The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to modernize virtually all U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, most of which are from the Cold War era. DOD manages the systems and platforms that deliver nuclear warheads and bombs—such as submarines, nuclear-capable aircraft, and missile systems—as well as nuclear command, control, and communications systems. NNSA manages the upkeep of nuclear warheads and bombs, as well as the infrastructure and capabilities needed to maintain, modernize, and produce these weapons.
However, DOD and NNSA have both faced challenges with their nuclear modernization programs, including some issues where we have priority open recommendations.
For instance:
Nuclear triad. There are three kinds of delivery systems that comprise the U.S. nuclear triad: nuclear-capable heavy bombers (known as the "air leg"), intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs (the "ground leg"), and ballistic missile submarines (the "sea leg"). But most of these systems are nearing or past their planned end-of-life updates and will require replacement. Modernizing DOD’s aging nuclear weapon systems could cost up to $350 billion over the next 20 years. DOD must keep these modernization efforts on track while also supporting ongoing critical missions.
Budgets and schedules for triad systems. DOD is also struggling to develop, innovative new nuclear weapon systems on budget and on schedule for all three legs of the triad. For example, the Air Force’s Sentinel, a new ICBM program, has exceeded its cost and schedule statutory thresholds and is currently being replanned. In addition, cost and schedule performance for the lead Columbia class submarine’s construction has consistently fallen short of targets.
LGM-35A Sentinel (top) and Lead Columbia Class Submarine Stern during Transport between Shipyards (bottom)
Nuclear security. NNSA has several programs to ensure proper access to and handling of the nation's nuclear weapons and related information. For example, it started a program in 2014 to further protect against insider threats from employees, contractors, and trusted visitors—but it hasn't fully implemented this program. Additionally, NNSA's efforts to identify, assess, and mitigate cyber security risks to specific nuclear weapons or manufacturing equipment are still in the early stages of development.
Nuclear weapons infrastructure modernization. NNSA plans to invest tens of billions of dollars in its decades-long effort to modernize the facilities and infrastructure needed to produce nuclear weapons. To achieve its modernization goals, NNSA must integrate 8 key programs and 16 related projects managed by separate offices within the agency. But NNSA doesn't follow certain best practices to ensure this integration occurs—specifically for schedules and cost estimates. For example, NNSA’s new facilities often exceeded their cost and schedule estimates.