China: Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data
Fast Facts
A third of foreign graduate students studying STEM at U.S. universities are Chinese nationals—some with access to sensitive research.
U.S. agencies have identified several factors indicating the types of students—such as being from a country of concern like China—who may pose a greater risk of transferring technology to foreign entities. Immigration and Customs Enforcement keeps a database related to these factors but hasn't assessed if it needs updating to capture additional data related to these risks. Also, some ICE data that may indicate students' access to technology is incomplete.
Our recommendations address these issues.
Highlights
What GAO Found
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has incomplete data that may indicate whether foreign students and scholars pose risks for transferring technology from U.S. universities to foreign entities. ICE's foreign student and scholar database contains data on the number of graduate students from countries of concern for technology transfer, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC). Graduate students studying in a science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) field have also been identified as more likely to be involved in sensitive research (see fig.). However, ICE has not established milestones to complete a required assessment of whether it needs to modify its database to collect additional data related to some risk factors, in part because it has focused available resources on other priorities. Further, information related to students' employment in the U.S., which may indicate whether they have access to technology, is incomplete. Completing the assessment and improving student employment data could strengthen U.S. government efforts to identify and assess technology transfer risk.
Foreign Graduate Students Studying Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math Fields at U.S. Universities, 2016–2020
To safeguard university research from transfer for the benefit of the PRC and other countries, U.S. agencies that fund research increased investigations of researchers for fraud and failures to disclose potential sources of foreign influence, according to agency data. These investigations have resulted in the removal of individuals from research positions because of undisclosed affiliations, such as receiving funding from a PRC-affiliated institution. While agency officials acknowledged concerns related to racial bias in their investigations involving China, they emphasized that no decisions are based on individual characteristics such as nationality or visa status. Officials also noted that the subjects of investigations were more likely to be permanent university employees than visiting foreign students and scholars.
This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2022. Information on the results of the Department of State's process for adjudicating visa applications for students and scholars who may pose a risk of transferring university research, the PRC's talent recruitment and scholarship programs, ICE enforcement efforts, and detailed investigations data that State, ICE, and the Department of Defense deemed sensitive has been omitted from this report.
Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billions of dollars each year on research conducted at U.S. universities. Foreign students and scholars contribute to this research. For example, about 723,000 Chinese nationals participated in graduate-level STEM programs from 2016 through 2020. Recent reports have noted the importance of, and challenges in, combating undue foreign influence, particularly from the PRC, while maintaining an open research environment.
GAO was asked to review agency efforts to counter PRC attempts to transfer federally funded research from U.S. universities. This report (1) assesses the extent to which agencies have identified and collected data related to characteristics of foreign students and scholars in the United States that may indicate risk of transferring university technology and (2) describes selected agency efforts to counter such transfers for the benefit of PRC-affiliated entities. For 2016 through 2020, the most recent years for which data were available, GAO analyzed ICE and State data and investigations information from the five agencies that provide the most federal funding for university research. GAO also reviewed relevant policies and interviewed agency officials.
Recommendations
GAO is making two recommendations to ICE to establish milestones for a required assessment and improve data related to factors that may indicate risk of technology transfer. ICE concurred with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement | The Director of ICE should establish milestones for completing the assessment required by NSPM-33 section 4(d)(ii). (Recommendation 1) |
In November 2022, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had incomplete data that may indicate whether foreign students and scholars pose risks for transferring technology from U.S. universities to foreign entities. GAO reported that ICE's foreign student and scholar database contained data on, among other things, the number of graduate students from countries of concern for technology transfer, such as the People's Republic of China. GAO also reported that National Security Presidential Memorandum 33: U.S. Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy (NSPM-33) required DHS to assess whether certain changes to its database were needed to collect specific categories of information outlined in the memorandum, such as employment and employment history and sources of financial support, among other categories. However, we found that ICE had not completed the assessment or established milestones to do so. GAO recommended that the Director of ICE establish milestones for completing the assessment required by NSPM-33 section 4(d)(ii). n its official comments on the report, DHS concurred with this recommendation and noted that ICE planned to work with the Department of State to address any challenges to collecting the information in its Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) described in NSPM-33 and to establish the milestones for completing the assessment. In November 2023, ICE provided GAO with the milestones it established to complete the assessment required by NSPM-33 section 4(d)(ii) as well as its assessment of all of the data points referenced in the memorandum. The ICE assessment document outlines the laws and documents ICE reviewed; entities, including the Department of State, with whom ICE met; and an assessment of all data points referenced in section 4(d)(i) of NSPM-33. Specifically, ICE's assessment states that five of the seven data points are currently collected and reported in SEVIS, and the other two data points could not be collected without a new regulation. The assessment also outlines options, such as working with other U.S. government entities, for collecting data not currently collected in SEVIS, such as on students' prior education and research affiliation. In assessing these data points, ICE has contributed to U.S. government efforts to identify and assess risks to U.S. research and development, specifically through the development of more complete data and a better understanding of information needed to identify students who present the highest risk for the potential transfer of university research.
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| United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement | The Director of ICE should take steps to improve employer information in SEVIS or otherwise update the records of foreign students approved for OPT as appropriate. (Recommendation 2) |
In November 2022, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has incomplete data that may indicate whether foreign students and scholars pose risks for transferring technology from U.S. universities to foreign entities. GAO reported that ICE's foreign student and scholar database-the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)-contained data on, among other things, the number of graduate students from countries of concern for technology transfer, such as the People's Republic of China. However, GAO found that information related to students' employment in the U.S.-particularly those participating in the optional practical training program (OPT), which provides temporary employment related to students' area of study-is incomplete in the database. Such employment data may indicate which students have access to technology and therefore aid efforts to assess technology transfer risk. GAO recommended that the Director of ICE should take steps to improve employer information in SEVIS or otherwise update the records of foreign students approved for OPT as appropriate. DHS concurred with this recommendation. During our review and in its comments on our report, ICE outlined steps it could take to improve employer data in SEVIS for students participating in OPT. These steps included, among other things, sending letters to students notifying them of missing data. In July 2023 ICE reported that in February 2023, following issuance of our report, it sent out 1,291 letters to employed students participating in OPT who had failed to report employer information. ICE noted that, as a result of this effort, 593 students submitted updates and another 188 inquired about how to update their records. ICE noted that it would continue to send out such letters to relevant students to ensure the employer information in SEVIS was updated regularly and significantly improved. ICE also described plans to update SEVIS to include a drop-down menu for employer information intended to reduce data input errors. The steps ICE has undertaken to improve employer information in SEVIS should enhance U.S. government efforts to develop more complete data and better understand which students present the highest risk for the potential transfer of university research.
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