocation; 
* Report results to advance organizational learning and demonstrate 
USAID's contribution to overall U.S. government foreign assistance 
goals. 

Evaluating: 
* Perform at least one evaluation for high-level objectives during the 
life of the objective to understand progress, or lack thereof, and 
determine possible steps to improve performance; 
* Disseminate findings; 
* Use findings to further institutional learning, inform current 
programs, and shape future planning. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Data for USAID PFM Projects: 

The figures below show fiscal years 2010 and 2011 performance data for 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) projects that focus 
significantly on public financial management (PFM) capacity building 
at the national and provincial level.[Footnote 33] 

Figure 9: Fiscal Year 2010 Performance Data for USAID Projects with a 
Significant Focus on PFM Capacity Building at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Economic Growth And Governance Initiative (EGGI): 

Indicator: Domestic revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: $845; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: $388.9; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: $435.6; 
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: $455.6; 
Annual target: $1,135
Annual actual: $1,655.1. 

Indicator: Tax revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: $583; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: $335.6; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: $355.6; 
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: $375.6; 
Annual target: $912; 
Annual actual: $1,379.8. 

Indicator: Nontax revenues (millions of U.S. dollars); 
Baseline 8/15/09: $262; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: $53.3
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: $80.0
Q4 target: Not required; 
Q4 actual: $80.0
Annual target: $222; 
Annual actual: $275.3. 

Indicator: Tax revenues collected in priority revenue mustofiats; 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Indicator: Provinces with Revenue Reconciliation Database operational 
(cumulative number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q2 target: $7; 
Q2 actual: $7; 
Q3 target: $22; 
Q3 actual: $24; 
Q4 target: $29; 
Q4 actual: $29; 
Annual target: $29; 
Annual actual: $29. 

Indicator: Ministries where program budgeting commenced(cumulative 
number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: 37; 
Annual actual: 37. 

Indicator: Training activities conducted by EGGI (number of 
participants); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS): 

Indicator: Civil servants trained (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: 16,000; 
Annual actual: 14,494. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving capacity-building training (number);
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: 120; 
Annual actual: 0. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving subject-matter training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q4 target: Required, not provided; 
Q4 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Required, not provided. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID information. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Fiscal Year 2011 Performance Data for USAID Projects with a 
Significant Focus on PFM Capacity Building at the National and 
Provincial Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Economic Growth And Governance Initiative (EGGI): 

Indicator: Provinces in which Revenue Reconciliation Database 
installed (cumulative number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q1 target: 34; 
Q1 actual: 32; 
Q2 target: 34; 
Q2 actual: 33; 
Q3 target: 34; 
Q3 actual: 33; 
Annual target: 34; 
Annual actual: 33. 

Indicator: Ministries in which Revenue Reconciliation Database 
installed (cumulative number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q1 target: 21; 
Q1 actual: 21; 
Q2 target: 27; 
Q2 actual: 27; 
Q3 target: 27; 
Q3 actual: 27; 
Annual target: 27; 
Annual actual: 27. 

Indicator: Program Budget Implementation Teams established in budget 
units with EGGI support (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 20; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: 39; 
Annual actual: 39. 

Indicator: Budget units submitting budgets on time (number)[A]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: 
Q1 target: 0; 
Q1 actual: Not required; 
Q2 target: Not required; 
Q2 actual: Not required; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: 37; 
Annual actual: 37. 

Indicator: Number of budget units "graduated" by Ministry of 
Finance(MOF) from EGGI program[B]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q1 target: 0; 
Q1 actual: 8; 
Q2 target: 10; 
Q2 actual: 10; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: EGGI-supported external audits conducted by Control and 
Audit Office[C]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q1 target: 0; 
Q1 actual: 0; 
Q2 target: 6; 
Q2 actual: 9; 
Q3 target: 10; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: 9. 

Indicator: Training activities conducted by EGGI (number of 
participants); 
Baseline 8/15/09: 0; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Required, not provided; 
Q3 actual: Required, not provided; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS): 

Indicator: Civil servants trained (number)[D]; 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: 2,946; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving capacity-building training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: 120; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Indicator: Trainers receiving subject-matter training (number); 
Baseline 8/15/09: Required, not provided; 
Q1 target: Required, not provided; 
Q1 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q2 target: Required, not provided; 
Q2 actual: Required, not provided; 
Q3 target: Not required; 
Q3 actual: Not required; 
Annual target: Required, not provided; 
Annual actual: Not required. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID information. 

[A] Target and actual data not required for first, second, and third 
quarters because budget units submit draft and final budgets in fourth 
quarter. 

[B] Target and actual data not required for third quarter because 
graduation occurs in first quarter. 

[C] Third-quarter data not required because in March 2011 this 
activity was downsized to concentrate solely on production of an audit 
manual for the Control and Audit Office. 

[D] Third-quarter data for ACSS not required because training 
activities ceased during this quarter. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

The U.S. Agency for International Development letter was signed 
electronically by Sean C. Carroll, Chief Operating Officer. 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

September 12, 2011: 

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID)'s formal response to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) draft report entitled "Afghanistan Governance: Performance Data 
Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial 
Management Capacity" (GA0-11-907). 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this 
letter as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Sean C. Carroll /s/: 
Chief Operating Officer: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 

Enclosure: a/s: 

[End of letter] 

USAID Comments On GAO Draft Report No. GA0-11-907: 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that USAID's Administrator establish 
targets, as required, for each public financial management-related 
performance indicator in its Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP) 
for Afghanistan. 

Management Comments: USAID concurs with this recommendation. 
USAID/Afghanistan has commenced a comprehensive review of the 
USAID/Afghanistan Mission PMP to determine if adequate public 
financial management-related performance indicators, including 
baseline data and targets, are included. If any deficiencies in these 
performance indicators are identified, USAID will work to revise these 
performance indicators. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that USAID's Administrator take steps 
to ensure that the USAID-approved performance management plan for each 
implementing partner includes baseline data and targets for each 
indicator. 

Management Comments: In an August 25, 2011, email, GAO confirmed that 
this recommendation pertains only to PMPs for implementing partners 
supporting projects and activities related to the public financial-
management sector. With this clarification, USAID concurs with this 
recommendation. USAID/Afghanistan already has commenced a 
comprehensive review of all awards to USAID implementing partners 
working on projects and activities in the public financial-management 
sector to ensure USAID-approved PMPs arc in place for each award and 
each implementing partner's PMP includes sufficient baseline data and 
targets for each indicator. If deficiencies are identified, the US AID 
implementing partners will be required to revise the PMP to include 
sufficient baseline data and targets for each indicator. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that USAID's Administrator ensure that 
implementing partners report performance data at the established 
frequency in the performance management plan. 

Management Comments: In an August 25, 2011, email, GAO confirmed that 
this recommendation pertains only to implementing partners supporting 
projects and activities related to the public financial management 
sector. With this clarification, USAID concurs with this 
recommendation. As part of the comprehensive review commenced in 
response to draft report Recommendation 2, USAID/Afghanistan also is 
reviewing the reporting requirements set forth in relevant awards, 
including performance requirements. If USAID determines an 
implementing partner has failed to comply with the award performance 
reporting requirements, including requirements for reporting on 
performance data, the USAID will remind the implementing partner of 
this requirement and take appropriate action depending on the facts 
and circumstances associated with the failure to report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Major contributors to this report were Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant 
Director; Mary Koenen; Bruce Kutnick; Mona Sehgal; and Eddie Uyekawa. 
Technical assistance was provided by Ashley Alley, Pedro Almoguera, 
Emily Gupta, Jeffrey Isaacs, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Karen Deans, 
Denise Fantone, Etana Finkler, Jacqueline Nowicki, Esther Toledo, and 
Pierre Toureille. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For more information on U.S. direct assistance see GAO, 
Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. 
Assistance to Afghanistan Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-710] (July 20, 2011). 

[2] To further assist Congress in its oversight of the transition in 
Afghanistan, we are conducting a study of Afghanistan's donor 
dependence and a review of the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military 
Campaign Plan for Afghanistan focused on transition. 

[3] The implementation plan for the Roadmap establishes targets 
ranging from 3 months to 3 years for completion of activities. 
Examples of targets include implementing program budgeting for Afghan 
fiscal year 2011-2012, conducting consultations in 18 provinces to 
incorporate provincial needs in the national budget, and conducting 
standardized capacity assessments of ministries in areas such as 
finance and procurement. 

[4] Afghanistan's national budget includes the following ministries in 
the security sector: MOD, MOI, General Directorate of National 
Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security 
Council. MOD and MOI's budget constitutes the majority of the budget 
for security ministries. 

[5] The Afghan government budget is also referred to as the "core 
budget." Off-budget donor assistance is also referred to as the 
"external budget." Donors are responsible for reporting off-budget 
data to MOF. 

[6] GAO is currently reviewing Afghanistan's on-budget and off-budget 
expenditures from 2006 to 2010 to determine better estimates of off- 
budget expenditures. Additionally, according to a World Bank document, 
off-budget donor assistance for 2010-2011 could be significantly 
higher than reported. 

[7] The Afghan government's fiscal year, which is called solar year, 
is from March 21 to March 20. The period from March 21, 2010, to March 
20, 2011, is solar year 1389. 

[8] USAID's implementing partners are firms, including nonprofit 
organizations, which carry out contracts, cooperative agreements, and 
grants. 

[9] The project's implementing partner is in the process of developing 
a contract modification to extend the ACSS contract until October 2011. 

[10] Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance had $4.3 million in 
funding for fiscal year 2011 for 10 advisers in Afghan ministries. The 
number of Treasury advisers increased from 2 to 10 between 2008 and 
2010 as part of the U.S. civilian surge effort. In addition to the 6 
advisers at MOF, 4 Treasury advisers provide technical assistance to 
other Afghan entities such as the Afghan central bank and the Ministry 
of Transportation and Civil Aviation. Two adviser positions at the 
Afghan central bank are currently on hold. 

[11] NTM-A/CSTC-A's headquarters elements were fully operational by 
February 2010 and now operate as an integrated NATO and U.S. command. 
Of the 587 advisers and mentors, 282 are at MOI and 305 are at MOD. In 
addition to contractors, these advisers include U.S. government 
personnel as well as advisers from other coalition partners. 
Specifically, of the 282 advisers at MOI, 119 are U.S. government 
personnel, 120 are contractors, and 43 are other coalition officials; 
at MOD there are 67 U.S. government and coalition officials, and 238 
contractors. 

[12] Program budgeting is expected to align resources with intended 
outputs and outcomes. Prior to introduction of program budgeting, 
Afghanistan used line-item budgeting, which presents expenditures by 
inputs and resources purchased rather than intended results. 

[13] According to the USAID evaluation, program budget training 
imparted knowledge of the process to trainees, and trainers knew what 
they were doing and why it was important. USAID evaluation also noted 
that trainees were confident that they would be able to implement 
program budgeting independently, but appreciated that EGGI staff would 
continue to make themselves available to ensure that the budget- 
development process was successful in the future. 

[14] In Afghanistan, a medium taxpayer office is the office that 
handles tax collections for medium-sized businesses, educational 
institutions, and international organizations. 

[15] According to the USAID contracting officer for this project, 
USAID was not satisfied with the methodological rigor of the Afghan 
government evaluation. Therefore, USAID is planning to have its field 
program officers conduct an assessment of the effect of training on 
civil servants' performance. 

[16] In their evaluation, Treasury advisers rate the extent to which 
their efforts have contributed to their work objectives as well as the 
level of involvement of Afghan counterparts. According to Treasury, 
the evaluation, although subjective, is meant to provide a clear 
snapshot of the project and progress toward objectives. 

[17] In April 2010, the World Bank and DFID noted improvements in PFM 
of the Afghan government, especially at MOF, as part of their public 
expenditure review of Afghanistan. A multiagency review of 
Afghanistan's PFM, conducted by organizations including the World Bank 
and DFID, also noted progress in Afghanistan's PFM between 2005 and 
2007. However, this report also states that the results reflect 
substantial external support, adviser and to some extent operational, 
for PFM in Afghanistan. For more information see Afghanistan Public 
Expenditure Review 2010, Second Generation of Public Expenditure 
Reforms (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010) and Afghanistan Public 
Financial Management Performance Assessment (Washington D.C.: PEFA, 
May 2008). 

[18] Treasury advisers assigned a rating from 1 to 5 for each 
activity, with 1 representing a poor score and 5 representing the best 
score. The advisers rate each objective in their work plan for 
"noticeable and positive effect" upon completion and the level of 
involvement and commitment of their Afghan counterparts. For October 
2009 to September 2010, the overall "impact" of the advisers received 
a score of 3.33 out of 5, while the participation of Afghan 
counterparts was rated at 3.67 out of 5. 

[19] We have previously assessed the reliability of capability 
milestone ratings and found them sufficiently reliable to report on 
the readiness of Afghan National Security Forces combat units. 

[20] Capability milestone ratings are used to gauge the level of 
development of the assessed department and the degree to which it is 
capable of operating autonomously with no coalition support. While the 
rating system has remained consistent over time, in March 2010 four 
interim levels were established to provide a more gradual transition 
from not being able to accomplish its mission without significant 
coalition support to the end goal of fully autonomous operations. 

[21] MOD has two finance offices: MOD-Finance sets policy and has 
overall authority over the ministry's budget, and MOD-General Staff 
for Budget and Finance implements salary payments to the Afghan 
National Army. 

[22] According to CSTC-A officials, the current approach to capacity 
building was started as late as November 2009, at the direction of 
U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. 

[23] The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR) has reported on problems related to pay fraud and verification 
of police personnel in the following reports: Actions Needed to 
Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, SIGAR 
Audit-10-11 (June 29, 2010) and Despite Improvements in MoI's 
Personnel Systems, Additional Actions Are Needed to Completely Verify 
ANP Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength, SIGAR Audit-11-10 (Apr. 25, 
2011). 

[24] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be 
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain 
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2008). 

[25] ADS is USAID's directives management program. It includes agency 
policy directives, required procedures, and optional material. 
Performance management and evaluation information is detailed in 
chapter 203: Assessing and Learning. 

[26] USAID, U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan Post Performance 
Management Plan (2011-2015). 

[27] ADS 203.3.2.1 (a). 

[28] A mustofiat is a provincial office of MOF. 

[29] GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing 
Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable 
Maintenance Program Are Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689] (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 
2008). 

[30] GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance 
Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID's Agricultural 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-368] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010). 

[31] GAO, Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan 
Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and 
Coordination, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-138] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2010). 

[32] According to World Bank officials, municipalities in Afghanistan 
are authorized to raise revenues and incur expenditures. 

[33] Data for fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011 are not included 
because third quarter data were the most current at time of 
publication. 

[End of section] 

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