Defense Navigation Capabilities: DOD is Developing Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Technologies to Complement GPS

Increase Collaboration

Policymakers could consider mechanisms to coordinate across DOD to clarify responsibilities and authorities in prioritizing the need for alternative PNT technologies.

• Increased coordination could allow the military services to leverage one another’s research and development activities.

• Prioritization of alternative PNT could increase the technology’s visibility, allowing more programs and platforms within DOD to better understand available technologies.

• PNT solutions for a particular mission or platform may still need significant customization, possibly offsetting the benefits from centralized coordination.

• Current mechanisms, such as the PNT Oversight Council, may not have the capacity to take on alternative PNT coordination.

Focus on Resiliency

Policymakers could consider selecting the most resilient technologies as the cornerstone of the PNT suite for military missions, rather than defaulting to GPS.

• By focusing on resiliency, technologies that add to resilient PNT could receive higher priority for development, even if they are not full replacements for GPS.

• A PNT solution will likely need multiple technologies to meet full PNT requirements, because no single alternative PNT technology is currently able to provide all of the required information.

• DOD will need to continue maintaining GPS, as it will remain a part of the PNT solution.

Clarify Requirements

Policymakers could consider opportunities for DOD to clarify what level of PNT performance is actually needed for missions, rather than defaulting to requirements that match GPS performance.

• With performance requirements that better reflect mission needs, DOD could make more informed decisions (such as savings in cost or integration time) in developing viable alternative technologies that will meet the actual mission needs, but not necessarily have GPS-level performance.

• GAO previously reported that creating requirements involves appropriately skilled personnel.

• Programs may still want GPS-level performance because more precise PNT information is always desired, even when it goes beyond what is needed to complete a specific mission.

Coordinate with Industry

Policymakers could consider ensuring that DOD and commercial industry coordinate so industry is prepared to meet DOD’s needs, and DOD can leverage industry advances.

• DOD clearly communicating its needs to industry could allow industry to be better positioned to meet those needs.

• Industry may have alternative PNT technologies that could be applied to defense.

• Commercial industry may not be incentivized to develop and manufacture alternative PNT technologies if the market is too small.

• A lack of transparency into proprietary commercial technology may mask vulnerabilities of different PNT technologies.

Institutionalize Open Architecture

Policymakers could consider making the open architecture initiative more permanent, including providing funding.

• With appropriate resources, DOD’s open architecture initiative has the potential to greatly reduce integration costs and time for all PNT technologies.

• Open architecture could keep DOD ahead of evolving threats to PNT, as it would be easier to field new alternative PNT technologies.

• The open architecture initiative will need buy-in across the military services, as well as with commercial industry partners, which may be difficult to achieve.

• Once implemented, the open architecture initiative could need continued resources and governance, as the architecture will likely evolve.

Analyze Vulnerabilities

Policymakers could consider having DOD conduct ongoing analysis of vulnerabilities of different PNT systems.

• Given that a future solution will likely require a PNT system comprised of a combination of different technologies, users could be better informed about each combination’s overall vulnerabilities.

• Users could better match PNT solutions to the mission and threat.

• The complexity of having a unique PNT system for each mission and platform could make this analysis difficult.

• If DOD relies more on alternative PNT, the threats will evolve in response to that strategy, which may mean the vulnerability analysis needs to be updated regularly.